ML20024C416

Affidavit of RA Pratt Re Diesel Generator Cracking. Reliability Record of Improved,Current Prodcution Cylinder Heads Provides Addl Assurance Cylinder Heads Free from Costing Imperfections.Prof Qualifications Encl

ML20024C416
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	07/07/1983
From:	Pratt R LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO., TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20024C405	List: ML20024C404 ML20024C408 ML20024C411 ML20024C416 ML20024C426
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8307120606
Download: ML20024C416 (27)

Text

. ._ _ _ __ ._ _

,y LILCO, July 7, 1983 l

1

- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board i

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)

)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. PRATT i

Richard A. Pratt, duly sworn, deposes and says as fol-lows:

1. My name is Richard A. Pratt and I am employed by Transamerica Delaval Inc. (TDI) as the Manager of Customer Ser-vice. My professional qualifications are set forth in Attach-l ment A to this Affidavit.

2. As Manager of Customer Service for TDI, my princi-pal duties and responsibilities include management and supervi-i sion of the department responsible for installation, testing, l startup and acceptance of TDI manufactured products, including diesel generators. In this connection, I have had occasion to observe and to be involved in the installation and startup testing activities associated with TDI diesel generators installed at a number of nuclear power plants, including 8307120606 830707 PDR ADOCK 05000322 O PDR J 1

. . - - - _ . _ _ _ . - . _ , ..___ . _ _ . _ _ . . .. _ - ._ - .._.-_a

1 (1) San Onofre Nuclear Generating Sta-tion, Unit 1, l

. (2) Comanche Peak Nuclea.? Station, (3) Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station, (4) Taiwan. Power Kousheng and Maanshan Nuclear Stations, l (5) Midland Nuclear Power Station, (6) Perry Nuclear Power Station, (7) Bellefonte Nuclear Power Station, and (8) Shoreham Nuclear' Power Station.

3. In connection with my involvement in the Shoreham diesel generator installation and preoperational test program, I have had numerous occasions to inspect the Shoreham diesel generators 1/ and to observe them in operation under a variety l

of circumstances. In addition, I am familiar with matters relating to model R-4 diesel generator cylinder heads original-ly installed with the Shoreham diesel generators, including the manufacturing processes and quality assurance processes used in connection with these diesel generator heads. I am also per-sonally familiar with the manufacturing and quality assurance procedures used in connection with current production model R-4 1/ There are three identical TDI model DSR-48 diesel genera-tors at Shoreham designated by LILCO as DG-101, DG-102 and DG-103.

cylinder heads. In addition, I personally participated in the failure analysis conducted at TDI on the three Shoreham cylin-der heads which had minor water leaks.

4. Early in the preoperational testing process at Shoreham, minor leaks were detected in three of the 24 diesel generator cylinder heads. Analysis indicated that these leaks were the result of small cracks caused by casting imperfec-tions. The three cylinder heads have been replaced with cur-rent production model cylinder heads which are produced employing improved casting and inspection techniques designed to prevent or detect any such casting imperfections. LILCO has committed to replace all of the remaining original model cylin-der heads with improved, current production model cylinder heads. At present, I am advised that replacement of all heads will be on a schedule consistent with preoperational testing and fuel load and may not be completed until after fuel load.

In the interim, and until this is accomplished, LILCO intends to implement a surveillance or "barring over" procedure to en- ,

sure detection of leaks. As this Affidavit demonstrates (i) there is reasonable assurance that the original model cylinder heads remaining on the Shoreham i diesels are unlikely to contain any casting imperfec-tions which might develop into leaks; l

1

(ii) there is reasonable assurance that even if

! such casting imperfections should exist and develop k into leaks, the implementation of the surveillance or "barring over" procedure provides adequata assurance

! that such leaks would be detected in a timely fashion l and that there would be no effect on the reliability, operability or quick start capability of the diesels; 1

and (iii) the casting techniques and quality assur-

{ ance procedures employed in the manufacture of the cur-i rent model diesel generator cylinder heads provide ample assurance that casting imperfections that may l have existed in the previous model diesel generator 1

l cylinder heads either will not occur, or will be detected and remedied in the manufacturing process.

!J

5. Analysis of Shoreham diesel cylinder heads re-j turned to TDI from Shoreham indicated that the three leaks

[ detected emanated from cracks caused by operating stresses i

(created by cylinder firing pressure) that occurred at stress

! risers resulting from casting imperfections. Attachments B and i

C to this Affidavit are my memoranda reflecting the results of this failure analysis of the Shoreham diesel generator cylinder f

f heads.

I r

.s i

6. Delaval's experience with operating diesel genera-tors using identical cylinder heads to those originally suppli d with the Shoreham diesel generators gives ample assur-ance that any additional casting imperfections or cracks are unlikely to exist in the remaining original diesel generator cylinder heads at Shoreham. In the first place, it is Delaval's experience that these casting imperfections occur in only a very small percentage (less than two percent) of these original model cylinder heads. Although the percentage of 1

heads at Shoreham that exhibited these casting imperfections is higher than the very small percentage noted above for all such cylinder heads in service, Delaval has evaluated the manufacturing and operating history of the Shoreham heads and has concluded they are not different from other cylinder heads of this type and vintage. Significantly, there are currently approximately 3500 such cylinder heads in use in a variety of j applications, including nuclear. A total of 152 cylinder heads 1

i identical to those originally supplied with the Shoreham diesel i

generators have been in successful operation at other operating nuclear power plants for as long as 4 1/2 years with no prob-lems encountered. ,

7. In addition, it is Delaval's experience that after 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> of operation, it is unlikely that the remaining

- __ ~ _ _ , _ .

j .

original cylinder heads would develop any cracks similar to those previously experienced at Shoreham. This conclusion is i based on experience and knowledge of the type of crack found at As already noted, a casting defect or flaw must be l

Shoreham.

present from the manufacturing process for this type of crack i

to develop. These flaws are not created during the operation of the diesels. Cracks develop at these flaws (or stress risers) when subjected to the operating stresses created by 2

cylinder firing pressure. Thus, once a cylinder head is subjected to full power operation with the associated naximum

^

i cylinder firing pressure, cracks would be expected to appear, if at all, soon thereafter. As already noted, it is Delaval's experience that cracks similar to those found at Shoreham i occur, if at all, prior to completion of 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> of

operation. The cracks in the Shoreham heads developed in the i

range of 100 to 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> of operation. Each of Shoreham's diesel generators now has over 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> of operation and this substantially increases the likelihood that there are no addi-tional casting imperfections or cracks in the cylinder heads at Shoreham other than those already detected. , confidence that further cracks will not occur is strengthened given that a sub-stantial portion of the more than 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> of operating time for each diesel generator at Shoreham was conducted under high I

load or high power conditions.

i l

i

8. Although Delaval is confident that additional cracking of cylinder heads is unlikely at Shoreham, Delaval has recommended and Shoreham has adopted a surveillance or "barring over" procedure designed to detect in timely fashion any cylin-der head leaks. This barring over procedure is a well accepted procedure in the industry for accomplishing this purpose. In fact, "barring over" is a standard industry procedure conducted prior to all manual starts of diesels, including Shoreham's.

It ensures that water leakage will be detected. I am familiar with the draft Shoreham procedure on barring over, SP #

27.307.02, " Emergency Diesel Generator Cylinder Leak Detection Test." This procedure is effective to detect leaks in a timely fashion and gives added assurance that operation of the diesel generators with the remaining originally supplied cylinder heads will result in reliable operation and start capability.

4 9. As the analysis of the Shoreham diesel generator t

cylinder heads returned to TDI from Shoreham indicated,2/ the cracks developed from casting imperfections and the cracks were self-relieving and nonpropagating. In addition, the cracks in-volved admitted only small amounts of jacket water into the combustion chamber which had no effect on the combustion pro-cess and were simply blown out of the exhaust system along with 2/ See Attachments B and C.

- . - , , , - .,,----,-,x__._,-._,-v_--.- ,.-_.--...,---.-..,-,-,,--,--,--w -

other combustion by-products.. This conclusion is also confirmed by the observation during operation of one of the diesel generators that included one of the three leaking cylin-der heads. The observation noted a leakage rate of 9.25 gal-lons/ hour from the jacket water system. This leakage was blown

! out of the exhaust system during operation of the diesel and did not affect its operation.

10. The cracks found in the three Shoreham heads also would not affect the rapid starting capability of the engine.

Although a leak rate of 9.25 gallons / hour was observed during the operation of one of the engines, this rate would fall sub-stantially immediately following shutdown of the engine. The small cracks detected in the cylinder heads wars opened by the stresses induced by the combustion process. After engine shut-down, stresses on the heads are reduced substantially, allowing the crack to close. Stresses on the head are further reduced when the cylinder head cools. Thus, only very small amounts of jacket water would leak into the combustion chamber after shut-down with no adverse effect on the rapid starting capability.

This conclusion is confirmed by the observations made on the Shoreham diesels. After leakage was detected from the jacket water system, the diesel generator was shut down and the cylin-ders were checked for water. Less than a cupful of water was l 1

!~

l

found in the combustion chamber. This small amount would not affect or impair the rapid start capability of the diesel gen-erator. The conclusion that there would be only a small amount of seepage, if any, occurring after shutdown is also confirmed by the results of the hydrostatic test conducted as part of the failure analysis. Tne hydrostatic test of the cold head et 100 psi resulted in only alight seepage from the crack. Following shutdown of the engine, the jacket water system would also be shut down, reducing the system pressure to essentially O psig (during operation, the cystem operates at approximately 30 psig). Thus, not even the' alight seepage noted in the hydro-static test would occur in the event a crack did develop in a cylinder head.

11. As noted, the leaks detected in the Shoreham die-sel cylinder heads were caused by casting imperfections. In the nine years since LILCO's engines were manufactured, TDI has continued to develop and improve the casting and manufacturing processes employed in producing the four valve steel cylinder heads like those originally supplied with the Shorehan cylin-ders. TDI has also improved and developed techniques to detect flaws in the casting and manufacturing processes. These im-provements employ more extensive inspection and testing (mag-netic particle inspection, both AC and DC, ultrasonic testing

and dye penetrant testing), stress relief techniques, air, gas and watertight hydrostatic testing (at higher pressures than used in connection with the cylinder heads originally supplied with the Shoreham diesel engines) and pickling. These improve-ments result in cylinder heads of even higher quality and reliability than the quality and reliability of the cylinder heads originally supplied with the Shoreham diesel generators.

12. The reliability record of the improved, current production cylinder heads provides additional assurance that these cylinder heads are free from the casting imperfections detected in the three Shoreham diesel generator original cylin-der heads. Current production cylinder heads installed in six marine DMR V12-4 TDI diesel engines have accumulated over 19,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of reliable operation without any evidence of sim-ilar casting imperfections or head cracking failures having occurred.

l Richard A. Pratt Subscribed and sworn to 1

before me this day ,

of July, 1983. l 1

l l

Notary Public .

l 1

7 u -

g-- * - yw--t. y - ,.--, y- , av, - y.-r -m a=

r  :

..'. ATTACHMENT A Professional Qualifications RICHARD A. PRATT Manager, Customer Service Transamerica Delaval Inc. (TDI)

Born August 5, 1943 Bachelor of Science, Mechanical Engineering U.S. Naval Academy, 1967 1967-75 -- Lieutenant, USN 1975-77 -- Liaison engineer, TDI Duties and responsibilities included review and resolution of engineering matters and issues that arose in connection with the design and manufacture of the entire line of TDI products and vendor

, supplied components.

1977-79 -- Project Engineer, TDI Duties and responsibilities focused on technical is-sues relating to contract engineering administra-tion.

1979-81 -- Manager of Product Engineering, TDI Duties and responsibilities included the management and supervision of 50 engineers and draftsmen in the preparation of detailed engineering drawings of TDI engines and preparation and publication of TDI in-struction manuals.

1981-83 -- Manager of Customer Service, TDI Duties and responsibilities include the management and supervision of 50 field service engineers and representatives in the installation, startup and testing of TDI manufactured products.

1 1

, , )g LILCO, July 7, 1983 i

- UNITED ST.*JES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)

)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. PRATT Richard A. Pratt, duly sworn, deposes and says as fol-lows:

1. My name is Richard A. Pratt and I am employed by Transamerica Delaval Inc. (TDI) as the Manager of Customer Ser-vice. My professional qualifications are set forth in Attach-ment A to this Affidavit.

2. As Manager of Customer Service for TDI, my princi-pal duties and responsibilities include management and supervi-sion of the department responsible for installation, testing, startup and acceptance of TDI manufactured products, including diesel generators. In this connection, I have had occasion to i

^

1 observe and to be involved in the installation and startup l testing activities associated with TDI diesel generators installed at a number of nuclear power plants, including l

_-_ -- . ~ . . . -

(1) San Onofre Nuclear Generating Sta-tion, Unit 1,

- (2) Comanche Peak Nuclear Station, (3) Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station, (4) Taiwan Power Kousheng and Maanshan Nuclear Stations, (5) Midland Nuclear Power Station, (6) Perry Nuclear Power Station, (7) Bellefonte Nuclear Power Station, and (8) Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

3. In connection with my involvement in the Shoreham diesel generator installation and preoperational test program, I have had numerous occasions to inspect the Shoreham diesel generators 1/ and to observe them in operation under a variety of circumstances. In addition, I am familiar with matters relating to model R-4 diesel generator cylinder heads original-ly installed with the Shoreham diesel generators, including the manufacturing processes and quality assurance processes used in connection with these diesel generator heads. I am also per-sonally familiar with the manufacturing and quality assurance procedures used in connection with current production model R-4 i

1/ There are three identical TDI model DSR-48 diesel genera-tors at Shoreham designated by LILCO as DG-101, DG-102 and DG-103.

l-l l'

. _ , . - - ~ _ _ . _ _ - . , . - - . _ . - _....m , . - - . _ . _ . _ , - _ . _ , - , . - _ , , _ .

I cylinder heads. In addition, I personally participated in the failure analysis conducted at TDI on the three Shoreham cylin-der heads which had minor water leaks.

4. Early in the preoperational testing process at

- Shoreham, minor leaks were detected in three of the 24 diesel generator cylinder heads. Analysis indicated that there leaks ,

were the result of small cracks caused by casting imperfec-tions. The three cylinder heads have been replaced with cur-rent production model cylinder heads which are produced employing improved casting and inspection techniques designed to prevent or detect any such casting imperfections. LILCO has 1

committed to replace all of the remaining original model cylin-der heads with improved, current production model cylinder heads. At present, I am advised that replacement of all heads  !

will be on a schedule consistent with preoperational testing and fuel load and may not be completed until after fuel load.

In the interim, and until this is accomplished, LILCO intends to implement a surveillance or "barring over" proceditre to en-sure detection of leaks. As this Affidavit demonstrates (i) there is reasonable assurance that the original model cylinder heads remaining on the Shoreham diesels are unlikely to contain any casting imperfec-tions which might develop into leaks; i

(ii) there is reasonable assurance that even if such casting imperfections should exist and develop

- into leaks, the implementation of the surveillance or "barring over" procedure provides adequate assurance j that such leaks would be detected in a timely fashion and that there would be no effect on the reliability, operability or quick start capability of the diesels; and (iii) the casting techniques and quality assur- ,

ance procedures employed in the manufacture of the cur-rent model diesel generator cylinder heads provide ample assurance that casting imperfections that may have existed in the previous model diesel generritor cylinder heads either will not occur, or will bc 4

detected and remedied in the manufacturing process.

4

5. Analysis of Shoreham diesel cylinder heads re-turned to TDI from Shoreham indicated that the three leaks detected emanated from cracks caused by operating stresses (created by cylinder firing pressure) that occurred at stress risers resulting from casting imperfections. Attachments B and C to this Affidavit are my memoranda reflecting the results of this failure analysis of the Shoreham diesel generator cylinder heads.

1

6. Delaval's experience with operating diesel genera-tors using identical cylinder heads to those originally supplied with the Shoreham diesel generators gives ample assur-ance that any additional casting imperfections or cracks are

unlikely to exist in the remaining original diesel generator cylinder heads at Shoreham. In the first place, it is Delaval's experience that these casting imperfections occur in only a very small percentage (less than two percent) of these

} original model cylinder heads. Although the percentage of heads at Shoreham that exhibited these casting imperfections is higher than the very small percentage noted above for all such cylinder heads in service, Delaval has evaluated the manufacturing and operating history of the Shoreham heads and ,

has concluded they are not different from other cylinder heads ,

of this type and vintage. Significantly, there are currently .

approximately 3500 such cylinder heads in use in a variety of applications, including nuclear. A total of 152 cylinder heads identical to those originally supplied with the Shoreham diesel generators have been in successful operation at other operating nuclear power plants for as long as 4 1/2 years with no prob-lems encountered.

d

7. In addition, it is Delaval's experience that after 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> of operation, it in unlikely that the remaining 1

.. ~

original cylinder heads would develop any cracks similar to those previously experienced at Shoreham. This conclusion is basedbnexperienceandknowledgeofthetypeofcrackfoundat Shoreham. As already noted, a casting defect or flaw must be present from the manufacturing process for this type of crack to develop. These flaws are not created during the operation of the diesels. Cracks develop at these flaws (or stress i  :

risers) when subjected to the operating stresses created by cylinder firing pressure. Thus, once a cylinder head is subjected to full power operation with the associated maximum cylinder firing pressure, cracks would be expected to appear, if at all, soon thereafter. As already noted, it is Delaval's experience that cracka similar to those found at Shoreham occur, if at all, prfor to completion of 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> of operation. The cracks in the Shoreham heads developed in the range of 100 to 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> of operation. Each of Shoreham's i diesel generators now has over 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> of operation and this 1

substantially increases the likelihood that there are no addi-tional casting imperfections or cracks in the cylinder heads at i

Shoreham other than those already detected. Confidence that l 2

further cracks will not occur is strengthened given that a sub-l stantial portion of the more than 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> of operating time for each diesel generator at Shoreham was conducted under high load or high power conditions.

l 1

, , ,, ,_,_y . _ , . ., __, , , _ _

8. Although Delaval is confident that additional cracking of cylinder heads is unlikely at Shorehem, Delaval has recommended and Shoreham has adopted a surveillance or "barring over" procedure designed to detect in timely fashion any cylin-der head leaks. This barring over procedure is a well accepted procedure in the industry for accomplishing this purpose. In fact, "barring over" is a standard industry procedure conducted prior to all manual starts of diesels, including Shoreham's.

It ensures that water leakage will be detected. I am familiar with the draft Shoreham procedure on barring over, SP #

27.307.02, " Emergency Diesel Generator Cylinder Leak Detection Test." This procedure is effective to detect leaks in a timely ,

fashion and gives added assurance that operation of the diesel i generators with the remaining originally supplied cylinder heads will result in reliable operation and start capability.

9. As the analysis of the Shoreham diesel generator cylinder heads returned to TDI from Shoreham indicated,2/ the cracks developed from casting imperfections and the cracks were self-relieving and nonpropagating. In addition, the cracks in-t volved admitted only small amounts of jacket water into the combustion chamber which had no effect on the combustion pro-cess and were simply blown out of the exhaust system along with 2/ See Attachments B and C.

1 1 1 1

- _ , - - - . . . - . . _ - . , . , , - - - -,~ -.

i. . l l

other combustion by-products. This conclusion is also confirmed by the observation during operation of one of the ,

diesel generators that included one of the three leaking cylin-der heads. The observation noted a leakage rate of 9.25 gal-lons/ hour from the jacket water system. This leakage was blown out of the exhaust system during operation of the diesel and i did not affect its operation.

10. The cracks found in the three Shoreham heads also would not affect the rapid starting capability of the engine.

Although a leak rate of 9.25 gallons / hour was observed during i the operation of one of the engines, this rate would fall sub-t stantially immediately following shutdown of the engine. The small cracks detected in the cylinder heads were opened by the stresses Anduced by the combustion process. After engine shut-down, stresses on the heads are reduced substantially, allowing the crack to close. Stresses on the head are further reduced when the cylinder head cools. Thus, only very small amounts of jacket water would leak into the combustion chamber after shut-down with no adverse effect on the rapid starting capability.

This conclusion is confirmed by the observations made on the Shoreham diesels. After leakage was detected from the jacket i water system, the diesel generator was shut down and the cylin-ders were checked for water. Less than a cupful of water was l

1 l

l l

0 .

found in the combustion chamber. This small amount would not affect or impair the rapid start capability of the diesel gen-erator. The conclusion that there would be only a small amount of seepage, if any, occurring after shutdown is also confirmed by the results of the hydrostatic test conducted as part of the failure analysis. The hydrostatic test of the cold head at 100 psi resulted in only slight seepage from the crack. Following shutdown of the engine, the jacket water system would also be shut down, reducing the system pressure to essentially O psig (during operation, the system operates at approximately 30 psig). Thus, not even the slight seepage noted in the hydro-I static test would occur in the event a crack did develop in a cylinder head.

11. As noted, the leaks detected in the Shorehau die-nel cylinder heads were caused by casting ir. perfections. In the nine years since LILCo's engines were manufactured, TDI has continued to develop and improve the casting and manufacturing processes employed in producing the four valve steel cylinder heads like those originally supplied with the Shoreham cylin-ders. TDI has also improved and developed techniques to detect i

flaws in the casting and manufacturing processes. These im-I provements employ more extensive inspection and testing (mag-l

[ notic particle inspection, both AC and DC, ultrasonic testing I

y _ _ _ _

. . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - , - , - . _ . ~ , . . _ , _ . _ . - -,__._.__-._m., ..__,w.mm,,__.

i

\

l and dye penetrant testing), stress relief techniques, air, gas and watertight hydrostatic testing (at higher pressures than used in connection with the cylinder heads originally supplied with the Shoreham diesel engines) and pickling. These improve-ments result in cylinder heads of even higher quality and reliability than the quality and reliability of the cylinder heads originally supplied with the Shoreham diesel generators.

i i 12. The reliability record of the improved, current production cylinder heads provides additional assurance that thesa cylir. der heads are free frem the casting imperfectione

- detected in the three Shoreham diesel generator original cylin-der heads. Current production cylinder heads installed in six ,

marine DMR V12-4 TDI diesel engines have accumulated over 19,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of reliable operation without any evidence of sim- .

ilar casting imperfections or head cracking failures having occurred.

Richard A. Pratt subscribed and sworn to before me this day j of July, 1983.

I Notary Public .

l- I i

i -- - - - - -- , . - . , . . . _ . _ , . , , , , , , . . _ . , _ . - ,_, __, _ . _

, , ' E. ATTACHMENT A Professional Qualifications

1. RICHARD A. PRATT Manager, Customer Service Transamerica Delaval Inc. (TDI)

Born August 5, 1943 Bachelor of Science, Mechanical Engineering U.S. Naval Academy, 1967 1967-75 -- Lieutenant, USN

, 1975-77 -- Liaison engineer, TDI Duties and responsibilities included review and

- resolution of engineering matters and issues that

- arose in connection with the design and manufacture of the entire line of TDI products and vendor supplied componente.

1977-79 -- Project Engineer, TDI Duties and responsibilities focused on technical is-sues relating to contract engineering administra-tion.

1979-81 -- Manager of Product Engineering, TDI Duties and responsibilities included the management and supervision of 50 engineers and draftsmen in the preparation of detailed engineering drawings of TDI engines and preparation and publication of TDI in-struction manuals.

1981-83 -- Manager of Customer Service, TDI Duties and responsibilities include the management and supervision of 50 field service engineers and representatives in the installation, startup and testing'of TDI manufactured products.

l

e y FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL INC. ENGINE & COMPRESSOR DIVISION

' Customer Engine No. Part or Assembly No. RMR No. Date F.A. No.

LILCO 74010/012 03-360-03-OF 9496 March 28, 1983 0150

( ELEMENTS OF FAILURE:

Cylinder Head P/N 03-360-03-OF 1 S/N E94 H/N 488P .

SYMPTOMS OF FAILURE Fire deck water leak; water detected in combustion chamber.

EXAMINATION OF ELEMENTS:

1. The cylinder head was returned with a suspected water leak for failure analysis and rework - if possible.

The head was visually inspected and the fire deck was found to be coated with 2.

. & mixture of rust and carbon, characteristic of a water leak.

3 The head was then hydrostatically tested at 100 psi. A seepage leak was noted and marked between the intake and valve seats (see figure 1).  ;

4. A 1-3/4" X 2-3/26" section of the fire deck coctaining the crack was ren.oved ,

from the fire deck ty milling.

5. After a visual inspection, the sample was forced open. Microscopic inspection '

tevealed a quench crack (hot tear), which probably resulted from ahrinkcge of the casting during cooling. (See Photo 1). The tear covered d out PO% '

of the sample section. Products of oxidatior: and corrosion filled the cracked region, typical of a hot. tear. Hieroacopic examinstion confirued this crack ran in all three planes. There was no evidence of propogation of the crack past the original hot tear, nor was there any sign of fatigue failure.

6. The sample saction measured 7/16" thick. Drawing specification for this section is 3/4". Evidently, a core print broke off, allowing the core to float and the fire deck section was cast thin. This thin section cooled at a more rapid rate than the surrounding metal and the hot tear resulted.

Ultrasonic testing confirms the fire deck is thin in other areas also.

7. The thin section will be milled out of the fire deck and material of the correct thickness will be welded in place. Since the head is dispositioned as suitable for repair, further destructive testing will not be done.

SUMMARY

OF ANALYSIS:

l Typically, cracks in the fire deck are not encountered between the intake valve seats. Something unusual must happen, such as the core print breaking, for a hot tear to occur. Sporadic hot tears were encountered in cylinder heads manu-factured in the early and mid 1970's. Subsequent improvements in casting tech-niques (gating, chills, new risers, etc.) have effectively eliminated this problem. ,

TAILURE ANA1.YSIS REPORT - TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL INC. ENGINE & COMPRESSOR DIVISION

. D. G. Contantion item 3 P2gs 2 No* 0151

.. , LILCO - S/N 74010/12

Subject:

Cylinder He:ds Preliminary 1, Date: May 9, 1983

SUMMARY

OF ANALYSIS (continued) Page 6 of 9 The cores and pattern have been revised and rebuilt to eliminate problems such as the broken coreprint.

These heads:were not originally stress relieved and were hydr-tested at a lower l pressure (75 psi). Thus, the hot tear went undetected. With stress relief, higher )

pressure hydro test, ultrasonic testing and other current production / inspection techniques - such a defect would normally be detected. .

CONCLUSION:

The failure of this head is attributed to a casting defect, undetected in the manufacturing process, which evidenced itself only after considerable firing '

cycles had occured. Prevention / detection of such defects has improved, so they are now located and corrected in the manufacturing process.

This crack would not have caused a catastrophic failure of the engine or compro-mised its ability to carry full load, as the water leak rate is very slow. The head is repairable, and will be processed onder the factory cylinder head rework program, ,

e Date: d_. ~

34 _

8/Yd 3_

Signature-Failure Analyals E6gineer L.

4

I

1. u- -

. c:y: . ' a. . . . Q i

. . ~.

$ \ Y ib.i . h.,S,! . . , . [h Wh ..

(Ni 76 M.k.. .....r d,W.M...

M.9

@ i g @I ) e 9....4 ~ @s.Jfis rs *m <'t.x u o,.. -

y . . -

k,%*"E. q$ , . . ' .', f

~ . -

.. .v -t

. ldh h- Y< ,.... s k,,g%f

• Yy$?kk

h..Sl  ?;.f*  ! . .

'*JG H%M RI.':&m. M, .. >, S. .'s'-@h l . . ',

/*3 2... .Y'.

. @. y %.~. .7.s.K.d Y.h W j? l *'

, .6$.W$'--~ %f h.$.' M Ya- i' @ .?... .$ f,'. t. \ '?,;~-;t,;d ,'%D, .

.f.h*D.WM$

f.?w f;.s$lfes;C;Q,,A n

• 4- . . . ' . *'

;::<; y 's.: c'C; l_ W' '.*' $~'t. ,>~'.w*.

%. ~

r evR:...NM.. .- i * -

... . c -c ,

~ .}

5 C. .e ..

• l' .

h. [' l.7*>g;*:*.y' M 'i f (. {~ *'-?$'UN  ?.- _ 6J. ~

el ? '#' fa f .l Mk.)2'.k fQ M ,7 %

. = *

• 4 * * :."a.-.: *> " Yl*.",N;.*I **4( ;i -T;4.V .' *h a;*.~ T.' j

- : , .. , . . . y h -

e ". * .-t J' . -

My%. V .*-k r!'d. % ** %'

• n

" 7).

Q 4g t .? g .

si,' ' . , ,Ad $.. y?,e n

• %'. 7.y ,

n9- . m ., ,%mh, .. ..  :.c y.y, - .e .. .,Wh ,*.  ? . $. .Y ' Q

.,'" 3 yA. e y; ' i  %, m%4'e: . e

%a ,- ' +)

. v.#'I 5- Os f g .. - ,. . d- 1 *'E'-zW-P h- w

~ --

. . n~.gt .% s.j ** s * .a. ,,*=&'*:J l

. .% *. . .

• j*,/- '*

f 6}+ *-.  %, w

' X'&.

- e,;. o

.g.. '

. s.

s n, -

, . , , 1 . 7- .'st * *L ' -

e d $fN h hh. h }, Cj ,..."[ e*. * , {hy  %'pg* 't O

mmus &.f . 'cf.j'tp

- 9 >[ -Q. . . .[4.

..et . e.

+ s g. '". ,,; rf - . %: Mw*-$'

..g.. .

a f:

63=>c.. >-

e W

• 2 I> .* . ' - O'!-'  ;<-[ . 'a' Q.Q . ^-

' ^

;.l*b )q m&h

. .uo.ra:- f [. h 1,e.>

43S3 L *fC

• i ,,;, .y m

= a.

./ ' f * '&s . em>..;. v ~.

., ,',y,. .e '-

. W . M.. . , .

4.r Eo

'~

f.~ $

{

,.,.,h? ~4' k :. h w &M m sms

c. . n ces

.W d :p  ? S .o .c s?a ?6d!d!yN%w"Q@)n

.,i - .- .

%q' A Die ' e'h.

• yNE@ m.MMM r

L

. 7 r

{

MY fa* *** *

,D -*x aid')'7, M d .- c

..". h j- " ,- [ '". ,.

g (. '

t.

. .~,g(. . i

.4.,  %. .

a

• ,' g < -. .W4,%,q. c *

,p .f., 4, , ,*. %u ,,

N..k -- t 6  ?- y . o,- ese c73 r*,;;y",&, ,w-W: #M g o u> u. n.

Q.. .*. y . . o( . '\',.:,e e ..

w

. r. - .. .,

>J

% ,,xs- . . . : :Lsi r.

&,,pvs. > . " ^..' *, -

'.h .Qq v l*- 4 a.A* . .@.g ,

\ . L:= *  ?.  ;. .

• %ri,-Q.

R R 2 % W WUMi$>);?:'N.

C .M.+%R(M M i N. . ,

& ~ ' ??ll.?h$kf^?h..'~h.

.;l .

j r.4 .. >.

.9 . t .; ~,g+c .e e

. <y f, . .v-...

k .: $ , hvr7 h.)

4

. , x ;n.;y;.-

. 4..q . , f. 5 f- /*.g. 5 h.h../

m,)hi:

.s. _

,-.s~ 4c. % q. -v.,

'1, , a - ' a. ' 4 g .:..

.J.W.f. <

q , T .-[.;.t:i..?, S*.% :. ,

~'_:.4

~ . ' . , . .. .:n .H 't .- y ... ,.Xr. ... : ~.:p 2.%.z .;.1.%.

. w- ,-.fm.. m~

MA* C. K M..T..;

~

.% 5,7.R, D e-),' c.sg t/A'77 Ost/

c .

r

'-  : L O C4 *7~/OAl '. .. '8  :.. .

- . :c..gs'd:Y,y

, . ,s . f W T.*..=y

. ::),f.'S4A1R.k ':* * '.q.Gl i

.. r gcIv.:F,,n

',% y,' 9"f.lM, m [" M....e Y;..w:..h,7;tQ-$@.~%hMN 'F[7w2%;p;Mp? y

~ . ? y%'s '. s' *\

• $]i..*  ::, . .

;.y.:.

~.,  :

mf; . ..t.

. .@~. Ip*v.t.8

. Gg.8:.'.'

• J . V ,.W . $ $], ..:'s

z. _ .$

• *' ' Y [.

e _

.e

. (T C &, }*? :' hh, ,.. * ~

/"[ ' -

t  %

. YhD. a., g. g _ . sh.*

. s , g.

e*, e

• . ' ; . ,; , /*: 3

.; Q , .

.. k '

._.,/

. ,.e..

e.$ .

a i .

'.' /. . ..

. . . *s. .. *9 f* .

e # & .-

• 1'[ *

-.** 3 9'-

w 4

/,,

A. .f r m;.c, ,-< .g

(-- . \.m

x -

g 2. ..

s . . *.- . '%. /;t's.'

~~~

- ~,. ~ ~ - - , _

h .f .

/,

f '

. v ,-

l ..

~~~___

,.-  % . . l. /

Y .1 .. ,:

.  :~

- t v' -  ;. . ' ~ ' -

m ,ugg 3 ,

1

. FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL INC. ENGINE & COMPRESSOR DIVISION

/# . Customer Engine No. Part or Assembly No. RMR No. Date F.A. No.

March 28, 1983 0151 Lilco 74010/12 03-360-03-OF 9496 ELEMENTS OF FAILURE:

Cyilnder Head P/N 03-360-03-OF i S/N E31 .E27 H/N 92P 73P SYMPTOMS OF FAILURE:

Exhaust passage water leak.

EXAMINATION OF ELEMENTS:

1. The cylinder heads were returned with known cracks, to be reworked.

2. Inspection of the fire decks revealed they were costed with a mixture of water and r'ust, typical of leaking heads.

3. 'The heada sere hydrostatically tested. A water leak was noted in the .

f exhaust passage near the flange in each head, (See photo & Fig.1), and was marked.

4. The head was dispositioned as suitable for rework preventing any destruct-ive analysis. Thc leaking section of the head was ground out. Examination of the metal filings revealed inclusions of sand (from the core) in the ,

(4 metal.

5. All of the poor metal was ground out until only sound base metal remained.

The section was then repaired by welding per standard shop procedure.

SUMMARY

OF ANALYSIS:

Exhaust passage leaks are not normally encountered so close to the exhaust flange. However sporadic core breakage and resultant inclusions are not unusual in cylinder heads manufactured in the early 1970's, when these heads were made. Subsequent improvements in casting techniques have eliminated these sort of problems.

Also, these heads were not stress relieved and were originally water tested at a lower pressure than is now standard, allowing the cracks to originally go undetected. With stress relieving and high pressure water testing, which more accurately simulate service conditions, such cracks no longer go undetected.

• CONCLUSION:

The failure of this head occured due to a typical manufacturing defect.

Detection of such defects has improved so they are now located during the manufacturing process for reworked heads. Manufacturing techniques have

' improved such that these defects no longer occur in production heads.

FAILULE ASALYSIS REPORT - 1RANSM1 ERICA DELAVAL ENGINE & C0liPRESSOR DIVISION

LILCO - S/N 74010/12 Pcgs 2 No. 0151

1. ' CONCLUSION -(continued)

In no way would this crack have caused a catastrophic failure of the engine or

(~ compromised its availability in stand-by service.

The head is. repairable provided no new unrepairable cracks are detected in final stresh relieving.

D. G. Contention item 3

Subject:

Cylinder Heads Preliminary 1, Date: May.9, 1983 Page 9 of 9 3

Date:

Signature-Failure Analysis fngineer

(:

1 4

e O

e