ML19354D833

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LER 89-011-00:on 891222,unplanned Actuation of ESF Primary Containment Isolation Sys Occurred When Performing Sys Layup Implementation Package for Hpci.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Breaker Positions changed.W/900112 Ltr
ML19354D833
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 01/12/1990
From: Notaro J, Danni Smith
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-011, LER-89-11, PM-90-009, PM-90-9, NUDOCS 9001220233
Download: ML19354D833 (4)
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LONG' ISLAND LIGHTING. COM PANY I- SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

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-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission' Document Control Desh -

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. Washington .D.C. 20555 i

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 100f'R50.73, f onolosed' is: Shoreham Nuclear LPower. A

-Station's Licensee Event Report, LER 89-01f.  ;

-Sincerely yours, .g C da< avr) ,

Jac A. Notaro Plant Manager .

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- Enclosure cc: William T. Russell, Regional Administrator-Frank Crescenzo, Senior Resident: Inspector Institute of Nuclear Power Operations,-Records: Center '

American Nuclear Insurers SR.A21.0200 t

9001220233 900112

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Shorehe7. NuMear pcwer Station Unit 1 0 151010101 il919 1 lOFl0- l 3 flT66 64i ggogiogDue To procedural Error When performing System Layup Imolementation 0V9NT DATt m' L9h NubED48 46 i Repont Daf t 17. OTMER f ACitettil envotytp see e404tm pay ygas ygan '98 a6 gogy, ga, yggp paci6ttv .uauts D0ce.it hvW9taisi maj 015101010 1 1 I

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On December 22. 1989 at 1117 hours0.0129 days <br />0.31 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.250185e-4 months <br />, an unplanned actuation of the Engineered Safety Feature Primary Containment Isolation System  ;

occurred. This~ event occurred when a System Layup Implementation '

Package (SLIP) for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was being implemented. Thin SLIP required two breakers to be opened to deenerigize area temperature monitoring elements in the HPCI system. These two breakers also supplied power to the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System isolation logic so when these breakers were opened, this system isolated. The two breakers were reclosed, the RWCU System was returned to its normal lineup at 1125 and plant management personnel were informed. This isolation of the RWCU System was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) and the NRC was notified at 1214. This Licensee Event report is being submitted per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). The cause of this event was an inadequate procedure. One corrective action was to change the required positionc of the 2 breakers in the HPCI SLIP. Another was to modify the SLIPS for the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System and the Steam Leak Detection System to allow compor.?nts in laid-up l systems such as HPCI to be deenergized by remov.ng their fuses and still leave power to components in operable systems.

  • Reactor Defueled g.;c,. . =

NAC Form Set. U 8 NUCtEM 161042,08V ComeM,ESION F **"

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION awaovio owe no siso-co4 -

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Shoreham Nuclear power Station Unit 1 0l5 0 l0 l013 l2 l 2 8l9 -

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010 0l2 0F 0b ELANT_AND_ SYSTEM _IDENTIEICATlDU General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor Energy-Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [xx].

IDENI1EICAIl0H_QE_THE_EYEHI Reactor Water Cleanup System isolation occurred while implementing a System Layup Implementation Package for the High Pressure Coolant Injection System.

Event Date: 12/22/89 Report Date: 1/12/90 '

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CONDITIONS _EBIDB_ID_IHE_EYENI Reactor Defueled - All fuel assemblies stored in the Spent Fuel Pool hode Switch - Refuel RPV Pressure = 0 psig RPV Temperature = 86 Degrees F-POWER LEVEL - 0 DESCBIEIl0H_QE_IBE_EYEHI  ;

On December 22, 1989 a System Layup Implementation Package (SLIP) i was being implemented on the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) [BJ]. This SLIP required opening two breakers to deenergize the 8 HPCI Equipment Area. Temperature Elements (1E41*TE053, 054, 055.

and 056 A and B). This action was required by the Protected System ,

Component Power' Supply Checklist section of the SLIP. However, these two breakers also supply power to the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) [CE) Leak Detection logic. When the two breakers were opened at 1117 hours0.0129 days <br />0.31 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.250185e-4 months <br />, the deenergization of the RWCU isolation logic caused the RWCU containment isolation valves (1G33*MOV-033 and 034) to close. This was an unplanned ~ actuation of the Engineered Safety Feature Primary Containment Isolation System and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii). The implementation of the SLIP was stopped'.

The two breakers were reclosed and the RWCU system was restored to-its normal lineup at 1125 hours0.013 days <br />0.313 hours <br />0.00186 weeks <br />4.280625e-4 months <br />. Plant management personnel were notifled and the NRC was notified at 1214 hours0.0141 days <br />0.337 hours <br />0.00201 weeks <br />4.61927e-4 months <br />. This Licensee j Event Report is being submitted per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). _

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.**' UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ' amovio ows no mo-oio4 ExPtats:8 '31/W DOCEtt NUMBER.42) i gga huusta (si past (31 8,actLif t tsadet ti

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0l0 0p 0F 0l3 Texte . w. arcs amawim CAUSE_DE_IHE_EYENT This event was caused by a procedural inadequacy.. The Protected.

System Component Power Supply Checklist for the HPCI SLIP specified 2 breakers as being in the "open" position. This is consistant with the SLIP Program guidelines which specify "open" as the preferred breaker position. However, in this case,' review of the HPCI SLIP was insufficient to determine that opening the breakers would deenergine the RWCU isolation logic. Thus;the HPCI SLIP should have

-required the two breakers to be " closed" and the fuses to the HPCI Equipment Area Temperature isolation logic to be removed.

ANALYSIS _DE_IDE_EYENI There was no safety significance to this event. The plant.is shutdown and has been.defueled since August 1989.

The Primary Containment Isolation System performed as designed.  !

Following the RWCU isolation the operators took the appropriate >

actions to-restore the RWCU system to its normal lineup.

CORRECTIYE_ACIIONS

1. A change to the HPCI SLIP was made to correct the position of ,

the 2 breakers. .{

2. The implementation of the HPCI SLIP was subsequently completed.
3. This event was reviewed by all SLIP preparers and-reviewers to ensure that the preparation and review of SLIPS is. thorough and  ;

accurate, especially when isolating control power supplies. '

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4. SLIPS for the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System and the Steam  :

Leak. Detection System have been prepared:to allow components in laid-up systems such as HPCI to be deenergized by removing

' fuses and still leave power to components in operable systems such as RWCU.

l ADDITIONAL _INEDBMATION i

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a. Manufacturer _$nd_modeLaumtar_of_ failed _comnonent_ial. j N/A 4 s
b. LER_ numbers _nf_ previous _similar_ereatm l None j g

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