ML19317D253

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Memorandum in Support of 770819 Petition for Rulemaking by Wi Electric Power Co,Wi Public Svc Corp & Bg&E Requesting Amend of 10CFR73.55(d)(1) Re Access & Physical Searches. Certificate of Svc Encl
ML19317D253
Person / Time
Site: Oconee, Three Mile Island  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/19/1977
From:
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:
Shared Package
ML19317D241 List:
References
RULE-PRM-73-2 NUDOCS 7911190633
Download: ML19317D253 (7)


Text

Aug !3t 19, 1977 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )

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PHYSICAL SEARCHES AT ) Docket No. PRM i h h NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS )

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING On February 24, 1977, the Commission published in the Federal Register amendments to its regulations setting forth requirements for the physical protection of nuclear power reactors. 42 Fed.

Reg. 10836. Among these requirements is the obligation imposed by 10 CFR 573.55 (d) (1) that at all points of personnel access to the protected area " searches of all individuals be made" and that the " search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices shall be conducted either by a physical search or by use of equipment capable of detecting such devices."

Petitioners Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, and Baltimore Gas and Electric Ccmpany believe that a requirement for a " pat-dcwn" physical search is unnecessary in view of the other protective measures required, the absence of such a requirement for other (and more sensitive) facilities, and the serious problems which the physical search requirement imposes. On the other hand, " pat-dcwn" physical searches shculd be permitted in any case where security personnel are suspicicus about an individual and signs should be posted that individuals entering a protected area may be subject to search.

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12. Positive licensee control over all designated licensee vehicles;
13. Numbered picture badge system for all persons authorized access to protected areas without escort;
14. Escort required for individuals not authorized to enter protected area without escort;
15. Individuals requiring escort must register name, date, time, purpose of visit, employment application, citizenship and name of individual being visited;
16. Access to vital areas limited to authorized individuals requiring access:
17. Positive control of personnel and vehicle access to vital areas; la. Special badges for vital area access;
19. Protection by locks and active intrusion alarms of unoccupied vital areas;
20. Reactor containment dcors and hatches to be alarmed and locked;
21. Positive access control to reactor containment when frequent access required;
22. Control of keys, lccks, ccmbinations and related equipment;
23. Chcnge of key, lock ccmbination or related -

equipment on evidsace of its compromise;

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. Safeguards Requirements", 42 Fed. Reg. 34310 ' July 5, 1977),

573. 4 6 (d) (4) , which exempts frem the search requirement ERDA couriers and licensee employees with NRC or ERDA clearances.

Certainly, any requirements which require searches of cleared personnel are totally unnecessary.

Modifying the rule to explicitly permit physical searches on suspicion and to inform all individuals prior to entering a protected area that they may be searched would also lend further assurance to the security prcgram.

II. OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH RESPONSIBILITY OVER FACILITIES MORE SENSITIVE THAN NUCLEAR PCWER REACTORS DO NOT REQUIRE PHYSICAL SEARCHES AS PART OF THEIR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

Nuclear power reactors are by no means the mest sensitive facilities operated or licensed by the Federal Government.

Nuclear weapcns storage areas, military nuclear research facilities and many military bases would seem to have a greater need for physical security protecticn than ecmmercial nuclear reactors. Even the anti-hijacking precautiens in effect for all ec=mercial airlines would appear te need measures at least as strict as these for nuclear pcwer plants. Yet in none of these cases de government regulations require a physical search.

The security requirements for nuclear weapcns are governed by Department of Defense Directive No. 5210.41,

" Security Criteria and Standards fcr Protecting Nuclear Weapons" (September 10, 1976). This directive applies te all Defense Department ccmpenents having responsibility for

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.ent ry con trol rosters, a; visitor control system and a duress system. Unescorted entrance.to Limited and Exclusion Areas is restricted to cleared individuals with an escort system for persons without clearances. However, even for uncleared (but escorted) persons having access to nuclear weapons, no physical search is required. -

Security regulations in other defense related areas also have no requirement for physical searches. The Energy Research and Development Administration precedures are set forth in ERDA Manual Chapter 2000. Specifically, ERDA Manual Appendix 2401, Physical Protection of Classified Matter and Information, makes no mention of physical searches.

Defense Department regulations used for the security of naval shipyard construction (including naval nuclear construction) require no physical searites. See DOD 5220.22-M, " Industrial Security Manual for Stfeguarding Classified Information",

and DOD 5220.22-R, "Inc.ustr: a1 Security Regulation. "

Ncamilitary secu ;y programs similarly de not require physical searches. To deter pctential hi-jackers, the Federal Aviatica Administration in 1972 adopted 14 CFR S121.538, " Aircraft Security." This regulatien requires that each carrier adopt A screening system, acceptable to the Administra-tion, that is designed to prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft of any explosive or incendiary device c: weapon. . . .

To cur kncvledge, no carrier has adopted, ner has the FAA required, a screening system which requires physical search.

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_9 of visitor might appear. In the absence of a wcman guard, the physical search, and the woman's entry, would have to be delayed until a woman guard was obtained. In scme instances, this might result in a significant delay in order to have a woman guard report to the plant.

The likelihood of a substantial delay in processing people through the security system is likely with the onset of colder weather and the need for entering personnel to remove their coats, jackets and sweaters, so that those items can be searched prior to the physical search of the individual.

Significant delays may be involved in processing large numbers of people, particularly during outages when a significant increase in the number of workers coming on-site can be expected. This added time may result in additional costs to the utility in temms of reduced productivity or requests for additional compensation. Larger guard forces may also be required in an attempt to reduce the delay.

IV. CONCLUSICN As shcwn above, the physical search requirement imposed by the Commission is unique. In the perspective of the risks of industrial sabotage accepted by American society and the precautiens taken in connection with those risks, the Commission's physical search requirement appears excessive and unreasenfrie.

Other government agencies with responsibility over activities Of equal or greater sensitivity and susceptability to industrial or other sabotage do net require a physical search as a part of their

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )

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PHYSICAL SEARCHES AT ) Docket No. PRM l D- 2e-NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certiy that copies of the foregoing " Petition for Rule Making" and " Memorandum In Support of Proposed Rule Making" were mailed; first class, postage prepaid, this .9th day of August, 1977, to the following:

Mr. Edson Case Docketing and Service Secticn Acting Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Office of Nuclear Reactor Commission Regulation Washington, D. C. 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 General Counsel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. ^0555 l \

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