ML20196D777
| ML20196D777 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1988 |
| From: | Baranski J, Cuomo M, Czech L, Halpin P, Letsche K, Papile J, Roberts R, Zahnleuter R KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, NEW YORK, STATE OF, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196D722 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-3, NUDOCS 8802180065 | |
| Download: ML20196D777 (170) | |
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UN ",'l " " ,'g AMERICA NUCL RY" COMMISSION lO Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board
)
O' In the Matter of )
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
, Unit 1) )
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!O AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF' GOVERNMENTS' OPPOSITION TO
, LILCO'S
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION MOTIONS ON CONTENTIONS 1-2 AND 4-10
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Affidavits in Support of Governments' Opposition to LILCO's Sum ==rv Disposition Motions on Contentions 1-2 and 4-10 A) .
TAh Affidavit 1 Affidavit of Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York, Feb. 8, 1988 ("Cuomo Affidavit")
,O 2 Affidavit of Patrick G. Halpin, Suffolk County Executive,
- Feb. 9, 1988 ("Halpin Affidavit")
3 Affidavit of Richard C. Roberts, Suffolk County Police .
Department, Feb. 9, 1988 ("Roberts 1988 Affidavit")
4 Affidavit of Richard C. Roberts, Suffolk County Police Department, Sept. 25, 1984 ("Roberts 1984 Affidavit")
5 Affidavit of James E. Papile, James C. Baranski, and Lawrence B. Czech, New York State Radiological Emergency O Preparedness Group, Feb. 10, 1988 ("REPG Affidavit")
6 Affidavit of James E. Papile, New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group, May 11, 1987 ("Papile Affidavit")
7 Affidavit f Karla J. Letsche, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart,
^.O Feb. 10, 1988 ("Letsche Affidavit")
8 Affidavit of Richard J. Zahnleuter, State of New York, Feb. 10, 1988 ("Zahnleuter Affidavit")
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board O
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 O ) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
.O AFFIDAVIT OF MARIO M. CUOMO, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Mario M. Cuomo, being under oath, deposes and says as follows:
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- 1. I am the Governor of the State of New York. Under New l York law, I, as Governor, would be responsible for directing the O
State's response to any radiological emergency within the State
- of New York.
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- 2. On May 6, 1987 I submitted an affidavit in the instant I
proceeding. Attached to that affidavit was a statement dated June 30, 1986, issued by me concerning misstatements and mis-10' characterizations made by LILCO concerning the implementation of l
LILCO's radiological emergency response plan for the Shoreham plant. These LILCO statements related particularly to LILCO's O
so-called "realism" argument and LILCO's claims as to how the 1 0
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State would respond to a hypothetical radiological emergency if the Shoreham plant were licensed to operate. A copy of my May 6,.
O i- 1987. affidavit and the attached June 30, 1986 statement is incorporated as Exhibit.1 hereto.
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- 3. I hereby affirm that~the statements set forth.in my May 6, 1987 affidavit and the June 30, 1986 statement continue to be Etrue today. As stated therein, as Governor'of the State of New O
York, in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, New York State personnel would not be authorized to utilize the LILCO emergency plan for Shoreham and, further, New York State
.O personnel would not be authorized to rely upon advice from LILCO personnel or otherwise to work in coordination with LILCO j personnel. The reasons for this position are set forth in my
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June 30, 1986 statement and need not be repeated herein. It is l important to bear in mind that experts of New York State have i
i analyzed LILCO's Pltn and the capabilities of LILCO's emergency
!O workers as part of the State's participation in the NRC's licensing proceedings. These State officials, including those who presented sworn testimony, have found LILCO's emergency plan to be unworkable and its emergency workers incapable of performing effectively in a radiological emergency. The true "realism" is that LILCO has a paper plan and a paper emergency O
response organization which are inadequate and unworkable. The State has no confidence in either of these. Therefore, under no circumstance could or would the State rely on LILCO's Plan or O
emergency workers to protect the safety of New York's citizens.
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The State would not put the public's welfare at LILCo's disposal.
- 4. I am awar.: that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's new emergency planning regulation dated November 3, 1987, includes the following sentence:
D In addressing the circumstances where applicant's inability to comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this l section is wholly or substantially the result l of nonparticipation of state and/or local p governments, it may be presumed that in the event of an actual radiological emergency state and local officials would generally follow the utility plan.
l I refer specifically to the language, H . . . It may be presumed that in the event of an actual radiological emergency state and local officials would generally follow the utility plan." I hereby state firmly that officials of the State of New York would O not follow LILco's emergency plan. There is no basis for any suggestion to be made to the contrary. In fact, officials of New York State would neither follow LILCo's emergency plan nor work O with LILeo's emergency response personnel. LILeo's plan is unworkable and inadequate, and LILCo's emergency response personnel are incompetent. The State of New York could not O effectively exercise its police power obligation to protect the health and safety of its citizens if the State were to rely upon LILCO's plan and personnel in a radiological emergency.
O Moreover, except for a few who have analyzed LILco's plan solely for the purposes of litigation, New York State's emergency planning and response personnel are not aware of the contents of O
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LILCO's plan and have not trained 'or prepared in any way to implement it.
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- 5. I am informed that LILCO in its recent summary disposition motions claims that in a radiological emergency, New York State would give LILCO permission to carry out particular emergency planning functions, such as sounding sirens or disseminating emergency broadcast messages. This is untrue.
O First, these functions could not be turned over to LILCO because they are inherently within the police powers of the State. Only the State is legally cons':ituted to exercise the functions that O
LILCO falsely claims the State would authorize LILCO to perform.
Second, LILCO's personnel are not capable of performing functions necessary to protect the health and safety of the citizens of New p"
York in a radiological emergency. LILCO's personnel do not possess the competence and skills to confront and respond effectively to the exigencies of a nuclear accident that require O such extraordinary actions as evacuating hundreds of thousands of people facing innumerable personal difficulties, and dealing with the pressures and complexities of what would be the most O
challenging and demanding emergency that any population center in this nation has ever faced. Thus, the State would not use LILCO's resources or turn over to LILCO any State resources,
.O including the State emergency broadcast system. Nor would the l State manage or coordinate a response from any LILCO facility.
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- 6. I am informed that LILCO claims that I would be required to exercise my authority under Article 2-B of the a
Executive Law so as to use LILCO's emergency plan and emergency workers in a radiological emergency. LILCo's claim is untrue.
Articic 2-B dcca not require me to use resources offered by LTLCO 3
or anyone else that I consider inadequate and incapable of aiding the State and its citizens in responding to the exigencies of a radiological emergency. I consider LILCO's emergency plan and O
emergency workers to be precisely that -- inadequate and incapable. To use LILCo's resources would be to compound severely the risks and dangers that the public would already be O
facing from the radiological accident. Article 2-B imposes no duty on me to take action that I believe would harm the welfare
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cf New York's citizens.
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O Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York Affirmed this QM U day of February, 1988.
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3 Attachm;nt 1 3 l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board In the Matter of )
)
J LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Em' erg.ency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power )
Station, Unit 1 )
________________________________)
C AFFIDAVIT OF MARIO M. CUONO, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Mario M. Cuomo, being under oath, deposes and says as g follows:
- 1. I am the Governor of the State of New York. Under New York law, I, as Governor, would be responsible for directing the v
n State's response to any radiological emergency within the State of New York.
- 2. On June 30, 1986, I issued a Statement, the purpose of O which was to correct misstatements and mischaracterizations by LILCO concerning the implementation of LILCO's radiological emergency response plan for the Shoreham plant, LILCO's so-called c "realism" argument, and the State's response to a Shoreham emergency were the plant to be licensed to operate. A copy of my June 30, 1986 Statement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
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- 3. I hereby affirm that my June 30, 1986 Statement is truthful and accurate, and that it continues to reflect my position as Governor, and the posit n of the State of New York, on the subjects discussed therein.
Ma io M. Cuomo O Go"ernor of the State of New York O
Subscribed to and sworn before me this 6A day of May, Notary Public 9M $8f4/df State of New York O Qualified in xings county My commission expires: /2/J///
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Exhibit A 9
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O Statement by Governor Mario d4 Cuomo O
I have reviewed the statement issued on June 23, 1986, by Suffolk County Executive Peter F. Cohalan concerning O misstatements by LILCO of his position on the licensing of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. I support the County Executive's statement.
I am issuing this statement for the similar purpose O
of correcting misstatements and mischaracte.rizations of my position that LILCO is continuing to make. ..
O 1. There is no basis for LILCO to suggest that the State would respond to a Shoreham emergency in accordance with LILCO's emergency plan or in concert with LILCO. The State would do
'3 neither. Suffolk County has resolved not to implement LILCO's emergency plan or to respond in concert with LILCO the State would not in an emergency act inconsistently or in conflict with the County, Where a local government of the State judges that it would not rely in an emergency upon a particulai entity, such as LILCO -- and provides reasonable' bases such as those contained in O
the Suf folk County Executive's statement -- the State could not responsibly second guess the local government's judgment.
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- 2. Even setting aside Suffolk County's determination, New York State could not responsibly act in concert with LILCO O
during a radiological emergency. Indeed, the established position of the State is that LILCO's emergency plan is unworkable. The State, therefore, could not in an emergency
'O choose to rely upon the very plan that it has found to lack merit.
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Moreover, throughout the Shoreham project, LILCO has demonstrated poor judgment with respect to matters involving the plant. The decision to press ahead with licensing Shoreham in the face of the determinations of Suffolk County and New York State that they would not adopt or implement emergency plans is itself an example. Similarly, the finding of the State Public
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, Service Commission that LILCO's management of the Shoreham project was "imprudent" in the amount of at least $1.3 billion is i more evidence of the LILCO's poor judgment. Also, LILCO's
.O emergency response to Hurricane Gloria last autumn shows that in j the one recent test LILCO faced in a real emergency, the
, Company's actions were inadequate. In short, there is no basis
..e for the State, or indeed the public, to have confidence in
- LILCO's judgment or capabilities in an emerg'ency. Given this, the State could not and would not rely upon LILCo, its emergency ;
- O plan, or its advice in the event of a radiological emergency at i
- Shoreham.
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LILCO has repeatedly suggested that during an emergency I would suspend New York laws to permit LILCO to implement its 1
'O emergency plan. I could not lawfully delegate to LILCO police power to implement its emergency plan. But, even if I could, I cannot conceive of taking the extraordinary measure of suspending O
the laws of this State in order to permit LILCO, a company in which the State does not have confidence, to implement a plan which the State believes to have no merit. Whatever I would do O
at the moment of an emergency would be for the public good.
LILCO's plan does not serve the public good, and I would not l
facilitate the implementation of it.
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- 4. LILCO is seeking a license to operate Shoreh=a on the basis of a fiction, which LILCO ouphemistically calls "realism."
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- t has created this fiction in part by misrepresenting a statement I issued on December 20, 1983. Significantly, however, the purpose and thrust of that statement was to explain why O
New York State opposes the licensing of Shoreham. Included in t
the four pages of my December 20, 1983, statement is the i
following paragraph:
C Of course, if the plent were to be operated and a misadventure were t'o occur, both the State and the County would help to the extent possible; no one suggests otherwise.
O However, government a obligation '
to respond to a catastrophe should not be used as an excuse, for inviting the peril.
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l This paragraph is being misused by LILCO to create false O impreselons in support of the licensing of Shoreham. This is contrary to my opposition to the licensing of Shoreham and a mischaracterization of my intent on December 20, 1983, and now.
() Because LILCO is misusing these words for an end to which I strongly object, I hereby take the extraordinary measure of withdrawing these words so that they not be cited, quoted, or
!O otherwise relied upon.
I have directed my special counsel to transmit copies of g this statement to LILCO, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.'
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f v February 9, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
() - Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board
)
() In the Matter of )
< )
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. )
Unit 1) *
)
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AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK G. HALPIN O
Patrick G. Halpin, being duly sworn, does state as follows:
I. Introduction
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.. I am the County Executive of Suffolk County, New York.
I have held this position since January 1, 1988, having been duly
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elected to this position in November 1987. As County Executive, I am authorized to direct the County's response to emergencies.
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- 2. I am familiar with "LILCO's Motions for Summary Dispo-sition of Contentions 1-2 and 4-10," dated December 18, 1987.
This Affidavit addressen matters alleged by LILCO in the Motions.
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- 3. LILCO alleges in the Motions that in the event of a .
radiological emergency at Shoreham, the Suffolk County government would respond by working in close coordination with LILCO person-nel and that Suffolk County officials, in carrying out such a O response, would rely upon and follow LILCO's offsite emergency response plan for Shoreham. LILCO asserts that such a coordin-ated response effort between LILCO and suffolk County personnel O must be presumed to occur on the basis of the NRC' recently amended emergency planning rule, set forth at 52 Fed. Reg.
42078-87 (Nov. 3, 1987). Attachments 1 and 2 to this Affidavit ^
O are summaries and quotations of LILcO's various assertions about the ways in which LILCO claims Suffolk County and New York State would act in the event of an emergency at Shoreham.
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- 4. LILCO's assertions regarding how Suffolk County would respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham are false.
O Suefolk County believes that Shoreham should not be permitted, and indeed will not be permitted, to operate above 5 percent
- power. If, for present purposes of discussion, however, one O assumes that Shoreham were permitted to operate, and if there were then a radiological accident at Shoreham, Suffolk County would not use LILCO's plan or coordinate with LILCO personnel in any response to that emergency. To use or otherwise follow O
LILCO's plan in any way or to rely upon LILCO personnel would be to violate the County's established emergency planning policies, t brea h the trust f ur citizens, and t endanger the safety O
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of the public through reliance on a LILCO plan and LILCO emer-I) gency workers that are incapable of protecting the public safety.
II. County Policy 9.
- 5. Suffolk County's policy that it will not use LILCO's plan or rely upon LILCO personnel in a Shoreham emergency does
() not represent a new County policy. Rather, the policy is long standing, enunciated first in Resolution No. 111-1983, then followed by Peter F. Cohalan, the County Executive during most'of
. () the period covering the Shoreham emergency planning controversy, :
and subsequently followed by my predecessor in office, Michael A.
LoGrande. A copy of Resolution No. 111-1983 is Attachment 3 g) herate: a copy of Mr. Cohalan's statement is Attachment 4 hereto; ,
and a copy of Mr. LoGrande's affidavit adopting Mr. Cohalan's statement is Attachment 5 hereto.
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- 6. I hereby affirm my agreement with, and I hereby adopt as :
part of this affidavit, Attachments 3-5 hereto. I will not burden this affidavit by repeating the statements and rationale !
j) contained in those Attachments. I stress, however, that they set forth in detail the bases for the County's decision not to adopt or implement an emergency plan for Shoreham, the reasons that the
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County would never use LILCO's Plan, and why the County would O ,
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.,2 never in any way rely upon or coordinate with LILCO personnel in O the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham.1/
III. Additional Comments Related to LILCO's Motions O
- 7. I am informed that LILCO asserts repeatedly that the County would give LILCO approval or permission to take various
() actions in the event of a Shoreham accident.1/ LILCO's asser-tions are false. As County Executive, I would never grant LILCO any such permission or approval. First, in my view, giving LILCO O such permission or approval would constitute an improper transfer of the governmental authority and police powers of this County to LILCO. It would thus be inconsistent with my responsibilities as the County Executive and would put into LILCO's hands the O
public's safety that I was elected to protect. Second, LILCO LILCO suggests that because County police officers have responded to several security threats at Shoreham, the County O would work cooperatively with LILCO if there were a radiological emergency at Shoreham. LILCO's suggestion is false and a distortion of logic, because the events and circumstances are totally different. The County has determined that it is possible to respond adequately to a Shoreham security incident and the County does so. The County has also determined that an adequate O response to a radiological emergency is not possible. Therefore, the County has resolved not to adopt or implemrit an emergency plan, and it will not do so. The County is thus forthright in the context of both security and emergency planning. It is disingenuous for LILCO to torture facts and logic in order to
- create false impressions about the County's intentions.
,O 3/ For example, LILCO states in its "Introduction: Memorandum of Law" (p. 3) that "LERO must get permission from the State or 3
County to activate the warning sirens (for example) or to recommend to the public that they shelter or evacuate." LILCO then states that "LERO workers would be permitted to perform C) specific functions under the direction of these governmental authorities." Id. at 4.
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i cannot be trusted'to perform its duties capably, let alone
() perform emergency functions upon which the welfare and safety of 1.3 million citizens of Suffolk County would depend. We on Long Island have learned not to rely on LILCO to take action capably:
O LILCO's feeble and woeful response to hurricane Gloria and its gross mismanagement of Shoreham's construction are but two drama-tic examples.3/ Finally, we have seen the debacle of LILCO's
() performance in its February 1986 "exercise." Even though LILCO had originated the scenario for the exercise, even though the "exercise" has been found to be too limited in scope, even though O LILCO had received advance notice of the date of the nuclear "accident," and even though LILCO had conducted countless drills to get ready for the exercise and the specific date it was scheduled for. LILCO's LERO personnel still performed incompe-O tently. The Licensing Board's recent decision in LBP-88-2 under-scores what we have known for years: LILCO's LERO personnel are O 3/ I am informed that LILCO in several affidavits has asserted !
that its personnel's capabilities have been established through actions such as responding to gas line breaks and directing' ;
traffic in a few minor circumstances, and because some individual !
LILCO employees have received 7.vards. I do not belittle these efforts -- they are commendable. But we must keep in mind how 0 limited these actions were; they are irrelevant to the scope and types of action that would be required in a radiological emergency. When LILCO has been required to act in response to a major event such as Hurricane Gloria, or to the simulation of the 1986 Exercise whose scenario LILCO created for itself, its performance has been inadequate. And, no matter how many gas
() line breaks LILCO might postulate, the severity and massive impact of a nucleer accident at Shoreham would create burdens on L LILCO's workers that even the best gas-line repairman could t probably not even imagine. Indeed, it is ridiculous for LILCO to !
compare a localized gas line break to the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people under circumstances of a nuclear plant L C) disaster. The fact that LILCO does this, again shows that LILCO does not take emergency planning seriously.
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"amateurs" (LBP-88-2, at 6), not competent emergency workers; and O LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed, including deficiencies in communications, training, mobilization of workers, public infor-mation, media relations, and handling emergency broadcast system
() matters.d/ LBP-88-2 provides further corroboration of my judg-ment and Suffolk County's determination that the County could not and would not rely upon LILCO's plan or personnel. LILCO's plan
() is seriously flawed and unable to protect public safety, and LILCO's personnel are incompetent and inadequately trained to take effective emergency response actions. Therefore, in a radi 1 gical emergen y situati n at Shoreham, whatever response O
Suffolk County made, it would be without following LILCO's emer-gency plan or coordinating with LILCO or LERO. I emphasize that in su h a situati n, it w uld n t even be realistic to consider 0
working with LILCO. The citizens of Suffolk County would undoubtedly view LILCO as the culprit that recklessly forced Shoreham into operation over the public's overwhelming opposi-
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tion. The accident would again prove LILCO's judgment to be worthless, and it would prove the public's to have been right.
LILCO would be seen as having betrayed its promise that an acci-dent was virtually certain not to happen. No Suffolk County official could then turn to LILCO for aid and advice on how to respond to the catastrophe which LILCO itself created. There 1/ LILCO asserts in its Memorandum of Law (p. 8) that its LERO personnel are "trained" to respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham. Suffolk County's witnesses at the Exercise hearing, including expert police officers, conclusively demonstrated LILCO's assertion to be false, and LBP-88-2 underscores this
() fact.
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O would be public outrage toward LILCO and disbelief of anything a LILCO was part of, including recommendations for protective actions, public information, and other emergency response actions.
- 8. LILCO urges that the County would be irresponsible if it were to act on its own. LILCO claims that the County would have to use LILCO's sirens and LILCO's radio massages and other resources because LILCO's methods are in LILCO's judgment the best way of protecting the public. LILCO is entitled to its g views of what.is "best" for itself, but LILCO does not speak for the County and has no basis or competence to claim what is "best" for the County or what our "best efforts" would be. The County a speaks for itself through its Legislature and its County Execu-tive. On Shoreham matters, we speak in one voice: Suffolk County would not use LILCO's Plan or resources because we believe q LILCO's Plan is inadequate and unworkable. We thus have concluded that our "best efforts" would be exercised as described above -- acting on our own, without regard to LILCO's Plan or personnel.
- 9. I want to ensure that there is no misunderstanding of Suffolk County's policy: Suffolk County will not under any U
circumstances rely on LILCO's emergency plan or on LILCO's LERO personnel. I have directed my staff to gather all copies of LILCO's Plan in the County's possession, except for only three
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l copies which will be maintained to assist our litigation efforts. l 3 The Suffolk County Police Department ("SCPD") personnel who have served and/or may serve as witnesses will have one copy to share only for purposes of assisting with matters in litigation.
O Mr. Boyle, the County Attorney, will have one copy for purposes i
of assisting with matters in litigation. And Mr. Kurtter, my l Deputy County Executive who oversees Shoreham matters, will have
() one copy for purposes of assisting with matters in litigation.
All other copies of the Plan have been or are being sent to the County's outside litigation counsel, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, for
() their use in litigation. It must be stressed, therefore, that County personnel know essentially nothing about LILCO's Plan, except for those few persons who have provided litigation support. And, these persons' knowledge of LILCO's Plan is thus z) limited to having identified, analyzed, and/or testified about inadequacies in the Plan and specific ways in which the Plan is defi lent. These persons have not studied LILCO's Plan for any O
purpose of preparing or learning how to administer or implement the Plan. There has been and will be no planning or training whatsoever for County personnel to take any actions pursuant to y
LILCO's Plan or any other plan or to work with LILCO personnel.
- 10. It is my intent that the foregoing paragraphs put to rest conclusively LILCO's baseless statements that Suffolk County would ever rely on LILCO's Plan or personnel in an emergency.
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. rYet, there are a number of additional matters contained in
$3. LILCO's Motions that I wish'to address below..
- 11. I am informed that LILCO asserts that in the event of
{} an emergency, I or my-representative would go to LILCO's
+1 7 Emergency Operations Center. It also is asserted that LILCO personnel would be permitted to come to the SCPD police head-
- () quarters in Yaphank to assist in briefing an'd dispatching County police. Indeed, LILCO would have the Licensing Board believe that the Suffolk County police would work with LILCO's Traffic l() Guides to implement the traffic and E9Z perimeter access control measures set forth in LILCO's Plan. LILCO also contends that its
. personnel would be given permission to remove obstructions such
) as accidents and stalled or broken down vehicles from the road-ways and to provide fuel to motorists. LILCO's statements are false, and I reject them as pure fantasy. I would not go, nor would any County representative go, to LILCO's facility; and no
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LERO personnel would be permitted into the SCPD headquarters.
Moreover, under no circumstances would the Suffolk County police work in partnership with LERO personnel to direct traffic or
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control access to evacuated areas of the EPZ. It is equally
! baseless for LILCO to suggest that the police would implement the i
[ traffic control portions of the LILCO Plan. They would not do
- O i so. Nor would I or any other County official give LILCO permis-
! sion to remove roadway obstructions or to provide fuel to motorists during a Shoreham emergency. I repeat that LILCO's O
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i 3-l actions over the years make LILCO a company whose judgment and
.() -competence Suffolk County and the public cannot trust or rely on. I I would be derelict in my responsibilities if I were to work with LILCO in a radiological emergencj situation when the public's
() -lives and safety were in danger and when the public had to have confidence in their leaders and their leaders' judgment. Indeed, if in an emergency I were to turn to the discredited LILCO for
() help or advice, I would have no credibility with the public because neither I nor the public have any trust in LILCo. If I turned to LILCO, I would lose my effectiveness.as a public
,(3 official. .
- 12. I am informed that LILCO claims that Suffolk County personnel would use LILCO's Plan and rely upon LERO personnel 73 because New York State law, particularly Article 2-B of the New York Executive Law, and the Suffolk County Charter, call for the use of private resources in an emergency. LILCO's statement O
is false and seriously misleading. While New York law permits reliance in appropriate circumstances on a volunteer organization to carry out certain tasks, the clear premise of New York law is
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that a County Executive, before relying upon any volunteer organ-ization, must consider the volunteer organization to be competent I and helpful in performing needed emergency services. In the present instance, neither LILCO's judgment nor its competence is i worthy of Suffolk County's trust. LILCO has demonstrated itself and its LERO organization to be grossly inadequate in its j)C .
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structure, organization, composition, training, performance, and
$3 even purpose. Indeed, LERO has shown itself simply to be a cosmetic organization that LILCO has sought to use for the R12 forma purpose of securing an NRC license, not an organization C) actually constituted to be able to provide effective emergency services in a nuclear accident where human lives and safety are on the line.1/
O
- 13. I am informed that LILCO asserts that Suffolk County in the past has merely offered "generalized denials" in stating that
() it would not rely upon LILCO or LILCO's Plan. LILCO's statement is false. Attachments 3-5 hereto do not constitute "generalized denials," but rather constitute detailed explanations of why Suffolk County, in the rational exercise of its police powers, O
has decided not to adopt or implement an emergency plan for Shoreham and why no County Executive could or would make use of LILCO's Plan or rely in any way on LILCO personnel in an emer-O gency. These are pointed statements of principle and practical explanations detailed with chapter and verse specificity. The fact that LILCO persists in mischaracterizing these categorically g
clear statements and seeking to pass them off as inconsequential is, to Suffolk County, just another example of the cavalier O
1/ For example, the County Charter permits the County to use "trained" radiological personnel. LILCO cites this provision at pages 5-6 of its Memorandum of Law. But LILCO omits a critical fact: LILCO's personnel are not trained and competent emergency workers on whom the County could rely. The County's witnesses at
() the Exercise hearing conclusively demonstrated this, and LBP-88-2 underscores it.
O
a O
L conduct, the lack of good faith, and the misdeeds LILCO has C) consistently manifested toward Suffolk County. In short, LILCO's claim is simply a distortion'of the truth.
() 14. I am informed that LILCO asserts that the principal reason that Suffolk County would not use LILCO's Plan is Suffolk County's alleged disagreement with LILCO's choice of.a 10-mile
()
plume exposure emergency planning zone. LILCO's statement is false. The principal reason that Suffolk County would not use LILCO's Plan is that the Plan would not protect the public's safety, but would instead imperil public safety. Indeed, ;
O following an eight month, S600,000 study and analysis by a team of nationally recognized experts, Suffolk County determined that an adequate emer9en y re8ponse, whether it be in the context of a 2, O
10, or 20-mile EPZ, would not be possible to achieve.5/ The County's determination was the basin of its resolution not to adopt or implement an emergency plan for Shoreham that was upheld
)
1/ LILCO refers several times to the so-called Voorhees plan, i.e.,
the draft County plan which was developed in 1982 and rejected by Suffolk County in Resolution 111-1983. LILCO's references to that plan are irrelevant because the plan was rejected and is thus a nullity.
,O The plan was a draft document prepared in 1982 by County consultants; when the draft was presented to the Legislature, and reviewed following extensive hearings, it was rejected on the merits. The draft was not distributed to County officials or departments for use under any circumstance. The County has devoted no resources to the implementation of the rejected plan or to any other plan. To my
'() knowledge, no copies of that draft plan are even available to County response personnel. LILCO's references to Mr. Cohalan's statement that the Voorhees plan was the "best possible" plan are likewise irrelevant.
The consultants were told to prepare the best possible plant but that plan was not adequate and was rejected. LILCO's assertions that the rejected draft plan reflects how Suffolk County would act in a Shoreham ,
'() emergency are baseless, false, and a distortion. LILCO has no right to arrogate to itself the power to speak for the County and attribute to the County the false statements that LILCO fabricates.
O
I (J l by the federal courts anct the courts of New York as being lawful O and rationally based. LItcO's claim, again, is simply a distortion.
C) 15. I am informed that LILCO asserts at various places in its Motions that the NRC's new rule and the so-called "best efforts" principle require the Licensing Board to presume that in
() the event of a serious radiological emergency, Suffolk County would take actions which are contrary to Suffolk County law ,
(Legislative Resolution 111-1983) and the sworn statements of t'wo O past Suffolk County Executives and myself. LILCO's assertiens are false. The NRC's new rule permits no such presumption. Indeed, t the new rule recognizes that local governments and State govern-ments have the authority and responsibility to exercise their ,
9 police powers in the manner which they deem serves the health, l welfare, and safety of their citizens. Attachments 3-5 hereto, as well as the discussion in the body of this Affidavit, explain O
thoroughly why Suffolk County has determined that its police power responsibilities require it not to adopt or implement an emergency plan f r Shoreham and not to rely on LILCO's Plan or O ,
LILCO's personnel. Suffolk County has thus acted conclusively within the sphere of governmental responsibilities that is exclusively the County's. Neither LILCO nor the NRC is in a position to second guess how Suffolk County exercises its police '
powers, and any such suggestions of LILCO or the NRC would be both misguided and false. It is only this County government-- l C) i
n u
established by law and elected by the people it is constituted to ,
O serve -that can speak authoritatively of what the County would ,
itself do in an emergency. The fact is that Suffolk County speaks through its elected officials: the County Legislature and r O the County Executive. The Legislature through duly enacted Resolutions, and the Executive through repeated statements and representations, including affidavits such as the instant affi- .
O davit, have spoken cate9erically and directly: suffolk County would never follow or otherwise use LILCO's Plan or rely on, coordinate with, or otherwise work with LILCO's personnel in the O event of a radiological emergency at the Shoreham plant. Any statement of LILCO or anyone else tc the contrary is but mere fantasy.
O^
( V ~~Patfick G. Halp n O 4 ,
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 9 day of February 1988, s
L LtunA %
(Notary Publid Nuf AM Ptleuc. 9.it . Nm bk th Ocw;5:Je vrch tw My Commission expires: k n W m b p M y31,19
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- L.If,CO VERSION OF A BEST EFFORTS CONTENTION pOVERNMENT' RESPONSE < -
9'- -
g.
S&6: Activation of -Pursuant to the LILCO version - '-
a sirens, direct of d best. efforts response, the broadcast Governments would: e 3
messaging making s $;0. . protective action
,O decisions , ,
.~' q
- x
_y 1) "tell LERO to sound'the
'..,' sirens" (Motion at 2);
/s .
Q '
i) '.
grant'LERO permission to s ' implement "certain elements of e .*
d the emergency response" '
(Motion at 13); including
- - notification, evacuation ' ~ '
O ,_ y _. , ,
. and/or early dismissal of '-'
s schools (Motion at 14); -g
- q
- 3) rely on the advice of the ,
4 plant staff (Motion at 15);
i < .
, 1 is
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t
- 4) use the Emergency' Broadcast '
~
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System messages written by '
N LILCO (Motion at 16); --
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- 5) "direct the emergency response .
!O ut of the LERO EOC"
! _ (Motion at 20). #.
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1 LILCO VERSION OF A BEST EFFORTS CONTENTION GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
'l&2 Direct traffic, block Pursuant to the LILCO version R roadways, erect of;a best efforts response, barriers on roadways, the Governments would:
- ' g channel. traffic during
>- a Shoreham emergency.
- 1) "implement in the field the traffic control elements of
'], the LILCO Plan" (Motion at 2);
h 'N ' 2) be able to supply the communication system and C) police necessary to implement the traffic control elements of the LILCO Plan (Motion at 3);
\,
X3
- 3) notify, mobilize and dispatch
' the police to the traffic control points [ Motion at 4);
- 4) have Suffolk County police assembled and briefed at I) Yaphank in two hours time (Motion at 5);
- 5) instruct Suffolk County police
- N to direct traffic pursuant to the advice of LERO traffic O." ^' guides and the guidance of the
- - LILCO Plan rather than implement an ad hoc response
.o of their own (Motion at 8);
f 6) grant permission for the LERO
() traffic guides to direct traffic in the event an adequate number of Suffolk County police fail to report (Motion at 10).
O
'O O-
.O 4
LILCO VERSION OF A BEST EFFORTS CONTENTION GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
.Q:
10 Provide access control Pursuant to the LILCO version at the perimeter of of a best efforts response, the the E&Z Governments would:
r,,
v (1) "Suff ik County Police could and would provide long-term access control" _(Motion at 4);
(2) the best efforts response of the Suffolk County police would "be adequate to protect
() the public health and safety" (Motion at 7);
(3) the Suffolk County police "would maintain EPZ perimeter control" and keep the public C) out of evacuated areas (Motion at 8).
4&9 Removing road Pursuant to the LILCO version obstructions and of a best efforts response,
.(3 providing gasoline the Governments would:
(1) in a fast-breaking accident, give LERO permission via a telephone conversation to remove obstructions from the
- r)
' road and dispense gasoline to evacuees (Motion at 1);
(2) in a slower developing accident, give permission to LERO at the LERO EOC to remove
-() obstructions and dispense gasoline to evacuees (Motion at 1);
O O
O D
69; LILCO VERSION OF A BEST EFFORTS CONTENTION GOVERNMENT RESPONSE dD-(3) grant permission to LERO quickly-(Motion at 2);
(4) "certainly" allow LERO to clear road obstructions and JD dispense gasoline (Motion at 6).
7&8 Make and implement Pursuant to the LILCO version ingestion pathway, of a best efforts response, the jp recovery and reentry Governments would:
decisions (1) the State of New York would:
(a) implement its generic
-)
recovery and reentry and ingestion pathway procedures, using the LILCO Plan to compensate for the lack of a county plan (Motion at 2);
- 5) (b) "convene the State Recovery Committee" (Motion at 6);
(c) "function in the lead position for long-term
.C) radiological monitoring and medical follow-up for the general public." The County "would assist the State, using the LILCO Plan" (Motion at 13);
(d) "recommend protective actions and direct ingestion pathway activities for Nassau and Suffolk counties"
,() (Motion at 19);
(e) use the LILCO Plan to maintain an inventory of dairy farms, food processing plants and
() State farms (Motion at 21);
.O
gl LILCO VERSION OF A BEST EFFORTS CONTENTION GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
'h "U j (2) Suffolk County would:
' , l (a) use the LILCO Plan and I LERO resources (Motion at i, . 2, 6);
"O-(b) collect data on the needs of an affected area and submit that data to the 7 State (Motion at 12);
=A (c) "follow its normal
^>
, procedures for all other emergencies" (Motion at 12);
(d) provide security and fire protection (Motion at
.O 14);
(e) determine the availa-bility of transportation (Motion at 14);
O (f) gather data and submit requests for federal aid (Motion at 14);
(g) would implement all of
.(3 LERo's recovery and reentry procedures (Motion at 14);
l (h) use LERO data and LERO decontamination and
- () transportation resources and procedures (Motion at 16);
>O l
I O
l
!O
O.
LILCO VERSION OF A BEST EFFORTS CONTENTION ' GOVERNMENT RESPONSE O'.
(1). "use LILCO's ingestion pathway procedures and resources" (Motion at 19);
-O- (j) use LILCO's procedures-for writing EBS messages (Motion at .4);
2 (k) use LILCO's procedures for ingestion pathway
) (Motion at 25);
(1) be responsible for implementing all LERO/ County activities and for coordinating with the State (Motion at-25);
O (3) the State and County would use the LILCO Emergency News Center (Motion at 24);
,0 (4) the State response to an ingestion pathway incident would be adequate (Motion at 26).
-O
- O t
10 i
O
~O Attachment 2
.O.
Examoles of LILCO "Best Efforts" Statements I.
Introduction:
Memorandum of Law on LILCO's Motions for O Summarv Disoosition of Contentions 1-2 and 4-10 "Later on in the emergency contact (between LERO and Suffolk County] would be face-to-face, because Suffolk County, using its 'best efforts,' would send a representative to the LERO Emergency Operations Center (EOC)."
Memorandum at 4.
O "In a real emergency, LERO workers would be permitted to perform specific functions under the direction of these O (State and County] governmental authorities."
Memorandum at 4.
( 3 "(T]he State and County would order (or ask -- it makes no difference) LILCO to sound the sirens; the authorities would not refuse to do the best thing simply because it was part
- () of the LILCO Plan . . . . (I]f plant conditions dictated that people should evacuate, the County would not refuse to evacuate them just because the LILCO Plan called for evacu-O ation."
Memorandum at 12.
O O
O J "The plain truth is that the authorities would do either-what the LILCO plan calls for or something better."
Memorandum at 12.
O II. LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 5 and 6 (Makino Decisions and Tellina the Publici "It is indisputable that the County would agree to sound the r-warning sirens if the public needed to be alerted, because the sirens are the best way to do it."
Motion at 2.
O
"(I]n the event that the County were faced with a phone call from LERO reporting that there was an emergency at the O
plant, that a Site Area or General Emergency had been declared, and that the public should be alerted, it is clear that the County would tell LERO to sound the sirens because
'O the public deserve to be notified and because there is no reason not to alert them."
Motion at 2.
LO l
l LILCO has revised this Summary Sheet, in light of the amendment to the emergency planning regulations, to provide O
the LERO Director with more specific instructions about how to . . . obtain permission to begin implementing certain i elements of the emergency response."
- O Motion at 13.
l
.O t .
1 "After getting permission to-initiate the EBS message and
[] sound the sirens, the LERO Director would suggest that the' Suffolk County Executive go to the LERO EOC, would end the call, and would immediately implement OPIP 3.3.4, Prompt j) Notification Systen Activation."
Motion at 14-15.
() "[T]he 'best efforts' principle dictates that the County Executive would have to rely on the best available informa-tion, and that is the advice of the plant staff, parti-O cularly when no other information is available."
Motion at 15.
O- "[T]he Suffolk County Executive would be no worse off than officials near other nuclear plants; ing county executive faced with a ' fast-breaking' accident would be forced to O rely, at least in the initial stages of the response, on the advice and recommendations of the utility's onsite experts."
Motion at 16.
O P
o
() A
0
() "The question may remain whether-the County Executive would allow the'use of the EBS messages in the LILCO plan or spend time rewriting them. Obviously he would have the option of r)- changing the messages if he wished. But the 'best efforts' orinciole recuires that he use the ore-acoroved messaaes if immediate action is needed."
O Motion at 16.
"It must be assumed that the County Executive or his O designee would direct the emergency response out of the LERO EOC. simply because that is where the information he needs is to be found."
.() Motion at 20.
"The 'best efforts' principle dictates that the County would
- (3- operate out of the LERO EOC."
Motion at 20.
{3 "Since LERO personnel and the County officials at the LERO EOC would be able to work in coordination, the emergency response would be implemented with a minimum of delay or
() confusion. The Suffolk County Executive, or his repre-l l
sentative, would be in charge and would have the responsi-bility for ordering the implementation of emergency response O actions."
Motion at 23.
O
.O III. LILCC's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 1 and 2 (Directino Traffic O
"LILCO's position that the Board should summarily dispose of Contentions 1 and 2 is based on one disputable fact: the c). 'best efforts' of the.Suffolk County police (working in cooperation with LERO) would be to implement in the field the traffic control elements of the LILCO Plan in the event O of a Shoreham emergency."
Motion at 2.
() "(T]here can be no question that the Suffolk County police could provide the personnel and communications system necessary to direct traffic during a Shoreham evacuation
.O . . . . [T]here is also no question that the police, with l assistance from LERO, would be able to implement the traffic control portion of the LILCO Plan without appreciable delay
- O or confusion."
Motion at 3.
O l io
- O O . ._ __ .. . _ -.
O O "When the 'best efforts' principle is applied to the existing record, a clear picture emerges how the police would respond during a Shoreham evacuation. Specifically, c) it is evident that the police could be notified and mobilized quickly, that they would know where to go once they were dispatched, and that they would understand what
-() they needed to do once they arrived at the TCPs."
Motion at 4.
O "The Board has found that LERO's Traffic Guides could report to their Staging Areas and be readied for dispatch within approximately two hours. The Suffolk County police would
!O almost certainly be able to assemble and be briefed at Yaphank within the same time."
Motion at 5.
O "The Traffic Guides would monitor the officers' radiological exposure and inform them if Protective Action Guidelines
{) (PAGs) for permissible exposure were exceeded. Other than l
this, the police would probably not need any assistance in performing their duties."
lg Motion at 8.
"With a police 'best effort,' . . . :raffic control would be
() performed in almost exactly the same way it would under the
.O _
O ^
'LERO-only response which the Board has already examined and O' approved. The.only difference is that Suffolk County police, rather than LERO Traffic Guides, would actually be directing traffic."
() Motion at 8.
"The 'best efforts' principle forecloses the argument that
()' the police would drastically deviate from the LILCO plan, or simply ignore the advice of trained traffic guides, in favor of some spur-of-the-moment, ad haq response of their own.
O Common sence refutes the argument that the police, trying their best, would somehow spoil the emergency response out of ignorance or incompetence."
O Motion at 8.
4 "If in such circumstances some LERO Traffic Guides were
- () mobilized and dispatched'before enough police could be mobilized and briefed, these Traffic Guides could be given permission to direct traffic by themselves."
O Motion at 10.
IV. LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 10 (Access Control at the EPZ Perimeter "LILCO submits that, given the 'best effor.ts' principle, there is no question that the Suffolk County police could and would provide long-term access control if necessary."
O Motion at 4.
l 0 -
CT 'i
"[T]he 'best efforts' principle of 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(1)
- () compels the conclusion that the police would provide long-term control if necessary."
Motion at 5.
O
"(T]he police's 'best efforts' would certainly be adequate to protect the public health and safety."
() Motion at 7.
"(S]ince under the 'best efforts' principle the police would O maintain EPz perimeter control, the public would be effectively kept out of those evacuated areas."
Motion at 8.
O V. LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 4 and 9 (Tow Trucks and Fuel Trucks)
"In a real emergency LERO would get permission from Suffolk
+
County (or, as a back-up, from New York State) before removing any obstructions from the roads or giving any gasoline to evacuees. In a fast-breaking accident LERO O
would get permission from the County Executive by telephone, as detailed in the accompanying LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 5 and 6 (Making Decisions.and O
Telling the Public). In a more likely slower-developing accident, permission would be obtained face-to-face from a l County representative at the LERO EOC."
O Motion at 1.
O . _ . . . . .
~
O
"(P]ermission to do their jobs would be obtained and 0; transmitted to the (LERO) road crews very quickly."
Motion at 2.
O "(T] hey (the LERO road crews) would not do their emergency jobs until told to by the EOC, which would first have received permission from Suffolk County."
() Motion at 5.
"(I]n an emergency the LERO Director of Local Response would O ordinarily receive permission to perform needed functions from the County Executive."
Motion at 5.
O
"(W] hen the LERO Director, at the EOC, got permission from the County (or State) to remove obstructions and give gas to l() motorists, he would relay the information to the Road Logistics Coordinator, also in the EOC."
Motion at 5.
O "When informed that an obstruction needed to be cleared, the Suffolk County Executive, using his 'best efforts' to
() protect people, would certainly allow LERO to clear it. If there were an evacuation, he would certainly allow LERO to provide gas rather than let evacuees' cars run dry."
' (3' Motion at 6.
- O _
y v
"In an emergency requiring the evacuation of the public from
() around.the Shoreham plant if an obstruction occurred on the roads that would hinder evacuating motorists, Suffolk County would permit LERO personnel to remove the obstruction unless
() there were a better way to remove it."
Motion, Attachment 1.
() "In an emergency requiring the evacuation of the public from around Shoreham, Suffolk County would permit LERO to give fuel to members of the public who needed it to evacuate.
O Motion, Attachment 1.
VI. LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 7 and 8 (Incestion Pathway and Recovery and Reentrv)
O
"[T]he State can apply its recovery and reentry and inges-tion pathway procedures in the generic plan section of the State Plan to a Shoreham emergency."
- O Motion at 2.
P
"(D]uring a Shoreham emergency, the State of New York would O
implement its generic recovery and reentry and ingestion '
pathway procedures since they are not site-specific and would use the LILCO Plan as needed to compensate for the O
fact that no county plan for Shoreham has been appended to the generic section of the State Plan. Suffolk County, on the other hand, would fulfill its clearly defined O
()
O responsibilities in the State Plan by using the LILCO Plan j and LERO resources."
Motion at 2.
- ) "During a Shoreham emergency, using its 'best efforts,' the State would direct recovery and reentry activities, u ing its own procedures, and Suffolk County would use the LILCO 3 Plan and LERO's resources to meet its responsibilities."
Motion at 5.
() "If there were an emergency at Shoreham, a 'best efforts response would require that the State convene the State Recovery Committee. The Committee would be comprised of the
() same State personnel and its members would be charged with the same responsibilities enumerated in the State's recovery procedures."
() Motion at 5.
"At this point in the emergency, Suffolk County will have
() been working side-by-side with LERO, using the LILCO Plan, since the onset of the emergency. Since Suffolk County has no recovery plans for a Shoreham emergency, it would
() continue to use the LILCO Plan to coordinate its participation in the recovery phase until recovery and reentry is accomplished."
fj Motion at 6.
()
e "The Suffolk County Executive and the Director of Local 43 Response would continue working together during the recovery and reentry phase. The County Executive would retain full responsibility for local decisionmaking and would direct the
_j County's response to the emergency. Meanwhile, the Director of Local Response would cerve as an advisory to the County Executive. The County Commissioner of Fire, Rescue and t; Emergency Services or his designee would work with the Manager of Local Response and would chair the Recovery Action Committee. Similarly, the County Commissioner of the
() Department of Health Services or his designee would work with the Health Services Coordinator; the County Commissioner of Police or his designee would work with the
() Evacuation Coordinator; and the County Public Information Officer or his designee would work with the Coordinator of Public Information."
O Motion at 8.
! "The 'best efforts principle requires that the State would O commence recovery operations for Shoreham based on these four major considerations. Since the State applies the Plan genericall3 to all other nuclear power plants in New York, 1
,9 it can apply it to Shoreham without modification. Thus, 1
precisely how the State would respond to a Shoreham l emergency is clear, as the following sections show."
(3 Motion at 9.
l lO
() ~
"Since the State witu be implementing its recovery and C). reentry procedures, this division of responsibilities will also occur during a Shoreham emergency. The State would follow its procedures and Suffolk County would fulfill its
() role.in the State Plan by using LILCO's recovery procedures and resources.".
Motion at 10.
O "The same decisionmaking process and coordination between the State and County would occur during a Shoreham emer-O gency. The LERo Coordinator of Public Information would work with the County Public Information Officer to dis-seminate information on the local level."
() Motion at 11.
"The County Executive would be responsible for collecting
() data on the needs of the affected areas and submitting that data to the State."
Motion at 12.
O "Suffolk County's involvement in this area does not require special planning for a radiological emergency. Rather, the O County would follow its normal procedures for all other emergencies."
Motion at 12.
O O ,
O "During the recovery / reentry phase of a Shoreham emergency,
() -the State would function in the lead position for long-term radiological monitoring and medical follow-up for the
. general public. The State would implement the same
- (3 - radiological monitoring activities and decisions for a .
Shoreham emergency that it would-for any other power plant in New York State. Suffolk County would assist the State,
() using the LILCO Plan, in any manner that the State deemed appropriate."
Motion at 13.
O "Consequently, the only functions that a county performs independently of the State are (1) providing security and
-Q fire protection, (2) determining the availability of transportation, and (3) gathering data and submitting them for federal aid. None of these functions require special O radiological expertise. Rather, they are the types of activities that counties normally perform during any emergency. The only function that may require special O assistance during a Shoreham emergency would be assessing the transportation needs of the public."
Motion at 14.
- 0, 4,
"Even though the LILCO Plan duplicates many of the State's activities, Suffolk County would still implement all of O
()
- O LERO's recovery and reentry procedures during a Shoreham
- (j. emergency."
Motion at 14.
O "(B}ased n the 'best efforts' principle, the State would implement its procedures completely."
Motion at 14.
O
. . . Suffolk County, using 'best efforts,' would implement the LILCO Plan to fulfill its responsibilities-in the State Plan."
Motion at 14-15.
"The State will perform its functions and use their data in making protective action recommendations to the County. The County will take LERO's data under advisement in its discussions with the State about what protective measures to O
take."
Motion at 15-16.
Q.
+O 10
- O
6-
.O 0
- "Since Suffolk County has no decontamination procedures in place, the County would use LERO's resources. The State,-
however, retains the responsibility for deciding when to
() begin these activities; LERO would not initiate environ-mental decontamination without direction from the County and/or_the State."
() Motion at 16.
"Since LERO has arrangements for transportation in place, O Suffolk County would use LERO's resources."
Motion at 16.
0 "The County Executive would make decisions about where to set up traffic control points on the advice of the LERO Evacuation Coordinator and the County Commissioner of O Police. The Suffolk County Executive would decide whether LERO traffic guides should be used during the reentry process."
O Motion at 16-17.
"Any communications activities implemented by LERO would be
() at the direction of Suffolk County."
Motion at 17.
O
() _
9 "LERO would not perform any security functions on public
- grounds other than helping with traffic control at the County Executive's request.
Motion at 17.
O "The Manager of Local Response and the County Commissioner of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services will jointly chair O the Recovery Action Committee and, as such, would be responsible for the implementation of these tasks. They would brief the County Executive and the Director of Local O Response on the status of reentry operations. The County Executive would take this information under advisement and would confer with the State on what protection action should O be implemented."
Motion at 17.
.O "The best efforts principle requires that the State implement its radiological ingestion exposure procedure during a Shoreham emergency and use the LILCO Plan wherever
- O site-specifio Procedures and information are needed. As such, the State would recommend protective actions and direct ingestion pathway activities for Nassau and Suffolk 1
(J Counties, the only two counties in the Shoreham 50-mile ingestion pathway."
Motion at 19.
l
'O l
() l
, l O d l
l "Obviously the State is prepared to mobilize its district l
-(1 offices on Long Island for an ingestion pathway response.
Therefore, they could do the same for Shoreham."
. Motion at 19.
d
"(T]he 'best efforts' principle dictates that Suffolk County use LILCO's ingestion pathway procedures and resources in resp nse t su h an emergency."
O Motion at 19.
O "(S] tate agencies provide the necessary resources to protect the public health, property, and the environment."
Motion at 20.
.o "Departments of Health, Agriculture and Markets, Environmental Conservation, State Police, and Transportation, the State Emergency Management Office (SEMO), and the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group (REPG) will participate in assessing the impact of the radiological emergency on the ingestion pathway and will
- O work with local governments in their response."
Motion at 20-21.
O
"[T]he State would rely on the LILCO Plan which maintains complete lists of dairy farms, food processors, duck farms, O
O
.O.
beef farms, fruit farms, vegetable and potato farms, farm
-() stands, milk dealers, and ice cream plants."
Motion at 21.
() "(T]he 'best efforts' principle requires the State and County to follow the LILCO Plan which calls for using the ENC for this purpose."
(f Motion at 24.
"The County, however, would use LILCO's procedures for g writing EBS messages."
Motion at 24.
"The "best efforts" principle requires Suffolk County to use the LILCO Plan in response to an emergency at Shorcham.
Since the State performs most ingestion pathway response activities, Suffolk County can easily fulfill its designated functions in the State Plan by using LILCO's procedures for ingestion pathway."
Motion at 25.
'O "Both LERO and the State can perform these functions without working at a cross purposes since the County Executive would O- be responsible for implementing all LERO/ County activities and for coordinating them with the State.
Motion at 25.
O O
O "There can be no question that the State's response to an O ingestion pathway incident would be adequate."
Motion at 26.
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O Attachment 3
. . . . . . , . ~ . . ~ . ..se as Introduced by Legislator 3 , Prospect, Foley, Nolan,.Blass, Wehrenberg, Rizzo,caracappa, Df'3dre, Geise, A11 grove, LaBua, DevL.s, Hariton, Beck B a e '* '
i RESOLUTION NO. 111 - 1983, CONSTITUTING THE FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS OF SUFFOLR COUNTY ON WHETHER A LEVEL OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TO RESPOND TO A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT AT THE SHOREHAM O NUCLEAR POWER STATION CAN PROTECT THE HEALTR, WELFARE AND SAFETY OF THE RESIDENTS OF l SUFFOLK COUNTY WHEREAS, New York, the New Suf folk County has a duty under . the constitution of the State c Charter York State Municipal Hcme Rule Law, and the Suffolk to Coun' C) County; and protect the health, safety, and welf are of the residents of suffe:
ITHEREAS,
- the Long Island Lighting Company ("LILCO')
desires the to north operate the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ("Shoreham"),is constructing loca ted a:(
O is within the boundaries of Suffolk County; andshore of Long Island near the town WHEREAS, a serious' huclear accident at release of significant qua'ntities of radioactive fission products; andShoreham could result in '
WHEREAS, nealth, the release of such radiation woul'd pose a severe hazard to tt O safety, and welfare of Suffolk County residents; and ,
iniEREAS, ,
shoreham on the duty of Suffolkin recognitton County oftotheprotect effects of such potential hazard posed i welfare the health, safety, at of its citizens, this Legislature on March 23, 1982, adopted Resolutic No. 262-1982, which directed that suf folk County prepare a "County Radiologic 2 O Imergency st the citizens Response PlanCounty of Suf folk to serve theand
. ."; interest of the safety, health, and welfa: '
WHEREAS, in Resolution 262-1982, loveloped by the County "shall not be operable and shall not be deemedthe Legislature adequat and capable of being implemented such until time as it is approved by tr luffolk County Legislature"; and O WHEREAS, in adopting Resolution 262-1982, the Legislature found tha sarlier planning efforts by LILCO and County planners (the "original planeir Sata") were inadequate posed by conditions on Long beekuse they failed to address the particular probler Island and further failed to account for huma schavior during a radiological emergency three Mile Island; and and the lessons of the accident 4 ,
c) '
WHEREAS, on March 29, 1982, Peter F.
acting to implement Rosolution 262-1982, by ' Cohalan, Suffolk County Executivt Executive Order established tr suffolk Coun*.y Radiological Emergency Response Plan Steering Committe
(* Steering Committee") and directed it to prepare a County pian for submittal t
) the County Executive and County Legislature; and WHEREAS, the Steering Committee assembled a group of highly qualified ar sationhlly plans and recognized experts from diverse disciplines to prepara such coun: .
.O L
O .
KHEREAS, such highly qualified experts worked in a diligent
' onscientious
- ef fort at af. pst in excess of $500 100 to prepare anc the best
>psaible plan for suffolk' county, and particularly to ensure that such plan too)
.nto account all particular physical and behavioral conditions on Long Islant
~O
- hat af fect the adequacy of the emergency response plan; and WHCREAS, the analyses, studies, and surveys of such experts included: '
(a) Detailed analyses of the po ssible releases of radiation frot Shoreham; O (b) Detailed analyses of the re.diological health consequences of sue:
radiation release on the population of Suf folk County, giventh, meterological, demographic, topographical, and other specifi-local conditions on Long Islands (c) k detailed social survey of Long Isla d residents to determin.
O '
and assess their intended behavior in the event of a seriou ;
accident at Shoreham; (d) A detailed survey of school bus drivers, volunteer firemen, an certain othey , emergency response personnel to determine whethe emergency .pe r. sonne l intend to report promptly for emergenc lO duties, or. instead to unite with , heir own families, in the even of a serious accident at Shoreham;- -
(e) Detailed estimates of the number of persons who would be ordere to evacuate in the event of a serious accident at Shoreham, a well as the number of persons who intend to evacuate voluntaril j) even if not ordered to do so; (f) Detailed analyses of the road network in Long Island and the tim required to evacuate persons from areas affected by radiatic releases; (g) Detailed analyses of the protective actions available to suffol 13 County residents to evacuate or take shelter from such radiatio releases; and (h) Analysis ' of the lessons learned from the accident at Three Mil Island on local government responsibilities to prepare for radiological emergency;. and O
WHER2AS, on May 10, 19 8 2, LILCO, without the approval or authorization c
- he suffolk County Gove rnment, submitted to the New York State Disaste
?reparedness Commisssion ("DPC") two volumes entitled "Suffolk Count Radiological Emergency Response Plan" and contain'ing the original planning data as fur ther revised and supplemented by LILCO, and requested the DPC to revie O snd approve such LILCO submittal as the local radiological emergency respons plan for Suffolk County; and HMEREAS, in Resolutions 456-1982 and 457-1982, the County furthe addressed the matter of preparing for a radiological emergency at Shoreham ar amphas,ized that:
O (a) The LILCO-submitted document was not and will not be the County Radiological Emergency Response Plan; and O
g - . -
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(D) The, Count 's indiological Em3rgone Response Planning Policy, a
_ .s <entaclater,y'p c Resolution 456-1982, as follows:
4 g e" 1 Suffolk Coun'ty shall not assign funds or personnel to test o
! - implement any radiological emergency response plan for
- () Shoreham th Nuclear Plant unless that plan, has been fully develope l
i to the best of the County's ability. -
l Suffolk County shall not assign funds or personnel to test o implement any radiological emergency response plan for th Shoreham Nuclear Plant unless that-plan has been subject of a
~()
- least two public hearings, one to be held in Riverhead, and on tb be held in Hauppauge.
I Suffolk County shall not assign funds or personnel to test o impleeent any radiological emergency response plan for th
!_ thoreham Nuclear Plant unless that plan has been approved, afte
'O public hearings, by the suffolk County Legislature and the Count Executive; and WHEREAS, on ~ June 9, 1982, the DPC rejected thm.LILCO-submitted documen for the reason that it was de,ficient; and g in[EREAS, on October 6, 1982, LILCO, again without Ehe approval c authorization of the Suf folk County Government, submitted to the DPC an amende
/ersion of the previously submitted LILCO document which had been rejected h the DPC; and
, WHEREAS, on December 2, 1982, the Draft County pudiologidal Emergenc tesp nse Plan auth rized by Res luti n 262-1982 was submitted to the Count
'O *. egislature for review and public hearings as specified in Resolutions 262-1982 456-1982, and 457-1982; and .
THIE RE AS , in January 1983, the Legislature held hearings on the Draf
- ounty plan, which hearings included:
.O (a) More than 1,590 pages of transcripts; (b) Detailed written statements and oral testimony of County exper
- consultan'ts who prepared the Draft County plan;
(c) Detailed written statements and oral testimony of LILCO officia'. '
- O and expert consultants retained by LILCo; (d) Detailed written statements and oral testimony of the suffol i
- County Police Depar tment, the County Realth Department, th
, County Social Services depar tment, and the County Public Work l Depar tmant, all of which would have indispensable roics 2i
- () responding to a radiological emergency at shoreham; '
(e) Detailed written statements and oral testimony of organizatior !
! in Suffolk County concerned with radiological emergenc [
preparedness; and
- () *(f) Extensive presentations by hundrsde of members of the genera public; and
'(3
O , .
' miEREAS, members or the Legislature also _ travelled to and held pub 11 l
tearings in the vicinity (7! the Three Mile Island W "lear Power Plant to gai information on the lessons to be learned by local povernments froe the acciden
- s. ,
dh Th: 2e Mile Island; and 13 WHEREAS, the Draft County plan identifies evacuation and protectiv theltering as the two primary protective actions which would need to t implemented in the event of a serious accident at Shoreham; and WHE RE AS , evacuation of Suffolk County residents in the event of radiological emergency could take as much time as 14-30 hours because of variou
() factors, including: the limited number of appropriate evacuation routes i Buffolk County; difficulties in mobilizing police and other emergency personnel lifficulties ensuing from spontaneous evacuation of large numbers of Count residents, thus creating severe traffic congestion; and unavilability c L
titernate evacuation routes for persons residing east of Shoreham and thus th Tecessity for shch persons during an evacuation to pass by the plant ar O >ossibly through the radioactive plumes and WHEREAS, evacuation times in excess of 10 hours -- and certain1 avacuation~ times in the range of 14-30 hours -- will result in virtua immobilization of evacuation and high exposure of evacuees to radiation suc
- hat evacuees' health, saf,ety', and welfare would not be protected; and O .
to protect Mrsons frc WHEREAS, protective sheltering is designed excessive radiation exposure by such persons staying indoors until radiatic sith the greatest danger to health has passed; and WH E RE AS , if protective sheltering were ordered for Suffolk Count o residents, unacceptable radiation exposure would still be experienced 1 substantial portions of the suf folk County population, thus making it impossib:
s
- o provide for the health, welf are, and safety of these residents; and WHEREAS, the document submitted by LILCO to the DPC without Coun O spproval or authorization is deficient because it does not deal with the actu would ~
L local conditions, physical and behavioral, on Long Island that g incountered during a serious nuclear accident at Shoreham; and WHEREAS, the document submitted by LILCO to the DPC without Coun tpproval or authorizatidn does not ensure that effective protective action
>ersons subject to radiation exposure, in the form of evacuation or shelterin sould be taken in event of a serious nuclear accident at Shoreham, and thus su O locument, even if implemented, would not protect the health, safety, and welf a zi' Suffolk County residents; and WHERE AS , the extensive data which the Legislature has considered ma
- lear that the site-specific circumstances and actual local conditions existi sa Long Island, particularly its elongated east / we st configuration whi O coquires all evacuation routes from locations east of the plant to pass within zone of predicted high radiation, the inef fectiveness of pr.otective shelterir the severe traffic congestion likely to be experienced if a partial or comple svacuation were ordered, and the difficulties in ensuring that emerger personnel will promptly report for emergency duties, preclude any emerger response plan, if implemented, from providing adequate preparedness to prote O the he'*1the welf are, and safety of Suf folk County residents; now, therefore, Lt
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RESOLvzD, that the sraf t County plan submitten t. .the County Legislatur an 1982, if implemented, would not protect the health,and welfwill, are,not b
- O and thus is not approved December 2, f folk County residents ety of su
>1cmented; and be it further document submitted by LILCO to the DPC without th RESOLVED, that the if implemented, would not protect the health O inty approval or authorization,and safety of Suf folk residents and thus will not be
'. fore,
- be implemented; and be it further that since no local radiological emergency response health, welfplan are, for an RTSOLVED, will protect the rious y nuclear uf accident at Shorehamunty resi ents, andbysince the preparation indicating to and imp Count
,0 the public
' any such plan would be their misleading tohealth, welfare, and safety are being protected when, i sidents that et, such is not the case, the County's radiological emergency planning proces
- hereby terfninated, and no local radiological emergency , plan for response implemented; and be ti
' 1 occident at the Shoreham plant shall be adopted or
.trther radiological emergency plan can protect tr t -
O ,
that since no no radiologica RESOLVED, salth, welf are, safety of Suffolk County residents and, sincebe
- adopt necessary to assure tha
- nargency plan shall take all actions l xocutive is hereby directed any 'other to governmental agency, be it State or Federal, a:
ictions taken by lO :ensistent with the decisions mandated by this Resolution.
JATED: Febnary 17. 1983 APP BY:
O AAIL%
County Executive of Suf folk County Date of Approval J 4,3 73 0 .
O e
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(, Exnibit B 4 COUNTY OF CUFFOLK
O O O
March 10, 1987 O
Mr. Victor Stello Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission O washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Stello:
On behalf of the government of Suffolk County, we are writing in reply to your letter of February 20, 1987, which O responds to the January 16 letter of the Suffolk County Executive. The County Executive's letter had corrected certain of your statements quoted in the press that mischaracterized the actions of Suffolk County concerning the Shoreham nuclear power plant. Your February 20 letter rejects the County Executive's corrections and reiterates even more emphatically the O mischaracterizations you made earlier.
Tha message of your February 20 letter is clear: the Staff of the NRC has decided that public safety does not matter at Shoreham; that what matters only is putting the plant into operation. You have converted the Staff's role in the Shoreham o licensing proceedings from participant in the case to champion of the cause -- LILCO's cause. In short, you have betrayed the Staff's responsibility to the public in these proceedings. It is time for you to take remedial actions.
Accordingly, first, the government of Suffolk County O requests that you immediately disqualify yourself and.the rest of.
the Staff from participating further as a party in the Shoreham The Staff has subordinated its own identity to that proceedings.
of LILCO, and permitting the Staff to continue to participate as a purportedly impartial party would be nothing but a ruse.
Section 0.735-3(a)(6) of the NRC's Regulations requires that the O Staf f "not give or appear to give. f avored treatment or competitive advantage to any member of the public." The Staff O 6:~ rvas **=
- s's a a * * =oa'a' *~ *' ' "'w""**'***"* * '"**"" "*
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Mr. Victor Stello March 10, 1987 Page 2
- O cannot satisfy this standard: your February 20 letter is a manifesto of the Staff's favor and partisanship toward LILCOs a declaration of hostility toward Suffolk County.
,o Second, Suffolk County requests that you appear before a Special Session of the County Legislature. Your February 20 letter parades a bias that stems either from ignorance of the ,
facts or from design. We want to know the sources upon which you rely for information concerning emergency planning at Shoreham.
With whom from LILCO and other entities outside the NRC have you
() met, and what have they said? What private conversations have you held with NRC Commissioners? What is your true purpose in putting LILCO's interests above those of Suffolk County's citizens? The citizens of Suffolk County have the right to know the full story behind your actions concerning emergency planning issues at Shoreham.
O Finally, we request that you digest the facts presented in l this letter. To begin, the County Executive's January 16 letter corrected your mistatement that in a "real emergency" Suffolk l County would cooperate with LILCO and "follow LILCO's plan." The
! Executive informed you that your statement was unfounded and jO ine crect, and transmitted documents, including suffolk County Resolution No. 111-1983, to explain in detail the reasons for his statement that, "I would not use the authority of this government to implement LILCO's emergency plan or to work in concert with ,
LILCO to effect an emergency response to an accident at Shoreham."
I)
Your February 20 letter demeans the County Executive's statement. In scarcely veiled terms, you accuse the County Executive and the County Legislature of being liars, and even boast that you "continue to stand behind" your earlier misstatements. This presumptuousness does not suit an appointed .
NRC employee addressing the elected government of 1.3 million O people.
The fact is that the government of Suffolk County would never use LILCO's emergency plan, or work in concert with LILCO, or rely upon LILCO's advice or judgment in a nuclear emergency.
Whatever our actions, they would not include LILCO or LILCO's O plan. This is the result of the County government having absolutely no confidence in the judgment or competence of LILCO.
The June 23, 1986 statement of the Suffolk County Executive, which I sent you on January 16, explains the reasons in detail.
O l
O l-__-___-___________ . _ - . _ - - _ _ _ _ __ _ ___-_ . . _ -_ . -
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Mr. Victor Stello March 10, 1987 Page 3 D
Your February 20 letter persists in mischaracterizing the emergency planning actions of Suffolk County. You write of the "refusal" of the County to participate in emergency planning and 3 charge the County with "intransigence." The facts belie your .
words.
In fact, Suffolk County has participated thoroughly in emergency planning. In March 1982, we retained a team of nationally recognized experts at a cost of $600,000, directed O them to prepare the "best possible" plan, and gave them f ree rein to do that. Eight months later, when the experts completed their draf t plan and the extensive studies, analyses, and surveys that accompanied it, the County Legislature held eight days of open hearings at which specialists from around the country, including LILCO's consultants and officials, and members of the public o testified. Sixteen hundred pages of testimony were compiled.
Thereafter, the County Legislature travelled to Three Mile Island to meet with local government officials and the public in order to learn first-hand the lessons of the 1979 nuclear accident.
In February 1983, the County Legislature analyzed the O emergency planning materials and testimony before it and concluded that in the event of a serious nuclear accident at Shoreham, it would not be possible to evacuate or otherwise protect the public. The bases for this determination are stated in Resolution No. 111-1983: among them are the limited roadway network, population densities, and other physiographic conditions g which would cause people who were attempting to evacuate, instead to become stuck in gridlock. These people, therefore, would be exposed to the very radiation from which they were directed to flee.
The government of Suffolk County had two choices: to adopt an emergency plan, or to resolve not to adopt one. To have done O the former would have misled the public into believing they were being protected when in fact they were not. To do the latter would be to tell.the truth: that the adoption of an emergency plan would merely put an ineffective paper plan on the shelf and lull the public into a sense of false security. This government was elected to tell the public the truth and to protect their O. . welfare. That is what we did resolving in County Resolution No. :
111-1983 not to adopt or implement an emergency plan.'
l Suffolk County's Resolution No. 111-1983 and the County's t actions were challenged by LILCO in Federal court. The County won the cases the Court ruled that the Resolution is lawful and O rationally based. LILCo also challenged the Resolution in State court. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the County's decision not to adopt a plan. In short, the County lawfully exercised its police powers.
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0 Mr. victor Stello'
, March 10, 1987 Page 4
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It is clear to us that you accuse Suffolk County of "refusing" to participate in emergency planning only because you do not like the result of the County's emergency planning process
-- that is, the decision not to adopt or implement an emergency plan.
.)
.(
The reason for your view presumably is that the County's '
actions do not enable the NRC to license Shorehaa. If Suffolk
. County had followed the identical emergency planning process it used, but instead decided to adopt an emergency plan, we believe you would now be praising the County for its "participation" in ,
emergency planning. You cannot have it both ways: The County in !
l fact participated thoroughly in emergency planning and, as part j() of that participation, acted lawfully to protect the welfare of its citizens. For the same reasons that you would praise a ;
- County decision to adopt a plan, fair-mindedness requires that i you accept the County decision not to adopt one.
Your February 20 letter states, "The record of this !
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protracted proceeding also shows various state and local permits for environmental monitoring, building and moning were also sought by LILCO and approved." This is a contrived and ,
( misleading statement, apparently intended by you to convey the impression that the County promoted the construction of Shoreham, ,
and only as a last minute device to prevent operation of the o plant raised the emergency planning issue. The impression you seek to convey is false. The fact is that in issuing whatever !
permits for Shoreham that you have in mind, the County did not address, and was not required to address, the feasibility of evacuating Long Island's residents in a nuclear emergency. The permits you have in mind presumably dealt with whether LILCO g satisfied local building and other codes. The permits did not deal with whether safe evacuation was possible. Indeed, the agencies with the opportunity to address radiological emergency preparedness issues were the AEC and NRC, when LILCO applied for a permit to construct Shoreham and thereafter. However, they refused to address the issues. It is thus the AEC and NRC, along ;
O with LILCO, who are responsible for building Shoreham without '
taking into account whether safe evacuation is possible.
I Moreover, in 1977, when LILCO applied for an operating license and the County intervened in the NRC's proceeding, the !
County raised the issue of whether evacuation was feasible at $
Shoreham. This was three years before the NRC even had a rule O requiring an effective local emergency plan. The County's action :
followed the persistent efforts, begun in 1970, of a.Long Island >
citizens group that had intervened in the Shoreham construction permit proceeding to raise and litigate the emergency planning issue before the AEC. In 1973, at the strong urging of LILCO and ;
O the AEC Staff, the AEC ruled'that the citizens group could not -
raise or litigate the emergency planning issue at that time. The '
issue was postponed by the AEC until the "operating license f-O i
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, k Victor Stello 1 March 10, 1987 l Page 5
- O stage." Therefore, it is clear that the only reasons that emergency planning issues were not considered before construction of Shoreham was well underway were (1) because LILCO insisted on this and the AEC agreed; and (2) because the NRC did not require
.O the issue to be thoroughly examined until the adoption of its post-Three Mile Island regulations in 1980.
You know well that the turning point for all concerned with radiological emergency planning was the Three Mile Island accident, when the Kemeny Commission, Congress, and the NRC
- ) itself heralded the need for workable local emergency preparedness. Indeed, all of the major investigations into the emergency preparedness aspects of Three Mile Island concluded that workable local emergency preparedness is a key to effective response to a nuclear accident. The investigators implored local
(
l governments to approach this responsibility seriously. NRC i officials who travelled across the country holding workshops O echoed the need for effective local involvement in emergency planning. No one had the temerity to suggest that a County which i
had extensively examined emergency preparedness for a nuclear plant within its jurisdiction, drafted the best possible emergency plan, and lawfully determined that the public could not be protected would be confronted with NRC Staff efforts to ,
O license the operation of the plant on the basis of a utility's l illegal emergency plan. This is precisely the action of the NRC i Staff in the Shoreham case. ;
The fact is that Shoreham was sited by LILCO and construction of the plant was approved by the AEC when emergency lO planning was given little attention. As late as 1979, before the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC's regulations did not require a local emergency plan as a condition of licensing a plant. The NRC required only that the utility submit "procedures for notifying, and agreements reached" with local governments that were of a general nature. Your letter of February 20 evidences .
O the Staff's willingness to license shoreham under circumstances which do not comply even with the NRC's discredited pre-Three Mile Island regulations.
Your February 20 letter discloses the refusal of the Staff to confront reality. Indeed, reality is that (1) Suffolk County O has participated extensively in emergency planning and has rationally determined safe evacuation and other prote'etion of the ,
public to be impossible; (2) the County's determination has been upheld in Federal and State courts; and (3) LILCO's substitute l l emergency plan has been held by New York State courts to be l l illegal and not implementable. By choosing to rationalize
'O LILCo's licensing objective in the shoreham proceedings, rather I than advocating reality, you have become stuck with promoting the l following fantasy that in the absence of County, state, or l
L
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O Mr. Victor Stollo March 10,1987 Page 6 O
implementable LILCO emergency plans, the public still would be protected by a not implementable emergency plan which has been lawfully opposed by County government in order to protect the public's welfare.
O we look forward to your early reply.
Si cerely, j
W . $_ - e Micha.1 A. Locrande O aregory y) sighs Presiding Officer Suffolk County Executive Suffolk County Legislature O
cc: NRC Service List O
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Attachment 4 3 .
STATEMENT OF SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE PETER F. COHALAN
, JUNE 23, 1986 J
I AM ISSUING THIS STATEMENT TO ENSURE THAT THERE ARE NO J MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF MY POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION. I AM PARTICULARLY MOTIVATED TO MAKE THIS STATEMENT BECAUSE LILCO HAS MISSTATED MY POSITION IN EFFORTS TO PERSUADE FEDERAL AGENCIES TO LICENSE SHOREHAM. LET THE RECORD BE -
J CLEAR: I AM OPPOSED TO THE LICENSING OF SHOREHAM.
IN FACT, I HAVE NEVER SUPPORTED THE LICENSING OF SHOREMAM FOR COMMERCIAL OPERATION. ON MAY 30, 1985, I GAVE QUALIFIED J
SUPPORT ONLY TO A TEST OF LILCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN ON THE CONDITION THAT THERE WOULD BE PARTICIPATION OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY GOVE RNMENT. HOWEVER, ON JUNE 10, 1985, THE NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT, AND LATER THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RULED THAT I COULD NOT CHANGE COUNTY POLICY BY
, COMMITTING COUNTY PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES TO A TEST. IN J
RESPONSE, I WITHDREW MY MAY 30, 1985, POSITION, AND ON NOVEMBER 7, 1985, FORMALLY REQUESTED THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NOT TO CONDUCT A TEST OF LILCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN.
ON FEBRUARY 13, 1986, OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE COUNTY LEGISLATURE AND MYSELF, LILCO CONDUCTED A TEST OF ITS EMERGENCY PLAN. I STATED THEN THAT THE EXERCISE AMOUNTED TO "THEATER OF o
r~ m 9 1-
,- h,-
O THE ASSURD."
THE TEST WAS UNREALISTIC AND.WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO CONVEY FALSE IMPRESSIONS OF LILCO'S COMPETENCE. WE ON LONG ,
ISLAND WERE NOT DECEIVED; WE HAVE FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCE WITH O
LILCO* S LACK OF COMPETENCE -- LET'S NOT FORGET THE $1.35 BILLION .
IMPRUDENCE FINDING AND LILCO'S RESPONSE TO HURRICANE GLORIA. I FEEL THAT THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE FEBRUARY 13 TEST O CAME AFTERWARD, WHEN THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, FRANK PETRONE, ANNOUNCED THAT l LILCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN DOES NOT PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT 10 THE PUBLIC WOULD BE PROTECTED IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AT SHOREHAM. IN SHORT, MR. PETRONE, SAID SHOREHAM SHOULD NOT BE LICENSED TO OPERATE.
O SINCE rEBRUARY 1983, IT HAS BEEN CLEAR To sUrrOLK COUNTY THAT THE OPERATION OF SHOREMAM WOULD CREATE A POTENTIAL DISASTER FOR THE PUBLIC. AFTER EXTENSIVE AND COSTLY STUDIES, ANALYSES, O AND SURVEYS, PUBLIC HEARINGS, AND A TRIP '!O THE THREE MILE ISLAND VICINITY, THIS GOVERNMENT CONCLUDED THAT THE PUBLIC COULD NOT BE SAFELY EVACUATED OR OTHERWISE PROTECTED IF THERE WERE A SERIOUS' O ACCIDENT AT SHOREHAM. THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT, HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING THE PUBLIC'S WELFARE, THEREFORE, HAD ONLY WO CHOICES: TELL THE PUBLIC THE TRUTH THAT i
O mEY COULD NOT BE PROTECTED; OR DECEIVE THEM BY ADOPTING AN EMERGENCY PLAN THAT WOULD LULL THEM INTO BELIEVING THEY WERE l
BEING PROTECTED WHEN IN FACT THEY WERE NOT.
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O Surrors COUNTY CHOSE WHAT IT WAS OBLIGATED TO DO: IN REllOLUTION 111-1983, IT TOLD ITS CITIZENS THE TRUTH. THUS, THE COUNTY RESOLVED NOT TO ADOPT OR IMPLEMENT AN EMERGENCY PLAN FOR O SHOREHAM.
tHIS DECISION WAS UPHELD BY FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS.
IT WAS ALSO UPHELD BY GOVERNOR CUOMO AFTER EXTENSIVE ANALYSES BY THE MARBURGER COMMISSION.
O UNFORTUNATELY, LILCO HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT
! SHOREHAM SHOULD NOT OPERATE. FOR INSTANCE, AFTER RESOLUTION 111-1983 WAS ADOPTED, THE COUNTY INFORMED THE NRC OF OUR ACTION, AND lO ASKED THAT AGENCY TO APPLY ITS REGULATIONS BY DENYING LILCO A LICENSE TO OPERATE SHOREHAM. AT LILCO'S URGING, THE NRC REJECTED OUR REQUEST AND, INSTEAD, STARTED A 3-YEAR CONTORTED PROCESS OF
[O GIVING LILCO CHANCE-APTER-CHANCE TO CONCOCT A SCHEME BY WHICH TO LICENSE THE PLANT.
AT THE SAME TIME, LILCO LOBBIED TO ENLIST FEDERAL OFFICIALS O
TO SUPPORT LICENSING SHOREHAM. LILCO'S SUCCESSES PEAKED LAST YEAR WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SECRETARY OF ENERGY ANNOUNCED THAT SHOREHAM SHOULD BE LICENSED TO OPERATE OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF SUFFOLK COUNTY AND NEW YORK STATE. HE DID THIS IN THE FACE OF l THE PRESIDENT'S OWN POLICY ON GHOREMAM, WRITTEN OCTOBER 11, 1984, i
I
'fHAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT FAVOR THE IMPOSITION OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY AT SHOREHAM OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF NEW YORK STATE AND SUFFOLK COUNTY.
O 3
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[ p; -3 O M' l
O I.HAVE RECITED THIS BRIEF HISTORY TO BRING THE SHOREHAM SITUATION UP TO DATE. BY NOW, EVERY FAIR-MINDED PERSON MUST i
REALIZE THAT SAFE EVACUATION OF THE PUBLIC WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE ,
O IF THERE WERE A SERIOUS NUCLEAR ACCIDEW AT SHOREHAM. . THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF SUFFOLK COUNTY'S RESIDENTS AND ALMOST EVERY LONG ISLAND . ELECTED OFFICIE ARE OPPOSED TO THE LICENSING O OF SHOREHAM. AND BOTH THE NRC'S LICENSING AND APPEE BOARD' S HAVE REJECTED LILCO'S BID FOR A LICENSE. BUT DESPITE ALL OF THIS, THE CASE IS NOT OVER. WHY IS THAT7 s
THE REASON IS THAT LILCO PERSISTS IN TRYING TO LICENSE SHOREHAM AND IS NOW ORCHESTRATING THE BIGGEST DECEPTION OF ALL:
- EVEN THOUGH THE NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT AND THE NRC'S
'O LICENSING AND APPEE BOARDS MAVE RULED THAT LILCO CANNOT IMPLEMENT ITS EMERGENCY PLAN, THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, AT LILCO' S URGING, IS CONSIDERING A LILCO REQUEST TO LICENSE I SHOREHAM WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY IMPLEMENTABLE EMERGENCY PLAN.
I l THIS IS A PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER. IN THE WAKE OF CHERNOBYL,
- l. IT IS A RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF THE RESIDENTS OF LONG ISLAND. ,
SPECIFICELY, LILCO IS PRESSING THE NRC TO LICENSE SHOREHAM ON THE BASIS OF A FICTION IT HAS CREATED AND DUBBED "REALISM."
THIS FICTION GOES ON AS FOLLOWS: SHOREHAM SHOULD BE LICENSED r
i EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO IMPLEMENTABLE EMERGENCY PLAN, BECAUSE E THE PLANT WERE LICENSED AND IF THERE WERE AN ACCIDENT AT D ;
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SHOREHAM, THE STATE AND COUNTY WOULD IN REALITY ACT IN RESPONSE M THE ACCIDENT AND THIS AD HOC "RESPONSE" WOULD SOMEHOW PROTECT THE PEOPLE. LILCO ARGUES THAT THIS SET OF HYPOTHETICALS WOULD
.O COMPLY WITH THE NRC'S REGULATIONS AND PROVIDE A BASIS FOR THE LICENSING OF SHORERAM. IT WOULD NOT. LILCO'S FICTION IS ILLEGAL AND ILLOGICAL IT IS BORN OF CYNICISM AND INDIFFERENCE TO THE
.O PUBLIC'S SAFETY. -
FIRST, LILCO'S FICTION RETRIEVES THE DISCREDITED THEORY ON WHICH THE NRC LICENSED NUCLEAR PLANTS BEFORE THE THREE MILE
~O 4
ISLAND ACCIDENT. THEN, THERE WAS NO PRE-?LANNING OR INTEGRATED PLANNING REQUIRED FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITH THE UTILITY. THE NRC SIMPLY ASSUMED THAT IF THERE WERE AN ACCIDENT, O .
THE GOVERNMENTS WOULD KNOW HOW TO ACT ALONE AND WITH OTHERS IN RESPONSE. THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT PROVED THIS ASSUMPTION TO BE WRONG. FOLLOWING THREE MILE ISLAND, CONGRESS PASSED LAWS
,0 -
AND THE NRC MADE REGULATIONS THAT REQUIRE PRE-PLANNING AND INTEGRATED PREPAREDNESS. THERE IS NO PRE-PLANNING OR INTEGRATED PREPAREDNESS AT SHOREHAM.
- O SECOND, LILCO'S FICTION PRESUMES THAT STATE AND LOCAL 2
GOVERNMENTS NOT ONLY WOULD RESPOND TO AN ACCIDENT, BUT THAT THEIR
- RESPONSE WOULD WORK TO PROTECf THE PUBLIC. THUS, LILCO CLAIMS,
- O THE PUBLIC WOULD BE PROTECTED EVEN THOUGH THE GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO 1
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!O PRE-PLANNING, oR KNOWLEDGE OF INVENTORY OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES, NO PERSONNEL READINESS, AND NO TRAINING.
SUCH A PRESUMPTION IS UNFOUNDED; FARCICAL AT BEST.
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THIRD, LIreo'S FICTION PORTRAYS SUFFOLK COUNTY ACTING IN CONCERT WITH LILCO IF THERE WERE AN ACCIDENT AT SHOREHAM.
HOWEVER, COUNTY LAW PROHIBITS COUNTY PERSONNEL FROM IMPLEMENTING
- O LILCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN. EVEN IF IT DID NOT, TliE COUNTY COULD NOT RESPONSIBLY ACT IN CONCERT WITH LILCO AND ITS EMERGENCY PLAN.
THE COUNTY'S STUDIES, ANALYSES, AND SURVEYS, TOGETHER WITH OUR
~O DAY-TO-DAY EXPERIENCES ON LONG ISLAND WITH THE L3HITED ROAD i NETWORK AND THE CONFINED GEOGRAPHY, HAVE CONVINCED US THAT SAFE EVACUATION OF THE PUBLIC IS NOT POSSIBLE IN A SHOREHAM ACCIDENT.
lO LILCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN IS A GUIDELINE FOR TRAFFIC-JAM GRIDLOCX i
AND AN IMMOBILIZED EVACUATION WHERE HUNDREDS OF THOUSAND OF LONG ISLAND'S RESIDENTS WOULD BE TRAPPED TO ABSORB THE RADIATION THEY
- O SOUGHT TO FLEE. THIS COUNTY WOULD NOT ACT IN CONCERT WITH SUCH A l GUIDELINE FOR DISASTER.
FC 3, LILCO'S FICTION RESTS ON THE SURMISE THAT THE COUNTY WOULD HAVE CONFIDENCE IN LILCO, OR THAT IT WOULD RELY ON LILCO l BECAUSE TT"!RE WOULD BE NO ONE ELSE ON WHICH TO RELY. THIS IS FALSE. THERE IS NO CORPORATION ON LONG ISLAND WITH SO LOW A
!O STANDING WITH THE PUBLIC AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS LILCO. THERE IS EVEN A STRONG AND CREDIBLE EFFORT TODAY TO EFFECT A PUBLIC
.O 6-O
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O TAKEOVER OF THIS COMPANY. IN AN EMERGENCY OR OTHERWISE, THE PUBLIC AND THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN LILCO. WE COULD NOT, AND WOULD NOT, LOOK TO SUCH A DISCREDITED O SOURCE FOR GUIDANCE OR ASSISTANCE IN A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT. INDEED, LILCO WOULD BE THE OBJECT OF THE PUBLIC'S WRATH BECAUSE IT CAUSED THE ACCIDENT. IT WOULD BE THE ENTITY WHICH STEAMROLLED SHOREHAM O -INTO OPERATION OVER THE PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTS' OBJECTIONS. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD BETTER SERVE THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST TO ACT ALONE THAN TO ENTRUST THE PUBLIC WEAL TO MORE OF LILCO'S
.O POOR JUDGMENTS .
MOREOVER, LILCO' S RESPONSE TO HURRICANE GLORIA LAST OCTOBER LIVES INDELIBLY AS A LESSON TO EVERYONE ON LONG ISLAND. IN THE
- O POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, WE
- WOULD NEVER RELY UPON OR ACT IN CONCERT WITH A COMPANY THAT COULD NOT EVEN PUT THE LIGHTS BACK ON FOR DAYS.
O PIFTH, LILCO'S FICTION HAS PROMPTED THE COMPANY TO EXTEND j ITS PLEAS FOR LICENSING SHOREHAM TO SHAMEFUL LIMITS. ON JUNE 11, 1986, LILCO'S COUNSEL WROTE THE NRC, CLAIMING THAT STATE LAW
!O REoUIRES THE COUNTY TO TAKE ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY THAT PURPORTEDLY WOULD JUSTIFY THE NRC PUTTING SHOREHAM INTO
! OPERATION. THIS CLAIM MISSTATES THE LAW. IT WOULD NEVER BE O "APPROPRIATE" OR "NECESSARY" FOR THE COUNTY TO TAKE ACTIONS 7.N l PURSUIT OF LILCO'S ILLEGAL EMERGENCY PLAN.
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G O FINALLY, IN THE SAME LETTER OF JUNE 11, LILCO ENSHRINES ITS FICTION WITH THE FOLLOWING WORDS: ...THE LILCO PLAN PROVIDES A BASIS FOR A PRIVATE / GOVERNMENTAL PARTNERSHIP THAT COULD AND WOULD O BE EFFECTIVE TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC IN A REAL EMERGENCY, WHEN POLITICAL POSTURING WOULD BE ABANDONED AND THE SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC WOULD BE GIVEN PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE." THIS IS MORE N
O FANTASY. I REITERATE WHAT IS IN ESSENCE STATED ABOVE: NEITHER SUFFOLK COUNTY NOR I AS COUNTY EXECUTIVE HAS ANY "PARTNERSHIP" WITH LILCO; THERE IS NO "BASIS FOR A PRIVATE / GOVERNMENTAL O
PARTNERSHIP" OF ANY KIND WITH LILCor THE COUNTY HAS NO CONFIDENCE OR TRUST IN LILCO; AND IN AN EMERGENCY, THE COUNTY WOULD GIVE NO CREDENCE TO LILCO OR ITS PLAN AND WOULD NOT WORK IN CONCERT WITH
! O LILCO. INDEED, IN AN EMERGENCY, THE PUBLIC OF SUFFOLK COUNTY --
f SHOWN BY RESPECTED POLLS TO OPPOSE SHOREHAM BY MORE THAN 75 PERCENT -- COULD NOT TRUST THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS OFFICIALS IF WE, O
IN TURN, LOOKED TO THE DISCREDITED LILCO FOR GUIDANCE OR ADVICE.]
TO MAKE CERTAIN TH1.T LILCO' S MISCHARACTERIZATIONS OF MY POSITION ARE BROUGHT TO AN END, I SHALL TRANSMIT A COPY OF THIS O STATEMENT TO LILCO, THE NRC, AND FEMA. I SHALL ALSO EXPRESSLY NULLIFY MY JUNE 26, 1985 LETTER TO LILCO'S COUNSEL AND SHALL RESCIND EXECUTIVE ORDER 2-1985. BOTH OF THESE DOCUMENTS HAVE O EFFECTIVELY BEEN NULLIFIED BY EARLIER ACTIONS HOWEVER, LILCO'S PERSISTENT MISSTATEMENTS (SUCH AS IN ITS JUNE 11 LETTER) PROMPT ME TO CLEAR THE SLATE SO THAT NO PERSON CAN CONCOCT FURTHER O
O .s.
O 0- FICTIONS. I AM ALSO DESIGNATING CHIEF DEPUTY COUNTY EXECUTIVE FRANK JONES, AS NY REPRESENTATIVE, TO FOLLOW THESE MATFERS AND TO COORDINATE AS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE WITH THE COUNTY O LEoISLAruRE AND WITH THE ATTORNEYS HANDLING SHOREHAM MATTERS.
LILCO HAS LotBIED IN WASHINGTON AND ELSEWHERE TO CHARACTERIZE SHOREHAM AS A LITMUS TEST FOR NUCLEAR POWER. THUS, O LILCO SEEKS TO TRANSFORM THE SHOREHAM CASE INTO THE SHOREHAM CAUSE. THIS IS A DECEPTION. SUFFOLK COUNTY IS NOT ANTI-NUCLEAR, AND WE HAVE NO SUCH POLICY. INDEED, BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL
- O LAaORATORY IS IN OUR MIDST. THE COUNTY IS SIMPLY IN FAVOR OF DOING WHAT WE WERE ELECTED BY OUR CITIZENS TO DO
- TO PROTECF THEIR WELL-BEING AND TO BE TRUTHFUL. LILCO DOES NOT LIKE THIS, O sECAUSE THE RESULT PUTS THE COUNTY AGAINST THE MISTAKE LILCO MADE i AT SHOREMAM. BUT IN A DEMOCRACY, THE PUBLIC OOOD CANNOT BE DIS REG ARDED. SHOREHAM IS A MISTAKE; GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT
- O COMPOUND THE MISTAKE OF HAVING PERMITTED SHOREHAM TO BE BUILT i WITH THE MISTAKE OF LETTING SHOREHAM OPERATE.
j THE SHOREHAM CONTROVERSY HAS OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS GROWN-10 TO CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION. THIS IS NOT SOMETHING WE RELISH.
l TO STEP BACK FROM THE TRENCHES AND VIEW THE BROADER SCALE, ONE CAN ONLY WISH THAT LILCO HAD SEIZED THE OPPROTUNITY 10 ABANDON O SHOREHAM IN 1983 OR EVEN SOONER, WHEN THE INVESTMENT WAS SILLIONS LESS. WE WOULD STILL WELCOME SUCH A LILCO DECISION TVDAY.
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O BUT, THE Fact Is THAT WE HAVE A FIGHT ON OUR HANDS. LILCO REMAINS BLIND TO THE REALITY WHY SHOREHAM SHOULD NOT OPERATE. TO LILCO, CHERNOBYL NEVER HAPPENED, FEMA'S REGIONAL DIRECTOR NEVER
- O RESIGNED OVER SHOREHAM, THE WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF NEVER ADMITFED LONG ISLAND CANNOT BE EVACUATED, SUFFOLK COUNTY DID NOT WIN COURT VICTORIES UPHothING THE LEGALITY OF THE COUNTY'S O
POLICIES ON SHOREHAM, AND LONG ISLAND'S GEOGRAPHY IS NO DIFFERENT FROM ANYWHERE ELSE. INDEED, LILCO IS EVEN IMPERVIOUS TO THE OUTPOURING OF OPPOSITION 'IC SHOREHAM FROM EVERY CORNER OF LONG
.O ISLAND. VIRTUALLY EVERY ELECTED OFFICIAL OPPOSES SHOREHAM, THE GOVERNOR OPPOSES SHOREHAM, AND THE PUBLIC OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSES SHORE!!AM .
- O .
I REMAIN CONrIDENT THAT SUFFOLx COUNTY WILL PREVAIL. WE ARE ,
RIGHT, AND WE HAVE THE PUBLIC'S UNYIELDING SUPPORT. THE REASON IS
} THAT A BASIC TRUTH HAS DRIVEN THIS COUNTY FROM THE START: IT
!O WoULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO EVACUATE OR OTHERWISE PROTECT THE PUBLIC IF THERE WERE A SERIOUS NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AT THE SHOREHAM PLANT.
SHOREHAM SHOULD NOT OPEN.
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O Attachment 5 O
f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board O
In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power O Station, Unit 1)
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL A. LOGRANDE O
Michael A. LoGrande, being under oath, deposes and says as follows:
O
- 1. I am the County Executive of Suf f olk County, New York, and have held that position since December 27, 1986. As County Executive, I as authorized to direct the County's response to g
emergencies.
- 2. On January 16, 1987, in response to certain publicly
~
O reported misstatements made by Mr. Victor Stello, Executive Director for Operations, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, I sent Mr. Stello a letter informing him of the C) positions of Suf folk County (and my own as Chief Executive Officer of the County) concerning the LILCO Plan and the County's O
O actions in a Shoreham emergency if the Shoreham plant were to be licensed to operate. Likewise, on March 10, 1987, I, along with Gregory J. Blass, Presiding Officer of the Suffolk County 4 9 Legislature, again corresponded with Mr. Stello on those subjects.
The January 16, 1987 and March 10, 1987 letters are l
attached hereto as Exhibits A and B. I hereby affirm those statements, affirm that they are truthful and accurate, and af firm that they continue to represent my position as Suffolk County Executive and the position of Suffolk County on the
'O subjects discussed therein. '
3.
On June 23, 1986, my predecessor in this office, Peter O F. Cohalan, issued a Statement to correct misstatements made by '
LILCO concerning LILCO's so-called "realism" argument, and related matters. That statement is attached to Exhibit A, my letter of January 16, 1987. I hereby affirm that the County's position regarding the LILC0 Plan, LILCO's "realism" argument, and the licensing of the Shoreham plant remains as set forth in
- O Mr. Cohalan's June 23, 1986 Statement, and that Mr. Cohalan's statement truthfully and accurately represents the position of Suffolk County.
l O 4.
On February 17, 1983, the Suffolk County Legislature i
adopted Resolution No. 111-1983, which was approved by the Suf folk County Executive on February 23, 1983. A copy of IO l
Resolution No. 111-1983 is also attached to Exhibit A, my letter l of January 16, 1987.
Resolution No. 111-1983 is the law of l
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O Suffolk County, and it reflects certain of the findings and con-clusions of the County concerning an offsite response to a radio-t logical emergency at the Shoreham plant. ,
- 5. It has come to my attention that in "LILCO's Second '
. Renewed Motion For Summary Disposition of the ' Legal Authority' i
\
Issues (Contentions EP 1-10)," dated March 20, 1987, LILC0 t D asserts that the County is in possession of 18 controlled copies
- of the LILCO Plan, and that the County's oficials are "familiar" 4 .
with the Plan by virtue of their participation in the emergency planning litigation before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. '
4 These assertions are incorrect. To the best of my knowledge, the County is in possession of 8 copies of the LILCO Plan. Only 5 of
~O the Plans are up-to-date and, of those, 4 are in the possession of the SCPD for purposes of preparing testimony for hearings '
i before this and other Boards.
!O i
- 6. Neither I, nor my deputies, nor any members of my staff f
have in our possession the current version of the LILC0 Plan. I
- O have never reviewed the LILCO Plan and none of my deputies or .
l staff has ever reviewed that plan with one exception -- Mr. Frank
- Petrone, who reviewed portions of an earlier version of LILCO's
- O Plan while employed by FEMA, and has reviewed portions of LILCO's
- Plan in connection with the preparation of testimony in the L Shoreham Exercise proceeding. To my knowledge, no County
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{ of ficial or employee is suf ficiently knowledgeable of the LILCO Plan to implement all or a portion of it, with or without LILCO O
assistance.
=
O Michael A. LoGrande Suf folk County Executive Subscribed to and sworn before me this f' day of May, O 1987, o k,fk ., b / & <
Notary pud 11C /
State' of New York at Large My commission expires:
- O N PHYLLS A DUO M N0tARV PUOLC.3We How Yort ,
Ita, St411M75, $ den Cawt- .
1ern Espres Gaster 31,19.d
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O q
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O Exhibit A COUNTY OF SUFFOLK
-0 OFFICE OF THE COUNTY EXECUTIVE MICHAEL A. LOGRANoe O
January 16, 1987 O
Mr. Victor Stello Executive Director for Operations
( U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Washington, D.C. 20555
!O o.ar Mr. Stello On December 27, 1986, I took office as the Suffolk County Executive. I am writing in this capacity to correct two misstatements by you that were reported in the enclosed Newsday article of January 4, 1987.
lO First, you state that the problems concerning emergency planning for Shoreham "are all a direct result of the lack of participation by state and local governments." Your statement is unfounded and incorrect. The emergency planning problems at Shoreham are a direct result of the decision to construct the O Shoreham plant where a nuclear power plant does not belong. That decision was made by LILCO and approved by the NRC. LILCO and s the NRC are thus the ones responsible for the "problems" to which you allude. -
Second, you state, O "If there was (sic) a real emergency, there is no doubt that those people pledged to help protect the public would follow LILCO's plan. I'm convinced they would do anything to protect the public, and that means l following a structured plan. Unless they have a plan we don't know about, that means they would follow I
1 0 .
LILCO's plan."
Again, your statement is unfounded and incorrect.
Suffolk County has determined after extensive analyses that under w
no circumstances would it follow LILCO's emergency plan or lO response to an j rkincneertwithLILCOtoeffectanemergencyosedarecopies accident at Shoreham. For your information, enc
=us - em . ,me..,., . .. - v.a. = ,, i i t . isiei u o ooo
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- O Mr. Victor Stello January 16, 1987 Page 2
- O of Suffolk County Resolution 111-1983 and the June 23, 1986 statement of the former Suffolk County Executive. These documents reflect the conscientiousness of the County and provide
- O thoroughly considered bases for the County's determinations.
emphasize for thethat reasons as County elabora'ted in the enclosed documents, I Executive, -
I would not use the authority or resources of this government to implement LILCO's emergency plan or toto response work in concert an accident with LILCO to effect an emergency at Shoreham. Suffolk County has found LILCO's plan to be unworthy and unworkable. The County would
'4) not, and could not, rely on such a discredited plan.
Moreover, in recent years LILCO has repeatedly demonstrated itself to possess poor and untrustworthy judgment. For example, after holding full hearings, the State Public Service Commission'
.O denied LILCO recovery of $1.3 billion of Shoreham's costs because of LILCo's "imprudence" and "gross mismanagement" during construction of the plant. The County would not, and could not rely on the If the County did, guidance or advice of such a company in an emergency,.
government. its citizens could not trust their own UD very truly yours, '-
/IldG/kfhf,dC ICHAEL A. LeCRANDE Acting County Executive MALifmn Enclosures
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STATEHEFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE PETER F. CORALAN 10 JUNE 23, 1986 I AM ISSUING THIS STATEMENT TO ENSURE THAT THERE ARE NO O
MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF MY POSITION WITH RESPECT TO 1HE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION. I AM PARTICULARLY MOTIVATED M MAKE THIS STATEMENT BECAUSE LILCO HAS MISSTATED MY POSITION IN EFFORTS TO
-O PERSUADE FEDERAL AGENCIES TO LICENSE SHOREHAM. LET THE RECORD SE -
CLEAR: I AM OPPOSED TO THE LICENSING OF SHOREHAM.
IN FACT, I HAVE NEVER SUPPORTED THE LICENSING OF SHOREHAM
!O rOR COMMERCIAL OPERATION. ON MAY 30, 1985, I GAVE QUALIFIED SUPPORT ONLY TO A TEST OF LILCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN ON THE CONDITION THAT THERE WOULD SE PARTICIPATION OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY Q GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, ON JUNE 10, 1985, THE NEW YORK STATE N SUPREME COURT, AND IATER THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND THE COURT OF t
i APPEALS, RULED THAT I COULD NOT CHAPGE COUNTY POLICY BY lO COMMIrrING COUNTY PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES TO A TEST. IN RESPONSE, I WITEDREW MY MAY 30, 1985, POSITION, AND ON NOVEMBER 7, 1985, FORMALLY REQUESTED THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NOT TO CONDUCT A TEST OF LILCO'S EMERGE 9CY PLAN.
ON FEBRUARY 13, 1986, OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE COUNTY LEGISI.ATURE AND MYSELF, LILCO CONDUCTED A TEST OF ITS EMERGENCY PLAN. I STATED THEN THAT THE EXERCISE AMOUNTED M "THEATER OF O
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THE ABSURD."
THE TEST WAS UNREALISTIC AND WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED 70 CONVEY FALSE '.MPRESSIONS OF LILCO'S COMPETENCE. WE ON LONG
- O ISLAND WERE NOT DECEIVEDr WE HAVE FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCE WITH LILCO'S LACX OF COMPETENCE -- LET'S NOT FORGET THE $1.35 BILLION IMPRUDENCE FINDING AND LILCO'S RESPONSE TO HURRICANE I GLORIA.
FEEL THAT THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE PEBRUARY 13 TEST CAME AFTERWARD, WHEN THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, FRANK PETRONE, ANNOUNCED THAT O LILCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN DOES NOT. PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANC THE PUBLIC WOULD BE PROTECTED IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDEN AT SHOREHAM.
IN SHORT, MR. PETRONE, SAID SHOREHAM SHOULD NOT BE LICENSED TO OPERATE.
O SINCE FEBRUARY 1983, IT HAS BEEN CLEAR TO SUFFOLX COUNTY THAT THE OPERATION OF SHOREHAM WOULD CREATE A POTENTIAL DISAST FOR THE PUBLIC.
AFTER EXTENSIVE AND COSTLY STUDIES, ANALYSES,
- O AND SURVEYS, PUBLIC HEARINGS, AND A TRIP TO THE THREE MILE ISLAND VICINITY, THIS GOVEANMENT CONCLUDED THAT THE PUBLIC COULD NOT BE SAFELY EVACUATED OR OTHERWISE PROTECTED IF THERE WERE A SERIOUS O ACCIDENT AT SHOREHAM. THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT, HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING THE PUBLIC'S WELFARE, THEREFORE, HAD ONLY 'WO CHOICES
TELL THE PUBLIQ THE TRUTH THAT C THEY COULD NOT BE PROTECTED OR DECEIVE THEM BY ADOPTING AN EMERGENCY PLAN THAT WOULD LULL THEM INTO BELIEVING THEY WERE BEING PROTECTED WHEN IN FACT THEY WERE NOT.
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O SUFFOLK COUNTY CHOSE WHAT IT WAS OBLIGATED IN TO DO:
RESOLUTION 111-1983, IT TOLD ITS CITIZENS THE TRUTH. THUS, THE C
COUNTY RESOLVED NOT TO ADOPT OR IMPLEMENT AN EMER'JENCY PL SHOREHAM.
t THIS DECISION WAS UPHELD BY FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS IT WAS ALSO UPHELD BY OOVERNOR CUOMO AFTER EXTENSIVE AN C THE MARBURGER COMMISSION.
UNFORTUNATELY, LILCO HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT SHOREHAM SHOULD NOT OPERATE.
FOR INSTANCE. AFTER RESOLUTION 111-g 1983, WAS ADOPTED, THE COUNTY INFORMED THE NRC OF OUR ACTION, AND ASKED THAT AGENCY TO APPLY ITS REGULATIONS BY DENYING LILCO l
LICENSE TO OPERATE SHOREHAM. AT LILCO'S URGING, THE NRC REJECTED 9 OUR REQUEST AND, INSTEAD, STARTED A 3-YEAR CONTORTED PROCESS OF OIVING LILCO CHANCE-APTER-CHANCE TO CONCOCT A SCHEME BY W LICENSE THE PLANT.
AT THE SAME TIME, LILCO LOBBIED IV ENLIST FEDERAL OFFICIALS TO SUPPORT LICENSING SHOREHAM.
LILCO'S SUCCESSES PEAKED LAST YEAR WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SECRETARY OF ENERGY ANNOUNCED CHOREMAM S'lOULD BE LICENSED TO OPERATE OVER THE OMECTIONS O SUFFOLK COUNTY AND NEW YORK STATE. HE DID THIS IN THE FACE OF TP.E PMSIDENT'S OWN POLICY ON SHOREHAM, WRITTEN OCTOBER 11, 1984 O
THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATTON DOES NOT FAVOR THE IMPOSITION rEDERAL AUTHORITY AT SHOREHAM OvER THE O uECTIONS OF NEW YORK STATE AND SUFIVLK COUNTY.
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[ I HAVE RECITED THIS BRIEF HISTORY TO BRING THE SHOREHAM SITUATION UP TO DATE. BY NOW, EVERY FAIR-MINDED PERSON MUST -
O REALIZE THAT SAFE EVACUATION OF THE PUBLIC WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF THERE WERE A SCRIOUS NUCLEA!1 ACCIDENT AT SHOREHAM. THE OVERWHEIJ4ING MA.70RIT'.' OF SUFFOLK COUNT 1" S RESIDENTS AND ALMOST
.O EVERY LONG ISWD ELEND OFFICIE ARE OMSED M THE LICENSING OF SHOREHAM.
AND BOTH THE NRC'S LICZNSING AND APPEAL BOARD'S HAVE REJECTED LILCO'S BID FOR A LICENSE. BUT DESPITE ALL OF THIS, THE CASE IS NOT OVER. WHY IS THAT?
THE REASON IS THAT LILCO P3RSISTS IN TRYING TO LICENSE SHOREHAM AND IS NOW ORCHESTRATING THE BIGGEST DECEPTION OF ALL:
i EVEN THOUGH THE NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT AND THE NRC'S
'O -
LICENSING AND APPEAL BOARDS HAVE RULED THAT LILCO CANNOT IMPLEMENT ITS EMERGENCY PLAN, THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, AT LILCO'S URGING, IS CONSIDERING A LILCO REQUEST TO LICENSE to l N SHOREHAM WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY IMPLEMENTABLE EMERGENCY PLAN.
THIS IS A PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER. IF THE WAKE OF CHERNOBYL, t
IT IS A RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF THE RESIDENTS OF
!O LONG ISLAND.
SPECIFICALLY, LILCO IS PRESSING THE NRC TO LICENSE SHOREHAM ON THE BASIS OF A FICTION IT HAS CREATED AND DUB 8ED
- REALISM."
~
!O THIS FICTION GOES ON AS FOLLOWS: SHORE /.AM SHOULD RE LICENSED EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO IMPLEMENTABLE EM3RGENCY PLAN, BECAUSE IF THE PLANT WERE LICENSED AND E THERE WERE AN ACCIDENT AT io 4
!O 0 JL__--_-.__-__-__
9 O ,i s
r SHOREHAM, THE STATE AND COUNTY WOULD IN REALITY ACT IN RESPONSE TO THE ACCIDENT AND THIS AD HOC "RESPONSE" WOULD SOMEHOW PROTECT THE PEOPLE. LILCO ARGUE, THAT THIS SET OF HYPOTHETICALS WOULD COMPLY WITH THE NRC'S REGULATIONS AND PROVIDE A BASIS FOR THE LICENSING OF SHOREHAM. IT WOULD NOT. LILCO'S FICTION IS ILLEGAL O. AND ILLOGICAL; IT IS BORN OF CYNICISM AND INDIFFERENCE TO 'LHE PUBLIC'S SAFETY.
FIRST, LILCO' S FICTION RETRIEVES fHE DISCREDITED THEORY ON O WHICH THE NRC LICENSED NUCLEAR PLANTS BEFORE THE THREE MILE 7,SLAND ACCIDENT. THEN, THERE WAS NO PRE-PLANNING OR INTEGRATED PLANNING REQUIRED FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITH THE O UTILITY. THE NRC SIMPLY ASSUMED THAT IF THERE WERE AN ACCIDENT, THE GOVERNMENTS WOULD KNOW HOW TO ACT ALONE AND WITH OTHERS IN RESPONSE. THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT PROVED THIS ASSUMPTION TO BE WRONG. FOLLOWING THREE MILE ISLAND, CONGRESS PASSED LAWS O ,
s AND THE NRC MADE REGULATIONS THAT REQUIRE PRE-PLANNING AND INTEGRATED PREPAREDNESS. THERE IS NO PRE-PLANNING OR INTEGRATED PREPAREDNESS AT SHOREHAM.
O SECOND, LILCO'S FICTION PRESUMES THAT STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NOT ONLY WOULD RESPOND TO AN ACCIDENT, BUT THAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD WORK TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC. THUS, LILCO CLAIMS, THE PGBLIC WOULD BE PROTECTED EVEN THOUGH THE GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO O 3 O
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[ PRE-PLANNING, OR KNOWLEDGE OF INVENTORY OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES, NO PERSONNEL READINESS, AND NO TRAINING.
SUCH A PRESUMPTION IS S UNFOUNDED; FARCICAL AT BEST.
THIRD, LILCO'S FICTION PORTRAYS SUFFOLK COUNTY ACTING IN CONCERT WITH LILCO IF THERE WERE AN ACCIDEtrf AT SHOREHAM.
O HOWEVER, COUNTY LAW PROHIBITS COUNTY PERSONNEL FROM IMPLEMENTING LILCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN. EVEN IF IT DID NOT, THE COUNTY COULD NOT RESPONSIBLY ACT IN CONCERT WITH LILCO AND ITS EMERGENCY PLAN.
O THE COUNTY'S STUDIES, ANALYSES, AND SURVEYS, TOGETHER WITH OUR DAY-TO-DAY EXPERIENCES ON LONG ISLAND WITH THE LIMITED ROAD NETWORK AND THE CONFINED GEOGRAPHY, HAVE CONVINCED US THAT SAFE O EVACUATION OF THE PUBLIC IS NOT POSSIBLE IN A SHOREHAM ACCIDENT.
LILCO'S EMERGENCY PLAN IS A GUIDELINE FOR TRAFFIC-JAM GRIDLOCK AND AN IMMOBILIZED EVACUATION WHERE HUNDREDS OF THOUSAND OF LONG 10 ISLAND'S RESIDENTS WOULD BE TRAPPED TO ABSORB THE RADIATION THEY
! SOUGHT TO FLEE.
THIS COUNTY WOULD NOT ACT IN CONCERT WITH SUCH A GUIDELINE FOR DISASTER.
FOURTH, LILCO'S FICTION RESTS ON THE SURMISE THAT THE COUNTY WOULD HAVE CONFIDENCE IN LILCO, OR THAT IT WOULD RELY ON LILCO
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BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE NO ONE ELSE ON WHICH TO RELY. THIS IS FALSE.
THERE IS NO CORPORATION ON LONG ISLAND WITH SO LOW A
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STANDING WITH THE PUBLIC AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS LILCO. THERE IS EVEN A STRONG AND CREDIBLE EFFORT TODAY TO EFFECT A PUBLIC O
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.O TAKEOVER OF THIS COMPANY. IN AN EMERGENCY OR OTHERWISE, THE PUBLIC AND THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN O LILCO. WE COULD NOT, AND WOULD NOT, LOOK TO SUCH A DISCREDITED SOURCE FOR GUIDANCE OR ASSISTANCE IN A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT. INDEED, LILCO WOULD BE THE OBJECT OF THE PUBLIC'S WRATH BECAUSE IT CAUSED O mE ACCIDENT. IT WOULD BE THE ENTIM WHICH STEAMROLI,ED SHOREHAM INTO OPERATION OVER THE PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTS' OBJECTIONS. IN l SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD BE' ITER SERVE THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST l
TO ACT ALONE THAN TO ENTRUST THE PUBLIC WEAL TO MORE OF LILCO'S POOR JUDGMENTS.
MOREOVER, LILCO'S RESPONSE TO HURRICANE GLORIA LAST OCTOBER LIVES INDELIBLY AS A LESSON TO EVERYONE ON LONG ISLAND. IN THE lO POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, WE WOULD NEVER RELY UPON OR ACT IN CONCERT WITH A COMPANY THAT COULD NOT EVEN PUT THE LIGHTS BACK ON FOR DAYS.
1 FIFTH, LILCO'S FICTION HAS PROMPTED THE COMPANY TO EXTEND ITS PLEAS FOR LICENSING SHOREHAM TO SHAMEFUL LIMITS. ON JUNE 11, 1986, LILCO'S COUNSEL WROTE THE NRC, CLAIMING THAT STATE LAW O
REoUIRES THE COUNTY TO TAKE ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY THAT PURPORTEDLY WOULD JUSTIFY THE NRC PUTTING SHOREHAM INTO OPERATION. THIS CLAIM MISSTATES THE LAW.
IT WOUL.D NEVER BE lO "APPROPRIATE" OR "NECESSARY" FOR THE COUNTY TO TAKE ACTIONS IN l
l PURSUIT OF LILCO'S ILLEGAL EMERGENCY PLAN.
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3 FINALLY, IN THE SAME LETTER OF JUNE 11, LILCO ENSHRINES ITS FICTION WITH THE FOLLOWING WORDS: .
" ..THE LILCO PLAN PROVIDES A BASIS FOR A PRIVATE / GOVERNMENTAL PARTNERSHIP THAT COULD AN BE EFFECTIVE TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC IN A REAL EMERGENCY, WHEN POLITICAL POSTURING WOULD BE ABANDONED AND '1HE SAFETY OF THE 3
PUBLIC WOULD BE GIVEN PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE." THIS IS MORE N
FANTASY.
- I REITERATE WHAT IS IN ESSENCE STATED ABOVE: NEITHER SUFFOLK COUNTY NOR I AS COUNTY EXECUTIVE HAS ANY "PARTNERSHIP" O WITH LIT.C' -
THERE IS NO "BASIS FOR A PRIVATE / GOVERNMENTAL PARTNERSHIP" OF ANY KIND WITH LILCO; THE COUNTY HAS NO CONFIDENCE OR TRUST IN LILCO; AND IN AN EMERGENCY, THE COUNTY WOULD GIVE NO O
CREDENCE TO LILCO OR ITS PLAN AND WOULD NOT WORK IN CONCERT W LILCO.
INDEED, IN AN EMERGENCY, THE PUBLIC OF SUFFOLK COUNTY -- .
SHOWN BY RESPECTED POLLS TO OPPOSE SHOREHAM BY MORE THAN 75 PERCa.NT -- COULD NOT TRUST THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS OFFICIALS IF WE, IN TURN, LOOKEDTOTHEDISCREDITEDLILCOFORGUIDANCEORADVIC TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT LILCO'S MISCHARACTERIZATIONS OF MY O POSITION ARE BROUGHT TO AN END, I SHALL TRANSMIT A COPY OF THIS STATEMENT TO LILCO, THE NRC, AND FEMA.
I SHALL ALSO EXPRESSLY NULLIFY MY JUNE 26, 1985 LETTER TO LILCO'S COUNSEL AND SHALL RESCIND EXECUTIVE ORDER 2-1985.
BOTH OF THESE DOCUMENTS HAVE EFFECTIVELY BEEN NULLIFIED BY EARLIER ACTIONS; HOWEVER, LILCO'S PERSISTENT MISSTATEMENTS (SUCH AS IN ITS JUNE 11 LETTER)
PROMPT O
ME TO CLEAR THE SLATE SO THAT NO PERSON CAN CONCOCT FURTHER 9 .s.
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FICTIONS.
l I AM ALSO DESIGNATING CHIEF DEPUTY COUNTY EXECUTIVE FRANK JONES, AS MY REPRESENTATIVE, TO FOLLOW THESE .MNPPERS AND TO O
COORDINATE AS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE WITH THE COUNTY LEGISLATURE AND WITH THE ATTORNEYS HANDLING SHOREHAM MATTERS.
LILCO HAS LOBBIED IN WASHINGTON AND ELSEWHERE TO O
CHARACTERIZE SHOREHAM AS A LITMUS TEST FOR NUCLEAR POWER. THUS, LILCO SEEKS TO TRANSFORM THE SHOREHAM CASE INTO THE SHOREHAM CAUSE. THIS IS A DECEPTION. SUFFOLK COUNTY IS NOT ANTI-NUCLEAR, AN WE HAVE N SUCH POLICY.
O INDEED, BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY IS IN OUR MIDST.
THE COUNTY IS SIMPLY IN FAVOR OF DOING WHAT WE WERE ELECTED BY OUR CITIZENS TO DO: TO PROTECT O THEIR WELL-BEING AND TO BE TRUTHFUL. LILCO DOES NOT LIKE THIS, BECAUSE THE RESULT PUTS THE COUNTY AGAINST THE MISTAKE LILCO MADE AT SHOREHAM. BUT IN A DEMOCRACY, THE PUBLIC GOOD CANNOT BE DISREGARDED. SHOREHAM IS A MISTAKE; GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT O
N COMPOUND THE MISTAKE OF HAVING PERMITTED SHOREHAM TO BE BUILT WITH THE MISTAKE OF LETTING SHOREHAM OPERATE.
THE SHOREHAM CONTROVERSY HAS OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS GROWN-TO CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION. THIS IS NOT SOMETHING WE RELISH.
TO STEP BACK FROM THE TRENCHES AND VIEW THE BROADER SCALE, ONE CAN ONLY WISH THAT LILCO HAD SEIZED THE OPPROTUNITY TO ABANDON O
SHOREHAM IN 1983 OR EVEN SOONER, WHEN THE INVESTMENT WAS BILLIONS LESS.
WE WOULD STILL WELCOME SUCH A LILCO DECISION TODAY.
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O BUT, THE PACT IS THAT WE HAVE A FIGHT ON OUR HANDS.
LILCO S REMAINS BLIND TO THE REALITY WHY SHOREHAM SHOULD TO NOT O LILCO, CHERNOBYL NEVER HAPPENED, FEMA'S REGIONAL DIRECTOR NEVER RESIGNED OVER SHOREHAM, THE WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF NEVER ADMITTED LONG ISLAND CANNOT BE EVACUATED, SUFFOLK COUNTY DID NOT 0;
WIN COURT VICTORIES UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE COUN POLICIES ON SHOREHAM, AND LONG ISLAND'S GEOGRAPHY IS NO DIFFER FROM ANYWHERE ELSE.
INDEED, LILCO IS EVEN IMPERVIOUS TO THE O
UTPOURING OF OPPOSITION TO SHOREHAM FROM EVERY CORNER ISLAND.
i i VIRTUALLY EVERY ELECTED OFFICIAL OPPOSES SHOREHAM, THE GOVERNOR OPPOSES SHOREHAM, AND THE PUBLIC OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSES SHOREHAM.
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REMAIN CONFIDENT THAT SUFFOLK COUNTY WILL WEPREVAIL.
ARE RIGHT, AND WE HAVE THE PUBLIC'S UNYIELDING SUPPORT. THE REASON IS O .THAT A BASIC TRUTH HAS DRIVEN THIS COUNTY FROM IT THE START: %
WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO EVACUATE OR OTHERWISE PROTFCT IF THERE WERE A SERIOUS NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AT THE SHOREHA SHOREHAM SHOULD NOT OPEN.
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. . . . . . .m. . . . . uso-ea Introduced by Legislators Wehrenberg, caracappa, D' Andre, Geise, Allgrove, Bael i
- Prospect, Foley, Nolan, Blass, Rizzo, LaBua, Devine, Hariton, Beck
'(3 RESOLUTION NO. 111 - 1983, CONSTITUTING THE FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS OF SUFFOLK COUNTY ON WHETHER i
A LEVEL OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TO RESPOND TO A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT AT THE SHOREHAM i l
NUCLEAR POWER STATION CAN PROTECT THE HEALTH, WELFARE AND SAFETY OF THE RESIDENTS OF
() SUFFOLK COUNTY WHEREAS, Suffolk County has a duty under the Constitution of the State c Now York, the New York State Municipal Home Rule Law, and the Suffolk Count Charter County; ' and to protect the health, safety, and welf are of the residents of suffo:
O uMEREAS, ' the Long Island Lighting Company ("LILCO") is constructing ar dosires to operate the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ("Shoreham"), located (
th3 north shore of Long Island near the town of Wading River, a location whic is within the boundaries of Suffolk County; and WHEREAS, a serious' huclear accident O roloese of significant quantities of radioactive fission at Shoreham products;could andresult in tt WHEREAS, the release of such radiation would pose a severe hazard to tr nocith, safety, and welfare of Suffolk County residents; and UNEREAS, in recognition of the effects of such potential hazard posed i O shoreham on the duty of Suffolk County to protect the health, safety, ar salfore of its citizens, this Legislature on March 23, 1982, adopted Resolutic No. 262-1982, which directed that suffolk County prepare a "County Radiologica Imorgency Response Plan to serve the interest of the safety, health, and welf az sf the citizens of Suf folk County . ."; and O WHERZAS, in Resolution 262-1982, the Legislature determined that the ple Savoloped by the County "shall not be operable and shall not be deemed adequat and capable of being implamented until such time as it is approved by tr 's, 3uf folk County Legislature"; and WHERZAS, in adopting Resolution 262-1982, the Legislature found tha sorlier planning efforts by LILCO and County planners 01sta') were inadequate because they failed to address(the "original plannir the particular proble.-
posed by conditions on Long Island and further failed to account for huma schavior during a ' radiological emergnacy and the lessons of the accident 4 Ihree Mile Island; and l
WHE REAS , on March 29, 1982, Peter F. Cohalan, Suffolk County Executive
()seting to implement Resolution 262-1982, by ~ Executive Order established tr Buffolk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan Steering Committe
("Stoering Committee") and directed it to prepare a County plan for submittal t the County Executive and County Legislature; and WHERZAS, the Steering Committee assembled a group of highly qualified ar gictionhlly plan; and recognized experts from diverse disciplines to prepare such Count O
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- KHEREAS, such highly qualified experts worked in a diligent i topscientious effort at a cost and in excess of $500,000 to prepare the best i >pssible plan for Suffolk County, and particularly to ensure that such plan took
.nto account all particular physical and behavioral conditions on Long Island j():hnt affect the adequacy of the emergency response plant and WHCREAS, the analyses, studies, and surveys of such experts included (a) Detailed analyses of the possible Shoreham; releases of radiation fror
'O (b) Detailed analyses of the radiological health consequences of suet radiation release on the population of Suffolk County, giventhe meterological, d emog raphic, topographical, and other specific local conditions on Long Island;
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d (c) h detailed social survey of Long Island residents to determine
' and assess their intended behavior in the event of a seriout accident at Shoreham; (d) A detailed survey of school bus drivers, volunteer firemen, anc certain othey , emergency response personnel to determine whether emergency .pe rsonnel intend to report promptly for emergene)
(3 duties, or. instead to unite with their own families, in the event of a serious accident at Shoreham;- -
l (e) Detailed estimates of the number of persons who would be orderec to evacuate in the event of a serious accident at Shoreham, as well as the number of persons who intend to evacuate voluntaril)
- () even if not ordered to do so; a
( f) Detailed analysas of the road network in Long Island and the time required to evacuate persons from areas affected by radiatior releases; (g) Detailed analyses of the protective actions available to Suffol)
O County residents to evacuate or take shelter from such radiatior releases; and N (h) Analysis
- of the lessons laarned from the accident at Three Mile Island on local government responsibilities to prepare for 4 radiological emergency;. and WHEREAS, on May 10, 1982, LILCO, without the approval or authorization o:
- ha suffolk County Government, submitted to the New York State Disastet
?roparedness Commisssion ("DPC") two volumes entitled "Suffolk Count:
Radiological Emergency Response Plan' and containing the original planning data as further revised and supplemented by LILCO, and requested the DPC to reviet gend opprove such LILCO submittal as the local radiological emergency responsa picn for suffolk County; and WHEREAS, in Resolutions 456-1982 and 457-1982, the County furthen addressed the matter of preparing for a radiological emergency at Shoreham anc emphos,ized that:
O (a) The LILCo-submitted document was not and will not be the county':
Radiological Emergency Response Plan; and O
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,. enunciated in Radiological EmergencyisResponse Resolution 456-1982, Planning Policy, a as follows:
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Suffolk County shall not assign funds or personnel to test o implement any radiological emergency response plan L Shoreham for th Nuclear Plant unless to the best of the County's ability. that plan, has been fully develope i
suffolk County shall not assign funds or personnel to test o implement any radiological emergency response plan for
,34 th Shoreham Nuclear Plant unless that plan has been subject of a least two public hearings, one to be held in Riverhead, and on t'o be held in Hauppauge.
l Suffolk County shall not assign funds or personnel to test o.
implement any radiological emergency response plan for thi j) hhoreham i Nuclear Plant unless that plan has been approved, af te:
public hearings, by the Suffolk County Legislature and the Count:
l Executives and WHEREAS, on June 9, 1982, the DPC rejected the LILCo-submitted documen for the reason that it was de,ficient; and C) WazREAS, on october 6, 1982, LILCo, again without the approval o suthorization of the Suffolk County Government, submitted to the DPC an amende-
/orsion' of the previously submitted LILCo document which had been rejected b:
tho DPC; and WHEREAS, on December 2, Otosponse Plan authorized by Resolution 1982, the Draft County Radiological Emergenc:
262-1982 was submitted to the Count:
- . ogislature for review and public hearings as specified in Resolutions 262-1982 456-1982, and 457-1982; and (MEREAS, in January 1983, the Legislature held hearings on the Draf-
- ounty plan, which hearings included:
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(a) More than 1,590 pages of transcripts; s (b) Detailed written statements and oral testimony of county exper consultan'ts who prepared the Draf t County plan; O (c) Detailed written statements and oral testimony of LILCo official and expert consultants retained by LILCo; (d) Detailed written statements and oral testimony of the Suf foll County Police Depar tment, the County Health Department, the County Social Services department, and the County Public Work:
Depar tment, all of which would have indispensable roles D
,Q responding to a radiological emergency at Shoreham; l
(e) Detailed written statements and oral testimony of organizations in Suffolk County concerned with radiological emergene:
preparedness; and O (f) Extensive presentations by hundreds of members of the genera
! public; and
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WHEREAS, members or the tearings in the vicinity of the Three Legislature itile Island Nuclear also travelled Power to and held publi Plant information on the lessons to be learned by local governments from the acciden to gat
-:O *t Three Mile Island; and WHEREAS, the Draft County plan identifies evacuation and protectiv iholtering as the two primary protective actions which would need to b implomented in the event of a serious accident at shorwham; and
.O WREREAS, evacuation of Suffolk County residents in the event of tcaiological emergency could take as much time as 14-30 hours because of variou
' actors, including: the limited number of appropriate evacuation routes i iuffolk County; difficulties in mobilizing police and other emergency personnel lifficulties ensuing from spontaneous evacuation of large numbers of Count rosidents, thus creating severe traffic congestion; and unavilability c 11tornate evacuation routes for persons residing east of shoreham and thus th 1D locossity for shch persons during an evacuation to pass by the plant an
>ossibly through' the radioactive plumes and WHEREAS, evacuation times in excess of 10 hours --
and certaini svacuation times in the range of 14-30 hours --
will result in virtua immobilization of evacuation and high exposure of evacuees to radiation sue O : hat evacuees' health, saf.ety', and welfare would not be protected; and WHEREAS, protective sheltering is designed to protect p rsons frc ixcossive radiation exposure by such persons staying indoors until radiatic sith the greatest danger to health has passed; and WHEREAs, if protective sheltering were ordered for suffolk Count O rosidents, unacceptable radiation exposure would still be experienced 1 l substantial portions of the suffolk County population, thus making it impossib1
- o provide for the health, welfare, and safety of these residents; and WHERIAS, the document submitted by LILCO to the DPC without Count approval or authorization is deficient because it does not deal with the actua 13 Local conditions, physical and behavioral, on Long Island that would t encountered during a serious nuclear accident at Shoreham; and WHEREAS, the document submitted by LILCO to the DPC without Coun' approval or authorizatidn does not ensure that effective protective action !
>orcons subject to radiation exposure, in the form of evacuation or shelterine O sould be taken in event of a serious nuclear accident at Shoreham, and thus suc locument, even if implemented, would not protect the health, safety, and welfa:
)f Suf folk County residents; _and WHEREAS, the extensive data which the Legislatu a has considered mal
- locr that the site-specific circumstances and actual local conditions existin on L ng Island, particularly its elongated east / west configuration whic lO roquires all evacuation routes from locations east of the plant to pass within
! zono of predicted high radiation, the inef fectiveness of pr.otective shelterinc l tho severe traf fic congestion likely to be experienced if a ' partial or comple*
avacuation were ordered, and the difficulties in ensuring that emergent porsonnel will promptly report for emergency duties, preclude any emergenc response plan, if implemented, from providing adequate preparedness to protei 0 tho hemith, welfare, and safety of suf folk County residents; now, therefore, 1 Lt 1
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.' to the County Legislatur RESOLVED, thst'the sraft County plan submittokwould not protect the health,an welfare,
-Q 1982, if implemented, and thus is not approved and will not b ecomber 2, f folk County residents ty of Su cm:nted; and be it further submitted by LILCO to the DPC without th health RESOLVED, that the document ld not protect the d vil
- Ci.ty oro, approval or authorization, further if implemented, wouand safety o be implemented; and be it RESOLVED, that since no local radiological emergency protect the response health, plan an welfare, for will l t tio tous oty of nuclear Suf accident folk County at Shoreham residents,the andpublic since by the indicating preparation to Count and iimp emen Ocny such plan would be misleading to idents that their health, welf are, and safety are being protected for response t wh t, such is not the case,terfninated, and no local radiological emergency,planimplemented; and be i
( horeby cecident at the Shoreham plant shall be adopted or l '
! ther radiological emergency plan canradiologica protect tr
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that since no no RESOLVED, alth, weifare, safety of Suf folk County residents necessaryand, to sincebe assure the ' adopted orgency plan shall take all actions ocutive is hereby directed to governmental agency, be it State or Federal, a:
tieno taken by any 'other paistant with the decisions mandated by this Resolution.
.TED: February 17, 1983 APP BY:
$L W:
O Countf executive of suf folx county Date of Approval: J JJ 7% s lO .
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O Mr. victor Stello Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nucisar Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Stallo:
O On behalf of the government of Suffolk County, we n e writing in reply to your letter of February 20, 1987, which responds to the January 16 letter of the Suffolk County Executive. The County Executive's letter had corrected certain of your statements quoted in the press that mischaracterized the
'O actions of Suffolk County concerning the Shoreham nuclear power plant. Your February 20 letter rejects the County Executive's corrections and reiterates even more emphatically the mischaracterizations you made earlier. ~
The message of your February 20 letter is clear: the Staff of the NRC has decided that public safety does not matter at O Shoreham; that what matters only is putting the plant into operation.
You have converted the Staff's role in the Shoreham licensing proceedings from participant in the case to champion of the cause -- LILCO's cause. In short, you have betrayed the Staff's responsibility to the public in these proceedings. It is ;
time for you to take remedial actions.
O Accordingly, first, the government of Suffolk County requests that you immediately disqualify yourself and.the rest of the Staf f f rom participating further as a party in the Shoreham proceedings. The Staff has subordinated its own identity to that of LILCO, and permitting the Staff to continue to participate as O a purportedly impartial party would be nothing but a ruse.
Section o.735-3(a)(6) of the NRC's Regulations requires that the Staf f "not give or appear to give favored treatment or competitive advantage to any member of the public." The Staff 10 a . m .. ..,..... . . ~ .. . . . . ,,, , ,,,,,,. ....
O Mr. Victor Stello March 10, 1987 O page 2 cannot satisfy this r,tandard: your February 20 letter is a
,() manifesto of the Staff's favor and partisanship toward LILCO; a declaration of hostility toward Suffolk County.
Second, Suffolk County requests that you appear before a Special Session of the County Legislature. Your February 20 letter parades a bias that stems either from ignorance of the z) facts or from design. We want to know the sources upon which you rely for information concerning emergermy planning at Shoreham.
With and met, whom from what LILCO have theyand said? other entities outside the NRC have you What private conversations have you held with NRC Commissioners? What is your true purpose in putting LILCO's interests above those of Suffolk' County's O
citizens? The citizens of Suffolk County have the right to know the full story issues at Shoreham.
behind your actions concerning emergency planning Finally, we request that you digest the facts presented in this letter. To begiri, the County Executive's January 16 letter corrected your mistatement that in a "real emergency" Suffolk g County would cooperate with LILCO and "follow LILCO's plan." The Executive informed you that your statement was unfounded and incorrect, and transmitted documents, including Suffolk County Resolution No. 111-1983, to explain in detail the reasons for his statement that, "I would not use the authority of this government to implement LILCO's emergency plan or to work in concert with LITCO to effect an emergency response to an accident at O Looreham."
N Your February 20 letter demeans the County Executive's statement. In scarcely veiled terms, you accuse the County Executive and the County Legislature of being liars, and even l
boast that you "continue to stand behind" your earlier O misstatements. This presumptuousness does not suit an appointed NRC employee addressing the elected government of 1.3 million people.
The fact is that the government of Suffolk County would never use LILCO's emergency plan, or work in concert with LILCO, O or rely upon LILCO's advice or judgment in a nuclear emergency.
whatever our actions, they would not include LILCO or LILCO's plan. This is the result of the County government h4ving l absolutely no confidence in the judgment or ccmpetence of LILCO.
The June 23, 1986 statement of the Suffolk County Executive, l which I sent you on January 16, explains ths reasons in detail.
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() Mr. Victor Stello March 10, 1947 Page 3 O Your February 20 letter persists in mischaracterizing-the emergency planning. actions of Suffolk County. You write of the "refusal" of the County to participate in emergency planning and charge the County with "intransigence." The facts belie your words.
() In fact, Suffolk County has participated thoroughly in emergency planning. In March 1982, we retained a team of nationally recognized experts at a cost of $600,000, directed them to prepare the "best possible" plan, and gave them f ree rein to do that. Eight months later, when the experts completed their 4 draft plan and the extensive studies, analyses, and surveys that O accompanied it, the County Legislature held eight days of open hearings at which specialists from around the country, including '
LILCO's consultants and of ficials, and members of the public testified. Sixteen hundred pages of testimony were compiled.
Thereafter, the County Legislature travelled to Three Mile Island to meet with local government officials and the public in order to learn first-hand the lessons of the 1979 nuclear accident.
O In February 1983, the County Legislature analyzed the emergency planning materials and testimony before it and concluded that in the event of a serious nuclear accident at Shoreham, it would not be possible to evacuate or otherwise protect the public. The bases for this determination are stated in Resolution No. 111-1983: among them are the limited roadway O network, population densities, and other physiographic conditions which would cause people who were attempting to evacuate, instead %s to become stuck in gridlock. Thsse people, therefore, would be exposed to the very radiation from which they were directed to flee.
O The government of Suffolk County had two choices: to adopt an emergency plan, or to resolve not to adopt one. To have done the former would have misled the public into believing they were being protected when in fact they were not. To do the latter would be to tell the truth: that the adoption of an emergency plan would merely put an ineffective paper plan on the shelf and
() lull the public into a sense of false security. This government was elected to tell the public the truth and to protect their welfare. That is what we did resolving in County Resolution No.
111-1963 not to adopt or implement an emergency plan.-
Suffolk County's Resolution No. 111-1983 and the County's actions were challenged by LILCO in Federal court. The County O won the cases the Court ruled that the Resolution is lawful and rationally based. LILCO also challenged the Resolution in Stata court. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the County's decision not to adopt a plan. In short, the County lawfully exercised its police powers.
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Mr. Victor Stello March 10, 1987 13 Page 4 l
- It is clear to us that you accuse Suffolk County of
-g- "refusing" to participate in emergency planning only because you do not like the result of the County's emergency planning process
-- that is, the decision not to adopt or implement an emergency plan. The reason for your view prastmably is that the County's actions do not enable the NRC to license Shoreham. If Suffolk County had followed the identical emergency planning process it used, but instead decided to adopt an emergency plan, we believe 13 you would now be praising the County for its "participation" in emergency planning. You cannot have it both ways The County in fact participated thoroughly in emergency planning and, as part of that participation, acted lawfully to protect the welfare of its citizens. For the same reasons that you would praise a County decision to adopt a plan, fair-mindedness requires that g you accept the County decision not to adopt one.
Your February 20 letter states, "The record of this l protracted proceeding also shows various state and local permits l for environmental monitoring, building and zoning were also sought by LILCO and approved." This is a contrived and misleading statement, apparently intended by you to convey the O impression that the County promoted the construction of Shoreham, and only as a last minute device to prevent operation of the plant raised the emergency plarning issue. The impression you seek to convey is false. The fact is that in issuing whatever permits for Shoreham that you have in mind, the County did not address, and was not required to address, the feasibility of O 'vacuating Long Island's residents in a nuclear emergency. The permits you have in mind presumably dealt with whether LILCO satisfied local building and other codes. The permits did not '-
l deal with whether safe evacuation was possible. Indeed, the agencies with the opportunity to address radiological emergency preparedness issues were the AEC and NRC, when LILCO applied for a permit to construct Shoreham and thereafter. However, they l0 refused to address the issues. It is thus the Arc and NRC, along with LILCO, who are responsible for building Shoreham without taking into account whether safe evacuation is possible.
Moreover, in-1977, when LILCO applied for an operating license and the County intervened in the NRC's proceeding, the 1 County raised the issue of whether evacuation was feasible at l3 Shoreham. This was three years before the NRC e.ven had a rule requiring an effective local emergency plan. The Cousty's action followed the persistent efforts, begun in 1970, of a Long Island l citizens group that had intervened in the Shoreham construction
! permit proceeding to raise and litigate the emergency planning issue before the AEC. In 1973, at the strong urging of LILCO and
.O the AEC Staff, the AEC ruled that the citizens group could not raise or litigate the emergency planning issue at that time. The 1ssue was postponed by the AEC until the "operating license l
10 1
0-Mr. Victor Ste11o-
<3 March 10, 1987 Page 5 I
stage." Therefore, it is clear that the only reasons that
,l) emergency planning issues were not considered before construction of Shoreham was well underway were (1) because LILCO insisted on this and the AEC agreeds and (2) because the NRC did not require the issue to be thoroughly examined until the adoption of its-post-Three Mile Island regulations in 1980.
() You know well that the turning point for all concerned with radiological emergency planning was the Three Mile Island accident, when the Kemeny Commission, Congress, and the NRC itself heralded the need for workable local emergency preparedness. Indeed, all of the major investigations into the emergency preparedness aspects of Three Mile Island concluded
() that workable local emergency preparedness is a key to effective response to a nuclear accident. The investigators implored local governments to approach this responsibility seriously. NRC officials who travelled across the country holding workshops echoed the need for effective local involvement in emergency l planning. No one had the temerity to suggest that a County which '
I had extensively examined emergency preparedness for a nuclear l) plant within its jurisdiction, drafted the best possible emergency plan, and lawfully determined that the public could not be protected would be confrontsd with NRC Staff efforts to license the operation of the plant on the basis of a utility's illegal emargency plan. This is precisely the action of the NRC l Staff in the shoreham case.
( The fact is that Shoreham was sited by LILCO and construction of the plant was approved by the AIC when emergency %s planning was given little attention. As late as 1979, before the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC's regulations did not require a local emergency plan as a condition of licensing a plant. The NRC required only that the utility submit "procedures for O notifying, and agreements reached" with local governments that were of a general nature. Your letter of February 20 evidences the Staff's willingness to license Shoreham under circumstances which do not comply even with the NRC's discredited pre-Three
! Mile Island regulations.
Your February 20 letter discloses the refusal of the Staff l() to confront reality. Indeed, reality is that (1) Suffolk County l has participated extensively in emergency planning and has ~
l rationally determined safe evacuation and other protection of the l
public to be impossibles (2) the County's determination has been upheld in Federal and State courts; and (3) LILCO's substitute emergency plan has been held by New York State courts to be
() illegal and not implementable. By choosing to rationalize LILCO's licensing objective in the Shoreham proceedings, rather than' advocating reality, you have become stuck with promoting the following fantasy: that in the absence of County, State, or O ,
, - + - - , - - - _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ , ~ - , .
9
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'Q .
Mr. Victor-Stello March 10, 1987 O page o implementable LILCO emergency plans, the public still would be O protected by a not implementable emergency plan which has been lawfully opposed by County government in order to protect the public's welfare.
We look forward to your early reply, si cerely,
'O
$Kup -y .
l-- e dragory Q). Bl%)s Michael A. LoGrande Presiding Officer Suffolk County Executive Suffolk County Legislature cc: NRC Set.vice List O
O i s O
1 O.
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, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA H# NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board 3 )
! In the Matter of )
! )
i )
! LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY )
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 i) ) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
O AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD C. ROBERTS Richard C. Roberts, being duly sworn, does say under oath the following:
()
- 1. My name is Richard C. Roberts. I am an Assistant Chief Inspector in the Suffolk County Police Department, Yaphank, New
)
York.
- 2. I am familiar with LILCO's offsite radiological
)
emergency response plan for Shoreham, which I will refer to as the LILCO Plan. In particular, I have reviewed and I am familiar with the traffic control strategies, techniques and measures set forth in the LILCO Plan. Moreover, I have appeared as a witness on behalf of Suffolk County in the ongoing Licensing Board proceedings concerning the adequacy of the LILCO Plan. In this 9 l
D regard, a statement of my professional qualifications, as well as
) an explanation and discussion of the general organization and structure of the Suffolk County Police Department, was most recently included in the record in connection with.the February 13, 1986 Exercise proceeding (OL-5 docket). Egg Roberts 3
et al., ff. Tr. 2180, at 7-8 and Att. 1.
- 3. I have read and I am familiar with LILCO's motions for summary disposition of Contentions 1 and 2 and Contention 10, which are dated December 18, 1987. In addition, I have read and I am familiar with the Affidavits of Douglas M. Crocker, Charles A. Daverio, and Jay Richard Kessler, which are relied upon by LILCO to support its motions for summary disposition on Contentions 1 and 2 and Contention 10.
O
- 4. I have not had the opportunity to review or evaluate Revision 9 of the LILCO Plan, nor have any officials of the O Suffolk County Police Department ("SCPD").
- 5. Assuming arauendo that there would be some sort of ad O h2g response by members of the Suffolk County police to a Shoreham radiological emergency, such personnel, under existing circumstances, would not be knowledgeable about the procedures
() and strategies in the LILCO Plan; nor would they have been trained how to respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
Accordingly, when taking these factors into consideration, it is 0
O
O my opinion that it cannot be assumed that police participation g would provide effective preparedness during such a major undertaking as asserted by LILCO.
- 6. Based on my review of tae traffic and accesc control g
measures set forth in the LILCO Pian, it is my opinion that LILCO's traffic and access control schemes are inadequate, unworkable and unimplementable. This opinion is based not only on my review of the LILCO Plan, but, at least with respect to the traffic control portions of the Plan, also upon LILCO's performance in attempting to implement the Plan during the O
February 13, 1986 FEMA-graded Exercise. The Exercise revealed, and LILCO's performance demonstrated, the existence of many fundamental flaws in the LILCO Plan. Specifically, LILCO traffic
-O control personnel were not adequately trained, were too slow in mobilizing, were not dispatched or deployed in a timely manner, and were unable to communicate emergency information in an 0 adequate or effective manner.
- 7. LILCO has asserted that in the event of a Shoreham O emergency, the SCPD would have sufficient personnel, communications systems and other resources to direct traffic during a Shoreham emergency, in accordance with the LILCO Plan.
[3 There is, however, no plan and there are no procedures for the Suffolk County police to communicate with LILCO or LERO using any communication system in the event of a radiological emergency at lO l
o
O Shoreham. Moreover, during a Ghoreham emergency, the SCPD would also be called upon to perform at the same time other functions
() .
necessary to the public's health and safety on a County-wide basis. It.would be unrealistic to assume that only 165 police personnel would be required, as LILCO assumes, to service the (s>
public's needs and events which are likely to result or occur during a radiological emergency at Shoreham. In the absence of prior planning, the size of a police complement necessary to y
provide effective preparedness is unknown.
- 8. That any response by the SCPD to a Shoreham emergency would necessarily be ad hag in nature cannot be questioned. The SCPD has not formulated a plan to respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham. Nor can it do so at this time, since
~
County law -- particularly Resolutions Nos. 262-1982, 456-1982, and 111-1983 -- prohibits the adoption or implementation of any plan for a response to a Shoreham radiological emergency.
lO I
- 9. Other than a few officials who have reviewed the LILCO Plan in connection with this proceeding, personnel of the SCPD O are not familiar with the LILCO Plan, including the traffic control measures, proposed strategies and the access control measures set forth in the Plan. Thus, even assuming arauendo
() that the SCPD would follow the LILCO Plan, nothing about LILCO's traffic control measures and strategies, security functions, or l
l
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l i
i
- O access control measures is presently known by those Suffolk O-County police officers who would actually be called upon and expected to implement the LILCO Plan.
- 10. LILCO has asserted that the "best efforts" of the O
Suffolk County police, working with LERO, would be to implement the traffic portions of the LILCO Plan. In addition, LILCO has contended that the police would provide access control, which v
precludes entry into an area being evacuated because of the threat to public health and safety, as well as those areas that have been evacuated. LILCO is wrong. The SCPD would not O
implement all the traffic control portions of the LILCO Plan.
Many of LILCO's traffic control measures are, as the SCPD has previously testified, inadequate, unworkable and unimplementable.
O Moreover, even if it is assumed that the Suffolk County police were directed by the County Executive to implement the LILCO
! Plan, no mechanism has been designed or even contemplated by which the SCPD would work in partnership or in conjunction with LERO personnel. Notwithstanding LILCO's assertion that its I
'~
personnel are tr lined to advise and assist the SCPD should the D police participate in a Shoreham emergency, officers of the SCPD l
would not rely upon the. assistance or the advice of LERO l personnel, whom the police consider inexperienced and who have fO displayed a lack of essential training. Nothing in the Affidavit of Charles A. Daverio or the Affidavit of Jay Richard Kessler, which are relied upon by LILCO to support the proposition that O
O
P "volunteers," such as the LERO Traffic Guides, could be called upon to supplement and assist the police during a Shoreham
)
emergency, changes this conclusion.
- 11. LILCO also has asserted that its Traffic Guides are
)
trained to explain to the police the situation existing at the time of an emergency, to turn over posts for facilitating traffic to the police, to remain to advi,se and assist the police, and to monitor their radiological exposure during the evacuation effort.
Assuming arauendo that the police would respond to a Shoreham emergency, the police would not rely on inexperienced and
) inadequately trained LERO Traffic Guides for assessment or other l purposes, i
- 12. LILCO has asserted thmt, in many instances, it has modified its Plan as a result of specific criticisms made by the SCPD of the Plan's traffic control measures. LILCO, however, has not modified the traffic control portions of its Plan in any material way. Indeed, of the nine "technical changes" listed by LILCO in support of its summary disposition motion of Contentions
) 1 and 2, eight are mere corrections of "typographical errors."
Thus, for the most part, the criticisms of LILCO's traffic control measures which have been made by the SCPD remain
) uncorrected in the Plan.
i D
l 1
4
- 13. LILCO asserts that under the latest revision to the LILCO Plan (Rev. 9), the LERO Director is instructed by procedure 3
to request that several County officials, including the Commissioner of Police, or his representative, come to the LERO
,.s EOC in the event of a Shoreham emergency to "better coordinate u
the emergency response." Moreover, the police representative would be instructed to bring a portable police radio with him in order to communicate with police headquarters. Since the SCPD would not follow the LILCO Plan, unless directed to do so by the County Executive, no representative of the SCPD would report to the LERO EOC during a Shoreham emergency. Moreover, even O
assuming arcuendo that a police representative were to go to the LERO EOC, a portable police radio would not be relied upon as the sole means of communications between the LERO EOC and police O
headquarters.
- 14. LILCO also asserts that, under Revision 9 of its Plan, the LERO Director is instructed by procedure to request that the Suffolk County police begin to mobilize at least 165 uniformed police officers for traffic control in the event that it is O decided that evacuation is necessary. under no circumstance, however, could the SCPD ever mobilize at the request of the LERO Director. Furthermore, it must be recognized that since there is
() no police plan for responding to a Shoreham emergency, there is no reason to conclude that the mobilization of 165 police O
O
L) officers would be adequate, even assuming grauendo that the j mobilization request of the LERO Director, after approval of the J
County Executive, were to be followed by the police.
- 15. LILCO also asserts that Suffolk County would be con-tacted promptly in the event of an emergency at Shoreham. Based on my review of the LILCO Plan, and a review of the Affidavit of Douglas M. Crocker that is relied upon by LILCO in support of its O
motion for summary disposition of Contentions 1 and 2 and which describes LILCO's inadequate and delayed attempts to contact the SCPD during recent Unusual Event incidents and bomb threats at O Shoreham, it is my opinion that LILCO currently lacks the capability to promptly notify the SCPD in the event of a radiological incident at Shoreham.
- O
- 16. LILCO has asserted that LERO will send its Traffic Control Point Coordinator to serve as liaison at police
() headquarters during a Shoreham emergency. However, neither the LERO Traffic Control Point Coordinator nor any other member of I LERO would be provided access to police headquarters to serve as lO liaison or to perform any other like function in the event of a l Shoreham emergency, unless so directed by the County Executive.
l C) 17. LILCO also asserts that in the event an evacuation is recommended, the LERO Traffic Control Coordinator would be instructed to coordinate the dispatch of both the LERO Traffic I
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O Guides and the Suffolk County police. The SCPD, however, does not have any plan or procedures which would authorize the LERO
()
Traffic Control Coordinator or any other member of LERO to dispatch police personnel into the field or to supervise their activities while in the field. Thus, contrary to LILCO's assertions, the dispatch of tue police and the LERO Traffic Guides could not proceed in parallel, and they would not "link up" at the LILCO Traffic Control Posts ("TCPs") in the field.
- 18. The LILCO Plan does not allow for contingencies in the field and therefore lacks flexibility. In an emergency O
situation, emergency personnel would likely have to respond to unanticipated situations and otherwise take actions not planned for or even considered prior to the emergency. This could
-O require those personnel, for example, to take ad h2g actions, such as having to change posts in the field, in order to react and respond to emergency events.
^O l 19. LILCO has asserted that, in the event of a Shoreham emergency, LERO Traffic Guides would monitor the police officers'
- 3) radiological exposure and inform them if Protective Action l
Guidelines ("PAGs") for permissible exposure were exceeded. This l
assertion assumes that LERO Traffic Guides would be in close 3 proximity to the police as they directed evacuation traffic.
Such would not always be the case. In an emergency of this l magnitude, an unanticipated or unexpected event is likely to
- O l 'O
3 v .,
occur, necessitating reassignment of police personnel to other j) designated location (s). All field personnel should therefore be appropriately attired and equipped before dispatch, to provide them a maximum level of protecticn. Unlike LERO's workers, however, the SCPD does not possess necessary dosimetry and radiation protection equipment.
- 20. LILCO has asserted that there is no question that the O
police, with advice and assistance from LERO, would be able to implement the traffic control portions of the LILCO Plan witnout appreciable delay or confusion. First, as already discussed, the O
SCPD could not follow or implement the LILCO Plan, including the traffic control portions of that Plan, without the authority of the County Executive. Second, assuming arquendo that the SCPD have responded to a Shoreham emergency, they would not rely on
- f s assistance from LERO personnel, whom they consider inexperienced and who are lacking in essential training.
'O i
l 21. LILCO has asserted that the police could be notified 1
and mobilized quickly, that they would know where to go once they i) were dispatched, and that they would understand what they needed to do once they arrived at the LERO TCPs in the field. LILCO's assertion assumes four things: that the police would be familiar
() with the LILCO Plan; that the police would always follow the LILCO traffic control plan; that the police would be mobilized
.quickly; and that 165 police officers would be suff ci ent i to iO lO l
I
' ~~
7
/ ,
Q provide traffic control and other assigned duties. The first two assumpti na have been already dist;ussed: the SCPD would not
'O follow all the traf fic control porti: ens of the LILCO Plan and the-police officeru expected to respond to a Shoreham emergency are n t familiar u th the LILCO Plan. The third and fourth O
assumptions dro also without merit since, under the circumstances of a Shoreham energency, mobilization of a larger number.of personnel, inclu ding off-duty police, would likely not be O,
accomplished as quickly au LILCO assumes. Furthermore, even if the police could be mobiliced as assumed by LILCO, 165 police officers would t:onstitute only a portion of the personnel needed for traffic control,-security functions and access controls during a Shoreham emergency. Certainly, there is no reason to believe that the police, with no advance planning or training,
!O could be mobilized in sufficient strength, briefed and readied
~
for dispatch int 9 the field within the timeframe assumed by
! LILCO. Moreover, under such citcumstances, some police officers 10 already on duty throughout the police district would be required to continue to perform other tads within their jurisdiction (s),
1 l in addition to those Outlined in the LILCO Plan.
!O
- 22. hfith'!!espect to access control, LILCO states that the SCPD has "already made preparations for establishing access
)0 1 control." LItcO's Atatement is unfounded; no such preparations l
have been made. LILCO'e unfounded assertion is based on a list of intersections ~ prepared by the SCPD approximately four years
!O 1
, eg* :nr -
3 ago in preparation for the initial hearings on the LILCO Plan.
}y]f The list does not support LILCO's assertion for several reasons.
first, the list was prepared in the context of the previous hearings, which assumed that LILCO would be implementing access '
A
~
control and that only LILCO's 10-mile EPZ would be adhered to.
g response by the SCPD, however, would not necessarily utilize the LILCO Plan and therefore might not be bound by the EPZ that LILCO has defined. A completely different area could for example, be U,
evacuated, if the County Executive so ordered. Thus, the cited list could be inapplicable to determining where access control would actually be needed.
- 23. Second, LILCO's attempt to equate the preparation of a list for a hearing on the LILCO Plan with actual preparedness to
'O '
implement access control is unfounded. Actual preparation involves issues of planning, adequate personnel, timely
. mobilization, training, etc. -- none of which has been addressed
'O by the SCPD with respect to access control during a radiological emergency at Shoreham. If access control were in fact attempted ;
I by the SCfD, it would of necessity be ad h2g, with unknown O results.
- 24. Third, the list was prepared four years ago. Even if C) it were found applicable, it clearly is outdated due to i
development in those areas which has occurred in Suffolk County over that time period.
lO 1
lO I
O
- 25. LILCO also assumes that the SCPD will be able to mobilize sufficient personnel rapidly enough to implement access
()
control effectively. This assumption is unfounded. If, as LILCO argues, the SCPD were expected to implement an orderly traffic j flow and perform other necessary police functions, it is questionable whether sufficient personnel could be mobilized and placed in the field to provide access control over the very large geographic area which could be involve, 2 a radiological
'O, emergency. The SCPD has not determined the number of-officers who would be required for establishing an effective access control. While it is true that the SCPD has provided access control in response to some other previous events, the SCPD has never attempted to exercise access control over as large an area as could be involved in a radiological emergency occurring at O
Shoreham.
- 26. LILCO also asserts that LERO Traffic Guides might "supplement" the SCPD in implementing ac7ess control "acting under the authority of the police." The SCPD, however, could not grant volunteer LERO Traffic Guides such authority.
O
- 28. Even if the SCPD were to attempt to implement access control, it would be extremely difficult to do so in light of
() several factors. First, the geographic scope of the task is such that the SCPD may have insufficient resources in the short term.
Second, appropriate access control could require much faster 0
.O
O mobilization than the sCPD could achieve under the prevailing circumstances. Third, some people will have a strong motivation O
to enter the evacuating area (to find family, obtain belongings, etc.), thus rendering the task of access control more difficult.
Access control, as previously noted (mag 1 10), precludes entry' C) into an area being evacuated because of the threat to public health and safety, as well as those areas that have been evacuated. Fourth, access control on a long-term basis would
- O place additi nel maitments n personnel and resources that the SCPD has not addressed.
The foregoing facts are known by me to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am competent to testify to such facts, and would so teritify if I appeared as a witness in a public hearing on this matter.
O O
l2rA $ .
R;, chard C. Ro5erts Sworn to this /d day of February ' .
O M h. [
Notary Public 2h.,
My commission Expires: 44.u / /N
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temas sumams enumsummanuses
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C) 4 O
o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board O
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docke t No. 50-3 22-OL-3 CJ ) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
O AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD C. ROBERTS Richard C. Roberts, being duly sworn, does say under oath the following:
O
- 1. My name is Richcrd C. Roberts. I am a Deputy Chief '
Inspector with the Suf folk County Police Department.
O 2. I am f amiliar with the LILCO Transition Plan, the radiological emergency response plan which LILCO proposes to implement in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
O I have appeared as a witness on behalf of Suf folk County in the
, ongoing Licensing Board proceeding concerning the adequacy of us the LILCO Transition Plan.
O
C) 0
- 3. Suffolk County Executive Peter Cohalan has stated that in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, C) "[t]he County could not implement a response to a Shoreham ac-cident because County law -- particularly Resolution Nos.
262-1982, 456-1982, and 111-1983 -- prohibits that." Statement
() of Suffolk County Executive Peter F. Cohalan Before the Gover-nor's Shoreham Commission, September 30, 1983, at 9 (attached hereto). In addition, County Executive Cohalan stated that
() there is no other government in a position to respond and that the State government does not have a prompt response capabili-ty. Id. at 10.
O 4. Assuming arguendo that there could be some sort of ad hoc response by Suffolk County personnel to a Shoreham radiological emergency. Such personnel would not have been lO trained how to respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
Accordingly, it is my opinion, based on my experience in re-l sponding to emergency situations, that their response would be 1
- () inadequate and could not be counted on to provide effective preparedness.
- 5. LILCO has asserted that under the LILCO Transition Plan, State and County personnel could communicate with LILCO l and LERO using existing systems which are already installed.
I l
l D
i l
- O l
1
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O LILCO and LERO have no dedicated emergency planning communications system link with County offices. There is no O
plan and there are no procedures for Suf folk County personnel to communicate with LILCO or LERO using any communication sys-tem in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
O
- 6. LILCO has stated that space exists at the Emergency Operations Facility, the Emergency Operations Center, and the Emergency News Center for use by State and County officials.
As noted by County Executive Cohalan, the County could not im-plement a response to a Shoreham emergency and the State has no prompt response capability. See Cohalan Statement attached O
hereto.
- 7. LILCO has stated that the Transition Plan provides f r the incorporation of the County Executive or his designated O
representative in responding to an emergency should that of fi- *s cial choose to participate. As noted in the attached statement of County Executive Cohalan, "[t]he County could not implement g
a response to a Shoreham accident because County law -- partic-ularly Resolution Nos. 262-1982, 456-1982, and 111-1983 --
prohibits that."
- 8. LILCO has stated that the LERO Director of Local Re-sponse is to take into account in making any protective action O
3-O
O-
.o. .
recommendations advice that may be received from local and State government of ficials. As noted in the attached statement O of County Exocutive Cohalan, "[t]he County could not implement a response to a shoreham accident because County law -- partic-ularly Resolution Nos. 262-1982, 456-1982, and 111-1983 --
C) prohibits that."
- 9. LILCO has stated that its LERO traffic guides are trained to assist police should the police participate in an O
emergency. LILCO also has asserted that the Transition Plan provides for the incorporation by traf fic guides trained under
. the Plan of any police assistance that is offered during an emergency. As noted in County Executive Cohalan's attached statement, the County could not respond. Assuming arquendo l that Suf folk County's police did par ticipate in response to an O emergency, they would not rely upon the assistance or advice of
%s LERO traffic guides whom they considet inexperienced and who would be lacking in essential trainina. Roberts, et al., ff.
O Tr. 2260, at 39-44.
- 10. LILCO also has asserted that traffic guides are trained to explain to the police the situation existing at the O
time of an emergency, to turn over posts for facilitating traf-l fic to the police, and to remain as assistants if necessary in 1
O o ,
C) 4 O
coordinating the evacuation effort. To repeat, County law bars the County from implementing any response to a Shoreham emer-
.. O gency.
See Cohalan Statement attached hereto. As suming arguendo that the police would respond to a Shoreham emergency, the police would not rely on inexperienced and inadequately C) trained LERO traf fic guides for assessment or other purposes.
- 11. LILCO has asserted that if the State of New York and Suf folk County participate in an emergency response, the LERO organization will coordinate its activities with State and County officials. The attached Cohalan statement states that the County could not implement a response and the State has no
- O resources for a prompt response. See Cohalan Statement at 9-10.
I j) 12. LILCO has asserted that it could implement an uncontrolled evacuation, using no traffic guides, signs, cones, 's channelization or other traffic control devices, with an in-
) crease of evacuation times of less than one hour 35 minutes in normal conditions and one hour 55 minutes in inclement weather.
I disagree. LERO does not have the capacity to implement any
,O t
kind of effective evacuation of the EPZ or portions thereof due to its lack of experience in emergency evacuation operations.
The evacuation time estimates proposed by LILCO are far too l
O 5-l i
O l
O O
low, being based on unrealistic assumptions, particularly regarding the likely congestion on the limited Suffolk County road network. Pigozzi, ff. Tr. 2909 (entire testimony and es-pecially pages 37-39); Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 8-10; Polk, ff.
Tr. 2909, at 3-17; Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 8-10; Roberts, et O
al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 8 - conclusion; Bartgen, et al., f f. Tr.
3695, a t 5-19. Fur ther , the County's witnesses have specifi-cally contested the accuracy of LILCO's so-called O . uncontrolled" time estimates. Pigozzi, ff. Tr. 2909, at 37-38.
- 13. In my opinion, for an "uncontrolled" evacuation to have any potential to succeed, an emergency response organiza-tion would need to have traffic guides, tow trucks, etc. in place on evacuation routes during the evacuation effort so that O
they could respond to developing situations as the need arose.
l This was a concept of "uncontrolled" evacuation that the SCPD l
l suggested during the County's planning ef for t. Thus, the evac-
'O
, uation ef fort would be closely supported by trained and capable response personnel to assist evacuees if, for istance, severe congestion developed at a particular location. LILCO's concept C) of an uncontrolled evacuation is drastically dif ferent and com-pletely inadequate since LERO would have no capability for any response to the needs of the evacuating public when traffic C) congestion and similar events occurred during an emergency.
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kJ 10
- 14. LILCO suggests that its evacuation time estimates, ;
including those for an uncontrolled evacuation, are reasonable 33 when compared to time estimates at other nuclear. Power plant sites and that they meet the accuracy standards of NUREG-0654.
With respect to the accuracy assertion, I dispute that LILCo's
. () time estimates are accurate. Herr, f f. Tr. 2909; Polk, f f.
2909; Pigozzi, f f. Tr. 2909; Roberts, et al., ff. Tr. 2260. '
i Given the inaccuracy of the LILCO estimates, there is.no basis (3 to compare these estimates with those at other nuclear power plants.
j 15. LILCO asserts that the controlled evacuation plan
) used in the LILCO Transition Plan could be modified to elimi-nate traf fic guidance completely, with a resulting increase in evacuation time estimates of about 1-1/2 hours. I disagree.
(3 - If there were no traffic guides and if LILCO/LERO were in *!
charge of the evacuation effort, it is my opinion that chaotic conditions would result. This is because LILCO does not have ;
C) the institutional capabilities or experience to implement an adequate response , to a radiological emergency, and the public will realize this and will react accordingly. If chaos
() resulted, the evacuation would take considerably longer. 'rur- [
ther, without having the capability and authority to institute l
l traf fic control methods, there would be no ef fective means to C) l i
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respond to the chaos that would result. This would mean that evacuees would be stranded in traf fic and likely be exposed to health threatening radiation.
l l 16. In the event of an evacuation of all or portions of the EPZ, whether under controlled or uncontrolled conditions,
)
LILCO would need to have the capability to institute ef fective traffic control measures in order to have adequate prepared-ness. During the course of an emergency, there likely will be severe traffic congestion and also accidents. Unless the capa-bility exists to deal effectively with such traffic contingencies, it is my opinion that no ef fective preparedness
'O can exist.
- 17. The evacuation shadow phenomenon is expected to re-() sult in a large number of voluntary evacuees in the event of a Shoreham emergency. In order to cope with the traf fic conges- **
tion caused by these evacuees (who will be in addition to the 100,00 - 15 ,50 eva uees fr m within the EPZ), there must be 0
a capability to deal with the traffic control problems which are certain to ensue, including traffic jams, traffic going the wrong way, and roadway impediments. LILCO has inadequately considered the evacuation shadow phenomenon. Polk, ff. Tr.
2909, at 7-10; Pigozzi, ff. Tr. 2909, at 45-49.
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- 18. An uncontrolled evacuation would not result in' ade-quate response under the LILCO Plan. An essential attribute of O adequate- preparedness to respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham is- the capability to implement rapid and effective ac-tions to assist persons attempting to leave the EP3. Such ca-C) pability is essential because the precise way an emergency may develop cannot be predicted in advance. Thus, for example, if a serious traf fic tie-up occurs, it is essential that there be O a capability to assist in alleviation of the resulting conges-tion. If LILCO lacks legal authority to implement the traf fic and security-related functions contested in Contentions 1-4, 9, O and 10, then there will exist no capability to take necessary actions to assist persons ordered to leave the EPZ.
l 19. I have reviewed the LILCO emergency plan and conclude 0 that LEno employees, chiefly the traffic guides, will in fact
%s will be directing traffic. One does not have to "compel" or "require" people to move in a particular direction in order to O be directing traffic. The traffic guides, using hand signals and other directional devices, including parked vehicles blocking lanes, will be directing and attempting to affect the
() driving patterns of Suffolk County residents. This constitutes traffic direction in my opinion. See Tr. 3468-69 (Urbanik)
(traffic strategy to block lanes of the LIE with vehicles to O
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.O create congestion upstream, to attempt to preclude congestion d own s tr e am) .
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- 20. Under LILCO's plan, traffic guides are to be stationed at key intersections to facilitate the movement of traf fic by using hand and arm- signals, traf fic cones, parked vehicles and flashing lights and thus to discourage travel in certain directions. LILCO has asserted that traf fic will not be restricted from traveling in a particular direction. Howev-er, in my experience as a police o(ficer, the stationing of traf fic guides using hand and arm riignals and other devices (such as parked vehicles and flash.ing lights) will restrict
'O traffic from traveling in particuAar directions and will con-stitute the direction of traffic, something which I, a s a po-lice of ficer, do not believe LILCO is permitted to do.
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- 21. The LILCO assumption regarding the likely number of N accidents during an evacuation is too low. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 39-41.
- 22. LILCO has asserted that it will not force anyone to turn in a particular direction should they choose not to do so.
() However, LILCO intends to convert a two mile stretch of at least one two-way road to a one-way road. LILCO Transition Plan, Appendix A, Table XIII. LILCO will also be using O
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O channeling techniques and concurrent continuous flow treatment, methods of traffic control which will likely require drivers to
() go in particular directions. Thus, LILCO traffic guides will be forcing persons to turn in a particular directf.on. In addi-tion, under LILCO's Plan, LILCO traf fic guides will use cones, C) hand signals, arm movements, parked vehicles and flashing lights to encourage the movement of traffic out of the EPZ.
Such actions, taken by persons standing in or next to the road-l(3 way, will constitute the direction of traffic.
- 23. LILCO has asserted that the controlled evacuation contemplated under the LILCO Plan results in an evacuation time
'O estimate of four hours and 55 minutes for evacuation of the en-tire 10-mile EPZ in summer and good weather and six hours in inclement weather. The time estimate is substantially inaccu-() rate, for reasons that are described in the expert testimony of Suf folk County and New York State Department of Transportation t witnesses. See also 1 12, supra for citations, l
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- 24. LILCO has stated that whether a controlled or uncontrolled evacuation time estimate is used as the basis for protective action recommendations, LILCO will make the choice O
between evacuation and sheltering based on the . action that af-fords the greatest dose savings. This may be true, but these O
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recommendations will be based on a fundamentally inaccurate proposition namely that LILCO can implement either a q
controlled or uncontrolled evacuation. LILCO does not have that capability. LILCO may believe that it has that capability and thus recommend evacuation, resulting in people being O stranded in traf fic and potentially exposed to health threaten-ing radiation. See Pigozzi, ff. Tr. 290 9, a t 7-8.
O
- 25. LILCO has stated that trail blazer signs are located along every major road in the EPZ. In fact, these signs have not been located along any major road in the EPZ.
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- 26. LILCO han suggested that the evacuation time esti-I mates for an uncontrolled evacuation would not be altered if
.O there are n trail blazer signs. I disagree, sased on my ex-l perience and knowledge of the roads in Suffolk County, I N believe that signs providing clear guidance in an evacuation 3 scenario would be helpful to drivers attempting to escape from the EPZ. If there were no trail blazer signs, evacuation times would increase.
(3 27. LILCO ha s asser ted tha t the State of Connecticut has l
agreed to implement protective action recommendations in its State when notified by LILCO of an emergency at Shoreham.
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C) i However, Connecticut has not agreed to implement the LILCO Plan. Cordaro and Renz, ff. Tr. 13,858; Tr. 13,876-77 (Renz);
Tr. 13,877, 13,878 (Cordaro).
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& 28. LILCO has asserted that protective action recommenda-tions for the 50-mile EP3 need not be made immediately follow-ing the declaration of an emergency. While this may be true in some instances, a fast developing emergency may require protec-tive actions in close-in portions of the 50-mile EPZ relatively O
soon after declaration of an emergency.
- 29. LILCO has stated that following an emergency at a nu-() clear plant, many governmental entities will step forward to study the situation and to determine what actions should be taken to reenter the area af fected and to recover it if neces-sary. This may be the general rule, but there is no evidence
)
that either the State of New York or Suf folk County would in 's '
fact undertake recovery and reentry actions as suggested by LI LCo. Further, Executive Cohalan has stated that the County
.0.
could not implement a response. See attached Cohalan State-ment.
- (), 30. LILCO has asserted that dispensing fuel from tank trucks is not required under the NRC emergency planning regula-l tions or even suggested by NUREG-0654. NUREG-0654, Section
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II.J.10.K, requires that LILCO have a capability to remove road obstacles. If fuel trucks were not available to dispense fuel
~q to cars running out of gas, these cars would be obstacles and tht? there would not be compliance with NUREG-0654. Further, it is not enough just to push the disabled cars to the side of O the road as LILCO has suggested. In my experience as a police of ficer, even cars which are pushed to the side of the road after an accident or after suffering a breakdown or running out C) of gas do constitute road obstacles, causing people to gawk and slow down and likely to cause traf fic jams and sometimes acci-dents as well. Tr. 3418-19 (Michel). It is estimated that 277 O cars will run out of gas in a 10 mile EPZ evacuation; the pres-ence of so many disabled cars will impede the evacuation.
Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 13-17. See also Roberts, et al., ff.
j) Tr. 2260, at 55-59 (discussing vehicle breakdowns and effects on traf fic movement) .
- 31. LILCO has stated that its employees will be assigned E) to the EPZ perimeter to discourage people from entering the EPZ through the use of hand and arm movements and traf fic cones Such action, in my opinion as a police of ficer, constitutes the (3 direction of traffic for which LILCO lacks legal authority.
Fur ther, if adequate EPZ control is not exercised, additional congestion will result and evacuation times will be increased.
() Roberts, et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 67.
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O j 32. LILCO has stated that its employees will be channel-ing traf fic and the stream of people who may be arriving at re-
., location centers for assistance. In my opinion as a police of-ficer, such channeling of traffic constitutes the direction of O
traffic and LILCO is not authorized to perform av;:h functions.
lO _.::y ] g,) & .'h /$q.,7g' Richard C. Roberts T ps Sworn to this M day of September, 1984.
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a 3) 9 UNITED S.ATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ggleia the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board
)
] In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power )
Station, Unit 1) )
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g' AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES D. PAPILE, JAMES C. BARANSKI
_ , _ AND LANRENCE B. CZECH James D. Papile, James C. Baranski and Lawrence B. Czech, O being du'y . sworn, depose and say as follows:
I. Introduction O
- 1. I, James D. Papile, am currently the Director of the State of New York's Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group
() ("REPG"), a position which I have held for a little over a year.
Prior to that and since 1980, I was one of three associate planners for REPG. In my seven years with REPG I have helped
- () write and/or review numerous radiological emergency response plans.
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- 2. I, James C. Baranski, am a nuclear facility specialist J with REPG. 1 also hold the additional position of Exercise
.s Director'for-REPG. I have been a REPG emergency planning nuclear facility: specialist since 1981, and I have been the REPG Exercise
() ,
_ Director since January 1985. I have had extensive experience with nuclear power operations, including eight yatars in the
~ United States Navy Nuclear Power Program and six years as a
() Senior Reactor Operator at Indian Point Unit 3.
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- 3. I, Lawrence B. Czech, am currently Chief of Nuclear Pr tecti n Planning with REPG. In that position, I am O
responsible for the preparation, maintenance, revision, and oversight of the State portion of the New York State Emergency Response Plan. I am trained in health physics and have worked in d
the area of radiological health and radiation protection for l approximately 25 years.
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- 4. REPG, under the auspices of the State of New York's
(
Disaster Preparedness Commission, is responsible for emergency planning and preparedness for radiological emergencies pertaining to commercial nuclear power plants. We have two roles in this planning process. First, as emergency planners, we provide: (i) technical evaluations to senior State decision makers during O '
actual emergencies, drills and FEMA evaluated exercises; (ii) technical support in the preparation of drill scenarios; and (iii) technical training for State commissioners, county execu-O tive officers and health officials, county dose assessment staff, public information staff and other REPG staff. Second, through C)
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i its Exercise Director, REPG has lead-responsibility for scenario
- C) writing and off-site exercise planning. In particular, REPG must_ '!
ensure that drills and exercises maximize traini6g requirements ,
and meet defined objectives. In addition, the Exercise. Director
() coordinatea-development of on-site /off-site scenarios among !
federal officials, state and county governments, and nuclear utilities.
O
- 5. We are familiar with and have reviewed LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 7 and 8 (Ingestion Pathway
() and Recovery and Raentry) ("LILCO Motion"), which discusses the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan for '
Commercial Power Plants ("New York State Plan"). We are also j). generally aware of the fact that LILCO has filed a series of (
motions related to the legal authority issues, asserting generally that in an emergency, State and Suffolk County person- t nel would respond according to the LILCO and State Plans and
)
- would work cooperatively with LILCO personnel. LILCO's Motion is based on the premise that "during a Shoreham emergency, the State of New York would implement its ' generic' recovery and reentry and ingestion pathway procedures since they are not site-specific and would use the LILCO Plan as needed to compensate for the fact [t that no county plan for Shoreham has been appended to the generic section of the State Plan." LILCO Motion at 2. LILCO's factual assumptions are wrong. The New York State Plan is in fact site-specific for recovery and reentry activities and for all activi- ;
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ties, including ingestion pathway, does not work, and could not
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work, as LILCO postulates. !
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- 6. LILCO starts from the assumptions that (i) the New York 9 State Plan contains "detailed procedures about what the State would do during recovery and reentry (sic) ingestion pathway phases," and (ii) the counties play "minor roles" in planning for
- ingestion pathway and recovery and reentry decisions. LILCO Facts No. 11/ and LILCO Motion at 1. These assumptions are incorrect. As a general matter, it is true that a "generic"
- State Plan exists, but detailed county plans for each plant located in New York State except Shoreham are an integral part of that State plan. These county plans provide many of the details, procedures, and specific data and information necessary to permit the State to respond as required to the needs of a particular site, within both the 10-mile and 50-mile planning zones. In
)
addition, however, there are also many additional routines devel-oped at the State and county level via close interaction of personnel which are not reflected in the generic State Plan or
,, the county addenda. LILCO ignores the existence and importance J
of these additional routines. These county plans and other
( procedures describe important roles for Counties to play in
_ recovery and reentry activities and the Counties play significant U
support roles for ingestion pathway. It is therefore a serious misconception to suggest that Counties play "minor roles" in said activities. As a result, the State could not adequately respond
,,J to a Shoreham emergency without a detailed Shoreham-specific off-site plan appended to the State generic plan, without the training of State and local personnel concerning those specifics, O
1/ LILCO Statement of the Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue to be Heard on Contention 7 (Ingestion Pathway) and 8 (Recovery and Reentry) ("LILCO Facts").
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G without the development of internal agency procedures, and with-3- out the evaluation of State and local personnel during exercises and drills.
O 7. Based on its incorrect assumption that the counties play a "minor role," LILCO then argues that "the State can apply its recovery and reentry and ingestion pathway procedures in the O ' generic plan' section of the State Plan to a Shoreham emer-gency." LILCO Motion at 2. This statement ignores the structure of the New York State Plan, the nature of planning for the 3 recovery and reentry response, and the support role of the counties in the ingestion pathway phase. In fact, LILCO makes several general assumptions about the New York State Plan and emer9en y planning which are unwarranted.
O
- 8. It is implicit in LILCO's Motion -- primarily via
) LILCO's silence -- that LILCO assumes effective ingestion pathway and/or recovery and reentry activities could be implemented by State or local government personnel despite the fact that those personnel have not participated in Shoreham-specific drills and exercises. From experience at other sites in New York State, we have learned that the only way that State and local government l
personnel have been able to develop adequate site-specific O
response capabilities is through detailed planning, interfacing with personnel, drilling, and exercising. Through detailed State and local government drills and exercises, government personnel
.O have learned to work together and t'o prepare for unexpected l
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events. Absent such site-specific training, the likelihood of an
) effective response is. low.
- 9. At numerous points in its Motion, LILCO refers to plans.
} for other counties in New York State. LILCO Motion at 3-4 and LILCO Attachments 2-4 and 9-12. The apparent point that LILCO attempts to make by these references is that what is done at
] these other plants is somehow indicative of what Suffolk County would or could do on ingestion and/or recovery and reentry activ-ities for Shoreham. We disagree. Based upon our experience, we 3 know that despite whatever surface similarity might exist among county plans for various sites, the actual fact is that the various counties respond very differently to ingestion pathway and recovery and reentry matters. The differences result from a 3 ,
variety of factors, including: the perceived strengths and wcaknesses of various departments of government at the local level; the degree of advance interaction which occurs between State, local government, and utility personnel; and the amount ,
and quality of drills and other training which actually occurs.
We stress that what is set forth in the generic State Plan and the County plan addenda do ngi exclusively represent what I actually is done (or planned to be done) in an emergency situa- '
tion. Rather, there are detailed, albeit somewhat informal O
procedures and techniques which are worked out between State, local government, and utility personnel in the planning and training process which actually enhance the real framework for an i O
integrated response. Thus, LILCO's Facts Nos. 8-9, 17-18 are not relevant in this proceeding. At any rate, we dispute the O I l L _
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Qi apparent-inference LILCO-draws from those facts, ligt, that what C) is set forth in the general' plans for other Counties is a) all that is actually1 done_by or for those counties, or b) is
,, completely indicative of what ought to be done for a Shoreham
() -emergency.
- 10. There is no State preparedness related to the ingestion
() pathway or recovery and reentry portions of LILCO's Plan. The State has no sufficient resources'to respond to.a Shoreham emer-gency. While we have reviewed portions of LILCO's Plan, that has
() been only in the context of providing support to the State in the Shoreham licensing' proceeding. There has been no attempt to "learn" the LILCO Plan, to consider how to implement it, how it O might interfa e with the generic State plan, to develop internal agency procedures essential to an ingestion or recovery / reentry response at Shoreham, or to undertake the myriad of other actions which would be required prior to any drills or exercises of these
)
"plans" for Shoreham, much less a response to a real Shoreham emergency.
O II. Incestion Pathway
- 11. Turning first to ingestion pathway planning, under the Q
New York State Plan, the State Commissioner of Health has numer-ous ingestion pathway procedure response options. Egg New York State Plan III.35-38. The options range from simply increasing O
environmental surveillance to the removal of surface soil and isolating and prohibiting land use. The range of decisions which O -
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must be made is 11b'.strated by the options available for agricul-gp tural land, which includes alter use of land, to allow radioactive decay of short-lived radionuclides; remove contami-J nated surface crops and decay, for grasses, cutting and rolling sod - raking and removing mulch; remove of surface soil, allow natural surface erosion, or irrigate and leach; add excess lime to decrease nuclide solubility; and isolate and prohibit land uso.
O New York State Plan III. 38. To make the decision as to the proper protective response option in just this one area, substan-I tial information is needed on soil conditions, crop rotations, O
water flow patterns, and the resources and time required to ,
perform each option. This information will have to be collated 'g with information concerning the amount of radiological contamin-ation. To the extent C,ounty personnel are needed to provide these data, there must be interaction with County officials to pre-plan who will perform particular tasks. Then the appropriate O
county personnel must be trained and that training must be evalu-ated in exercises and drills. Obviously, proper training of government officials requires time and resources. Similarly,
'O drills and exercises require time a.d resources. At Shortham, there has been no such training, d:lills or exercises for govern-ment officials. The existence of a New York State Plaa and a O LILCO Plan which, to our knowledge, no State or County officials know about or have reviewed and exercised, would not increase the likelihood that effective protective action could be taken.
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- 4 12; ,Just as much information must be analyzed'before the-IE ' State Commissioner of Health makes decisions concerning agricultural 11and.-l Adequate ingestion pathway planning also requires similar;information and. analysis-as to consumable fruits 1 and vegetables, meat and meat products, grains, and animal feeds.-
New York State Plan'III.'38. Although the State Plan broadly divides the responsibility'for_ obtaining _this information among
] various Statt departments and local agercies, the New York State Plan does not have the detailed site-specific procedures required to-collect and analyze these data. The New York State Plan y specifically reserves to the State agencies the task of working out how infor:mation will be collected and analyzed and how
. personnel will be trained. No New York State agency has worked out-procedures, dedicated resources or trained personnel for j ingestion pathway data collection and analysis at the Shoreham site. LILCO claims to have information available to make the needed ingestion pathway decisions. To our knowledge the LILCO Plan has no provisions for obtaining information to make decisions on agricultural land, and has inadequate procedures to obtain information on other areas. At any rate. even if the f LILCO Plan had such procedures, they would not be implementable i absent detailed training, drills, and exarc3ses and extensive i
I study and interfacing among response officials. None of this has i lO occurred or can be predicted to occur for Shoreham, t
- 13. The level of training required for a proper ingestion 0 ]' -
pathway response is illustrated by our preparation for the Ginna
'T exercise of ingestion pathway planning, conducted in October O a _ _. _ _ __
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'1987.- RFIG participated in preparation for this exercise, and O ,
tha{ pr'paration e involved close to nine months of meetings to coordinate efforts aniong the State, .the ccunties and the utili-j'.' stjeis. LIn a6di. tion to coordination, our preparation involved O trainiEg irid Tdidls for. the State and county of f'icials. Indeed, two of'the.iaportaht lessons learned as a ree lt of the Ginna exercise'were: (i) the planning effort could span a significant-O "" ""' f " AI"*'- perhaps up to one year; and (ii) it is important to consult with lodal cooperative extension agents who are
~
familiar wdth land uce and the particular crops that might be g ready' dor harvesting at t' hat particular time.
- 14. LILCO fails to understand the nature of the New York State Plan, and therefore makes misleading statements such as ,
"the New York St ate Plan is composed of .the generic plan and the
' County appendices.F' This ignores the reality that the State Plan depends on the development of detailed procedures - going beyond the gen'eric Plan and county-speelfic addenda -- which implement the tasks identified in the Plan. Returning to the exnmple' of ingestion pathway implementation, the New York State O .
Plan leaves to various State agencies the responsibility of developing implementation procedures. Two major examples of a site-specific implemente tion procedures are (1) development of an ,
O' adequate local communication network for use by the ingestion uampling tearn, and ( 2) the establishment of an adequate opera-tions base fo2 the ingestion sampling teams.
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- 15. LILCO wrongly asserts that the State Plan has "clearly G defined responsibilities" for counties such as Suffolk County.
LILCO Motion at 2. In fact, the New York State Plan does not
% define responsibilities, since the precise details of how the f
- County can respond are only worked out in discussions when trying to determine what kind of assistance to the State the counties can provide. For example, in preparing for the Ginna exercise, 7 despite the existenca of a generic State Plan and county-specific addenda, there still needed to be discussions to delineate State and county responsibilities. These had to occur at the pre-planning stage, and then needed to be implemented and refined during drills, table-top exercises, and similar training sessions which emphasized the interfacing of personnel from the State,
, County, and utility. Obviously, for Shoreham, this has not been a
done for State and county officials.
- 16. The LILCO Motion unintentionally reflects the compli-
,U cated nature of the ingestion pathway procedures, for it states i
that the "Departments of Health, Agriculture and Markets, f
Environmental Conservation, State Police, and Transportation, the State Emergency Management Office (SEMO), and the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group (REPG) will participate in assessing the impact of the radiological emergency on the ingestion. pathway Q
and will work with local governments in their response." Motion at 20-21. This shows the types of information which must be gathered and the interagency coordination which must occur to make ingestion pathway recommendations. This coordination l in7olves interaction with the numerous officials and has never c
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been practiced with respect to Shoreham. Tr~lning and drills 0; that are Shoreham-specific would be essential.
- 17. LILCO attempts to evade the need for a Shoreham site O' . specific ingestion pathway plan by arguing that Suffolk County and Nassau County are already part of ingestion pathway plans for other sites. LILCO Motion at 18 n.12 and 19. It is a c)- fundamental premise of radiological emergency planning that such planning be site-specific to a certain plant, for only then-can one plan to coordinate State, County and utility activities.
g Moreover, one dedicates resources and trains personnel to react to an emergency at or emanating from a specific site. Thus, the fact that Suffolk and Nassau Counties are part of other plants' g ingestion pathways does not provide the basis for vy meaningful ingestion pathway planning, capabilities, or preparedness concerning a Shoreham accident.
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- 18. Thus, LILCO statements such as "there can be no question that the State's response to an ingestion pathway inci-dent would be adequate" (LILCO Motion at 26) are simply asser-tions without any support in fact. The decisions to be made in ingestion pathway analyses are numerous, complex, and require a vast amount of data. To our knowledge, the counties near
^O' Shoreham have not dedicated the. resources or trained the person-nel to support a state ingestion pathway response. Under these circumstances, it would be unlikely that such resources could be O
provided on an ad hog basis.
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III. Recovery and Reentry l
{)
- 19. Turning next to recovery and reentry operations, LILCO states that the New York State Plan "details what it will do C) during the' recovery and reentry and ingestion pathway response phases of a radiological emergency and who on the State and local government level will be responsible for carrying out those
() functions . . . .
Motion at 1 and LILCO's Facts 1 and 2. This is not true. The New York State Plan simply sets forth a general overview of what will go on during recovery and reentry and
- O in9esti n pathway phases. The actual details of what goes on are not in the State Plan.
- 20. In fact, recovery and reentry operations are extremely O
complicated and require detailed advance planning and drills as to who is doing what and how. For example, the entire process of recovery operations can begin only when there is a "determination of the recovery actions to be taken." New York State Plan. IV.2.
l To make this determination, the following kinds of activities are considered:
.O
- a. Sampling and monitoring of radiation and evalua-tion of data by the Department of Health.
O b. Decontamination activities, including waste disposal, under the direction of the Department of l Health, undertaken by the appropriate local agency depending on the method utilized.
- c. Security, including police and fire protection for
() affected areas -- will be provided by State and local police, and local fire agencies.
- d. Availability of medical service -- will be ascer-l tained by State and local health officials.
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- e. Availability of electric power and telephone communications -- will be ascertained by Public C). Service Commission.
- f. Adequacy of food and water supply.-- will be determined by Department of Agriculture and Markets and Department of Health.
(') .g. Operability of sanitary systems -- will be deter-mined by Department of Environmental Conservation.
- h. Availability of transportation -- will be deter-mined by local officials.
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- i. Availability of sources of heat -- will be ascer-tained by State Energy Office.
- j. Condition and needs of the affected population --
will be surveyed and determined by Department of Social Services with assistance from the American n
U National Red Cross.
New York State Plan IV 2-3. Each one of these determinations requires extensive fact gathering and analysis.
O
- 21. -LILCO asserts that the State "directs all recovery and l reentry activities for radiological emergencies for all nuclear O power plants in New York State other than Shoreham . . . .
Motion at 3 and LILCO Facts No. 4. This is not true. Much of the direction comes from local personnel, because the New York C) . State Plan specifically provides that "Local Chief Executives assess the needs of their affected areas in connection with the i State Energy Management Office. They direct recovery operations
() in their jurisdictions." New York State Plan IV.l. To respond adequately to a radiological emergency, the local officials must l be trained and have the necessary resources. To our knowledge, 1
-() no such training and dedication of resources has been done for a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
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- 22. LILCO also~ asserts that the emergency plans for 1 counties in New York State normally defer to the State Plan for
. instructions on recovery activities. First, this is irrelevant, because planning must be site-specific. Second, this is only a
) half truth. .The counties must take direct action ..d have the lead with regard to gathering data and directing people not to reenter contaminated zones.
I).
- 23. LILCO attempts to limit the Suffolk County recovery and
- reentry functions as follows
l D
L Consequently, the only functions that a county performs independently of the State are (1) providing security and fire protection, (2) determining the availability of transportation, and (3) gathering data and submitting them for federal aid. None of these h- functions require special radiological expertise.
Rather, they are the types of activities that counties normally perform during any emergency. The only function that may require special assistance during a Shoreham emergency would be assessing the transporta-tion needs of the public.
LILCO Motion at 14 (footnote omitted). This is not true.
Counties must, under the New York State Plan, supply data such as C) the availability of medical services, and more significuntly, "must direct the recovery operations in their jurisdiction." New York State Plan IV.1. This is a responsibility which requires C) planning, training and resources. It is not likely that this could be done on an ad hoc basis in a timely and effective manner, p
- 24. Moreover, even if we were to assume that other county plans were relevant, LILCO ignores the substantial responsibil-l 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Q ities identified in the county plans, and thereby understates Cl the role of the counties in implementing recovery and reentry operations. For example, the Monroe County Plan specifies that the New York State Plan provides only "guidelines" for recovery O and reentry operations. Egg Monroe County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan at I-D-2 (May, 1987) (hereafter "Monroe County Plan"). The County's responsibilities include:
O
- a. Completion of radiation surveys by the County Department of Health (CDOH) and the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) which indicate that contamination levels in an evacuated area are at g least below the contamination action guides in Table D-1. In areas which have been contaminated (sic), the CDOH and the NYSDOH may direct that reentry be allowed to all but specifically cordoned-off subareas.
g'
- b. Determination that a threat to public health, as a consequence of a release of radiation, no longer exists.
- c. Completion of the CDOH and NYSDOH directed decon-tamination activities, including waste disposal, undertaken by County Fire Departments. Assistance
.O and guidance in this area will be obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy,
- d. Notification to incoming traffic control check points of the areas for which reentry is authorized and the realignment of the traffic control O perimeter.
- e. In conjunction with the State of New York, the Federal government, and the Nuclear Facility Operator, the preparation and issuance of announce-ments to the communications media (e.g., news-O papers, and radio and television stations) and Reception / Congregate Care Centers specifying the areas which may be reentered.
- f. Continuation of security for evacuated areas, including those for which reentry has been O approved, to prevent unauthorized entry and vandalism.
- g. Provision of transportation for those individuals who were assisted during the evacuation.
O
O
- h. Distribution of drinking water and-foodstuffs, if
,V necessary, for the isolation of ingestion pathways and sources (see Part I, Section C.8.).
- 1. Establishment of a long-term radiation monitoring program for any contaminated county-areas.
Monroe County Plan at I-D-2..
IV. Most of LILCO's Facts Are Incomolete, Immaterial, or Irrelevant O 25. On the basis of the foregoing, as well as our overall experience in ingestion pathway and recovery and reentry matters, we disagree in whole or in part with many of LILCO's 55 "Facts" O as to which LILCO alleges there is no genuine dispute. We summarize below our views.
n v.
Eagt. _1. Denied. The New York State Plan contains some detailed procedures. However, many procedures are developed through interfacing of State, local, and utility personnel and 1
) site-specific development and are actually created only through extensive training, drills, and exercises.
Fact 2. Denied. In actual practice, the State and local government personnel who will be responsible for carrying out particular recovery and reentry and ingestion pathway functions are not primarily identified in the Plan. The government person-nel are identified as a result of conducting the training, drills, and exercises described in response to Fact 1.
lO l
O _ _.
,3 Fact-3. Agreed.
-O IFact'4. Denied. Much of the direction.of recovery and reentry activities for radiological emergencies is-conducted by O local government officials. Local government officials support the State in ingestion pathway activities. In addition, the State has not developed procedures that are applied generically
() to other plants. Rather, all procedures of the State are tailored to site-specific situations such as via detailed inter-facing, training, drills, and exercises involving State, local,
- () and utility personnel.
Fact 5. Denied. County personnel make their own g decisions on recovery and reentry.
Fact 6. We do not dispute that the LILCO Plan states what y LILCO says that it states. We do dispute certain of the implica-tions of what LILCO has asserted. It is implied that there are a finite number of actions which might be chosen which are "consistent with their . . . legal authorities to protect the health and safety of the public . . . ." Ingestion pathway and recovery and reentry activities are complex. Accordingly, there is considerable leeway for State and local governments to decide a
what actions are appropriate. Given this leeway, it is essential that in advance of an accident, if there is to be an effective response, there must be detailed interfacing and practice O
sessions to ensure that there is agreement among all participants regarding what actions might be appropriate. Absent such O
18 -
~
detailed pre planning, it is likely that a response would be O ad has, ineffective, and inadequate.
Fact 7. We do not dispute that the Indian P,oint and Nine
'C) Mile Point plans state what they state. For reasons already stated, we disagree that those statements are relevant to Shoreham. Further, it must be pointed out that regardless of
() what is stated in those plans, there are underlying procedures which have been developed for all plants on a site-specific basis. Accordingly, recovery and reentry operations are more g complex and tailored to site-specific contexts than is implied by LILCO's statement.
3 East 8. We do not deny that this is a quote from the Monroe County Plan. However, the quoted statement is taken out of context. The New York State Plan does not contain complete i"*t#" ti "" " "* " "Y' O .
Fact 9. We do not deny that this is a quote from the Monroe County Plan. We do dispute, however, the implication that this necessarily is the only way a response proceeds. Rather, as descripedpreviously,notwithstandingthegeneralprovisionsofa plan, implementing techniques and actions are developed through slee-npecific interfacing taking place during training sessions, drills, and exercises.
O Fact 10. Denied. We do not dispute what the State Plan states. We do dispute, however, that that is a complete state ~
O
.O:
ment of what in fact occurs. The local chief executives receive 43 information and recommendations from staff members on what actions are to be taken. Given that fact, it is necessary that there be advance planning and' training to accomplish those func-O tions. This would be difficult to do on an ad hqq basis.
Fact 11. The State Plan statement is accurate, but it
() ' appears on IV-2, not IV-1. However, in actual fact, recovery operations commence as early as possible in emergencies, not just when a situation "is stabilized."
O Fact 12. The quotation from the State Plan is accurate.
However, any recovery committee which may be appointed is es tailored to the specific site and to the specific details of the v
emergency. Accordingly, any implication that the specifics of a recovery committee for a specific site are set by this State Plan
,s provision is not accurate.
v Fact 13. Agree.
O Fact 14. The statement regarding the State Plan is accur-ate. However, in actual planning for recovery operations, a variety of other persons may have primary responsibility for the O
referenced actions, depending upon the site-specific implementing details that have been worked out during the interfacing and preparations related to the particular site.
O
'O
_ 20 -
/~
N2 Fact 15. Denied. The statement attempts to paraphrase what
() the State Plan says. In reality, however, the coordination of State assistance may be exercised by many other persons as well, including representatives of local jurisdictions. This_all O. depends upon the nature of the actual emergency and the site-specific pre planning, training, and drills which have addressed these matters. Accordingly, a generalization such as set forth
() in Fact 15 is not accurate.
Fact 16. Denied. This fact is vague in its reference to g "local committees for recovery operations." Accordingly, it is denied. We also do not believe that the planning for other plants is relevant since the planning must be site-specific.
O Fact 17. What occurs in Monroe County is irrelevant to the Shoreham proceeding. Further, based on our experience, it is our
. understanding that what actually would occur in Monroe County with respect to the County Executive is more complex. It would depend upon the detailed preparations and planning, plus the availability and knowledge of particular individuals at the time of the accident.
Fact 18. Not relevant. The same kind of caveats as with lO '
respect to Fact 17 are applicable to Fact.18.
l l Fact 19. Denied. Recovery operations actually involve
?# more considerations than the four major ones that are set forth l
l O _n_
O there. Other-considerations include all of those set forth on Y) pages IV-2 through'IV-5 of the New York State Plan.
Fact 20. Denied. While the State Plan provides as qu'oted, O the actual standard which may be used will be decided upon in close consultation with local officials and given the nature and circumstances of the accident. Detailed pre-planning is O- necessary to provide flexibility in view of the State Plan provisions.
O- Fact 21. Denied. The statement is an inaccurate paraphrase of page IV-2 of the State Plan. The State Department of Health is not the only agency that has responsibility for analyzing all O f the exposure pathways set forth in LILCO's statement. In actual practice, local officials, utility personnel, and others may also be involved.
- O Fact 22. Denied. The State Plan does not specify who uses the evaluation of these exposure pathways to determine the projected dose commitments. In any event, other data may also be utilized.
Fact 23. Denied. The actual responsibilities overlap
~ '
greatly and the LILCO attempt in Table 1 to create rigid areas of .
responsibility between State and County officials is not an accurate portrayal of the way emergency response works.
O O -
22 -
h l) -
Fact 24. LILCO accurately quotes the State Plan. .The O public information officer ("PIO") has detailed site-specific training to perform these functions. Absent site-specific training, these functions would be difficult to perform.
(1 Accordingly, we disagree with Fact 24 to the extent it implies that a State-level PIO could be appointed for Shoreham and I
perform such functions absent the kinds of detailed training
() which must be provided.
i Fact 25. LILCO accurately states what is in the State Plan, o However, the statement does not describe the fact that the state v
PIO is the point of contact, and the guidance is provided to the PIO by higher authority. This coordination requires detailed n, pre planning.
v Fact 26. Denied to the extent that there is the implication that these are the only factors that are considered before any information about recovery actions is disseminated to the public.
Denied also to the extent it implies that each such factor must be considered. The actual response to an emergency situation is less rigid. Such flexibility places a premium on extensive prior planning and training.
O Fact 27. Denied to the extent that it is implied that the actual release of information by the State PIO will be done only with the approval of the State Disaster Preparedness Commission n"
Chairman and the State Health Commissioner. In reality, the detailed site-specific procedures for how such information will
() i l
O be released are worked out and are quite flexible depending upon O the nature of the emergency, and other factors. Again, a premium is placed on advance training, without which effective response <
is not possible.
'O Fact 28. The quotation of the State Plan is accurate. No such assistance could be provided in the short term absent
(). detailed pre-planning such as is done for other sites. State policy precludes that for Shoreham.
Fact 29. Agreed.
O Fact 30. The description of the State Plan statement is
- "#^t**
O Pact 31. Agreed.
- O Fact 32. Denied. It is denied that providing police security and fire protection during an emergency is a "normal" county function. The details of who provides particular security
- O .
and fire protection will vary from site to site, depending upon the infrastructure of the local government and the availability of resources.
O Fact 33. Denied. The fact is vague. What counties do in l
l an emergency varies greatly depending upon the site-specific
'O characteristics of the topography and geography, the capabilities of the county, the availability of State resources, and other
.O -
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factors. Absent a listing of the factors which are assumed, this D. fact cannot be admitted or denied.
EAE1_31 We do not dispute that the LILCO OPIP provides as
() noted. We.have no confidence, however, that the LERO personnel necessarily have the capabilities and training to conduct these activitien.
O Fact 41 We do not dispute that the LILCO OPIP provides as noted. We have no confidence, however, that the LERO personnel ne essarily have the capabilities and training to conduct these O
activities.
Fa t jl6. Agreed.
O Eact 32 Agreed, but we disagree as described previously with the imolication that it is relevant that parts of Nassau County and :3uffolk County are in the ingestion pathway zones for other plants or would assist in providing an adequate response to a Shoreham accident.
O Fact 38. Agreed, but we disagree as described previously with the implication that the fact that parts of Nassau and O
Suffolk Countf are in the ingestion pathway zones for other plants is material or relevant or would assist in providing an adequate respcnse to a Shoreham accident.
O 25 -
l
D Fact 39. Denied.. State agencies rely on other internal' I3 procedures.
Facu 40. We do not dispute that LILCO quotes the State Plan i) correctly. We disagree with any suggestion, however, that with-out detailed Shoreham-specific advance planning between the State and Federal govern +1nt, that any effective ingestion pathway (j response could be effected for a Shoreham emergency.
Fact 41. Denied to the extent that it is implied that the g) counties provide only the support noted by LILCO. In fact, particular counties provide more or less support, depending on such factors as their capabilities, their planning, their training, and the nature of their governmental infrastructure, O
and other factors.
i Fact 42. Agreed.
O Fact 43. Irrelevant. Egg algQ responses to Facts 37 and 38.
.o Fact 44. We agree, but emphasize that the State's role may l vary and include more or less responsibility depending upon the l
- O site-specific planning which is carried out.
1 L
l Fact 45. Agreed. However, the actual actions of the O
Disaster Preparedness Commission on ingestion pathway response may be more or less or different from those provided in Fact 45, C) _
1
~ 1 L.) l depending on the nature of the accident, the nature of the pre- 1 C) planning and preparedness, and the nature of the capabilities of the loca1' governmental officials.
() Fact 46. Agreed..
Fact 47. We do not dispute the accuracy of the quotation
() from the State Plan. In fact, however, the actual exercise of command and control will vary from county to county and accident to accident. Again, the detailed pre-planning and interfacing
-() will explain who exercises command and control in what particular situation. Generalizations are not possible.
Fact 48. We do not dispute that the quotation is accurate.
'O We disagree with the LILCO statement that this procedure requires that the State establish "an extensive public alert notification system." The decision whether to establish such a system for O,
Shoreham is up to the State and local governments.
Fact 49. Disagree. The actual location and components of the joint news center vary from site to site.
Fact 50. Irrelevant.
.O Fact 51. We do not disagree that the LILCO Plan states as alleged by LILCO.
'O 40
XEROX TELECOP!ER 495110- 2-Sel 1:37PM J 4 2027789100J0 2
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FEB 13 '80 I5836 REPG R.BWY t# P.2 Fact 52 Denied. There are times when different persons may in fact be in charge of collecting various samples.
Fact 53 Denied. We cannot determine what the LILCO Plan "contemplates."
ract 54 Denied. The Ginna exercise included a test of I the State ingestion pathway procedure for local governments l in the vicinity of Ginna only. .
O ract 55 Agreed. However, we disagree with the implication t
that a State response elsewhere would necessarily be as adequate as the State response to Ginna. The adequacy of the State 0 -
response at oinna depended upon time consuming pre-planning.and preparations. . Absent a similar kind of effort, it is not likely that a State response to a Shoreham emergency would be adequate.
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D UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board -
O )
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power )
O Station, Unit 1) )
)
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES D. PAPILE O
James D. Papile, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
- 1. I am the Director of the State of New York's Radiological Emergency O Preparedness @oup (REPG). REPG, under the auspices of the State of New l York's Disaster Preparedness Comission, is responsible for emergency planning l
l and preparedness for radiological emergencies pertaining to comercial nuclear O power plants.
- 2. It is my understanding that LILCO's Second Renewed Motion for
'o Sumary Disposition of the Legal AJthority Issues (Contentions EP 1-10)
(Motion) notes the existence of a generic State radiological emergency
[
response plan and seeks to infer from this fact that the State is prepared and
,O able to respond adequately to a Shoreham eraergency. LILCO's attempted inference is wrong.
O 1
9 O
- 3. It is true that a generic State plan exists. However, detailed site-specific addenda which exist for each plant located in New York State O except Shoreham are an integral part of that plan. The site-specific addenda provide the details, procedures, and specific data and information necessary to permit the State to respond as equired to the needs of a partiGular site.
O within both the 10s11e and 50+11e planning zones. The State cou)d not respond adequately to a Shoreham emergency in the absence of a detailed Shoreham-specific off-site plan appended to the State generic plan, without the training of State personnel concerning those specifics, and without the evaluation of State personnel during exercises and drills. Since the State plan lacks a Shoreham-specific off-site plan, REPG cannot assure that a fully integrated, coordinated and effective State and local response to a Shoreham O
emergency could be implemented.
- 4. It is my understanding that LILCO's Motion contends that oral authorization to sound the sirens or to take other action can be readily %
obtained from the State. The bases for LILCO's contention are that the Radiological Emergency Comunications System (RECS) lines connect Shoreham and O LEA 0 to a) REPG in Albanyl O b) the State Police in Albany c) the State EOC in Albanys d) the State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) district office in O Poughkeepsie (SEHO is the current name for what LILCO refers to as the Office of Disaster Preparedness).
O _ ._ _
l
o O
However, none of these four RECS lines are capable of functioning.
First, there is no RECS line that connects Shoreham and LERO to REPG because O ' REPG's offices have changed locations and the Shoreham RECS line has repained in the same place. This Shoreham RECS line terminates in an office that has no role whatsoever in radio *,ogical emergency preparedness and is miles away O from REPG's current location. In addition, the wires for this line are not operational in any event. Second, there is no RECS line that connects Shoreham and LERO to the State Police Comunications Center in Albany because O the State Police's Communications Center has changed locations and the Shoreham RECS line has remained in the same place. This Shoreham RECS line also terminates in an office that has no role in radiological emergency
- O pnpan nns an the wins are not operational. Third, there is no RECS line that connects Shoreham and LERO to the State E0C in Albany and SEMO district office in Poughkeepsie because the wires are not operational. ben if the wires were operational, these two offices are only staffed during ordinary business hours. Thus, LILC0 cannot rely on the Shoreham RECS lines to seek N-oral authorization from the State to sound the sirens or to take any other action.
O
- 5. Additionally, it is my understanding that LILCO maintains that oral authorization to sound the sirens or to take other action can be readily obtained by using back-up commercial telephones, if necessary. Howev e ,
reliance by LILCO upon backwp cocinercial telephones would be misplaced, unless, among other things, verification and authentication procedures had O
been adopted. No such verification and authentication procedures exist.
- O 3
)
- 6. It is my understanding that the LILCO Motion also argues that certain
) State employees have become "familiar" with LILC0's Plan as a result of the litigation in this proceeding. LILCO suggests that such "familiarity" means that the State could implement or work with LILCO to implement LILCO's Plan. It is true that certain individual members of REPG have reviewed portions of the LILCO Plan for purposes of testifying before this Board and the OL-5 Board regarding l certain flaws in the Plan and in LILCO's exercise of that Plan. Such review has
~) been limited, however, to the extent necessary to provide truthful and accurate testimony. Most of REPG's members have no knowledge of the LILC0 P1an as it l
exists today or as it existed at the time of the Shoreham exercise. To my knowledge, no State employee or official is sufficiently familiar with LILC0's Plan to implement all or any portion of it, with or without LILC0 assistance.
Nor have any State personnel been drilled, trained, or evaluated in exercises 3 regarding the LILC0 Plan, which would be absolutely essential for a successful response to a Shoreham emergency.
- 7. I understand that the LILCO Motion states further that the State has 3
seven controlled copies of the LILCO Plan. Four recipients of those copies are '
attorneys who are using the Plan in connecticn with the State's litigation g efforts. One recipient is the State's equivr. lent of the NRC's public document room. REPG and other State agencies that have substantive response roles do not have anything more than scattered remnants cf out-of date transmittals from LILCO. Thus, REPG and key State agencies a.ae not sufficiently familiar with the LILCO Plan to implement all or any portien of it, with or without LILCO's a ss (stance. ,
O ds-Sworn to before me thi N'w s D. Pap 11 e
- C"
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9 February 10, 1988 C) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION B_efore the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board O
)
In the Matter of )
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) (Emergency Planning)
)
() (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) -
)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF KARLA J. LETSCHE lC Karla J. Letsche, being under oath, hereby states as fol-lows:
O
- 1. I am a member of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, the law firm which has been representing Suffolk County since early 1982 in l
the Shoreham operating license proceedings before the NRC (Docket lo t
I No. 50-322-OL). I have been personally involved, as one of the l counsel representing Suffolk County, in the litigation conducted before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the NRC Appeal l0
(
i Board, and the NRC, concerning LILCO's proposed emergency plan for Shoreham.
- O
! 2. This Affidavit is submitted in support of the Govern-ments' Answers to five of LILCO's December 18, 1987 Motions for Summary Disposition of Contentions 1-10, specifically, "LILCO's
Introduction:
Memorandum of Law on LILCO's Motions for Summary 10 1
O l
l Disposition of Contentions 1-2 and 4-10"; "LILCO's Motion for l O Summary Disposition of Contentions 1 and 2 (Directing Traffic)";
"LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 5 and 6 (Making Decisions and Telling the Public)"; "LILCO's Motion for
() Summary Disposition of Contentions 4 and 9 (Tow Trucks and Fuel Trucks)"; "LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 7 and 8 (Ingestion Pathway and Recovery and Reentry)"; and
() "LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 10 (Access Control at the EPZ Perimeter)," (hereafter referred to, collec-tively, as "LILCO's Motions").
O
- 3. LILCO's Motions all rely upon provisions contained in Revision 9 of the LILCO Plan, to support LILCO's argument that the existence and contents of the LILCO Plan, actions of LILCO and LERO personnel pursuant to that Plan, and a "best efforts" response of the Governments to a Shoreham emergency, combine to permit a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective
.O measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham acci-dent, and therefore support summary disposition of Contentions 1-10.
.O
- 4. Counsel for Suffolk County received a copy of Revision 9 on January 25, 1988. It consists of well over 1000 pages. It
. O' purports to revise portions of substantially all of the five-
! volume LILCO Plan.
O c)
)
- 5. None of the counsel for,Suffolk County have yet had an
[] opportunity to review or to analyze Revision 9 of the LILCO Plan, except for the provisions which relate to school evacuation.
This is a result of the extraordinarily heavy workload involved l
[] in meeting discovery and pleading obligations in: (1) the three pending remand proceedings in the OL-3 Docket (involving LILCO's l
l new EBS proposal, its new school evacuation proposal, and the g hospital evacuation issue); (2) the CLI-86-13 remand proceeding in the OL-3 Docket (involving the Commission's new rule and LILCO's seven summary disposition motions on Contentions 1-10);
p (3) the proceeding concerning LILCO's Request for Authorization to Operate Shoreham at 25% Power in the OL-6 Docket; (4) the appeal proceedings relating to the December 7, 1987 Licensing Board decision concerning the February 13, 1986 Shoreham Exercise in the OL-5 Docket; and, (5) Federal and State Court proceedings relating to the illegality of the LILCO Plan and the amendment to the NRC's emergency planning regulations.
- 6. In addition to not having had the opportunity even to review the contents of Revision 9, the Governments have had ao O
opportunity to conduct any discovery or other research, investi-gation, or analyses, of Revision 9, or of LILCO's assertions and claims relating to it which form the paredictate for the LILCO 0
Motions.
- 7. For the foregoing reasons, Suffolk County is not able O at this time to controvert the assertions and claims made by
-3~
0
- )
u
)
LILCO concerning Revision 9, its contents or effect. Similarly,
) suffolk County is not able to present by affidavit facts, related
- to Revision.9,,essentialito justify opposition to the portions of LILCO's Motions which rely upon'the contents of t'nat Revision.
e
) Under 10 CFR S 2.749(c), LILCO's Moti.ons must be. denied or de-ferred pending an opportunity for review and discovery.
8 ! '
i s,
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//
461 .
la Karla(J. Letschy L/
Sworn to and subscribed before me this -( day of
) February, 1988. ~ [
J htPublic
\' Notary
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) My Commission Expires:
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DATE: February 10, 1988 0
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNISfJION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board I) 1 In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COhPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
) (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) )
i O AFFIDAVIT OF RIcnARD 3. zAHNLEUTER Richard S. Zahnleuter, being under oath, hereby states as
- 11 ***
O
\. i am Deputy Special Counsel to Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York. Since 1984, Mr. Palomino g .(Special Counsel to the Governor) and I have continuously represcated the Governor and the State of New York in proces31ngs before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC")
concerning LILCO's application for an operating license for
- Shoreham. In my capacity, I have been personally involved in the litigation of all emergency planning issues on Docket No.
50-322-OL-3 since 1984, i
- 2. I submit this affidtvit in support of the Governments' responses to six pleadings submitted on Decetber 18, 1987 by LILCO under cover of a motion entitled, "LILCO's i
s O'
Motions for Summary Disposition of Contentions 1-2 and 4-10."
The six pleadings are: "LILCO 's IntreAv.ct. ion: Memorandum of
.O Law n LILCO's'Moticas for Summary Disposition of Contentient g
1-2.and 4-10";/"LILCNis Motion fcs Summary Dispositicn of N
Cententio'ns
~
, j 1 and 2 (Direct ('ag . Traffic)"; "LILCO's Motion for c
O summary Disposition of Contenti1ons a and 6 (Makir.g Decisions and Telling the Dublic"); "LILCO's Motion for Summary DispositionofContenkions4and9[(TowTrucks.andFuel 4; Trucks) a t "LILCo's Mocion for.- Summary Disposition of ,
Contentions 7 and 8 (Ingestion Pathway'and Recovery and l
Reentry)"; and "LILCO's Motidh for Pmnary Disposition of
'p Contention 10.e( Access Control at, the EPZ Perimeter) " I will refer to these pleadings as "TALCGja Motions."
l ,- *
.s v s #
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,v
- 3. The poipt o1% reference in LILCO's Motions is s i Revision 9 of the Although LILCO's Motions are
,,' LILCD Q an.
-_f l s j 1 t
l dated December 18, 1987, LILCO d.id not send Revision 9 to my I
office ur;til 7antiary q 22, 1988, and my office did not receive O. , ,,
Revisiory9 Jultil January 25, 1988, more than one Inonth after i N- i ,
LILCO's Motions had been filed. gevision 9 is a sizeable
, '/ ;# /
l I package, containing more than 1,000 pages. Flir;her, it O
appears from LILCo's transmittal letter that the ?.pvision 9 changes were so pervasive that it was more convenient,for 1 '
LILCO to 4'4 produce all pages of the Plan and OPIP rather lO y than to selectively reproduce the revised ones. ,.
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Counsel for the State of New York have not hae a '
sufficient opportunity to scrutinize Revision 9. As a result
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of. litigation in other Shoreham proceedings and a schedule j' calling for almost daily filings in this proceeding, counsel have necessarily given priority to the following: pending
,l) romands concerning LILCo's EBS proposal, school evacuation 4
proposal and hospital evacuation proposal; pending romand concerning CLI-86-13, the new rule and Contentions 1-10; the OL-6 Docket (25% power) ; the OL-5 Docket (December 7, 1987
- O i partial inital decision regarding exercise issues, and LILCo's associated appeal) ; court proceedings pertaining to the illegality of the LILCO Plan and the new rule.
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- 5. Counsel have also had an inadequate opportunity to determine not only what the Revision 9 changes are, but to t what extent and on what topics discovery and further investigation are needed.
'O 6. Accordingly, the State of New York cannot, for the reasons stated above, present in affidavits in response to
- LILCO's Motions facts that are essential to justify the State
- O of New York's opposition to LILco's Motions.
- 7. Under these circumstances, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.749(c), the Board should, respectfully., deny LILCO's I
Motions or order an appropriate continuance to permit review l
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I and discovery of Revision 9.
O 8. Besides addressing LILCO's Motions' reliance upon Revision 9, I also wish to emphasize that New York State's emergency planning and response personnel do not possess l
3 copies of the LILCO Plan. Counsel have acted to ensure that
! the copies of the LILCO Plan that LILCO has sent to severhil
! New York State offices, other than the copies that have been 3 discarded, are in the possession of counsel for our use in the litigation effort.
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Sworn to before me this /0 day of ",-
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February 1988 ,
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Nota 7 PU%c, State of be.y"o'k Q$1en m Albany County ~
No.4872813 Commisun EaN1a _9// r/pf _
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