ML20028E826

LER 83-001/01T-0:on 830108,during Cold shutdown,post-LOCA Recombiner B Discharge Inboard Primary Containment Isolation Valve & Leak Test Valves Not Fully Closed.Caused by Contractor Error.Valves Closed

ML20028E826
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	01/21/1983
From:	Hammer S NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20028E816	List: ML20028E815 ML20028E826
References
LER-83-001-01T, LER-83-1-1T, NUDOCS 8301280223
Download: ML20028E826 (3)

Text

!

f!RC FORM 384 U. L NUCLE AR f.E!ULATORY COMMISS40N  !

(72 77)

. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT l

CONTROL sLOCK: l t

l l l l l 6

lh (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED MPORMATION) 1 Stl l@

0 1 l P 8 l9 NLICEhSEE l M CODE l N l P l 1l@15 0 l 0l-14 l 0NUM8ER uCENSE l 0l 0 l 0 l 0 l26- l 0l0 LICENSE l@284 TYPEl1 Jo l 1SFlCAT 1 l@l CON'T C 1 %iC[ l L j@l 0l 5l0 l0 l0 l 2 l 6 l 3 l@l 89 0 l ll 0l8 l8 l3 Ql0 l 1 l 2 l 1l 8 l 380l@ 7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUM8ER 88 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROsABLE CONSEQUENCES h O 2 lDuring cold shutdown, inspection revealed that post IOCA recombiner B discharge l 0 3 l inboard primary containment isolation valve and associated leak test valves were l I O l 4 l I not fully closed as requf::ed by T.S. 3.7.A.2. Cummulative time primary containment l I ITITl I required while in this condition was 13 dayc. Detailed sequence of events provided; O 6 l to J Grobe. Region III. on 1/17/83. Calculations are available for review on site i f5TT1 l showing offsite doses during DBA would be less than 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. l l O la l l Previous similar events A0-25 and A0-74-10. l 7 8 9 80 DE CO E $ 8C E COMPONENT CODE SUS DE SU E y O 9 8 l Sl Al@ y@ W@ lV l A l L l V [E l Xl@ ]@ ]@ 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 _ SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION LER/RO EVENTYEAR REPortT NO. COOE TYPE

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30 g 31 g 32 KEN AC O ON PL NT M HOURS 22 S8 8 F 8. SU L R MA LxJ@LxJ@ LZ_l@ LZJ@ l 37 i I I I L_J@ 41 L" J@ L'J@ lV I 6'i'TE7i g 33 34 35 36 40 42 43 44 4y CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h g l Error by contractor and utility personnel resulted in valves not being closed. l 11 111 lValves closed and leak tested. Position of other accessible primary containment I i 2 l isolation valves verified. Procedures being reviewed and revised as necessary l l U_1.3_) l e n nvavane var,ivranco ca. seenchmane. l i 4 l l

                  $T[ES               sPOwER                        OTwER STATUS        @         $iEONRY                           OlSCOVERY OESCRIPTION y W@ l 0 l 0 l 0l@l                                                   NA                   l      [Ajgl            Engineer observation                                          l ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY                                                       LOCATION OF RELEASE i s        Lz1                                                    NA                   l                       NA                                                           l 7

RELE 8 9 ASE@D OF RELEASELiU@l to 11 44 l 46 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUM8ER TYPE DESCRIPTION l y l 0 l0 l0l@[Zj@l l

                  ' PERSONNEL iN;u' dies NuwgER              OESCRiPriON@                                        ghIhCM05000223 830121 7         8 9                   11       12                                                                                                                                   80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY '

TYPE DESCRIPTION . NA 7

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2 o [Y_j @lDESCRIPTIONPress release on 1/12/83. IS$ut l lllllllllllllf 7 8 9 to 68 69 80 5 NAME OF PREPARER Steve Hammer PHONE: 612-295-5151 2

    , ' Attcchment to LER 83-001 Northern States Power Company Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No. 50-263 Cause Description and Corrective Actions (Continued)

! Details of personnel errors as reconstructed from documentation and interviews 1 are as follows: 1

1. Pressure testing was performed by contractor personnel. Final steps of the procedure required that NSP operators be notified to close and tag the isolation valves. This notification was not made.

2. A work request authorization was prepared to chain, lock and tag the valves to prevent opening. The valves were chained and locked by

contractor personnel. Tags were prepared to secure the valves in the closed position. The NSP operator placed these tags on the wrong valves. This error was caused by lack of familiarity with the newly installed valves and lack of detailed valve description on the tag.

3. A contributing factor was that recombiner isolati6n valves had not been placed on a checklist. The design change package did not require placing these valves on a checklist as the procedure described above controlled the positioning of the valves.

4. Heavy work load caused by the high level of construction activity contributed to the personnel errors.

Details of actions taken to prevent recurrence are as follows:

1. Local leak rate test procedures and their associated operations controlling documents provide control of leak rate test connection valves, isolation valves, system valve line-up and leak test connec-tion cap replacement. These documents were reviewed to insure that all valves are listed as required.

2. Valve prestart checklists were revised to include appropriate leak

test valves and caps.

3. Procedures and checklists were revised to assure appropria.e valves and/or caps associated with hot fluid piping penetrations, double gasketed seals and electrical penetrations are closed / installed properly.

4. A valve prestart checklist was prepared for the post LOCA recombiner system.

5. Directives controlling placement of hold and secure cards were revised to provide more definitive guidance on equipment identification on the cards.

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Details of actions planned to prevent recurrence are as follows:

1. Additional training will be provided to operators on the proper l method to be used for filling out and placing hold and secure '

cards.

2. Valve positioning, locking, tagging and leak rate testing will be performed by NSP operating personnel.

3. The design change process and project coordinator responsibilities will be reviewed to determine possible changes to provide better control of design change and plant operational requirements.

Management response to this occurrence is continuing to establish assurance that occurrences similar to this event will not happen again. Organizational responsibilities, organizational interface procedures, resource requirements, training programs, plant modification commitment schedules, and work control processes are being carefully considered. Additionally, a corporate oversight committee has been established to assure that a complete review of the occurrence is accomplished and that all contributing factors are identified and adequately addressed in a timely manner.

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