ML19261C521
| ML19261C521 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261C520 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-52156, NUDOCS 7903230098 | |
| Download: ML19261C521 (35) | |
Text
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'h UNITED STATES
.. i NUCLsAR REGULATCRY CCMMisSICN 4
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peg 71979 Docket No: 50-346 MEMORANDUM FOR:
B. Grimes, Assistant Director for Engineering & Projects Division of Operating Reactors FROM:
S. H. Hanauer, Assistant Director for Plant Systems
. Division of Systems Safety
SUBJECT:
FIRE PROTECTION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT - DAVIS BESSE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1 Plant Name: Davis Besse Nuclear Station, Unit No.1 Docket Number: 50-346 Licensing Stage: OR Milestone Number: N/A Responsible Branch: DOR 4 Project Manager:
G. Vissing ASB Reviewer.
V. Leung Requested Completion Date: December 30, 1978 Review Status: Complete The Auxiliary Systems Branch has completed its review of the Davis Besse Nuclear Station, Unit No.1, Fim Protection Program. The Fire Protection Program was reviewed in accordance with Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1.
Table 1 of the SER presents an acceptable schedule for implementation of improvements under way or planned for the plant fire protection program.
The licensee has comitted to implainent emergency shutdown procedures and modifications to maintain hot shutdown capability by February 28, 1979, and to assure safe cold shutdown independent of the cable spread-ing room or the control room by October 31, 1979. These dates are consistent with the operating license provisions.
Based on our review, we find that the licensee's fire protection program with improvements already made by the licensee, is adeouate at the present time and with the scheduled modifications will meet the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, and meets General Design Criterion 3 and is, therefore, acceptable.
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B. Grimes FEB '
T9 Until the comitted fire protection system improvements are operational, we consider the existing fire detection and suppression systems; the existing barriers netween fire areas; improved administrative proce-dures for control of combustibles and ignition sources; the trained onsite fire brigade; the capability to extinguish fires manually; and the fire protection technical specifications provide adequate protec-tion against a fire that would threaten safe shutdown.
/
S. H. Hariauer, Assistant Director for Plant Systems Division of Systems Safety
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
R. Mattson R. Boyd W. Pike D. Eisenhut G. Vissing P. Matthews D. Fischer V. Benaraya G. Lainas C. Long R. Ferguson V. Leung
DAVIS BESSE 1 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW UNIT N0. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
INTRODUCTION II.
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION A.
Water Systems B.
Gas Suppression Systems C.
Fire Detection Syster.'.s III.
OTHER ITEfiS RELATING TO THE STATION FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM A.
Fire Barriers, Fire Doors, and Dampers B.
Cable and Conduit Penetration Fire Stops IV.
FIRE PROTECTION FOR SPECIFIC AREAS V.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND FIRE BRIGADE VI.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS VII.
CONCLUSIONS
DAVIS BESSE UNIT i Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report I.
INTRODUCTION We have reviewed the Davis Besse Unit i fire protection program and fire hazards analysis submitted by the licensee. The submittal, including Revisions 1, 2, 3 and 4, was in response to our request to evaluate his fire protection program against the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants." As part of the review, we visited the plant site to examine the relationship of safety related components, systems, and structures in specific plant areas to both combustible materials and to associated fire detection and sup-pression systems. The overall objective of our review of the Davis Besse Nuclear Plant fire protection program was to ensure that in the event of a fire at the facility, the unit would maintain the ability to safely shut-down and remain in a safe shutdown condition and to minimize the release of radioactivity to the environment.
Our review included an evaluation of the autcmatic and manually operated water fire suppression systems, the fire detection systems, fire barriers, fire doors and dampers, fire protection administrative controls and fire brigade training, and plant fire protection Technical Specifications.
Our conclusion given in Section VII is that the Fire Protection Program at the Davis Besse Unit 1 Plant is adequate at the present time, and meets General Design Criterion 3.
However, to further ensure the ability of the
. plant to withstand the damaging effects of fires that could occur, we are requiring, and the licensee has agreed, to provide additional fire pro-tection system improvements.
In accordance with an existing license condition (Condition 2.C.(3)h, the licensee is scheduling completion of these improvements by April 22, 1980. The schedule for specific fire protection system improvements is presented in Table 1 of this report.
Until the comitted fire protection system improvements are operational, we consider the existing fire detection and suppression systems; the existing barriers betwaen fire areas; improved administrative procedures for control of combustibics and ignition sources; the trained onsite fire brigade; the capabil y to extinguish fires manually; and the fire protection technical spec. fications provide adequate protection against a fire that would threaten safe shutdown.
This report summarizes the results of our evaluation of the Fire Protec-tion Program at the Davis Besse Unit 1 fluclear Plant.
II.
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION A.
Water Sucpression Systems The water fire protection system consists of one full capacity 2500 gpm motor driven fire pump, one full capacity 2500 gpm diesel engine driven fire pump, a separate pressure maintenance (jockey) pump, two separate water sources and a yard loop with sectionalizing post-indica-tor isolation valves.
. The fire pump connections to the yard main are spacially separated by 60 feet. The motor driven fire pump is located in the water treat-ment buildinc and takes suction from the 250,000 gallon fire water storage tank. This pump is automatically started when the system pressure drops to 120 psig. The 12 gpm jockey pump, running con-tinuously, maintains the pressure of 135 psig in the fire protection system.
The diesel driven fire pump is located in the seismic Category 1 in-take structure and separated by a three-hour fire rated barrier from other pumps in that atructure. This pum7 takes suction from Lake Erie and will automatically start when the. system pressure drops to 100 psig. The pump will also start automath ally on low level in the fire water storage tank before the motor drhcn pump shuts off at a lower tank level. Separate alarms monitoring pump running, prime mover availability, or failure to start are provided for the pumps in the plant control room. The fire pumps are installed according to the applicable sections of NFPA 20.
The automatic sprinkler system and manual hose station hose standpipe system are fed by a main yard lcop with multiple connections to interior fire protection systems header, e.g., the auxiliary buildina, turbine building, service building and reactor building. Each sprinkler system and manual hose station has an independent connection to the fire protection feeder, therefore, a single failure cannot imoair both the primary and backup fire protection system.
. Post indicator valves are provided
+.0 iso h te sections of the fire loop for maintenance or repair. Valves in the fire protection system which are not electrically supervised, with indication in the control room, will be locked or sealed in their normal operating position and checked periodically.
The automatic sprinkler systems, i.e., wet sprinkler system, pre-accion sprinkler systems, deluge and water spray systems, are designed to the requirements of NFPA Standard No.13 " Standard for Installation of Sprinkler Systems," and NFPA Standard No.15, " Standard for Water Spray Fixed System."
Manual hose stations are located throughout the plant to ensure that an effective hose stream can be directed to any safety related area in the plant. These systems are consistent with the requirements of NFPA Standard No.14, " Standpipe and Hose System for Sizing, Spacing, and Pipe Support Requirements."
Areas that have been eqcipped or will be equipped with automatic water suppression systems are:
(a) Cable spreading room" (b1 Auxiliary Building Passage and hatch area 310 and 313*
(c) AJxiliary Building Corridor 209 and corridor 304*
- Sprinkler System to be installed by April 1980.
~ (d) Auxiliary Building Pa.ssage 227
( s) Service water pump rooms *
.f) Component cooling water pumps room *
(g) Mechanical Penetration Room No. 4*
(h) Clean Waste Receiver Tank Room *
(i) North and east walls of Boric Acid Evaporator Room 235 (j) Diesel Generator Rocms (k) Diesel Generator Day Tank Rooms (1) Radwaste exhaust equipment and main station exhaust fan Room *
(m) Wall between Room 314 and the heater bay area of the turbine building.*
In the auxiliary building where the pipe rupture blowout panels are located between Rooms 235 and 124, the protection to be provided for these bicwout panels will be an automatic water curtain actuated by thermal actuation devices.
We have reviewed the design criteria and bases for the water suppres-sien systems and conclude that these systems with the additional sprinkler systems to be installed meet the guidelines of 4,nendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 :nd are in accord with the applicable portions of the National Fire Protection Associatio-f*Wri Codes, and are, therefore, acceptable.
. B.
Gas Suppress:on Systems Davis-Besse Unit I has no fixed gas suppression systems installed in the plant.
C.
Fire Detection Systems The fire detection system consists of the detectors, associated elec-trical circuitry, electrical power supplies, and the fire annunciation panel. The types of detectors used at the Davis Besse fluclear Plant are ionization (products of combustion), and thermal (heat sensors).
The system is continuously supervised with a fiFPA 72D Class B super-vised system.
Fire detection systems will given audible and visual -larm and annun-ciation in the control room. Local audible and/or visual alarms are also provided.
At our request, the licensee has agreed to install additional smoke detectors in the electrical and mechanical penetration rooms on ele-vations 565', 585' and 603'.
Additional smoke detectors will also be installed in corridor 209, fuel handling area room 300, and the ECCS pump rcoms.
We have reviewed the fire detection systems to ensure that fire detec-tors are located to provide detection and alarm of fires that could occur. We have also reviewed the fire detea.tiol' systems design criteria and bases to ensure that it conforms to the applicable sections of NFPA
. No. 72D. We conclude that the design and the installation of the fire detection systems with the additional detectors to be installed, meet the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 and the applicable portions of NFPA No. 72D, and are therefore, acceptable.
III. OTHER ITEMS RELATING TO THE STATION FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM A.
Fire Barriers All floors, walls, and, ceilings enclosing separate fire areas are rated at a minimum of 3-hour fire rating. The main control room area contains peripheral rooms which are located within the main control room 2-hour fire barrier. These peripheral rooms are provided with detectors and alams and one-hour fire rated ceilings and fire doors.
The licensee has provided acceptable documentation to substantiate the fire rating of the 3-nour barriers.
B.
Fire Doors, Dameers, and Fire Barrier Fenetrations We have also reviewed the placement of the fire doors to ensure that fire doors of proper fire rating have been provided.
All doors which separate safety related redundant divisions, including doors separating the turbine building from any safety related equip-ment room will be locked mechanically. Strict administrative proce-dures will be used to assure that the doors are not left ccen or propoed
. open during maintenance or plant operation. The licensee will add or replace fire doors in the CCW pump room, ECCS pump rocm and the Control Room complex with UL listed fire rated door assemblies.
Penetrations, including electrical penetration seals, through rated barriers are sealed to provide fire resistance equivalent to the barrier i ts el f.
Ventilation penetrations through barriers are protected by standard fire door dampers. The licensee will add UL listed fire rated door type dampers in the Electrical Penetration Room. The licensee has provided the necessary information to demonstrate that the penetration seals used in the penetrations for cable trays, conduits, and piping as well as fire dampers and their method of installation can provide a fire rating equivalent to the fire barrier. The fire dampers are installed in accor-dance with NFPA 98.
We conclude that the fire barriers, barrier penetrations, fire doors and dampers with the additional doors and dampers to be installed meet the guidelines of Appendix A to Technical position ASB 9.5-1 and are, there-fore acceptable.
IV.
Fire Protection for Soecific Areas A.
Cable Screading Rocm The walls, ficors and ceiling in the cable spreading rocm are designed to have a fire rating of three hours. Primary fire oro-tection will be provided by an autcmatic sprinkler (fog no::le)
_g_
system. The backup fire suppression system is the hose stations located immediately outside the cable spreading room. Smoke detectors are provided that will initiate a local alarm and audible and visual alarm in the cnntrol room.
All power, control.or instrumentation cable pass the flame test equivalent to the current IEEE No. 383 Flame Test. All cable trays within the cable spreading room are solid metal bottom trays with an air gap between the tray bottom and the cable and a ceramic fiber blanket barrier tray cover. All power cables in this room are enclosed in conduits to minimize the possibility of cable spreading rocm fire due to power cable overload. The licensee will install in-tray, linear-type, thermal sensing fire detector inside all cable trays within the cable spreading room in addition to the ceiling-mounted, area-type smoke detectois.
The licensee is also committed to establish an emergency shutdown procedure and capability to achieve safe shutdown in the event of a cable spreading room exposure fire or a control room cabinet fire which might disable redundant cable divisions of system necessary for safe shutdown. The procedures and modifications for hot and cold shutdown will be implemented by February 1979 and October 1979 respectively.
We have reviewed the licensee's fire hazards analysis and fire protection provided for the cable spreading room and corsider that appropriate fire protection has been provided and after +he modifi-cations and procedures are implemented will conform to the provisions of Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
B.
Comoonent Cooling Water (CCW) Pumo Room The rcom contains all three CCW ptmps for the plant at one end of the room. The heat exchangers for the CCW systems occupy the middle of the room. There are two CCW valves above a mezzanine grating at the opposite end of the room. We were concerned that an exposure fire could damage more than one CCW pump or valve train. At our request, the licensee agreed to provide an automatic sprinkler system in the CCW pump room and under the mezzanine floor grating below the CCW valves to protect them from a possible exposure fire.
In addi-tion a one-half hour rated fire barrier will be provided for the conduit associated with each CCW pump and CCW valve and the under side of the valve motor.
We have reviewed the licensee's Fire Hazards Analysis for this area ard conclude that appropriate fire protection has been provided and after the modifications are implemented will meet the guidelines of Appendix A of BTP ASB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
C.
Service Water (SW) Pumo Intake Structure The intake structure contains the three safety related plant service water pumps, two ncn-safety related cooling water makeup pumps and
. the diesel driven fire cump. The plant service water pumps and the makeup pumps are in a compartment separated by 3-hour fire-rated barrier from the fire pump. The service water pumps and makeup pumps are in a single row about 5 to 7 feet from each other with each service water pump separated from the other by a makeup pump.
The piping and conduit for each pump is routed away frcm each pump about 5 to 8 feet above the floor, and exits through the wall away from the row of pumps. During our site visit we noted that there was a high lateral air flow velocity caused by the room ventilation system.
We stated our concern to the applicant about an exposure fire on the floor from which the heat could convect laterally due to the air flow and damage the electrical conduits and the SW pumps before the sprinklers could be activated. At our request the licensee by July 1979 agreed to provide a sprinkler system with fast acting sprinkler heads at the same eiewation as the service water pump motors. The sprinkler system header supply valves will be electrically supervised or padlocked open and periodically checked. Fire barriers of at least one-half hour rating will also be provided to protect the electric condu'ts and the service water valves inside the room. The SWS is presently cross-connected to the condenser circulating water system with normally closed isolation valves. The licensee is ccmmitted to provide an emergency operating procedure which will cermit the condenser circulating water systen to be used as backuo to the S',iS to achieve safe shutdcwn using offsite pcwer. This procedure will be established by February 1979. The licensee further
. ccmmitted to provide a cross-connection from the Davis Besse Unit 2 or 3 SWS into the Unit 1 SWS by mid-1984 as a long term back-up to the Unit 1 SWS pumps to achieve safe shutdown without offsite power. Subsequent to this commitment, the Davis Besse 2 and 3 schedule has been significantly delayed. The licensee has therefore committed to provide by mid-1989 a backup to the Unit 1 SWS that will not require offsite power.
We conclude that the fire protection to be provided for the service water pump intake structure is consistent with the positions of Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1 and is therefore, acceptable.
D.
Fire Protection Inside Containment The major fire hazard within the containment is the reactor coolant (RC) pump lube oil system. To prevent a fire due to oil leakage the licensee has provided an engineered oil containment and collection system for each RC pump. The system has been designed to contain the oil from leakage or a pipe failure, and drains to a collection tank which is periodically emptied to assure tank capacity for the oil contained in one motor at all times while the reactor is critical.
The redundant safety related cable divisions enter the containment at penetrations approximately 90 degrees from each other or 120 feet apart which is acceptable separation.
In addition all safety related cables are installed in rigid steel conduit or covered steel wireway. The fire detection system consists of ionization type detectors installed at various areas
. within the containment. The fire suppression system inside the con-tainment relies on manual fire fighting operation. Portable fire sup-pression system including dry checmical and CO hand portable fire 2
extinguishers are provided. Hose stations are also provided just outside the containment. We have reviewed the licensee's Fire Hazard Analysis for the areas inside containment and conclude that with the addition of the RC pump oil cellection system that appro-priate fire protection is provided for this area and meets the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1 and is therefore, acceptable.
E.
Other Plant Areas The licensee's Fire Hazards Analysis addresses other plant areas not specifically discussed in this report. The licensee has committed to install additional detectors, portcble extinguishers, hose stations, and some additional emergency lighting as identified in the licensee's installation schedule. We find these areas with the commitment made by the licensee to be in accordance with the guidelines of Appendix A of BTP ASB 9.5-1, and the applicable sections of the National Fire Protection Association Code and are therefore acceptable.
V.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS The administrative controls for fire protection consists of the fire protection organization, the fire brigade training, the controls over combustibles and ignition sources, the prefire plans procedures for fighting fires and quality assurance.
, In response to Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, the licensee described those procedures and controls that were in existence at that time.
The lice.;ee has agreed to revise his administrative controls and training procedures to follow supplemental staff guidelines contained in " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Admini-strative Controls and Quality Assurance," dated 6/14/77, and implement then by February 1979.
A plant fire brigade of at least five members is organized to provide immediate response to fires that may occur at the site. The plant fire brigade will also be equipped with pressure demand breathing apparatus, portable communications equipment, portable lanterns, and other neces-sary fire fighting equipment. Spare air cylinders and recharge capability are provided to satisfy the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1.
The fire fighting brigade participates in periodic drills. Liaison between the plant fire brigade and the local fire departments has been establithed. The local fire departments have been on plant tours and have also been involved in training sessions with the plant fire brigade.
We conclude that the fire brigade equioment and training conform to the recommendations of the National Fire Protection Assnciatinn, Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 and suoplemental staff guicelines and are, therefore, accectable.
. VI. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATI0 tis We have reviewed the plant Technical Specifications issued for Davis Besse Unit No. I and find that they are consistent with our Standard Technical Specifications for fire protection. Following the imple-mentation of the cdifications of fire protection systems and admini-strative controls resulting from this review, the Technical Specifica-tions will be modified accordingly to incorporate the limiting condi-tions for operation and surveillance reovirements to reflect these modifications.
VII. CONCLUSION Tne fire prot u cn system for Davis Besse Unit 1 was evaluated and found to meec General Design Criterion 3 " Fire Protection" at the time the oriainal Safety Evaluation Report was issued in December,1976.
As a result of investigations' conducted by the staff on the fire protec-tion systems, fire protection criteria were developed and further requirements were imposed to improve the capability of the fire protec-tion system to prevent unacceptable damage that may result from a fire.
At our request, the licensee conducted a re-evaluation of their proposed fire protection system for Davis Besse Unit 1.
The licensee submitted in January,1978, a Fire Hazards Analysis and subsequently in response to our positions, four revisions to the Analysis. He also has compared his system, in detail, with the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Tecnnical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Plants."
. During the course of our review we have reviewed the licensee's submittals and his responses to our requests for additional information.
In addition, we have made a site visit to evaluate the fire hazards that exist in the Davis Besse Unit 1 Nuclear Plant and the design features and protection systems,rovided to minimize these hazards.
The licensee has completed many modifications or proposed to make additional modifications to improve the fire resistance capability for fire doors, dampers, fire barriers and barrier penetration seals.
The licensee has also proposed to install additional sprinkler systems for areas such as the cable spreading rooms, service water pump intake structure, component cooling water pump room, and various other areas.
To ensure that fires can be detected rapidly and the plant operators informed promptly, additional detectors will be installed in various areas of the plant.
In addition, the licensee has committed to establish an emergency shut-down procedures to bring the plant to safe cold shutdown condition in the event of a damaging fire in the cable spreading room, the main control rocm or the service water pump room.
The licensee is comitted to making all improvements by May 1980 except providing a backup to the SWS pumps without recuiring offsite pcwer will be implemented by mid-1984 thus meeting his license condition. We have reviewed the licensee's schedule and find it acceptable and hava included it in Table 1.
. We find that the Fire Protection Program for the Davis Besse Nuclear Plant with the improvements already made by the licensee, is adequate at the present time and, with the scheduled modifications, will meet the guidelines contained in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 and meets the General Design Criterion 3 and is, therefore, accept-able.
Until the comitted fire protection system improvements are operational, we consider the existing fire detection and suppression systems; the existing barriers between fire areas; improved administrative procedures for control of combustibles and ignition sources; the trained onsite fire brigade; the capability to extinguish fires manually; and the fire protection technical specifications provide adequate protection against a fire that would threatt.1 safe shutdown.
Our overall conclusion is that a fire occurring in any area of the Davis Besse Nuclear Plant will not prevent the plant from being brought to a controlled safe cold shutdown, and further, that such a fire would not cause the release of significant amounts of radiation.
TABLE 1 Davis Besse 1 Fire Protection System Modifications 1.
Service Water pump and valve room fire protection system modifica-tions are scheduled to be complete by July 1, 1979.
2.
Establish procedures for backup to the Service Water system from the Circulating Water system by February 28, 1979 In accord with License Condition 2.C.(3)h the licensee is scheduling completion of all modifications on the following list by April 22, 1980* except that the licensee will provide a Service Water system backup system which is independent of offsite power by mid-1984.
(See Section IV C.)
- Some modifications must be accomplished during first refueling cutage which is presently scheduled for mid-March thru mid-May 1980.
Table 1 1.
FIRE EXTINGUISHIRS Install additional hand-held portable fire extinguishers in the following rooms:
No. 2 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 236)
No. 1 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 208)
No. 3 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 303)
No. 4 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 313)
No. 2 Electrical Penetration Room (Room '427)
Passage (Room 241)
Valve Room (Room 212)
Maintenance Room (Room 320)
High Voltage Switchgear Room (Room 323)
Fuel Handling Area (Room 300)
Service Water Pump Room (Intaka Structure)
Control Room Complex Maintenance Work Area (Room 109) - Special Class D Dry Powder Type Extinguisher Located Near Lathe.
Table 1 2.
SPRINKI.ER SYSTEMS Install wet pipe sprinkler systems equipped with quick response type sprinklers in the following rooms:
No. 4 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 314)
Passage (Room 227)
Corridor (Room 209)
Passage and Hatch Area (Rooms 310 & 313)
Corridor (Joom 304)
Radwaste Exhaust Equipment and Main Station Exhaust Fan Room (Room 501)
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger and Pump Room (Room 328)
Service Water Pump Room and Valve Room (Intake Structure)
Clean Waste Receiver Tank Room (Room 124)
Install a wet pipe sprinkler system equipped with thermal actuated type water spray nozcles in the following room:
Cable Spreading Room Convert the existing manual sprinkler system in Diesel Generator Rooms 318 and 319 to an automatic pre-action type sprinkler system.
A moderate energy line crack analysis will be performed on water fire suppression system modifications and the existing auxiliary building water fire suppression system.
Table 1 3.
WATER CURTAINS Install an automatic water curtain on the following walls designated as fire barriers which are designed to spray water across unprotected feedwater vent openings.
No. 4 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 014) - Feedwater vent openings located in the east wall of the room.
Boric Acid Evaporator Tank Room (Room 235) East wall -
Feedwater vent opening interfccing with clean waste receiver tank room 124.
Boric Acid Evaporator Tank Room (Room 235) - Feedwater vent opening located in the north wall of the room.
NOTE:
These wall openings are required to relieve room over pressurization from a steam or fr-dwater line rupture.
Table 1 4
CONCRETE CL"ABING Install concrete floor curbs around the pumps in the following rooms:
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger and Pump Rocm (Room 328)
Service Water Pump Room (Intake Structure)
Install a concrete curb under the following doors:
Door 316 Iveated in the north wall of Diesel Generator Room 318.
Door 317 loc.'ted in the east wall of Diesel Generator Room 318.
Daar 218, at the entrance to the serv'.ce water pump area on the diesel fi e pump side.
Table 1 5.
HOSE STATIONS Install an additional hose station in each of the following areas:
Near Door 322 in the heater bay area on Elevation 585'-0".
Intake Structure.
No. 2 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 236)
No. 1 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 208)
Diesel Generator Room (Room 319)
Diesel Generator Room (Room 318)
No. 1 Main Steam Line Area (Room 601)
Heater Bay (Room 430) Near Room 427 6
Table 1 6.
BATTERY ROOM ALARMS Install loss of air flow indication with annunciation and alarm in the control room for the following rooms:
Batter / Room B (Room 42SA)
Ba tterf Room A (Room 42SB)
Table 1 7.
FIRE RATED DOORS Install 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated door assemblies in the following openings:
Tube pull openings in the north wall of Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger and Pump Room (Room 328).
Door opening southwest corner of ECCS Pump Room (Room 115).
HVAC openings exceeding 48" x 48" in the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier separating the turbine area from the Non-Radwaste Supply Air and Exhaust Equipment Room (Roc = 516).
Replace the following door assemblies with UL listed fire rated door assemblies rated for.i hours:
Door 502 in the Control Room Complex.
t Door 508 in the Control Room Complex.
Table 1 S.
FIRE RATED DAMPERS Install UL listed 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated door type damper in the following floor slab duct penetratloas:
18" x 6" supply and 18" x 6" return duct from Electrical Penetration Room 402 to radwaste fuel handling area air supply equipment area 50 at the 623' elevation floor slab.
18" x 12" supply grill at the 623' elevation floor slab, descending frem room 501 down into the No. 2 Electrical Pene-tration Room (Room 427) on Elevation 603'-0"
~
Table 1 9.
STRUCTURAL STEEL AND CABLE TRAY FIRE PROTECTION Apply spray-on type fire proofing to the following structural steel:
Supports for the four horizontal cable trays penetrating the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier at column line Q-F on elevation 602'-0".
Supporting structural steel in the mechanical and electrical penetration rooms.
Fortions of the structural supporting steel in the turbine building as determined by the turbine building thermal expansion analysis.
Table 1 10.
FIRE DETECTION Install Additional Area Type Fire Detection in the following Rooms:
ECCS Pump Room (Room 105)
ECCS Pump Room (Room 115)
Decay Heat Coolers Room (Room 113)
Passage (Room 110)
Clean Waste Receiver Tank Room (Room 124)
Annulus space, in the areas of Electrical Cable Penetrations Incore Instrumentation Trench Area (Room 220)
Letdown Cooler Area (Room 215)
Flooding Tank Area (Room 214)
Hatch Area (Room 317)
Passage (Room 410)
No. 1 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 208)
No. 2 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 236)
No. 3 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 303)
No. 4 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 314)
No. 1 Electrical Penetration Room (Room 402)
No. 2 Electrical Penetration Room (Room 427)
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (Room 237)
Boric Acid Addition Tank Room (Room 240)
Waste Gas Compressor Room (Room 244)
Waste Gas Compressor Room (Room 243)
Demineralizer Filter Room (Room 230)
Valve Room (Room 242)
Filter Room (Room 231)
Valve Room (Room 232)
Demineralizer Room (Room 233)
Boric Acid Evaporator Room (Room 234)
Boric Acid Evaporator Room (Room 235)
Passage (Room 227)
Passage (Room 241)
Makeup Pump (Room 225)
Valve Room (Room 212)
Valve Room (Room 211)
Charge Room (Room 321)
Passage (Room 322)
High Voltare Switchgear Room (Room 325)
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger & Pumu Rcem (Room 328)
Passage and Hatch Area (Rooms 310 & 313)
Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room (Room 212)
Fuel Handling Area (Room 300)
Corridor (Room 304)
Passage (Room 400)
Corridor (Room 404)
Battery Room B (Room 4 SA)
Low Voltage Switchgear P.com (F-Bus) (Room 428)
Table 1 Low Voltage Switchgear Room (E-Bus) (Room 429)
Battery Room A (Room 429B)
Corridor (Room 411)
Access Control Area Purge Exhaust Equipment Room (Room 515)
Radwaste Exhaust Equipment & Main Station Exhaust Fan Room (Room 501)
Air Supply Equipment, Radwaste Fuel Handling Areas (Room 500)
Control Room Toilet (Room 513)
Shift Supervisors Officer (Room 512)
Control Room Toilet (Room 506)
Instrument Calibration Room & Storage (Room 503)
A/C Equipment Room (Boom 603)
Install Fire Detection in the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (C-3630).
Relocate one of the fire detectors in the High Voltage Switchgear Room 323 to obtain maximum coverage of the room.
Install in-tray, linear type, thermal sensing fire detectors inside all cable trays inside the Cable Spreading Room (Room 422A).
Modify the fire alarm system to include rezoning, adding detectors, alarming each zone in the control room, adding line supervision to the output circuitry of the fire detection and fire protection panels, adding line supervision to the flow and pressure switches associated with the fire protection system, and incorporating the fire alarm system into the data processing and management section of the plant security.
Table 1 11.
COMMUNICATION Make portable radio communication equipment available to the fire brigade for energency fire fighting operations in the following rooms or operations:
ECCS Pump Room (Room 105)
ECCS Pump Room (Room 115)
No. I Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 208)
No. 3 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 203)
No. 4 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 314)
No. 2 Electrical Penetration Room (Room 427)
No. 1 Electrical Penetration Room (Room 402)
No. 1 Main Steam Line Area (Room 601)
No. 2 Main Steam Line Area (R,oom 602)
Purge Inlet Equipment Room (Room 600)
Auxiliary Feed Pump Unit Room (Room 237)
Auxiliary Feed Pump Unit Room (Room 238)
Passage (Room 227)
Boric Acid Evaporator Room (Room 234)
Passage (Room 241)
Pump Room (Room 225)
Corridor (Room 209)
Diesel Generator Room (Room 319)
Maintenance Room (Room 320)
Passage (Room 322)
High Voltage Switchgear Room (Room 323)
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel and Transfer Switch Room (Room 324)
High Voltage Switchgear Room (Room 325)
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger & Pump Room (Room 328)
Passage & Hatch Area (Roo2s 310 & 313)
Fuel Handling Area (Room 300)
Corridor (Roon 304)
Corridor (Room 404)
Low Voltage Switchgear Room (Room 429)
Corridor (Room 411)
Non-Radwaste Supply Air & Exhaust Equipment Room (Room 516)
Radwaste Exhaust Equipment & Main Station Exhaust Fan Room (Room 501)
Radwaste Fuel Handling Areas Air Supply Equipment Area (Room 500)
Table 1 12.
EMERGENCY LIGHTING Install 8-hour emergency battery pack lights in the following rooms:
ECCS Pump Room (Room 105)
ECCS Pump Room (Room 115)
Decay Heat Cooler Room (Room 113)
Passage (Room 110)
Pipe Tunnel (Room 101)
No. 1 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 208)
No. 2 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 236)
No. 3 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 303)
No. 4 Mechanical Penetration Room (Room 314)
No. 2 Electrical Penetration Room (Room 427)
No. I Electrical Penetration Room (Room 402)
No. 1 Main Steam Line Area (Room 601)
No. 2 Main Steam Line Area (Room 602)
Purge Inlet Equipment Room (Room 600)
Auxiliary Feed Pump Unit Room (Room 237)
Auxiliary Feed Pump Unit Room (Room 238)
Boric Acid Addition Tank Room (Room 240)
Passage (Room 227)
Botic Acid Evaporator Room (Room 234)
Boric Acid Evaporator Room (Room 235)
Passage (Room 241)
Veste Gas Compressor Room (Room 244)
Waste Gas Compressor Room (Room 243)
Demineralizer Filter Room (Room 230)
Valve Room (Room 242)
Demineralizer Room (Room 223)
Pump Room (Room 225)
Corridor (Room 209)
Honitor Tank Transfer Pump Room (Room 203)
Filter Room (Room 204)
Clean Liquid Waste Monitor Tank Room (Room 201)
Clean Liquid Waste Monitor Tank Room (Room 202)
Valve Room (Room 212)
Valve Room (Room 211)
Maintenance Room (Room 320)
Passage (Room 322)
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers & Pump Room (Room 328)
Passage and Hatch Area (Rooms 310 & 313)
Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room (Room 312)
Fuel Handling Exhaust Unit Room (Room 401)
Fuel Handling Area (Room 300)
Corridor (Room 304)
Corridor (Room 404)
Storage (Room 405)
Hoc Instrument Shop (Room 406)
Table 1 Battery Room B (Room 428A)
Low Voltage Switchgear Room (Room 428)
Low Voltage Switchgear Room (Room 429)
Battery Room A (Room 429B)
No. 1 Electrical Isolation Room (Room 428A)
No. 2 Electrical Isolation Room (Room 429A)
C;rridor (Room 411)
Purge Exhaust Equipment Rcom (Room 515)
Radwaste Exhaust Equipment & Main Station Exhaust Fan Room (Room 301)
Air.cspply Equipment, Radwast-Fuel Handlivg Areas (Room 500)
L;5e U: 1 Storage Tank Room (Room 249)
Turbine Lube Oil Tank Room (Room 432)
Table 1 13.
CONDUIT PROTECTION Install required Kaowool around conduits in the following rooms to protect equipment required for cold shutdown:
Passage 227 (a hour fire rated barrier will be provided
.around the entire length of the conduits associated with auxiliary feedwater train No. 1.)
Passage 209 (a hour fire rated barrier will be provided around the entire length of the conduits associated with the BWST level instrumentation, makeup pump No. 2, and Channel 2 BWST outlet valve.)
Passage and Hatch Area 310 and 313 (a hour fire rated barrier will be provided around the entire length of the conduits associated with both trains of CCW valves, the CCW crossover header and CCW return header from containment.)
Service Water Pump Room (a hour fire rated barrier will be provided around the conduits associated with power and control for the service water pumps and power and control for the service water valves on the return line to the forebay and the cooling tower makeup.)
Valve Room - Intake Structure - (\\ hour fire rated barrier will be provided around the conduits associated with power and control for the service water valves located in the service water discharge header.)
Component Cooling Water Pump and Heat Exchanger Room (a hour fire rated barrier will be provided around the conduits asse-ciated with control for toe component cooling water pumps and power and control for the CCW crossover valves.)
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Table 1 14.
MISCELLANEOUS The hydrogen line routed through the component cooling water heat exchanger and pump room will be relocated :. an area not containing safety related equipment.
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