ML20148D354
| ML20148D354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1988 |
| From: | Jones F ISLIP, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148D035 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-3, NUDOCS 8801250376 | |
| Download: ML20148D354 (35) | |
Text
_
4 January 18, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensinc Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK R. JONES Frank R. Jones, being duly sworn, states as follows:
I.
Introduction 1.
I am currently Supervisor of the Town of Islip, New York, having been appointed to this position in March 1987, and then elected in November 1987.
Prior to that, I served as Deputy County Executive of Suffolk County from July 1978 to January 1986, and then as Chief Deputy County Executive from January 1986 to December 1986.
From late 1981 through late 1984, l
I served as the official in the County Executive's Office in charge of matters related to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
i 8801250376 900119 PDR ADOCK 05000322 O
During 1985, I still remained involved in matters related to Shoreham.
In January 1986, I again became the official in the County Executive's Office in charge of Shoreham-related matters, i
l 2.
I have read LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition dated December 18, 1987.
This affidavit addresses whether LILCO has made a "sustained, good faith effort to secure and retain the participation" of Suffol'< County in offsite emergency planning
]
for the Shoreham nuclear power plant, as LILCO claims in its Motion.
The answer is, ne.
LILCO has not made such a sustained good faith effort.
l 3.
For a brief period of time in 1981, a working relation-l ship on emergency planning existed between LILCO and the County.
As discussed below, that working relationship related to a planning process that was inadequate and did not address practical, important issues of concern for public safety.
4.
From February 1982 onward, LILCO made no "good faith" effort toward the County concerning emergency planning, let alone a "sustained" good faith effort.
To the contrary, the history of LILCO's efforts toward the County have been marked by hostility, belligerency, falsification, misrepresentation, and coercion.
At various times, LILCO's actions have manifested actual bad faith when LILCO has put itself above the law, the County government, i
and its civic duty as a corporate citizen of
2 the County.
A dramatic example of LILCO's bad faith is shown by the year-and-one-half (January 1984 - May 31, 1985) during which LILCO refused to pay the $130 million in property taxes the Company owed Suffolk County.
LILCO did this with arrogance and bitterness.
LILCO had no concern whatsoever for the potentially damaging effects that its actions, as Suffolk County's largest 1
i taxpayer, would have on the citizens of the Coun'ty and the public 4
services upon which they depend.
Indeed, LILCO did this with the intention of creating financial pressures on the County's ability to maintain critical public services and of disrupting orderly governmental administration of the County's policies, budget priorities, and programs.
LILCO further sought to pressure the County into the unpopular option of having to raise the public's s
taxes -- that is, the taxes of the law-abiding citizens who, unlike LILCO, responsibly paid their taxes.
And, in fact, the County did raise taxes while LILCO hid the money it owed in a private bank account.
In short, LILCO cared nothing about who might be hurt by the Company's conduct.
It cared only about i
forcing the County to submit to LILCO's self-interests.
LILCO's i
strategy has been that the end, as LILCO sees it, justifies the means.
Such tactics do not evidence good faith.
J i
5.
To put LILCO's conduct into context, I will set forth some pertinent background information.
In addition, I will f
present year-by-year examples of how LILCO did not pursue a sustained, good faith effort to secure and retain the partici-
)
~
i
- I
pation of Suffolk County.
These are only examples; in fact, during the period since 1981, there are many additional examples as well, each of which further shows that LILCO has not made a sustained, good faith effort to secure or retain the County's participation.
II.
Backaround i
A.
Backcround:
The 1970s l
6.
A brief comment is first in ceder regarding the time period prior to 1982, particularly the 1970s.
As of that time, it is my understanding that there were no mandatory NRC offsite emergency planning requirements for nuclear plants.
In the absence of such requirements, there is no basis for LILCO's statement (Motion at 6) that LILCO during the 1970s made a sustained good faith effort to obtain County cooperation.
It is my recollection of LILCO/Suffolk County "cooperation" during the 1970s on emergency planning that, to the extent it existed at all, the planning effort and the scope of "plans" which were l
considered were extremely limited when compared with the comprehensive type of planning required in 1980 with the NRC's post-TMI adoption of the emergency planning regulations.
The earlier LILCO/ County efforts had been undertaken in the pre-TMI era when such planning was not given serious consideration.
I l
1
! I L
O thus disagree with LILCO's assertion that activities in the 1970s constituted a sustained good faith effort to obtain Suffolk County's participation in planning for a Shoreham emergency.
7.
Data indicate that LILCO made no such sustained effort in the 1970s, having instead chosen to take the hard-line posi-tion that such an effort was unnecessary until issuance of an operating license was under consideration by the NRC.
- Further, the record that LILCO itself made before the AEC in Shoreham construction permit hearings in the early and mid-1970s and LILCO's opposition to County emergency planning contentions in the NRC's operating license hearings in 1977 refute the LILCO assertion that there was a purely cooperative relationship' between the County and State in the 1970s.
The state of affairs was much more complicated than LILCO admits, and a more candid view of the facts shows that LILCO never -- before TMI or even after -- took emergency planning in Suffolk County as anything other than a mere regulatory inconvenience.
LILCO never showed a serious inclination to confront head-on with the County the actual, tough issues of emergency planning on Long Island.
3 a)
In 1970, when intervenors in the Shoreham construction permit proceeding sought to question whether an i
j adequate plan could be developed for Shoreham, LILCO and the NRC 7
]
Staff persuaded the Licensing Board not to consider the issue l
a I !
l
until the operating license review stage.
Eigt, Staff 9/14/70 Environmental Statement at 9; Tr. 2522 (statement of LILCO counsel); LILCO Proposed Findings, 6/8/71 at 27.
b)
LILCO did not take emergency planning seriously in the early 1970s.
When intervenors questioned whether LILCO would warn persons on nearby beaches in the event of an accident, the i
LILCO witness stated:
I am sure in the event such happened, we would send a messenger down and we would suggest they leave.
They could swim away if they wishod.
Tr. 2524 (Woffard) (emphasis added),
i c)
In 1977, Suffolk County intervened in the Shoreham operating license proceeding and attempted to raise emergency planning concerns.
For example, in an affidavit accompanying the County's Petition for Leave to Intervene on March 17, 1977, a County representative pointed out:
The feasibility of instituting effective protective measures is a site-related issue which depends on whe'Ner evacuation is possible and if so,
.w long it would take, matters which depenc upon the road network, the existence of water barriers to evacuation, weather conditions, the direction of evacu-ation, the size of the population to be evacu-ated, etc.
Thus, the radiological dosage incurred by the Shoreham population in the event of an recident may pose an unacceptable risk if the evacuation procedure proves infeasible or would take longer to carry out than expected, causing the target population to remain in the radiologically contaminated 6-
area longer than anticipated.
Have the appli-cant and staff adequately planned for such a radiological emergency?
Affidavit of Floyd Linton at 23 (Mar. 17, 1977).
LILCO opposed the County's petition to intervene.
LILCO's Opposition to Untimely Petition for Intervention (Mar. 25, 1977).
The Licensing Board permitted the County to intervene, but required the County to particularize its contentions.
Suffolk's Amended Petition to Intervene contained three contentions i
relating to emergency planning, including one which stated Intervenors contend that the Applicant and Regulatory Staff have not prepared and assessed an adequate evacuation plan for Shoreham as required by 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E, Criteria IV-E and 10 CFR, Part 50.34(b)(6)(v) with regard to the timing and feasibility of evacuation including, but not limited to, consideration of road net-l works, water bar.*iers, weather conditions, and population density.
2 Amended Petition to Intervene at 20 (Sept. 16, 1977).
LILCO opposed this petition as well.
LILCO's Reply to SC's Amended Petition (Sept. 27, 1977).
B.
Backcround to Plannino in the 1980s 8.
In September 1981, Suffolk County entered into a contract with LILCO whereby the County agreed to receive from i
LILCO $245,000 to defray the costs of the County preparing an j
j t 4 4
.. ~ - -
t emergency plan for Shoreham.
The plan the County began working on was being prepared primarily by two staff members of the County Planning Department.
They were working on their own, without close oversight by persons in the County Executive's Office.
9.
As the work of these two staff members progressed in late 1981, one of them began to hold a series of meetings with members of the public in several areas of Long Island.
Various citizens raised questions about the content and direction of the
)
emergency planning work being performed.
Soon, objections were being made to the County Executive's Office, and particularly to me, by citizens.
I and my colleagues in the County Executive's Office took these objections seriously, particularly those which i
pointed out that the staff members' work did not appear to deal
]
to any significant degree with the needs of persons who reside at the East End of the county
-- itat, people who during a Shoreham l
nuclear accident would have to drive toward Shoreham and the emanating radioactive plume in order to evacuate from the EPZ.
1 j
It also became clear that the ongoing work ignored some of the l
critical local government emergency planning lessons of the Three Mile Island accident.
10.
When my colleagues and I in the county Executive's Office examined these and related issues and their implications, we determined that the County's emergency planning effort had to be upgraded substantially.
Accordingly, we decided to terminate the ongoing work of the two staff members and to retain a team of experts to prepare a first-rate radiological emergency plan for the County.
For all purposes, we scrapped the inadequate work-product that had been prepared by the two staff members, 11.
At the same time, February 1982, we decided it would not be appropriate to accept funds from LILCO for our emergency planning effort.
The reason is that in December 1981, the Suffolk County Legislature determined that the County should increase its presence in the NRC's Shoreham licensing proceedings as a neutral intervenor -- lig., without taking sides for or against the Shoreham plant -- in order to assure that pertinent safety issues were fully addressed.
Since the County would be a litigant independent of LILCO before the NRC, and perhaps even opposing LILCO at times, the County decided that taking money from LILCO created the appearance of a conflict of interest.
Therefore, we returned to LILCO its initial payment to the County l
of $150,000 and informed LILCO that we would fund the emergency planning process entirely with County money.
Eventually, the l
l 1982 effort cost the County more than $600,000 -- not counting l
costs related to the time spent by County employees or lawyers.
Thus, the County spent more than twice the sum of the original LILCO/ County contract. i l
i 12.
The County's upgraded emergency planning process commenced on March 25, 1982, with passage of County Resolution l
No. 262-1982, which appropriated funds for the effort.
On March 29, 1982, the County Executive issued an Executive Order estab-lishing a Steering Committee to oversee preparation of the emergency plan.
I was appointed Chairman of the Steering Committee.
13.
To prepare the emergency plan, the County retained a team of nationally recognized experts.
These experts worked r
diligently during the spring, summer, and into the fall of 1982, completed their work in November 1982, and submitted their three-volume Draft Suffolk County Radiological Emergency P*.an to the County Executive, who in turn transmitted it to the Legisla-ture for legislative review at the beginning of December 1982.
In January 1983, the Suffolk County Legislature held eight days of public hearings on the plan in two locations within the i
County.
Scores of experts presented testimony, including LILCO's experts.
LILCO officials appeared twice at the hearings.
County officials and consultants also appeared.
Hundreds of members of the public testified.
All told, 1600 pages of transcript were compiled by the Legislature.
14.
Following these legislative hearings, members of the i
1 i
County Legislature travelled to Harrisburg and Middletown, Pennsylvania, to meet with local officials and others who had i
4
).
first hand experience with the practical aspects of emergency planning arising out of the Three Mile Island accident.
A public hearing was held by the Legislators in Harrisburg in connection with that TMI visit.
t 15.
On February 16, 1983 based on all of the data compiled, the County Executive recommended that the County not adopt the draft emergency plan because local conditions on Long Island -- such as the existence of only three major east-west i
roads to handle hundreds of thousands of motorists evacuating to the west -- made it impossible to safely evacuate or otherwise
[
protect the public in the event of a serious nuclear accident at Shoreham.
The following day, the Legislature independantly voted 16-1 not to adopt or implement an emergency plan for Shoreham.
The Legislature's reasoning is explained in County Resolution i
l No. 111-1983.
4 l
i III.
1982 1
16.
Shortly after Suffolk County embarked upon its upgraded I
emergency planning process, LILCO commenced a course of hosti'.e i
and belligerent actionc against the County -- conduct which, in I
my opinion, was not designed in good faith to secure the County's l
participation in emergency planning for Shoreham, but instead to create a fight with the County over emergency planning that LILCO calculated it could win.
Significantly, LILCO began and l
I l !
l
sustained this course throughout 1982, the period during which the County was actually preparing a. draft emergency plan for Shoreham and when there was no basis for anyone -- including LILCO -- to believe that such a plan would not emerge.
- LILCO, for reasons of its own, simply decided to pick a fight with Suffolk County.
17.
Also in 1982, Suffolk County requested LILCO to perform a full design review and physical inspection of Shoreham under a protocol which assured the independence of the experts who would perform the work.
The reason was that allegations riere rampant of poor workmanship and inadequate quality control and quality assurance at Shoreham.
The County made clear to LILCO in negotiations attended by me in spring 1982 that such a design review and !nspection was impartant to Shoreham's safety.
I i
personally made clear to LILCO that the need for a full physical i
inspection and design review was a matter completely separate
)
from the emergency planning issue.
LILCO, however, refused to l
consider the merits of the design review and inspection as something separate from emergency planning.
Thus, LILCO tried to link the review and inspection to the County's production of an emergency plan to LILCO's liking.
In essence, LILCO demanded that the County trade its governmental functions over emergency planning for LILCO's agreement to review and inspect the Shoreham l
plant.
This was an early instance of LILCO not acting in good i
faith toward the County with respect to emergency planning, but t
t j
instead treating the County as a political bargaining agent with the stakes being the County's abdication of its sovereign powers.
i l
i 18.
LILCO's next major action toward Suffolk County was particularly objectionable.
Over the County's strong and vocal objections, LILCO told both the federal and state governments
^
that the earlier emergency planning materials which had been i
prepared by the County's two staff members -- and which LILCO knew the County had discarded as inadecuate -- actually consti-i tuted the County's emergency plan.
LILCO made these misrepre-sentations in written statements to the NRC and to FEMA.
LILCO also did this in filings with the State of New York Disaster Preparedness Commission ("DPC").
19.
At a prehearing conference before the NRC's Licensing i
i i
Board held on April 14, 1982, lawyers for Suffolk County clearly 1
advised LILCO and the NRC that Suffolk County had no emergency i
plan as of then, and that the prior materials had been discarded.
Egg 4/]4/82 Tr. 771-72.
I was present at that hearing, and I i
personally advised the Board and parties on the record that the 4
County then had no emergency plan.
Tr. 774.
At that point, therefore, all parties had actual, official knowledge that there was no County emergency plan for Shoreham, but that the County i
was working on such a plan.
If at that time LILCO had been in l
k i
1
- j l
a f
o
?
i i
pursuit of a good faith effort to secure the County's participa-tion, it would have allowed the County's planning efforts to proceed without interfering.
i l
20.
LILCO's statements in the Summary Disposition Motion i
that it "was cooperative" with the County after the County began its upgraded planning efforts are belied by LILCO's own words and actions.
For example, even though the County was working dili-gently on a plan, LILCO charged that as of April 1982, the County "was obstructing review of its own emergency plan."
LILCO Letter.
t to Howard Pachman, June 23, 1982, at 4.
Such a LILCO charge of l
"obstruction" is telling evidence that LILCO was not making a good faith effort to secure the County's participation, particu-
{
larly since LILCO knew that the County had no plan.
- Rather, LILCO was making baseless charges that could only serve to poison 1
relations between the County and LILCO.
L i
l 21.
Further, in May 1982, without the County's knowledge or permission, LILCO gathered the discarded materials which had been i'
prepared by the County's two staff members, supplemented these with materials prepared by LILCO's own consultants, and packaged them in blue binders entitled "Suffolk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan."
LILCO knew that these binders did not i
]
contain the County's plan -- because the County was then working
]
on its plan -- but nevertheless transmitted the binders to the 1
DPC and asked the DPC to review them as Suffolk County's plan.
4 1 i j
4 -
l In its transmittal letter to the DPC, LILCO knowingly made the following false statement:
"LILCO hereby submits the local off-1 site emergency plan for Shoreham.
Later, LILCO also sent copies of the binders to the NRC and FEMA.
22.
Upon learning of LILCO's misrepresentation, Suffolk County objected to the DPC.
The County also demanded that LILCO stop its misrepresentation.
The Chief Deputy Suffolk County Executive wrote to LILCO on May 17, 1983, as follows:
l It is the County's hope that LILCO will promptly terminate its resistance to the e
County's good faith emergency planning efforts.
An increasing amount of the County's time is being consumed by the need to respond to seemingly bellicerent actions of LILCO that challenge the County's current effort.
I ask that you convey to your colleagues these serious sentiments, and that LILCO refrain from escalating further with rhetoric or deed any difference which exists between LILCO and the County with respect to the critical goal of effective radiological emergency prepar-edness.
(emphasis added).
It is clear, therefore, that in mid-lG82, l
contrary to LILCO's assertions, LILCO's actions were not in
(
pursuit of a sustained good faith effort to obtain the County's cooperation.
Instead, LILCO had assumed a hostile, belligerent, and deceitful attitude toward the County and the County's j
emergency planning efforts.
i
')
I i
i
} a
L i
23.
On May 18, 1982, the County Executive addressed the 4
Legislature in Special Session to inform the Legislators of LILCO's action.
The Legislature enacted Legislative Resolution I
No. 455-1982, which provided funds for retaining Special Counsel i
to investigate LILcO's act of sending to the DPC a document which LILCO falsely claimed to be the County's emergency plan.
In September 1982, the Special Counsel found that LILCO had submitted a false document to the DPC.
He also found that LILCO l
4 had sent it to FEMA and the NRC, and had even supplemented the i
i false document with a further filing with the NRC on September 1, 1982 -- a full 3-1/2 months after the County demanded that LILCO f
stop its misrepresentations.
The Special Counsel stated in his Report to the Legislatures j
This latest submission to another agency of l
government shows a total disregard of the County's position and a calculated course of i
conduct to peddle the plan to both state and federal agencies in contravention of the wishes of Suffolk County.
(p. 10) t These acts of unauthorized submission and conscious disregard cf the County's wishes and, indeed, its governmental sovereignty l
were not the conduct of a company making a good faith effort to f
secure the County's cooperation.
In large measure, they were i
simply acts of bad faith.
l i
1 24.
LILCO's hostile course of conduct in 1982 culminated when LILCO urged the DPC to continue to review the document it l
l falsely claimed to be the County's emergency plan.
This forced
[
l I
i
.l i
the County to obtain an injunction against the DPC in December 1982.
LILCO suggests in its Motion (p. 8) that LILCO's agreement to enter into a Stipulation after the injunction was entered is somehow an indication that LILCO had been or was pursuing a goad faith effort.
That is not accurate.
The fact that the County was forced to litigation due to LILCO's hostile conduct is in fact evidence of LILCO's disregard for cooperative relations with the County.
The Stipulation was made in a litigation context after LILCO had lo t the critical rounds in the lawsuit.
For LILCO to twist the facts which show its hostility to any other characterization is unfounded.
25.
LILCO's calculated course of hostile actions toward Suffolk County was underscored by the Company's total disrespect for the process of democratic government in Suffolk County and for the interests of the public.
At no time did LILCO evidence good faith efforts toward Suffolk County, its citizens, or the democratic process.
Even at this early stage of the Shoreham controversy -- when Suffolk County had taken no position except to express the intent to prepare the best possible emergency plan to protect its citizens -- LILCO was demonstrating a course of conduct that revealed elements of actual bad faith.
26.
For example, LILCO publicly demonstrated that it held itself to be above the law and above the County government.
Thus, in trying after-the-fact to rationalize its misrepresen-tation of the document LILCO pretended to be Suffolk County's emergency plan, LILCO's Vice President stated, as reported in the May 20, 1982 Suffolk Times (p. 2):
"(W) hen government refuses to act responsibly, as a government, then we must do so for the government."
Shortly thereafter, in a public address before the County Legislature, the County Executive asked LILCO to "outgrow its persistent gunslinger attitude" and to accept the County's good faith efforts to prepare an emergency plan.
LILCO did not heed the County's request, but continued through 1982 on a course of sustained nostility toward the County.
27.
I emphasize that LILCO's hostility during 1982 was a great distraction to County officials.
We considered LILCO's actions to be a threat to our sovereign powers.
The fact that LILCO -- a private corporation -
put the County's name on a document that was not the County's, then tried to pass that document off as the County's to both the state and federal governments, and then refused to cease after the County repeatedly objected, was shocking and intolerable.
We could not l
at that time square such conduct of LILCO with good faith efforts, and I cannot do so now'.
In my view, when people knowingly and deliberately misrepresent another person -- and even contrive to do so after the other person objects -- there is no room for any finding of good faith efforts.
l i l l
i.
28.
I have read LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition, dated December 18, 1987, and particularly LILCO's claim that its efforts were in good faith during 1982 and beyond.
I absolutely disagree with LILCO's characterizations.
In fact, LILCO's state-ments artificially ignore the context in which events actually took place, and they are selective in the extreme.
Even if one takes everything LILCO says at face value -- and that cannot factually be done -- LILCO's own statements are dwarfeu by the reality and implications of the matters set forth in this affidavit.
It is hard to imagine a private corporation exercising as much arrogance and hostility toward any level of government as LILCO did toward Suffolk County in 1982 and there-after.
In my judgment, LILCO's conduct toward Suffolk County from February 1982 onward was never predicated on good faith of any sort.
LILCO simply wanted a license for Shoreham at any cost, and it treated good faith as a dispensable inconvenience --
which it in fact dispensed with.
IV.
1983 29.
1983 began with LILCO's Board Chairman making a revealing statement about the Company's attitude toward Suffolk County.
At the public hearing held by the County Legislature on January 27, 1983, the suffolk County Executive asked LILCO's Board Chairman whether, if the County Legislature determined that adequate emergency preparedness was not possible due to the _ __
e limited local roadways and other constraints, LILCO would agree to drop Shoreham and work cooperatively with Suffolk County to resolve the resulting economic issues.
The Board Chairman said no, because he could not agree with such a determination.
1/27/83, Tr. 1487.
LILCO thus put itself above the government of Suffolk County, announcing that it -- not the County -- had the ultimate authority to determine what serves the public's welfare.
30.
Shortly thereafter, LILCO took a step -- a crass step
-- that further revealed its arrogance and mortally wounded its credibility.
When the Legislature held public hearings in Pennsylvania concerning the TMI accident, LILCO attempted to ensure that witnesses w'ho sigt.e.
up to speak would be f avorable to LILCO.
(Egg Attachment 1)
LILCO counseled these witnesses not to state that LILCO had persuaded them to speak.
Id.
l LILCO's attempt to create such a biased record was an act of
(
i deceit, a travesty of what good faith conduct toward the County would be.
31.
In February 1983, after extensive public hearings and deliberations, the Legislature voted not to adopt or implement an emergency plan for Shoreham.
LILCO responded to the County's l
j action with further hostility and name-calling, suggesting that l
l the County had ulterior motives, such as trying to find an excuse to kill Shoreham or to foster the political ambitions of local politicians.
LILCO then adopted a practice of sustained fear-t
! l
mongering to scare the County and public into supporting the operation of Shoreham even though they believed effective emer-gency preparedness was impossible.
That is, fearmongering -- not a good faith effort -- to exact emergency planning concessions from the County.
The Company thus claimed that Shoreham was needed immediately, or else there would be serious electricity shortages on Long Island with resulting brownouts and blackouts.
LILCO also claimed that if Shoreham did not operate, the rate-payers would have to pay the entire multi-billion dollar cost of the plant and electricity rates would skyrocket.
And, LILCO portrayed the County as being run by anti-nuclear activists and obstructionists bent on killing nuclear power.
Such repeated statements by LILCO did not constitute in any respect a sustained, good faith effort to obtain County cooperation.
To the contrary, they represented further evidence of LILCO hostil-ity and even bad faith toward to the County.
32.
LILCO based its fearmongering on serious distortions.
First, the capacity of electricity represented by Shoreham was not needed in the short term, and the State Energy Office's official findings supported this fact.
Second, the ratepayers would not necessarily have to pay all of Shoreham's costs, because the decision of allocating costs belongs exclusively to the State Public Service Commission, and the Commission had not decided the issue.
Significantly, in 1985, the PSC disallowed more than $1.3 billion of Shoreham's costs and ruled that this -
~~
I amount could not be included in.LILCO's rate base because it was the product of LILCO's mismanagement of Shoreham.
And, third, the County's decision not to adopt or implement an emergency plan for Shoreham was not made by anti-nuclear or any other kind of ideological activists.
The decision was made by responsible government officials who took their public duties seriously and made a tough decision the way they were required to do in order to serve their oaths of office and the publit trust.
The decision was non-partisan, made and supported by Republicans, Democrats, and Conservatives.
It was made purely on the merits.
When LILCO later challenged the County's actions in federal and state court, LILCO's suits were rebuffed and the~ County's actions in deciding not to adopt or implement a plan for Shoreham were found to be rational and lawful under state and federal law.
33.
From May through December 1983, Governor Cuomo's blue ribbon commission on Shoreham (the "Marburger Commission," headed by Dr. John Marburger, President of the State University of New York at Stony Brook) held hearings and considered varicus aspects of the Shoreham issue, including matters related to emergency planning, safety, and economics.
Representatives of the NRC and FEMA served on the Commission.
A major consensus conclusion of the Commission was that the emergency planning analyses performed by Suffolk County's consultants were reason-able and that there was no basis for the State to second-guess Suffolk County's determination not to adopt or implement an l l
r_
The Commission also concluded that Shoreham's power was not needed since feasible alternatives could be developed.
34.
LILCO has suggested. (Motion at 10-11) that its activ-ities before the Marburger Commission reflected good faith actions by LILCO to obtain Suffolk County and/or New York State cooperation.
That is not accurate.
I attended virtually all of the Marburger Commission meetings.
At hearings before the Commission, LILCO misrepresented the actions and motives of Suffolk County.
LILCO refused to accept at face value the County's action.
And LILCO continually exhibited hostility toward the County and the County's emergency planning efforts.
Again, LILCO's conduct did not constitute a good faith effort to secure the County's participation in emergency planning.
1 35.
LILCO also has suggested (Motion at 9-10) that its preparation and submittal to the NRC on May 26, 1983, of plans l
for Suffolk County and New York State was "part of its continuing l
efforts to secure the participation of the authorities."
I disagree.
LILCO's unilateral submission of such plans, without the authorization of the governments, was another example of i
LILCO's arrogance toward the governments.
Suffolk County had implored LILCO in 1982 not to submit unauthorized plans on the l
County's behalf.
LILCO's action in 1983 doing the same thing was 1
i a continuation of LILCO's hostile conduct.
It was in no way 1 \\
l I
m
c calculated to secure the County's cooperation.
Indeed, it led shortly thereafter to a June 1983 Licensing Board ruling that the plans submitted by LILCO purportedly for New York State and Suffolk County would not be considered since they had been submitted with no evidence of support from either of the govern-ments.
36.
LILCO finally has suggested that two extracts from depositions in 1983 which contain conciliatory statements from LILCO counsel (Motion at 11-12) constitute evidence of a good faith effort by LILCO to secure the County's cooperation.
I cannot help but observe that LILCO's claim of go6d faith is in a most sorry state if all it can find to support the claim are some disjointed comments of counsel during obscure depositions.
Where is the Company speaking and acting aptly and officially on the public record to demonstrate its good faith?
The fact is that there are no such words and actions, because what LILCO actually said and did was not in good faith.
V.
1984-85 l
37.
In 1984, LILCO began an intensified course of politically toned pressure tactics against suffolk County --
particularly on Long Island and in Washington.
On Long Island, LILCO in April 1984, sued Suffolk County alleging that the l
l County's emergency planning position was unlawful under federal 1 \\
l l
c-law.
Significantly, in 1985, the Court rejected LILCO's suit, finding the County's actions to be lawful and rational.
The U.S.
Court of Appeals later affirmed the rejection of LILCO's suit.
38.
LILCO also attempted to secure the federal government's participation in Shoreham emergency planning, thus again confirming LILCO's early 1982 decision to cease any genuine effort -- much less a sustained good faith effort -- to obtain the County's participation in emergency planning for Shoreham.
For example, in early 1984, I recall a news report of the Chairman of LILCO's Board stating that he was engaged in "guerilla warfare" against Suffolk County.
It is at about this time that LILCO admitted publicly that it had retained Lyn Nofziger, President Reagan's former assistant, as its "political consultant" in Washington.
It has since been disclosed that Mr.
Nofziger met on LILCO's behalf with White House, DOE, and FEMA officials, all in connection with LILCO's attempts to license Shoreham.
39.
Also during this period, LILCO was trying to evade having to deal with Suffolk County by making arrangements with the federal government to help push the County out of LILCO's way in licensing Shoreham.
LILCO's representatives met secretly with federal officials to devise means to force Suffolk County to adopt an emergency plan for Shoreham or means to override the effect of the County's actions.
These meetings became known when 25 -
r b
they were reported in the press, and when government documents were released.
It became clear that LILCO wanted the federal government to intercede and imbue LILCO's emergency plan with some sort of legal authority.
Thus, LILCO's efforts were devoted to attempting to secure federal government participation, not participation of Suffolk County.
40.
The actions of LILCO -- and particularly LILCO's misrepresentations that the Company had legal authority to exer-cise New York's and Suffolk County's police powers -- caused the County, New York State, and the Town of Southampton in early 1984 to file suit against LILCO in State Supreme Court.
In early 1985, the court ruled for the County and State, finding LILCO's claim to amount to a usurpation of the State and County's inherent police powers.
41.
In my judgment, the most significant action of LILCO in 1984-85 that evidenced not only the absence of the Company's good faith, but the presence of actual bad faith, was LILCO's calcu-i 1
l lated refusal to pay the property taxes it owed Suffolk County.
LILCO's refusal to pay taxes continued for a year and one-half, until the Company owed $130 million.
LILCO linked its refusal specifically to the emergency planning issue.
The Company's l
action was particularly reprehensible because LILCO was a corporate citi?:n or Suffolk County and the County's largest taxpayer.
LILCO expected.the County to continue to provide the r
public services that LILCO wanted just like every other taxpayer in the County, but it decided that it was above the rest of Suffolk County's citizens; it somehow did not feel the same civic duty to pay taxes as the rest of the people.
42.
LILCO unabashedly and repeatedly claimed that it was refusing to pay its taxes in order to squeeze the County's finances so tightly that the County would have to cave in and support LILCO's emergency plan.
Over the one and one-half years, through May 31, 1985, that LILCO refused to pay a total of
$130 million in taxes, the County came under severe financial pressure.
This caused turmoil in the County government and the consideration of budget reductions in government services; it threatened decreases in the County's bond ratings; and it had a generally debilitating effect on the County's financial climate and foreshadowed increased taxes for the public.
For example, to offset the loss of LILCO's tax payments in 1985, Suffolk County l
had to borrow money, raise property taxes, and establish other l
unprogrammed efficiencies.
LILCO's strategy was simply to create problems for the County and to destroy the County's ability to remain true to its convictions and thus resist LILCO's demands.
This not only evidences a lack of LILCO's good faith toward the County on the emergency planning issue, it also shows bad faith toward both the administration of law by the County government and toward the citizens who depend on the County for critical public services.,
l-
r-O 43.
LILCO's pressure tactics in refusing to pay the taxes it rightfully owed amounted to coercion against the County.
On May 30, 1985, the Suffolk County Executive gave in to LILCO's tactics, and agreed to a test of LILCO's emergency plan.
In return, LILCO immediately paid its $130 million in back taxes, with LILCO's Board Chairman stating that "[t]he reason for with-holding the taxes no longer exists."
Newsday, June 1,
- 1985, p.
4.
Later, the County Executive publicly stated that he had no choice but "to fall on the sword" because of the financial diffi-culties LILCO had caused for the County.
The result was that the County Executive agreed to support a FEMA-graded exercise of LILCO's emergency plan, which ultimately was held on February 13, 1986.
44.
Immediately after the County Executive approved support for the exercise, members of the Suffolk County Legislature sued him in State Court.
LILCO intervened in the suit against the County Legislature in an effort to protect the test of its plan that had been secured through its refusal to be a law-abiding citizen and pay its taxes.
Three New York State courts, including the New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the County Executive had acted unlawfully under the provisions of the Suffolk County Charter by supporting the LILCO exercise.
Subse-quently, the Executive opposed the exercise of LILCO's plan.
l l
1._
0 45.
Thus, LILCO's refusal to pay taxes had been successful in forcing the County Executive to take actions which the courts found to be unlawful.
It surely cannot be said that it was a good faith action (as LILCO seems to suggest at page 12 of the Motion) for LILCO to have forced the County Executive into a position of having to violate the law.
By no stretch of the imagination can any facet c5 good faith efforts be gleaned from LILCO's brazen repudiation of its civic duty to pay its property taxes.
VI.
1986 46.
LILCO's Motion cites no purported fact whatsoever during 1986 which is alleged to constitute a good faith effort by LILCO to secure the County's participation in planning for Shoreham.
During 1986, I know of no instance where LILCO's actions or words could be construed to be an effort by LILCO to secure the County's participation.
Rather, 1986, like the prior three years, was characterized by LILCO's hostility toward the County.
47.
In addition, 1986 again involved LILCO misrepresenting Suffolk County.
Particularly, LILCO repeatedly stated -- to the NRC and elsewhere -- that if Shoreham were operated and there were an accident at the plant, the County would act in partner-ship with LILCO and would aid LILCO in the implementation of l
r~
LILCO's emergency plan.
LILCO mischaracterized words of the County Executive in fashioning its claims, despite repeeted attempts by the County to cause LILCO to cease its unau'horized representations.
These misrepresentations became so intense that the County Executive had to issue a formal statement in June 1986 declaring the falsity of LILCO's statements and clarifying the County's position for the record.
VII.
Conclusion In summary, the facts show that LILCO has not made even an isolated good faith effort, let alone a sustained good faith effort, to secure and retain the participation of Suffolk County.
Ever since February 1982, LILCO has acted without good faith toward Suffolk County and, in several major instances, has demon-strated actual bad faith.
LILCO's conduct has included:
(1) repeated misrepresentations and falsifications of the County's position; (2) fearmongering to scare the County and public into supporting LILCO; (3) political strategies to force l
the County to act against its will; (4) efforts to circumvent the County's lawful police powers over emergency planning issues; (5) pressure tactics, including the refusal to pay taxes, to weaken the County's ability to exist financially without giving in to LILCO's self-serving wishes; and (6) sustained hostility l
l l
I and belligerency against tho County.
LILCO's conduct not only lacks goed faith toward the County, it is e.arked by repeated acts of bad faith.
.}$
s m e.._ 'AL'
~ (dpe)' /
~
Fragk Jones i
sworn before er this
/
day o January 19 in the State of New York.
l N
(My Cuauna s s *va,. wpm e s )
xin
/
JNotaryPublic) l l
l i
I l
I,
y
- p w
f Legislators Visit HQ m.
ge a du.
m ThreeMileIsland in %A To See 'and Ask
~ k Y%%k jidu*1IO
~
Ily Alan Finifer Y
yesterday to nrce Mile Island, site of the
'}
.)
'L.:
.I r
jlNjg0kdn','MWmW_GM racwsaay siert correspomtent
.-,/
nation's mogt (crious commercial nuc!ca r ac-Middletown, Pa. - Up and down South cident. %cy wanted to talk to residents and e
C* i Union Strect, this small borough's major local officials about the impact the nccident
- h.. '
-^"')b, jt.
,4 downtown thoroughfare, clusters of TV cam-had and whether the emergcccy plan there eramen, photographers und regmrters hud-wor ked. The legislature must decide by Feb.
g; died around Suffolk County legislators 22 whether to approve its drna plan.
4
[
time chores yesterday.
ing Shorcham, has submitted a rival plan to
'L M
interrupting residents during their lunch.
Iong Island I.ighting Co, v:hich is budd-b f
l
~llow do you feel about having Three Mile the state for approvnl. State and federal ap-I J
.. s t
bland just down the river?" leu lloward (it. proval of an cmergency plan is required to J
t 0
7 Amityville), the presiding officer of the Suf. obtain n license to operate Shoi' cham com-folk County legisinture, asked Donald Wolf, mercially-
{
I Y a retued chauffeur who has livn! here all of Acrompanied by a phalanx of reporters, r
i'
- I
(
e his M yents.
- A "Most people here don't say too much the legislatma took their own one dny crnsh 5
l nhout it." said Wolf, a short, stocky man who course on %rce Mile Island and its conse-seemel inditTercut to all the foss. "I don't quencen. They toured TMrs Unit I reactor.
g I
think it wared peopic."
which was undamngni in the March,1979, i
nccident that crippled TMI Unit 2. They q
Up the street, another local resident, Itho-6 trolled the strcela, soliciting residenla'
):
da Carr, cupinined her thoughts to three oth.
thoughts on the fensibihty of cmergency y
L er Icgisintors. "I have very strong feelings plans and on the innpact of hving so near the 1
I i about being o close to Three Mile Island," crippled nucicar pInnt.
j i s
]
she said. "I hnn<lic it the way I think mor,t
[
)
propic handic it: I trust it to God."
They lunched at Kuppy's Diner, and they c
l g After cinht days of hearings last month on held three hours of henrings at llarrisburg R
Suffolk~n draft emergency plan for the nearly City lin11,10 milca north of here. They heard I
~' k fA~
~,
4
~
completal Shorcham Nudcar Power Plant, from the ce local fire chiefs who said their vol-5
'N, ch:ht of the county's Ifilegislatorscnme here unteer fire l^ghtcra have never been reluc-1
-Continued on Page 32
- =woraen c. Twra a Logislators Alico Beck arxl Lou Howard al plant s visitors' center
~
(
e v
Suffolk Legislators Visit,
Three Mile Island Area
--Continued frem Page 6, tant to respond to emergencies at the nuclear plant. l They also heard from local citizens who insisted that people and animala had been harmed from ra-dioactivity released during and aAer the accident. !
And they heard from others who contended that no l'
cae was harmed. Numerous state and federal stud-ies have said the only signiScant public harm was psychological.
But there has been a perverse boon. In the four years since the accident gave TM1 international notoriety, the =a==cth plant has become a bit of a tourist hot spot. Mere than 250,000 people have visited the infor=ation center opposite the plant since 1979, said John Fidler a TMI spokesman.
And this April, a Sve mile rac,e will be run around TMI.
aAer the Enal witness, a local dairy farmer namedYesterday's whirlw i
Ronald Kopp told the legislators that his cows and ereps have re,mained healthy. Under questioning, Kopp said that a long Island Lighting Co. c5eial j
asked him to co=e testify before the legislators.
Ec-also said that the LIIIO escial, Darrell ed Kopp's participation.ord, asked him not to say that he had request.
"% e were only trying to get a balaaced prese'nta-tien," said La:ttferd, LU40's associate director of nuclear information. Lankford later conceded that he had also asked the three Ere chiefs to participate.
County e5cials were an called LILCO's subterfage. *gered at what' they 1f I were LI140 I wod not have done what they did today," sa,id Howard. "It looks like they brought people in..That t
.to.me is 'uncenacionable."
- 1. a.r it r,i m.ii i we I
t l
7 4
I i
full ter.islative board nest 't hursday urging that tue tmder a stipula' tion reached in Supreme Court with llowaid said i:e had mlorined Cohalan's offic e of (
A5 county file a plan of its own with the State Disaster the I,ong Island Lighting Co. in December.
his intende.1 announcement, but he did not speah to Picparedness Commission rather than he forced to finder that agreement, the Legislature has until the county executive thrcelly accept a plan submitted by 1.ilco or the State.
Feb. n to ml mit a ph Cob b b W m d e e g m g IloWAltD salD WillTitElt the county submits a lloward contended there would be "a ripple charging f'e utility with mismanagement and claim W 10 mile or a 20 milc evacuation plan doesn't matter to effect" of not having a plan lie noted that Suffolk ing it is derelict in not allowing the county to
\\
him. Ile said he believes a 10 mile plan would be has a responsibility to Nassau County resklents as conduct its own safety and design review of the N sufficient, but would support a 20 male plan if the well in its dealings with Lilco. Ile said that Suffolk Shoreham plant.
\\
majority of the lawmakers prefer it.
i must take care not to bankrupt Lilco by undue delay llowever. Cohalan has not sought to prevent the plant from opening. Several legislators questioned ]
"What is important is that we have a plan /* said in fighting Shoreham.
floward. "We learned on the Three Afile Island trip "WE CI, AIM WE ARE anxious to attract new yesterday said they had not made a firm decision on that they did not have a plan and that in itself was a industry to the bicounty area.' said floward. "We the adoption di an evacuation plan, but cohtended l
can't tell a businessman that we'just bankrupted the that any plan would require extensive review, and disaster."
Iloward released a draft of a motion he intends to biggest corporation on the Island, but don't worry, updating.
Pols blast Lilco for ' coaching' witnesses pre' siding officer of the I}gislature.x 3
- k.
- N h. aU M S. '"
i By IblICIIAEL IIANRAIIAN.
400 acre farm four miles northeast of
~
3 a
^* ([, '
the plant. spoke in rebuttal of an who chaired the session, said that I.il-U g,
k \\\\)
f carlier witness who contended that the co's attempt to hide its actions in N
^
Ilarrisburg, Pa.-The Suf folk Coun. presence of the nuclear plant had sending select witnesses "ts something P;-
I' I
.d.$" yJ T, Lk...
.y on a fact finding mission and con' N.
ty Legislature traveled here 200 miles resulted in an increase in the number that to me is unconscionable.
2 of. still borns and defor med births of f
s f-W local livestock. I,ilco's involvement The panel of legislators that partici p tp
..n, p
ducted a special public hearing in the Pennsylvania State Capital Wednesday was disclosed when I,cgislator Sondra ' pated in the fact fintimg visit to Penn '
i af ternoon only to find out that the Itachely (D Deer Park) thanked Kopp sylvania to hear the witnesses also I ong Island I,ighting Co. had attemp-for volunicesing his service and asked included John Wehrenberg (It11o1 how he had come to Icarn of the brook), the deputy presidmg officer; ggV f
( )[.; I ted to stack the deck by sending in E...,.j pre screened witnesses to testify to the Suffolk Legislature's hearing being John Foley (D lilue Point); Hose Cara-
- li f.<ry t-lawmakers about public reaction to the conducted in the chambers of the liar. cappa ut Selden)
- Alice fleck (R Itahy.
,s accident at the nearby Three Mile Is. risburg City Council.
lon). Alichael D' Andre (St. James). and j
-t, land miclear plant.
Gregory Illass (11 Jamesport).
- y,b/ p 3
~
"DOES IT AI ATTER?" asked Kopp.
Then he declared: "IIe asked me not to FOI.I.0 WING IIIS candor in telling 3
, g>k /y chief,1,ilco pubtle relations man and say this, but I was cor.tartal by Darrell the legislators that he was instructed A
4 spokesman on nucicar energy I,ankford from your place at by the Lilco representative not to re.
- ],
3'
. matters at' the Shoreham plant soll Shoreham.-
veal the utility's role in gettmg him to i
- l. lW i cited a young Middletown. Pa, farmer testify, the legislators assured him that
[f % -
' to give testimony at the hearirg and Lankford, who was present at the they consjdered his testimony to bc M
instructed the farmer to not let on to hearings, admitted during questioning valid.
[
the legislators that he was recruited by by reporters that he contacted Kopp i
+
d A
Lilco.
and three voluntcer fucfighters and Kopp testified that he and his family urged them to testify at the session.
had experienced no unusical effects to Presiding off.cer l_ou Howard Chaired. The farmer, Ronald Kopp. 2ft, who
. Lou.
session.
'.with his father and brother operates a lloward (R Amityville), the (Continued on following page )
)....
...n, th defects he validity of our argumcots before any ire issued."
TTA ADDED, "TIII. town will continue w lead in hattimR r.iant authorities and
}UShyi.iiooj Y 6 KlaEM g g 1
' stacked (0NE YARDFRF 4 the deck
) a.r.=fono.wtheseeaent WITH EVERY TV h
ama sad corn
_.... A Q_A_
Ei eTefs 'Re'3'de#l$$'"t7,";.
IRE _HAS F0_RCfD US Jo sat unifi faed that they were parucipants in a local emergency response plan and We Ese totab; lost to f art ine of our"3'N branches and ses are forced to li sidste - [M a
S at t$ n el sur lavettery to make teen for the containers b t
eve t an erge
.e s plant Thev sa4 bowever, that they fsN el carpet and area rs s at sea coming g
Ilj S' were not called upon to respond dur.
to en warebasses. M t !! l$ 70lll Cglllty, ing the nuclear emergeory at the plant
.a four years ago.
f-I
'I I
e I
r s
l i
f.
ward, Lan((ofd a :
BUY 1 SQ YD E, BUY 1 SQ YD,'
GE use, u.n exiosed aai urec ha t
t hat o
,8 presentauon? When pressed u to why k hh q
(Lileo) were lookzeg for wu a balanced e
khg to g
.'L
- i Ldeo thought R wu necessary to CA s
3 e,
l )
sttempt to tude its role _in recru2 ting r
suis 20 1
sos',
';,,.o
~
\\
n i,j
'Et;EJG EiB i
- . ?-.
r i'
A sensational selecties d worW famens.
We rygt im;xrted directl by KA3 se u pott es.1 Pgritas iiri +
2.
OFF jf CAP g4 m s u s. s -. ~ -
um >
- g. ~ ADE1.
0.g y
E.
C ;"Emot H
/ ROMANIAN a l'; '
O, s
.-M
'.*T
<TAHlilAN3
= = >
l
< CHINESEL 'v,"
6 kt y%
/DHURRIE!. e (@ Q t
1 Wall m _.
i V{ f$%.
Mh' i
au Lets2 tor Sondre Bachery a
questioned farmer.
y
{}
1 1
the witnesses. Laakford rephed: *They would be somewhat tatated in thest M "'^
testunomy by beag considered ploys of f.3*
)
4
'"'s*!'.feo'"d"!Eauve saa mat T,<
s y/9 %
- u by a look at the list of people corrJeg for.w to spea et d-mma at PROFESSIONAL
'lr'#P2"se77A'tJ '.'ien'E" fe t^
mse sms ra-s to the presiding offker, sa4 bowever, gg '
g
/
$*al"n'g 'E*g*A *a'e"I*Or'iUg'N Same day deliyery and vsr.
I Clerk's offwe. "This was as open bear.
teg and an oe, sue, theyt h vtag bWe taaer mou...
j Tite PREgENCE of two !.4e0 pub b NtIo'tk ?e"l awry $# ' 'lr*o$ $
1e$
f
\\.
' V ne' We ?'inN i W :w Uk,2 were eaeluded from a tout of the nuclear plaat atta the legisistors, the i
r 2 Lilco put,lic relauons staffers were scheduled to accompany the lawmak.
e i ers Carneappa objected to the LILeo a PR peeple accompanytag them unue
- reporurs who were trivned by the legalaters were eatluded.
Lar.kford. at that potat, agreed not
{
I" Before spinning e.
/
the diol...
',y Ii'.?D,
-