ML20040A505

Rept on Equipment Survivability in Support of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Hydrogen Igniter Sys.

ML20040A505
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	01/19/1982
From:	MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
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ML20040A504	List: ML20040A503 ML20040A505
References
NUDOCS 8201210193
Download: ML20040A505 (52)

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Report on Equipment Survivability in Support of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Hydrogen Igniter System l

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Table of Contents Section Page I t

i 1.0 Introduction 1-1 i F

2.0 Analytical Technique 2-1 l l

4 3.0 Evaluaticn Easis 3-1 I, 4.0 Modelling of Hydrogen Burns I 4.1 Wetwell Burn Cases 4-1

• 4.2 Forced Clobal Burns 4-1  !

i 5.0 Modelling of Equipment 5-1 i i

t 6.0 Equipment Evaluated i 6.1 Criteria for Equipment Selection 6-1 6.2 Summary Equipment List {

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7.0 Equipment 7.1 Containment Locks and Hatches 7-1

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7.2 Containment Isolation Valves l 7-1  ;

7.3 Containment Electrical Penetrations 7-2 l 7.4 Igniter Assembly 7-2  !

7.5 Pressure Transmitters and Switches 7-3 7.6 Thermocouples 7-4 I 7.7 Radiation Detectors

' 7-4 l 7.8 Drywell Purge Compressor 7-5 [

7.9 Drywell Vacuum Breakers 7-5 7.10 Hydrogen Recombiners {

l 7-5 j 7.11 Motor Actuators 7-6 j 7.12 Air Actuators 7-6 j l 7.13 Limit / Position Switch 7-7 7.14 Cables 7-8 i 7.15 Hydrogen Analyzers 7-8  !

7.16 Safety Relief Valves 7-8 l 7.17 Containment Sprays 7-9 7.18 Piping Penetrations 7-9 f

7.19 Main Steam Isolation Inboard Valve 7-10 i 8.0 Secondary Fires 8-1 9.0 Pressure Effects on Essential Equipment 9-1 I i

10.0 Sensitivity Studies 10-1 f

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! 11.0 Experimental Verification 11-1 12.0 Conclusions 12-1 i t

13.0 References 13-1  !

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3 t 1.0 Introduction The Hydrogen Igniter System (HIS) is designed to ignite hydrogen in the unlikely occurrence of an event which results in the generation of excessive quantities of hydrogen from a large metal-water reaction in the, reactor prensure vessel. This is accomplished by the burning of the hydrogen as it is releaced in the drywell or frop the suppression pool "

surface. Evaluations usfug the CLASIX-3 program show that, for hydrogen releases from a 15% metal-water reaction, the HIS will insure containment structural integrity. The CLASIX-3 analyses also show that the ignition of the hydrogen results in multiple very high temperature spikes, although these spikes are very short in duration. The effect of these multiple burn temperature spikes on essential equipment is quantified in this report. '

To perform this evaluation, a list of essential systems has been generated. These systems serve to either ignite the hydrogen and monitor the course of the accident, maintain the containment pressure boundary, or recover the core. Limiting components of these systems have been identified and serve as a basis for evaluation of system survivability.

The basis for, evaluation is the thermal response of the equipment. Each piece of equipment evaluated is subjected to both global burns and the more severe temperature environment of the wetwell, even if a system or component has been identified as being located well away from the wetwell region. This is done to both ensure a conservative evaluation i and to allow single evaluations to be applied to classes of equipment despite location. When evaluations are based on comparisons with other similar equipment, the comparisons are made with components which are at least as limiting with regard to thernal characteristics.

Models of equipment have been developed to maximize heat transfer to the limiting component. Sensitivity studies on modelling assumptions and material properties have been conducted to ensure adequacy of the results. The resultant temperature response of both the outside surface and of internal limiting components is reported.

To ensure a conservative thermal response, heat transfer from the burn environment to the modelled equipment is maximized. A comparison of the predicted resultant I

temperature response with an experimentally measured temperature response of an igniter assembly is provided as verification in Section 11.0 of this report.

• A piece of equipment is assumed to survive if:

1. The maximum external surface temperature response is below the equipment qualification temperature, or

2. The maximum internal temperature response of the limiting 1

component is below the equipment qualification temperature, or

) 3. The limiting component can be shown to maintain its post-accident function based on reported test data, t

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L Add.itionally, an evaluation of the potential for secondary fires is pro-

• vided in Section 8.0 of this report. This evaluation is based on the l thermal surface responses of cable and an oil reservoir.

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l 2.0 Analytical Technique Heat transfer to the evaluated components from burn environments was determined based on natural convection and radiation from an absorbing /

emitting, atmosphere.

Natural co'nvective heat transfer is calculated using the relation:

h = he (AT) he (Reference 2) where.

AT - temperature difference between the surface and the ambient atmosphere he and he - are, respectively, the coefficient and exponent for the natural convection term Radiativeheattransferfromtheburnenvironmentgotheequipmentis modelled utilizing the methods suggested by Hottel , where:

s+1 Q= cP(Eg Tatmos 4 - o< Tg surface 4) 2 0F Stefan Boltzmann Constant E, emissivity of the outside surface E o< are the emissivity and absorptivity of the steam / air E' E environment T, , , burn temperatures T, g, , box outside surface temperatures The values of emissivity and absorptivity utilized, insure an upper bound of radiative heat transport to the equipment. Sensitivity analyses varying relationships (turbulent, laminar) of natural convection and using forced convection based on the burn velocity of 6 fps are utilized to establish the adequacy of responses obtained. The overall conservativeness of this approach is verified by the results obtained in Section 11.0.

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3.0 Evaluation Basis The thermal response of essential equipment was evaluated based on CLASIX-3 predicted temperature environments for the " base case". The base case environment results from a stuck open relief valve (SORV), 8 v/o hydrogen, 85% hydrogen burn with one train of containment sprays operating and a 6 fps burn speed. The CLASIX-3 analysis predicts that, for the SORV hydrogen release senario, all hydrogen burning will take place in the wetwell. This results in comparatively mild environments elsewhere in the containment and drywell (see Figures 1 and 3). Except for the igniters, there is no other essential equipment located in the wetwell. However, for this evaluation, the wetwell temperature environment is used throughout the to determine the theraci response of evaluated equipment containment.

In addition the thermal response of equipment to 4 successive global, 8 v/o, 85% hydrogen burns is evaluated.

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l 4.0 Modelling of the Hydrogen Burns j i

l The temperature ef fects of repeated hydrogen burns on the equipment and itc components are calculated using a revised version of the HEATING-34 heat transf er program. The code has been modified to model the thermal response of the equipment to successive hydrogen burns. The modifications which arn incorporated to allow the code to simulate radiative heat transfer from and to an emitting / absorbing atmosphere are outlined in this section. The code has also been modified to use a time dependent function of atmospheric temperature.

This is used to simulate the successive hydrogen burns shown in Figures 2 and 7.

Two CLASIX-3 generated burn transients are utilized for the evaluation of equipment thermal response:

a. The temperature environment in the wetwell for the " base" case (case sal), and;

b. The temperature environment resulting from a forced global burn with CASE sal.

4.1 Wetwell Burn Cases The composite burn transient models 60 successive burns. Based on the fine detail of these burns, as indicated on Figure 2, enveloping burn profiles have been developed. The first 3 burns are modelled with a 1000 F ptak.

The temperature exponentially decays back down to 120 F in 13 seconds.

There are 130 seconds (peak to peak) between these burns. At 655 seconds af ter the beginning of the first burn, (which occurs at approximately 4850 seconds) a set of 12 sequential burns occur. The peak temperature of this second set of burns is modelled as 800 F with the temperature exponentially decaying to 150 F in 18 seconds. There are 39 seconds (peak to peak) between each of these burns. At 1255 seconds from the beginning of the first burn, the remaining 45 burns are modelled. These burns have a modelled peak temperature of 850 F with 36 seconds between each burn. These 45 burns each exponentially decay down to 180 F in 13 seconds. All 60 burns take 2 seconds to reach their peak temperatures.

4.2 Forced Global Burns The thermal response of essential equipment to postulated multit le global burns has been evaluated. To provide a basis for this evaluation, a CLASIX-3 generated temperature profile of a forced containment burn in CASE sal was utilized. The containment temperature profile which was modelled to envelop this global burn peaks at 800 F in 11 seconds and then exponentially decays back down to 200 F in the subsequent 29 seconds. The ddtails of the temperature spike resulting from a single, global burn are shown in Figure 7. This burn i profile is repeated again at 1000,1570, and 2170 seconds af ter the beginning I of the first global burn.

Plots, of equipment thermal response to the above burn transients are provided from the time of the first burn.

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5.0 Modelling of Equipment For each piece of equipment analyzed, an appropriate HEATING-3 model was '

constructed. These models, besides considering heat transfer from the burn environment through the component, also considered radiative and ,

convective heat transfer across air spaces. In these models, best estimate thermal properties were utilized; however, the geometry wss chosen to maximize the thermal response of the limiting component. This was done, for example, by both using the minimum thickness of an enclosure and also the minimum distance from the burn environment to the limiting component. The level of detail developed for each model was dependent on the geometry of component, material makeup, symmetry of the component, and boundary conditions. Sensitivity studies were performed to justify the appropriateness of the modelling assumptions.

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. i 6.0 Equipment Evaluated 6.1 Criteria for Equipment Selection For the evaluation of equipment survivability, basically four criteria were used te establish the essential equipment list provided in Section 6.2. These are:

1. Systems which must function to mitigate the consequences of the event;

2. Equipment which must maintain the containment pressure boundary;

3. Systems which may be necessary to recover the core;

4. Systems whose function may be required to monitor the course of the event.

1 6.2 Summary Equipment List The following is a list of systems and equipment which may be required to function af ter a hydrogen burn and which were included in the equipment survivability program:

1. Containment isolation valves, penetrations, locks and hatches

2. Hydrogen igniter system

3. Hydrogen recombiners, drywell purge compressors and drywell vacuum breakers

4. Containment spray (CS) system

5. Safety relief valves

6. LPCS, LPCI and RHR systems

7. Reactor level and pressure instruments

8. Hydrogen analyzers

9. Containment pressure and high-range radiation instruments

10. Containment and suppression pool temperature instruments

11. Contair. ment and drywell pressure instruments

12. Associated instruments and controls

13. Associated power and control cables

14. Limit / position indication switches

15. Main steam inboard isolation valves 6-1 i

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s 7.0 Equipment 7.1 Containment Locks and Hatches Containment locks and hatches provide an essential containment boundary and their integrity must be maintained. A personnel hatch 1 is represenative of all locks and hatches. Personnel locks are located both in the containment and wetwell region.

, Personnel locks, like other hatches, consist of a steel cylinder

which fits in the containment opening with sealed doors on each i end. The cylinder is typically 3 inches thick with equally heavy l doors on each end. To maintain the containment pressure boundary, the doors are sealed with inflatable seals (See Figure 8). These seals, similar to those in other hatches, are made of an organic material and are more susceptable to the burn environment than the

steel doors and cylinder. All other equipment (cables, limit switches) associated with the operation of the hatch doors are sealed inside steel boxes or conduit and are thus protected from the containment environment, while the seals are exposed.

The seals were modelled in two dimensions and as being inflated (See Figure 9). The outside surface of the door was exposed to the containment environment, while inside the door, the environment remains at a constant temperature. The surface temperature of the inflatable seals adjacent to the burn environment peaked at 216*F for burn case 1 and at 187*F for burn case 2. These results are l presented in Figures 10 and 11. Sjncethequalification I temperature of the seals is 250*F , the containment locks and 1

hatches will survive the predicted hydrogen burn environment.

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l 7.2 Containment Isolation Valves l Containment isolation valves have, as part of their operating

! systems, limit switches, instrument cables, air actuators or motor

! actuators. These are all potentially limiting components. These control components were selected as limiting because the valve internals are well protected in a thick steel housing. Add ition-ally, these valve internals, unlike the control components, are typically designed to function in contact with high temperature /

pressure fluid conditions.

I Air and motor actuators have been evaluated and the results are reported in Sections 7.11 and 7.12. The limit switches and cables were evaluated and the results reported in Sections 7.13 and 7.14.

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7.3 Containment Electrical Penetrations Containment electrical penetrations allow electrical cable to penetrate the containment while maintaining the containment pressure boundary. All containment electrical penetrations are made up of a steel canister (which is an integral part of the con-taircont pressure boundary), cables, terminal blocks, and modular units. Each electrical penetration is shielded from the direct burr. environment by a rigid steel enclosure. The unprotected steel canister is made of stainless steel. The shell of the igniter assembly (Section 7.4) is made of similar material and thus has the same thermal properties. However, the sceel canister of the penetration is much thicker than the igniter assembly housing so the thermal capacity of the canister is greater. Therefore, the surface temperature would be lower than that reported for the igniter assembly. Similarly, since the modular units are made of the same material and also have thicher walls than the igniter assembly, these same conclusions apply. In addition, the terminal blocks and the cable insulation have similar thermal properties.

Because the terminal blocks are thicker than the cable insulation, the thermal capacity of the terminal blocks is greater. Therefore, the surface temperature is lower for the terminal blocks than for the cable insulation.

The terminal blocks are made of a phenolic material. Phenolics have been shown to withstand very high temperature and still retain flexural strength.

i inated phenolics have Survival been temperatures reported in theasliterature high as 9g0*F for lam-Fire testing has been performed by Westinghouse 6 to prove the thermal toughness of the modular units. In these tests, a propane torch was directly applied for 20 minutes to the surface of the sealant material. (The adiabatic flame temperature of propane is l

in excess of 3000*F). In this burn test, only the first half inch of sealant was burned out; and there was no evidence of degradation, such as cracks, beyond the area where the seal begins.

Medium voltage penetrations differ from the standard penetration by having a ceramic bushing and grounding lugs in addition to the com-ponents listed above. All of the materials used in the assembly (ceramic, metallic, Dow Corning 170A and B) are highly heat resistant.

The peak temperature response of the medium voltage penetrations exposed to the burn environment will be less than the maximum thermal response of instrument cables (surface temperature of 300*F). Consequently, the cable is also the limiting component for medium voltage penetrations.

Survivability of electric cable is discussed in Section 7.14.

7.4 Igniter Assembly All igniter assemblies in the Grand gulf containment are similar so that the model developed and the results obtained here are applicable for each assembly.

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The igniter assembly is an 8" x 8" x 6" stainless steel box with a removable access cover. It houses the transformer and terminal strip mounted on a stainless steel plate and also contains the associated wiring. The glow plug extends out through the front and is assumed to be insulated from the box by the glow plug mount. A spray shield extends over the front of the box to protect the glow plug from dripping water. The igniter assembly is modelled as mounted on a 1" thick carbon steel plate. The entire assembly and mounting is modelled as exposed to the burn environment. The assembly is shown in Figure 12.

A two-dim *ensional model of the igniter assembly was determined to be the minimum necessary to provide a representative temperature distribution inside the box. The side view of Figure 12 was used for the model. Instead of using a full scale two-dimensional model, the box model uses only the lower half of the box. This model, as shown in Figure 13 maximizes the thermal response of the assembly internals. Although the igniter assembly is not symmetrical about the mid-plane, symmetry was assumed using the smaller air gap distance to increase the heat transfer to the transformer. The upper y-side is insulated as there is no net heat flow across the mid-plane in a symmetrical model. During normal operation, the transformer generates approximately 25 watts of heat. This heat source has been included in the model. The transformer was taken as the limiting component. Terminal blocks are evaluated in Section 7.3 and cables have been evaluated in Section 7.14. The other components of the box will not be affected by the predicted hydrogen burn environment.

Figure 14 is the temperature response of the assembly to burn case

1. The maximum surface temperature for the igniter assembly was 246*r, while the transformer surface reached 210*F. In burn case 2, shown in Figure 15, the transformer surface reached 183*F and the exterior surface of the assembly reached a maximum temperature of 205*F. Sensitivity studies performed on the effect the hot glow plug would have on the igniter box thermal response showed that the glow plug did not need to be included in the model. The qualification temperature of the heat shrinktupfngusedonthe connection of the igniter power leads is 340*F All of the reported temperatures are well below the transformer qualification temperature of 400*F; consequently, the igniter assembly will survive the predicted hydrogen burn temperature transients.

7.5 Pressure Transmitters and Switches Pressure transmitters are located within the containment at elevation 135'. Pressure transmitters consist of the sensing element and the associated electronic circuitry. The electronics are taken as the limiting component since the rest of the transmitter is designed for a harsh steam environment. The

' electrical components are enclosed in a stainless steel housing.

This housing is modelled in Figure 43, 7-3

r Pressure switches are located in the wetwell region. They are all 1

metallic switches designed to operate in high pressure and temperature environments. A pressure switch was modelled as a thin walled cylinder filled with air (see Figure 46).

The results of burn cases 1 and 2 for the pressure transmitter are i

presented in Figures 44 and 45, respectively. The maximum surface temperatures of the electronics housing were 235*F for burn case 1 and 196*F for burn case 2. The results of testing conducted on a particular transmitter model indicate that it will perform its function during and pf ter exposure to a temperature of 303*F for 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />, at a minimum .

The venggr specified maximum long-term operating temperature is 200*F. Since all of the pressure transmitters evaluated are similar devices for qualification and since the peak temperatures experienced are very short in duration as shown in Figure 44, each of the essential pressure transmitters will survive the predicted hydrogen burn environment.

The pressure switch results are presented in Figures 47 and 48 for burn cases 1 and 2, respectively. The maximum surface temperatures of the switch were 254*F for burn case 1 and 198*F for burn case 2.

3 These teggeratures are well below the operating temperature range 4

of 600*F . Therefore, the pressure switch will survive the predicted burn environment.

7.6 Thermocouples

Thermocouples, though different in size and orientation, all have the same major components and perform the same function.

Thermocouples are generally composed of a slender probe and a terminal block sealed in a metal housing (See Figure 16). As discussed in Section 7.3, unenclosed terminal blocks will survive the predicted burn environment. Hence, the enclosed thermocouple terminal blocks will also survive the predicted burn environment.

Therefore, the limiting component for all thermocouples is the associated inst rumentation cable. Survivability of cable is discussed in Section 7.14.

7.7 Radiation Detectors i

The four in-containment area radiation detectors are used to monitor radiation levels in the containment during accident I conditions. These detectors are located high in containment (El.

208') and in the drywell, well away from the harsh environment of the wetwell region. The detector is a hermetically sealed, thin walled ionizction chamber made of metallic and ceramic materials

! (See Figure 17). The detector was modelled in onc dimension as a stainless steel cylinder filled with air because there are very few internal components to consider. Temperatures on the inside and outside surfaces of the housing are reported in Figures 18 and 19 for burn cases 1 and 2 respectively. The maximum outside surface l

temperature reached 264*F and 208'F, respectively for these cases.

These surface temperatures are well byow the qualification temperature which is in excess of 350*F , Thus, this equipment will survive the predicted hydrogen burn temperature environment.

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7.8 Drywall Purge Compressors The 2 drywell purge compressors are located in the containment at elevation 185'. The purge compressors are located well away from the harsh burn environment of the wetwell region. Since its main purpose is to purge the hydrogen produced in the drywell into the larger containment through the suppression pool, the compressor internals are essentially open to the atmosphere. The compressor, shown in Figure 20, consists of an oper tousing containing a drive-motor, assorted metallic parts and a lubrication system with an oil sump. The housing and assorted metallic parts will not be affected by the burns, so the limiting component is the drive motor. A smaller motor was analyzed in Section 7.11. The motor of the motor actuator analyzed is a more lititing case because the motor has a thinner housing wall, less air space inside and less heat capacity.

Thus, the smaller motor would tend to heat up faster and to a higher temperature than the larger one.

In order to investigate the possibility of secondary fires in the open oil sump, a one dimensional layer of lubrication oil was exposed to the predicted burn atmosphere (Figure 21). Figures 22 and 23 show the oil surface temperature for burn cases 1 and 2.

The maximum surface temperatures of the oil were 228'F at.d 216*F for burn cases 1 and 2, respectively. Sinc auto-ignition temperature of the lubricating oil is 485'F,g the the oil will not ignite when exposed to the burn atmosphere. For further discussion, see Section 8.0. Based on this and reported results in Section 7.11, the purge compressor will survive the predicted burn environment.

7.9 Drywell Vacuum Breakers The limiting component of the drywell vacuum breakers was chosen as '

the limit switch. Survivability of limit switches is discussed in Section 7.13.

7.10 Hydrogen Recombiners The function of the hydrogen recombiners is to maintain the hydrogen concentration in the containment and drywell below 4 v/o.

The recombiners would not be effective in controlling the hydrogen released from a 75% metal-water reaction of all active cladding.  ;

Their role in this type of accident would be strictly secondary.

However, since long term hydrogen control may be necessary for significantly lower hydrogen releases, they are evaluated here.

Hydrogen recombiners are located high in the containment at elevation 208', well away from the severe burn environment of the wetwell. Because of their high operating temperature, they are made of highly heat resistant materials. The electric cable used to power the recombiners was considered the limiting component. -

Survivability of cable is evaluated in Section 7.14. Hence, the hydrogen recombiners will survive the predicted hydrogen burn environment.

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7.11 Motor Actuators Motor actuators have two main parts that enclose the valve stem.

One housing encloses the motor that drives the actuator and the other housing encloses the switchgear and other associated electrical components (see Figure 24). Because the motor and switchgear are enclosed in separate housings, both were modelled and exposed to the burn environments, j

The motor evaluated is typical of all AC motors associated with essential equipment. As shown in Figure 25, the top left quadrant of the motor is represented. This allowed all the major components to be included in the mcdel. As the motor is symmetric and hence there is no net heat ficw across the mid-plane, the r = o plane is insulated. The motor was modelled in R-Z coordinates because of the cylindrical shape of the motor.

Figures 26 and 27 provide the outside and coil surface temperatures vs. time for burn cases 1 and 2. The maximum outside surface temperature for burn case 1 was 184*F while the internal coils

• reached 178*F. For burn case 2, the maximum surface temperature reached 168'F and the coil temperature reached 162*F.

The actuator switchgear is composed of metallic (steel) and non-metallic (Bakelite) parts. The actual switchgear is complex and hence a simplified heat transfer model is required. The model developed, as shown in Figure 25, consists of the switchgear housing and a block of steel and Bakelite side by side. The non-metallic surface is separated from the housing by an air gap.

Two sides of the model are insulated because the model is symmetric. The distances from the exposed surfaces to the modelled internals are minimized in order to maximize their thermal response. Consistent with the shape of the switchgear assembly, rectangular coordinates were used.

Three temperatures are reported for each burn case: the outside surface temperature, the surface temperature of the metallic region, and the surface temperature of the non-metallic region. '

For burn case 1, these maximum temperatures are 208*F, l'R*F and

• 148*F, respectively. For burn case 2, the same points . e at 182*F, 144*F and 140*F. The plots of temperature vs. time are presented in Figures 28 and 29. The temperature response of the limiting components in either case, coils for the motor or internal surfaces of the switchpgar, were well below their qualification temperature of 200*F Thus, the motor actuators will survive the predicted hydrogen burn environment.

7.12 Air Actuators Air actuators, used for opening air operated valves, have several major components. These include a junction box, 2 limit switches, several filters and a solenoid valve. All of these components are I protected by their own housing. The two most exposed components  ;

l are the limit switches and the solenoid valve. Limit switches are '

discussed in Section 7.13. The solenoid valve is evaluated as the limiting component.

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The valve is cylindrical in shape, thus R-Z coordinates were used.

The lower Icft hand quandrant was modelled because the valve is 4

symmetric about the R and Z axes (see Figure 30). This view also l allows all the major components to be rep esented in the model. L The two inside surfaces were insulated, because there is no net i heat flow across the midplane of a symmetrJc model. Temperatures ,

are reported for the outside surface and the coil surface in  :

Figures 31 and 32. For burn case 1, the maximum housing l temperature reached 255"F and the coil temperature reached 251*F.  !

For the less severe burn case 2, the maximum housing and coil I temperatures reached 210*F and 203*F respectively. For the i solenoid, the maximum temperature gached was well below the qualification temperature of 330*F . Based on this and the results reported in Section 7.13, the air actuators will survive the predicted burn environment.

7.13 Limit / Position Indication Switch +

t Limit switches are used on isolation valves, vacuum breakers, air actuators, and motor operators and are required to function for the .

equipment to operate properly. Limit switches, as shown in Figure {

33, include contact strips, springs, levers, gaskets, rollers and housing. Almost all of the internals are metallic with the ,

exception of the contact block assemblies and the gaskets. The I contact block assemblies are made of an asbestos filled phenolic while the gaskets are made of either silicone rubber or nitrile >

butadiene rubber. Since the contact block assembly material can l withstand the predicted high temperatures (see Section 7.3), the

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scaling gasket is evaluated as the limiting component. l t

The limit switch is modelled from the side view as shown in Figure I

34. Only the bottom half of the switch was modelled and the internals were simplified. The upper y-side of the model is insulated to account for model symmetry. The back of the switch l was also insulated to account for the assembly mounting. The rubber seals and air gap are also modelled to minimize the internal

' thermal response.

The outside surface temperature, contact block assembly temperature and the temperature of the rubber gaskets are given in Figures 35 and 36. In burn case 1, the outside and gasket temperatures peaked at 212*F while burn case 2 showed a maximum of 187'F for the surface and gasket. The resultant temperature of the gasket is well glow the qualification temperature which is in excess of 300*F . Based on these results, the switch will survive the predicted hydrogen burn environment.

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7.14 Cables Instrument cable is generally the smallest type of cable found in power plants.

Since these cables have the thinnest insulation and the smallest diameter they will have the greatest thermal response to the burn environments. The thermal response of several cables from different manufacturers were evaluated and the cable with the most limiting thermal response has been reperted. All cables consist of a stranded copper conductor surrounded by insulation and a jacket. (See Figure 37).

The thermal responses of cable protected by conduit and exposed to the burn environment directly were evaluated. The conduit modelled is the thinnest type available for power plant use (1/8" thick).

The one dimensional model of the cable, with and without conduit, is shown in Figure 37. Sin ce the cable is symmetric, a one-dimensional model is appropriate. The materials used for the insulation and jacket are typical of all electric cable and the results obtained in this evaluation are bounding for other cables.

The results of burn cases 1 and 2 are presented in Figures 38 and

39. For cable without conduit, the maximum exterior surface temperature reached 300*F, while the maximum conductor temperature reached 275'F for burn case 1. For burn case 2, the maximum surface temperature was 265'F and the conductor surface temperature peaked at 235*F. The cable temperatures obtained when conduit was used are lover, as expected. Since all safety-related cable in containment is routed in cable trays or conduit, the case reported is an upper bound evaluation of the cable temperature response.

Cable in contact with the conduit was also evaluated. The peak temperatures obtained were 30*F lower than the case. The qualification temperature for the cable totally expgsed is 320*F ; and the bounding, exposed case yielded lower temperatures. Therefore, the cables will survive the predicted hydrogen burn environment.

7.15 Hydrogen Analyzers The portion of thiu system located inside the containment consists of an enclosed, insulated metal sampling tube with a heat trace running along its length. The insulation completely surrounds the sampling tube and heat trace. The insulation will protect the samplingtubefromtheburneg3ironment; and, as the insulation has a temperature limit of 1200*F , the hydrogen sampling system will survive the predicted burn environment.

7.16 Safety Relief Valves The safety relief valves (SRVs) are attached to the main steam lines and are designed to operate under harsh environmental con-ditions. The SRVs are located in the drywell, well away from the wetwell and containment hydrogen burn environment. However, the thermal response of the SRVs to the wetwell environment was evaluated. As shown in Figure 40, the valve and operator can be divided into three components; the valve, the solenoid and the air cylinder.

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As the valve housing is thick metal and designed to operate in direct contact with steam at operating system temperatures, it will not be affected by the hydrogen burn environment. The solenoid used in this valve is much larger than the one analyzed in Section 7.12. Also, the solenoid on the valve is enclosed, while the one analyzed in Section 7.12 is exposed directly to the burn environment. Therefore, it can be concluded that the solenoid results presented in Section 7.12 bound this case.

The cables used to power the valve are much larger than those analyzed in Section 7.14 and will sur- tve the burn transient based on the results presented in Section 7.14. Limit switches present in the valve are similar to but larger than the ones evaluated in Section 7.13. The valve limit switches are completely enclosed, while those evaluated are not. Therefore, the results of Section 7.13 bound this case. To complete the evaluation, the thermal response of the air cylinder to the burn environment was evaluated.

The air cylinder is modelled, consistent with its geometry, as a one dimensional, thin walled cylinder (see Figure 40). The external temperatures of the air cylinder are reported in Figures 41 and 42.

The peak external temperatures reached were 184*F and 163*F for burn cases 1 and 2, respectively. These peak temperatures arg gell below the qualification temperature for the valves of 349*F .

Hence, the safety relief valves will survive the predicted hydrogen burn environment.

7.17 Containment Sprays Motor operated valves, piping and pumps make up the containment spray system. The pumps are located outside of the containment and will not be affected by the burn environment. The associated piping and spray nozzles located inside the containment will not be affected by the, burn environment. Valves and actuators have been evaluated in Sections 7.2 and 7.11. Based on these evaluations, the containment spray system will survive the predicted hydrogen burn environment.

7.18 Piping Penetrations There are two types of piping penetrations, flat plate and flued head. Both types of penetrations are an integral part of the con-tainment boundary and are made of carbon steel at least as thick as the process pipe itself. Since all parts of the penetrations are carbon steel, they will not be affected by the predicted burn environment.

7-9

i 7.19 Main Steam Isolation Inboard Valves These isolation valves are located in the drywell and are outside the wetwell burn environment. The valve consists of the valve l internals and housing and an air actuator with solenoids and limit switches. The valve is designed to operate in direct contact with ,

steam at high system operating temperatures. The valve housing is '

made of stainless steel which is similar material to that used for the igniter assembly and thus has similar thermal properties.

Since the valve housing is much thicker than the igniter assembly i housing the thermal capacity of the valve is greater than that of the igniter assembly. Because of these thermal characteristics, and the fact that the valve will be in a much less harsh environment (i.e., the drywell) compared to the predicted environment for the igniter assembly (i.e. , the wetwell), it is concluded that the surface temperatures for the valve will be much less than those of the igniter assembly. The air actuator is similar to, but much larger than the one analyzed in Section 7.12.

Therefore, the solenoid results presented in Section 7.12 also apply to this case. Limit switches are analyzed in Section 7.13.

The limit switches and solenoids evaluated in the other sections were exposed directly to the predicted burn environment, while the ones on these particular valves are completely enclosed. Based on this evaluation, the isolation valve will survive the predicted hydrogen burn environment.

I k

7-10 ,

8.0 Sec_ondary Fires To evaluate the potential for secondary fires, the maximum surface temperatyres of an exposed oil reservoir, exposed cables and cables in conduit, were evaluated. The thermal responses of these components to the'vetwell and global containment burn environments show that no ignition will result. The maximum cable sur .ce temperature does not exceeg4300*F. The ignition temperature of exposed cable is in excess of 600*F . The maximum oil surface temperature does not exceed 300*F.

The ignition temperature of lubricating oil is in excess of 480*F .

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9.0 Pressure Effects on Essential Equipment For the SORV scenario, with the operation of HIS in the wetwell, containment pressures do not exceed 10 psig as shown on Figure 6. Since the Grand Gulf NUREG-0588 pressure environments of 15 psig containment and 30 psig drywell envelop the peak hydrogen burn pressures (see Figures 4, 5, 6), the effects of pressure on essential equipment, due to operation of the HIS, is not a concern.

It should be noted that the base case reported in Reference 17 does show a pressure spike of 24 psig in containment at the end of the scenario.

This spike was the result of an artificially induced burn in the containment. Although the hydrogen concentration had not reached the burn criteria, this burn was initiated to demonstrate that the containment capacity would not be exceeded even if the hydrogen remaining in the containment were burned. Since this containment burn was artifically induced to determine containment response and would not occur for the specific original burn parameters established for the base case, the effects of the resulting pressure spike on essential equipment surviability was not evaluated.

l 9-1

10.0 Sensitivity Studies Tu assure that the reported thermal response of equipment is adequately representative of the actual equipment thermal response, several sensitivity studies have been conducted.

following: These studies invcive the a.

Calculational time steps and thermal mesh spacings were varied to assure that a convergent solution is obtained.

b.

Various modes of convective heat transfer were modelled to determine their impact on the analytical results. Both turbulent and laminar natural convection correlations, as well as forced convection, were utilized, c.

Thermal conductivity and emissivity were varied over their expected range of values, d.

Various geometrical representations were modelled, and their effects on the temperature responses were determined.

The results.of these studies showed that the analytical response was well represented, as the results did not vary significantly. Hence, along with the experimental verification discussed in Section 12.0, the reported equipment responses are bounding.

10-1

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I 11.0 Experimental Verification I

To provide verification of the adequacy and conservativeness of the j methodology used for analyzing the thermal response of essential j quipment, i compatison with experimental results has been performed.

! The experimental results used are from the Fenwal test Phase 2, l Part 2 Test 3 (Reference 15). The test results provided a good evaluation

! basis since environmental temperature, pressure and the igniter assembly l surface temperature-time histories were reported. To perform the 1

verification, a two-dimensional heat transfer model of the McGuire

! igniter assembly was constructed. The basis for developing this model

) is identical to that applied for the essential equipment discussed in Section 7.0. The Fenwal test burn environment was curve fit and

' applied in the transient thermal analysis, to detenmine the thermal response of the igniter assembly.

A two-dimensional model of the igniter assembly, as shown in Figure 49 was l developed for this analysis. The transformer was considered to be made entirely of copper with no internal heat generation. The glow plug and wiring were not considered in the model. The exterior

surface of the igniter assembly was modelled as a mounted 8" x 8"

stainless steel box with a wall thickness of 1/8".

1 For this evaluation the exterior surface of the McGuire igniter asembly was exposed to two different exterior air temperature profiles and the thermal response of the assembly was determined. The first profile is the thermocouple-determined air temperature reported in the Fenwal tests and shown in Figure 50. However, due to the response time associated with j thermocouples, a second air temperature profile was used. This profile l was based on the actual pressure profile obtained (Figure 51) and took into consideration the temperature spikes that would be reported in a CLASIX analysis. This profile, modelled in Figure 52, is considered t6 be a best estimate of the actual air.

4

When the thermocouple determined air temperatures are used, the analytical j temperatures predict assembly surface temperatures within 3*F of the

maximum reported experimental surface temperatures. When using best estimate

! sir temperatures, the analytical results conservatively over redict the experimental results as shown on Figure 53. These conservative results are j expected since an upper bound on the environmental emissivity is used in the analytical methodology. The consideration of transformer heat generation in the analysis would add even more conservatism to the analytical comparison i of the predicted temperature response.

I Since the methodology used for this experimental verification is also used

, in the survivability analysis of essential equipment, it can be concluded that the results for the essential equipment will also be conservative.

I 11-1

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l l

12.0 Conclusions I

)

As part of the program to demonstrate the viability of glow plug igniters as a hydrogen control system for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, an equipment survivability study has been completed. The objective of the study was to verify that equipment identified as having an e'ssential role in recovering from a degraded core event would not be rendered inoperable by the hydrogen igniter system. The results of the study show that all equipment identified as essential will survive the predicted burn environment.

In fact, in all cases, considerable margin exists between the calculated equipment temperatures and the temperatures at which equipment operation would be threatened. A summary of the results of the study is provided in Table 1 In addition to the margin noted between the calculated temperatures and the survival temperatures, a number of other factors and conservatisms should be considered in evaluating the conclusions of this report.

i Among the conservative factors which can be explicitly identified, the f ollowing are the most significant:

1

1. Although the equipment is located throughout the containment, all analyses were performed assuming exposure directly to the wetwell j

environment. This assumption eliminates the need for justifying models of equipment located near or outside the wetwell region.

2. The assumed burn profiles for the wetwell burn are more conserva-tive than the global burn profiles for equipment survivability.

The magnitude of the temperature spike is higher and the total number of spikes is much greater. To verify this conclusion, all analyses were performed assuming exposure to both a wetwell and a global burn environment. In all cases, the wetwell burn profiles resulted in equipment surface temperatures that were higher by 20*F to 60*F.

3. The models used in all heat transfer analyses were conservatively

constructed. In particular, geometry considerations were often

simplified to allow credit for symmetry in the model. For example, in numerous cases, air gaps of varying thicknesses are found inside equipment. To simplify these models, minimum air gaps were used, 1

thus maximizing heat transfer across the gaps to the critical components. In other cases, insulated surfaces were ignored if it

.I maximized heat transfer to critical components. In addition, all exposed surfaces of the equipment were assumed to be completely immersed in the burn environment. Secondly, numerous sensitivity studies were completed to support the conclusions of this report.

As noted in Section 10.0, these studies included the physical parameters, the computer models and the heat transfer mechanisms.

The results of these studies demonstrate that the conclusions reached are not sensitive to the individual parameters defined in the study, varied over their expected range of values. Finally, despite these assurances that the methods used are conservative, a comparison with experimental data was also conducted. (See Section 11.0) These comparisons demonstrate that the methods used in the study will over-estimate the thermal response of the

, equipment.

12-1 t

His study, therefore, justifies the conclusion that the proposed hydrogen control systen will not jeopardize the ability of the plant to recover from a degraded core event. h is conclusion is based on shalyses using conservative methods and results which have signi-ficant margins when compared to maximum allowable temperatures, k

4 i 12-2 I

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13.0 References

1. Letter AECM-81/336, Mississippi Power and Light Company, dated August 31, 1981.

2. Chagman, A. J., " Heat Transfer", 2nd Edition, 1967.

3. Hottel, H.C. and Egbert, R.B., " Radiant Heat Transmission from Water Vapor", AIChE Trans., Vol. 38, 1942.

4. " HEATING 3 - A UNIVAC 1110 Heat Conduction Program," ORNL-TM-3208, W.D. Turner and Simantov, February 1971.

5. Certificate of Conformance for Rubber Parts, Presray Co., Pawling, N.Y. PR 4179-6-4323-1, 2, 3.

6. " Fire Test of a Penetration Module". Westinghouse Electric Corpor-ation, October 3, 1976, PENTR 75-26.

7. " Radiation Effects on Organic Materials in Nuclear Plants" EPRI RP 1707-3 by M.B. Bruce and M.V. Davis,1981.

8. Containment Monitor Qualification Test Plan, Victoreen, Inc.,

June 6, 1978.

9. " Handbook of Tables for Applied Engineering Science", 2nd Edition, 1976.

10. Letter from L. F. Dale (MP&L) to R. L. Tedesco (NRC), Mississippi Power and Light Company " Response to NUREG-0588", Grand Culf Nuclear Station, July 1, 1981.

11. NAMCO Co,ntrols, Report Number QTR 105, August 28, 1980.

12. Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Technical Specifications 9645-E-030.1, 9645-E-030.2.

13. Johns-Manville Product Sheet for Glas-Mat 1200 Fiberglass Insulating Blanket, 1979.

14. Mississippi Power and Light Company " Final Safety Analysis Report", Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, pg. 9A-8, Amendment 43, September 1980.

15. Duke Power Company, submittal to USNRC, "An Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures at McGuire Nuclear Station". Section 2, October 1981.

16. Pressure Controls Inc., Product Sheet for Model A-17 pressure switch

17. Letter AECM-81/505, Mississippi Power and Light Company, dated December 21, 1981

18. Raychem Corporation, Product Sheet and Performance Test Results for Type WCSF-N Nuclear Sleeves, 1979.

13-1 i

Table 1

~

Susunary of Results i

Maximum Calculated Maximum Calculated Qualificationlor Tested Equipment - Limiting Component Surface Temperature 3 Interior Temperature 3 Surviva14 Temperature

1. Containment Locks & Hatches - seals 216 F --

250 F

2. Isolation Valve - instrument cables 300 F 275 F 320 F

3. Electrical Penetrations - cables 300 F 275 F 320 ,F

4. Igniter Assembly - transformer 246 F 25. F 400 F ,

5. Pressure Transmitter 235 F ___ 303 y

6. Presseure Switch 254 F 600 F -

7. Thermocouple - embles 300 F 275 F 320 F '

8. Radiation Detece.or - housing 264 F -- 350 F

9. Purge Compressor - motor 184 F 178 F 200 F

10. Vacuum Breaker - limit switch 212 F 176 F 300 F

11. Hydrogen Recombiners - cable 300 F 275 F 330 F

12. Motor Actuators - motor 184 F 178 F 200 F

- switchgear 208 F 158 F 200 F

13. Air Actuators - solenoid 255 F 251 F 330 F

14. Limit / Position Switch - contact block assembly 212 F 176 F 300 F

15. Cables - w/o conduit 300 F 275 F 320 F

16. Hydrogen Sampling - fiberglass insulated See Note 2 See Note 2 1200 F

17. Safety Relief Valves - housing 184 F --

349 F

16. Containment Sprays - motor actuators 208 F 158 F 200 F Notes:

1. See Equipment section (Section 7.0) for temperature references.

2. Hydrogen Sampling qualification temperature higher than the highest temperature spike modelled; therefore, no model developed. See Section 7.15.

3. All temperatures reported were calculate 1 for the more severe wetwell burn case.

4. Based on referenced test results which show that the limiting component maintains its post-accident function.

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Motor Actuator - Switchgear ,

Burn Case 2 .

Solanoid 1/2 N.P.T. Conduit Volva A, -

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R5gion 3 -

Carbon Steel

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rib ion 6 -

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Regions 2,5: Rubber Gasket

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Figure 35 Limit / Position Switch

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Actu 1 Drawing - Cables l

e Jacket N

Conductor

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Model - Cables

/N .a

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all dimensions in inches

• Insulated Insulated Materials:

Region 1 -

Copper - conductor Region 2 -

Ethylene propylene - insulation Region.3 -

Hypalon - jacket Region _4 -

Air ,.

Region 5 -

Carben Steel - conduit Figure 37

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n. - .. . . .. . . s.. ,. . . _ . . - . , I I

i B $ $ f

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Materials M i l

Regions 1-5 Steel Region 9 Copper  !

Kegions 6-8 Air l l Figure 49  !

i I

t l

Figure 50: Fenwal Tests, Experimental Air and Igniter Box Temperatures -

None M. 2 Part %. 2 Tent. k. 3 l-Initial Pressure - 14.05 pale Inttin! Trenteratiare - If#' F

! Volesse $ fly 11 2 Flow Rete 7Tseth Steers F1cee Rate - 0 3 lb/ min i Spray Flew Rate Max. Net PreasiEe - 10.t",th/in g -

• hs. Air Temperature - 3f>78 F i

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Time in Minutes

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TRANSIENT 1.lUltN WITII STEAM I N.l E("l'IO N .

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• =

anno a.zme z.sas sms sur a4sa verse enet TIME (snin)

• Figure 51 - Fenwal Tests, Pressure Response Curve I

Figure 52 : Analytical Best Estimate Temperature Profile l _ . . ... .

l j

l .

. ._.__ _ _. _ _. u._. . p. e . g g

_ i._i.- .. _-._ ..i . - _ . . . .

. . _._is.. . _h_..._ __ . .. u. .

.u..e..u..__ ..uu u._._ ._pm _.. . . E .. _ . _ .

j ._ _ ____... ._. .._.___ _ . _ . . . . . . . . . . _.. . . . ... ....

1 . ... . .. . ._. . .. . . .

l s'"%

b __. _ . __ _ _ _ . . . . . _ . _ . .. _ _ .

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y . ... . . _ _ _ _ .

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x s x $ xx$

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Analytical Tenperature ,

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N.

a gg3N

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>~ O go Temperatures plotted are the igniter

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box exterior surface temperatures LLJ o .

a.N r

au -

HD D

g

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a

• t). 00 8'O.00 1'60.00 2'40.00 3'20.00 ~ 4'00.00 4'80.00 Sh0. 00 TIME (SEC1 -

Figure 53 Comparison of Analytical and Experimental Surface Temperatures

Enclosur.e No. 2 to MPB-82/0012 In further response to NRC Hydrogen Control Question A.3, of the NRC letter

~

dated October 28, 1981, more detailed descriptive information is being pro-vided for the following essential equipment: a solenold, a pressure

, transmitter, a cable in conduit, and an igniter assembly. The figures and materials of construction provided, in conjunction with the survivability analysis, as described in Section 7.0 of Enclosure 1 to this letter, are sufficient for the NRC to perform an independent thermal analysis of this equipment.

i i

l.

- - ~ .=- ::::.

. SLDT ROR NG EDVER ,

RWER RtasOVAL -

3 C' \ .

vggg #

M IVE

s. - Q PECIALWRENCM ADAPTER $ g% ' :ssuLATING WASHER POR 80dNDID BASE S G AsstusLY WRDER NO.182 53 M

() fDufTTED WMtN ts0LDED CDIL E IAf D1 M8808 TANT SOLitsotD B ASE gLa. Astus LY $ ~~4 () TadG PAR 75 AS THEY ARL RE480VID REN.,.o

.R m.D.m R

(.s.

s e a, -

L uuT= .A I.

@Q ODW:TTED WHth tsOLDED EDIL 5 LEEDI OCKstNG @

• l

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.- tf2 OR 3/4 NPT l

CDMDut1 CONNECTION 4 IMBERTCORE AB5t utLY THRu goupectD 8481 GAREE ()' G AGE IN D VALVI UVIR.

LPPIR VALVE EHK$

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s VALVE 900Y AmtestLT.P.

NN 3EARileG GASEET$

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$ - mov.mhG SRACEIT : PER VALVg ging I

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OEIA80 VALV' , LIVER 0 CAP ---Cr$C OUIDE CAP

.% auene,ma -

u TMil VIEW SHOW5 VALVES W1TM Sfit AND 1/4 ORIFNlES.

masm ax

.gmy,o eo e.acncaten ma r POR VALVES wiTM E/14 ORIFacts.TML EXTERNAL 900Y 8" **'"* D' 9' wt soe' AND INTERNAL PART5 CONFIGURATION ARE SLlGDfTLY

. D4 F F E R ENT.

i l

Figure 1 ASCO Solenoid

, . 1

4 i

1 I

ASCO SOLENOID Materials of Construction Component Material Dimension

}

1. Coil Copper Windings I.D. = 7/16" 0.D. = 1 5/16" Height = 1 1/16"

2. Insulating Washers Fiberboard 1.D. - 7/16" 0.D. = 1 5/16" Height = 1/32"

3. Housing (Including Stainless Steel 0.D. - 2 1/2"

] Cover) Thickness = 1/8" Height = 1 5/8"

4. Solenoid Base Carbon Steel Diameter = 7/16" Height = 1 1/4" 1 Sub Assembly (Vertical Piece)

5. Solenoid Base Stainless Steel Diameter = 1 5/16" Sub Assembly Thickness = 1/16" (Flat Piece a,t Bottom) l 6. Yoke Carbon Steel Thickness = 1/16" (Coil Assembly Fits Snuggly Into It)

7. Sleeve Stainless Steel Thickness = 1/32" Diameter = 1 1/8" 1

)

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Rosemount 1153 Pressure Trancmitter Material's of Construction '

Component Material Isolating' Diaphragms and Drain / Vent Valves Type 316 Stainless Steel Process Flanges Type 316 Stainle.,s Steel Process 0-Rings Type 316 Stainless Steel Fill Fluid Silicone Oil Flange Bolts Plate Alloy Steel Fitting Adapter Type 316 Stainless Steel Electronics Housing Low Copper Aluminum with Epoxy-Polyester Paint Process Connection 3/6" Swagelok Compression

, Fitting Electrical Connection 1/2-14 NPT Conduit With Screw Terminals l

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Igniter Assembly Materials of Construction

, Component Mat erial . Dimension

1. Glow Plug Mount Type 304L Stainless Steel 1" diameter

2. Cover Plate Type 304L Stainless Steeel 1/8" thick

3. Gasket Methylvinyl Siloxane Sheet 1/8" thick

4. Sub Panel Type 304L Stainless Steel 1/8" thick l

5. Top and Bottom Type 304L Stainless Steel 1/8" thick

6. Sides and Back Type 304L Stainless Steel 1/8" thick

7. Hood Type 304L Stainless Steel 1/8" thick

8. Terminal Block Phenolic

9. Junction Box' Type 304L Stainless Steel 14 guage

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