LD-93-092, Forwards Evaluation of Sys 80+ Std Design Interfacing Sys LOCA Challenges, Special Rept.Improvements Identified to Sys 80+ Design as Result of Evaluation Listed.Sys 80+ Design W/Improvements Stated in Rept Complies w/SECY-90-016

From kanterella
(Redirected from ML20045C486)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Evaluation of Sys 80+ Std Design Interfacing Sys LOCA Challenges, Special Rept.Improvements Identified to Sys 80+ Design as Result of Evaluation Listed.Sys 80+ Design W/Improvements Stated in Rept Complies w/SECY-90-016
ML20045C486
Person / Time
Site: 05200002
Issue date: 06/15/1993
From: Brinkman C
ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20045C487 List:
References
LD-93-092, LD-93-92, NUDOCS 9306230181
Download: ML20045C486 (2)


Text

.

... ~

ABB s

ASEA BROWN BOVERl June 15, 1993 LD-93-092 Docket No,52-002 i

l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Vashington,-DC 20555

Subject:

System 80+5 Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accident (ISLOCA)

Dear Sirs:

r Attached is the ABB-CE report presenting the evaluation of the System 80+ design in response to ISLOCA events.

There were some improvements identified to the 1

System 80+ design as a result of this evaluation. The improvements to the System 80+ design include:

3j ll' 1.

Increasing the design pressure of some equipment and some systems, 2.

Adding equipment and instrumentation which terminate and limit the scope of-an ISLOCA, and 3,

Changing system interface' locations.

The System 80+ design with the improvements stated in the' report complies with,

[

~

the SECY-90-016 recommendations.

The evaluation was conducted by. ' defining an ISLOCA as an event, which occurs outside containment in a system connected to the t

RCS and results in a loss of primary system inventory. The event is assumed to l

be caused by the inadvertent opening of RC's isolation valves or the failure to close of RCS isolation check valves. This assumption was made because various studies have indicated that the more likely ISLOCA precursors would be initiated

{

by human errors or procedural deficiencies.

The acceptance criteria were established to demonstrate that:

1.

The system retains its structural integrity throughout the event, 2.

Any leakage caused by the event would be limited tio the makeup system capabilities, and 3.

Offsite doses are limited to a small fraction of those in 10 CFR100.

t 210050 ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power i

y Comtniskm Engdeenng Irt.

1000 Pro!4cct H a Road Temphone (203) 66fM 911 f-l'

/)]

T*"J Post Offee Don 503 Fas (2c3) 285 9512 9306230181-930615 wg wnosw. connecteur o6095.e500.

Teiew 93297 cOMBEf4 WSOR PDR ADOCK 05200002 pq l

A.

PDR g

i

3 In conclusion, the design pressure for systems interfacing with the RCS was generally shown to be at least 40% of normal RCS operating pressure.

Where it was impractical to increase the design of the interfacing systems, a

justification for - alternate solutions was made.

The justification included complexity issues, use of first of a kind systems, hardware and installation, and the need for additional unproven systems.

Should you have any questions on the enclosed material, please contact me or Mr.

S. Ritterbusch of my staff at (203) 285-5206.

Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.

W C.B. Brinkman Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing I

f 1

Enclosures:

As Stated xc:

J. Trotter (EPRI)

M. Franovich (NRC)

T. Wambach (NRC)

MTC:Imk

- -.