ML19320D477

Forwards Revised Tech Spec 15.3.4 for Steam & Power Conversion Sys & Four 72-h Test Repts for Auxiliary Feed Pump in Response to NRC 800516 Request for Addl Info Re Auxiliary Feedwater Sys

ML19320D477
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	07/08/1980
From:	Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	Clark R, Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19320D478	List: ML19320D477 ML19320D502 ML19320D511 ML19320D518 ML19320D523 ML19320D526
References
TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-TM TAC-11692, TAC-11693, NUDOCS 8007210408
Download: ML19320D477 (4)

Text

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.y THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS POOR QUAUTY PAGES Wisconsin Electnc-c-r 231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046 MILWAUKEE WI 53201 July 8, 1980 Mr. H.

R.

Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Washington, D.

C.

20555 Attention:

Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Gentlemen:

DOCKET NOS, 50-266 AND 50-301 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 Your letter dated May 16, 1980 requested certain clarification and additional information concerning our previous responses to your letter of September 21, 1979 relating to the NRC requirements for the auxiliary feedwater system.

We are providing herein our responses to your May 16 letter.

These responses are labeled in accordance with that letter.

1.

Recommendation GS-1 (Technical Specifications)

Attached are revised Technical Specifications for the auxiliary feedwater system for your review.

You will note that we have included your requirements for operability prior to taking one or both units critical.

We have altered the suggested requirement for permissible operation with one or more pumps inoperable to reflect that only one unit need be shut down if a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is out-of-service for more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Continued operation of one unit is reasonable under this condition since two diverse sources of auxiliary feedwater remain available to the operating unit, namely the turbine-driven pump and the other motor-driven pump.

2.

Recommendation GS-5 (Total Loss of AC)

The interim or short-term action for this item appears

\\

to have been misinterpreted by the NRC in our previous 9

response.

We have already issued a Special Order s

requiring the auxiliary feedwater pump (turbine-driven) 800 721 0 $t)f

a 2'

1 i

Mr. H.

R.

Denton July 8, 1980 to be continuously manned in the event of a total loss of AC power'and the appropriate emergency operating procedures will be changed to include this requirement until such time as a modification is properly installed and operable which ensures cooling to these bearings on a complete loss of AC power to the facility.

The operator manning these pumps has at his disposal a portable battery-powered radio with two-way, two-channel direct communication with the control room and " emergency" battery-powered lanterns strategically located around the plant and in the near vicinity of the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

3.

Recommendation GS-6 (Redundant Verification)

The valve lineup checklists for the auxiliary feedwater system have been modified such that a second independent operator verification is required on all critical valves.

Critical valves are those in the major flow paths and the isolation valves for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump pressure transmitter which regulates pump discharge pressure.

These checklists are performed following major maintenance and periodic testing.

4.

Additional Short-Term Recommendations a.

3.2 (72-Hour Endurance Tests)

These tests were completed prior to December 30, 1979 in accordance with our previous response.

To provide for review of these tests and the results.

as requested, we have attached copies of these tests (WMTP 11.21 for Unit 1 and 2 turbine-driven pumps and WMTP 11.22 for each of the electric-driven feed pumps [P38A and B]).

b.

B.5 (Unusual Event PNO III 80-25)

To prevent-future occurrences of this event, the isolation valves for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump pressure transmitter have been locked open'and are included in the valve checklists which require a second independent operator verification.

3L G

Mr.

H.

R.'

Denton July 8, 1980 5.

Recommendation GL-3 (Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Bearing Cooling) 4 We believe that the NRC review of our prior response.

may have been misunderstood.

In that response we proposed to supply the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump bearing coolers with service water during normal conditions and by the diesel-driven fire water pump during loss of all AC power.

This will be accomplished through the use of a passive design concept, i.e., as service: water pressure decays from loss of all AC, the bearing cooler will be automatically supplied by the fire water header through a system pressure-controlled regulator valve; the subsequent pressure decrease in the fire water header will in turn automatically start 1

j the diesel-driven fire water pump.

Our proposed modifi-i cation will require no operator action to accomplish

. he above events.

t 6.

Recommendation GL-4 (Auxiliary Feedwater Supplv)

Our' position that automatic switchover for the auxiliary feed pump suction is not necessary is unchanged.

The NRC has not justified its position that automatic switch-over is necessary to assure auxiliary feedwater pump protection or that such switchover will not create more problems with redundant low suction indicators and the attendant circuitry.

We, therefore, do not propose to make any commitment to changes in this regard.

The NRC has proposed that as an alternative to automatic switchover, licensees could-upgrade the primary water supply to meet seismic Category 1 requirements and tornado protection.

The condensate storage tanks were designed for a ground acceleration of 0.06 g in any direction horizontally and 0.04 g vertically occurring simultaneously'and in conjunction with other loads, without exceeding code allowable stresses.

This design, therefore, already meets, in part, the Class I seismic criteria as specified in Appendix A of-the plant's Final

~ Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report- (FFDSAR).

7.

Basis:for AFW System Flow Requirements Information concerning the requirement, basis, and assumptions for AFW system flow is available in the Point Beach Nuclear Plant FFDSAR.

Specific reference to these items may be found in the following FFDSAR Sections:

'10.2.2 (Design Features, Auxiliary Feedwater System) ; 14.1.1 (Loss of Normal Feedwater) ; 14.1.12

.(Loss 'of All. AC Power) ; 14.2.4 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) ; and 14.2.5 (Rupture of a Steam Pipe).

By

3 Mr. Harold R.

Denton July 8, 1980 letter dated April 25, 1980 we also recently submitted to the NRC additional information concerning the analysis of a steam line break with continued feedwater addition.

If your review of this material indicates that you have continued questions in these areas, perhaps a meeting could be arranged to discuss these items further.

If you concur with the Technical Specification changes proposed in this response, we will submit suitable license amendment requests to incorporate these changes into the licenses.

Very truly yours, C. W.

Fay, Director Nuclear Power Department Attachments Copy to NRC Resident Inspector Point Beach Nuclear Plant

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