ML19257A249
| ML19257A249 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1979 |
| From: | Reinaldo Rodriguez SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | CALIFORNIA, STATE OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257A247 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001030281 | |
| Download: ML19257A249 (52) | |
Text
i.,'
December 4, 1979 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC S AFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
)
Docket No. 50-312
)
(Rancno Seco Nuclear Generating Station )
LICENSEE'S ANSWERS (SET NO. 2) TO THE CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES DATED NOVEMBER 15, 1979 11.
INTERROGATORY:
Describe SMUD's on-site procedures wnicn are to be followed in the event of a plant emergency related to feedwater transients.
SMUD's response should include a discussion of the personnel who are available to be called to the facility to provide advisory technical assistance and those persons' qualifications and an identification of all documents related to these procedures.
ANSWER:
Emergency Procedure D-14, " Loss of Steam Generator Feed", identifies the actions to be taken fol-lowing the loss of feedwater flow to one or more steam generators.
Procedure A-51, " Auxiliary Feedwater System",
may also be utilized during feedwater transients.
Personnel available to provide advisory tecnnical assist-ance during a feedwater transient include the following:
Manager of Nuclear Operations Plant Superintendent Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor Supervisor, Nuclear Maintenance Division Technical Assistant 1666 253 sooioso r2Tri
L Supervisor, Nuclear Operations Division Chemistry and Radiation Supervisor Senior Nuclear Engineer Mecnanical Engineering Associate Nuclear Chemist Electrical and Instrument Control Supervisor The background and experience of these individuals is identified in a letter from W. C. Walbridge (SMUD) to Dr.
Harold R.
Denton (NRC) dated July 30, 1979.
In addition to these supervisory level personnel numerous other engi-neering support personnel covering the nuclear engineering, mecnanical engineering and electrical engineering disci-plines from both the plant staff located on site and the engineering support services in the SMUD Generation Engi-neering organization are available to provide assistance.
Copies of the procedures identified above and the letter cited will be provided pursuant to Licensee's Response to the California Energy Commission's First Request for Production of Documents.
- 12. INTERROGATORY:
Describe the facility's control room instrumentation which are followed by operators to diagnose off-normal conditions during a feedwater transient.
If tnis instrumentation can be disabled by the failure of a non-safety related f acility design feature, they should be identified and those failures indicated.
ANSWER:
During the course of a feedwater transient, the reactor operator relies primarily on steam generator level indication, feedwater flow indication, reactor coolant 1666 254
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system temperature and pressure indication, and pressurizer level indication.
The nonnuclear instrumentation (NNI) system provides this readout capability to the operator.
The most limiting failure which might occur would be loss of power to the NNI systems.
In this event, the operator can saift to the computer and provide trend recorder indication of pressurizer level, reactor coolant system pressure, reactor coolant system temperature, and steam generator water level.
The operation of the computer is independent from the operations of the NNI system.
Loss of power to the NNI system will be alarmed and indicated to the operator, thereby providing timely information of why the instrumentation is not functioning properly.
- 14. INTERROGATORY:
Describe each document, if any, which nas been prepared by SMUD or is in SMUD's possession relating to tne facility or to B&W reactor systems concerning control room design, human engineering f actors, or improved operator training methods.
ANSWER:
Documents identified will be provided pursuant to Licensee's Response to the California Energy Commission's First Request for Production of Documents.
- 15. INTERROGATORY:
Identify all individuals who have been employed by SMUD during the last three years as reactor operators, supervisors of reactor operators, or as instruc-tors of operators.
In addition to other information pro-vided in response tc this interrogatory, provide the following data:
describe the individual's experience with nuclear systems, each training course the individual has taken and all tests taken by the individual, including the test results.
ANSWER:
Individuals wno have been employed by SMUD during the last three years as licensed Reactor Operators, up to and including those functioning as first line supe _ visors 1666 255 t
of Reactor Operators or instructors of Reactor Operators, received tneir licenses in one of three groups:
The first group included D.
E.
Comstock, W.
J.
Ford, D.
- Gouker, D.
E.
Spencer, M. A.
Carter, and J. M. Mau.
Over tne last tnree years these individuals performed as Reactor Operators or first line supervisors of Reactor Operators.
Tne second group of licensed personnel included K. O.
Byers, J.
King, J.
C.
Nichols, T.
- Tucker, L.
- Adkins, A.
- Fraser, H.
Hieronimus, and D.
Zompetti.
These personnel, during tne last three years, have also functioned as either Reactor Operators or first line supervisors of Control Room Operators.
The tnird group of licensed personnel included N.
S.
- Giroux, R. Macias W. Morisawa, G. S.
Nitta, and D.
E.
Tipton.
These personnel have performed as Reactor Operators during the last three years.
The specific training provided to each of tnese individuals has been described in tne following documents.
For the first group of licensed operators, see the letter from E.
K. Davis (SMUD) to Mr. Paul F.
Collins (AEC) dated January 2,
1974.
The training for tne second group of operators is described in the letter from J. J. Mattimoe (SMUD) to Mr.
Paul F.
Collins (AEC) dated September 17, 1974.
The train-ing for the third group of operators is described in the 1666 256 t
letter from J. J. Mattimoe (SMUD) to Mr. Paul F.
Collins (NRC) dated March 4, 1976.
Each of these letters also describes tne individual's experience witn nuclear systems.
Attached are Tables 15-1, 15-2 and 15-3, which describe the test performances which are applicable to individual sections of the training described in the letters to Mr. Collins.
Table 15-4 describes the annual requalification exam results for operators in all three gtoups.
Although many SMUD employees have participated in operator training by giving some lectures or discussions in specific areas of their expertise, they were not hired as instruc-tors, do not provide instruction as a full-time responsi-bility, and are not included in this tabulation of instruc-tor personnel.
Personnel who have been assigned primary responsibility for the training of operators during the past three years are W.
J.
- Ford, J. M. Mau, and D.
E.
Gardiner. In September, 1979, S.
Redeker was hired as a Nuclear Plant Ins truc to r.
The background and experience of W. J. Ford and J. M. Mau have been described in the letter from Mr. Davis to Mr. Collins dated January 2, 1974.
The experience of Mr.
D. E. Gardiner is described in Enclosure 1.
The experience of Mr. Steve J.
Redeker is described in.
Operator training has also been conducted under contract to General Pnysics Corporation; however, in all cases, the i666 257 responsibility for the actual conduct of the program, its progress and monitoring, has been under a SMUD-employed instructor supervisor The letters identified above will be provided pursuant to Licensee's Response to the California Energy Commission's First Request for Production of Documents.
- 16. INTERROGATORY:
Identify all written operator instruc-tions, directions, or procedures which are available to current operators at the f acility.
ANSWER:
Documents identified will be provided pursuant to Licensee's Response to the California Energy Commission's First Request for Production of Documents.
M
- 17. INTERROGATORY:
Identify any oral instructions, directions or procedures which have been given to operators at the facility since March 28, 1979, and which relate to increased safety precautions in light of the TMI incident.
ANSWER:
In an effort to assure timely response to in-creased safety precautions resulting from continued review of the Tnree Mile Island accident, some oral explanations were given to operators to assure their familiarity with the concepts underlying procedure changes.
However, in all cases those instructions dealing with actions to be taken by operators in the event of feedwater transients were provided as changes to operating procedures.
These changes are addressed in the answer to Interrogatory 2.
18.
INTERROGATORY:
Describe the qualifications that SMUD applies in recruiting and/or selecting operators for the facility.
In particular, describe the minimum educational background, work experience, physical health, physical attributes, mental health and emotional stability, age, 1666 258 sex, special skills, and any other criteria which prospective operators must have in order to be employed at ene facility.
Identify any documents relating to the f oregoing qualification requirements.
ANSWER:
The employment announcement for control room operator (open) dated September 17, 1979, the employment announcement for control room operator licensing training dated November 20, 1979, and the employment announcement for power plant helper / equipment attendant (open) dated November 1, 1979, include the minimal educational back-ground, experience, typical skills and physical require-ments for employment as a licensing candidate or as a casic entry nonlicensed operator in anticipation of that nonlicensed operator eventually being trained and func-tioning as a reactor operator.
Consistent with the principles of equal employment opportunity, no specifica-tions relative to age or sex are identified in any of tnese employment announcements.
After completing the various steps of the selection process, a successful can-didate will be required to take a physical examination meeting the standard acceptable to SMUD's physician.
In practice, this physical examination provides information equivalent to that needed for the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission's required Certificate of Medical History.
This assures that the successful candidate, should ne or sne become a licensing candidate, has the necessary physical health to qualify for the NRC license exam.
Upon hiring an individual, SMUD will subject him or her to the Gordon personnel profile test.
This test is administered by the 1666 259
security organization and reviewed by tnat organization.
In addition, tne physician giving the initial physical exam will note, as a part of that exam, whether any traits whicn might be considered abberant behavior have been manifested in the course of the examination.
When that physician does observe some aberrant behavior, tne candidate will be referred to a clinical psychologist for further psycnological examination.
Copies of the employment announcements identified will be provided pursuant to Licensee's Response to the California Energy Commission's First Request for Production of Documents.
19.
INTERROGATORY:
How are each of the criteria described in response to Interrogatory 18 measured and considered in determining the acceptability of a prospective operator?
ANSWER:
Educational background of the applicable candidates is measured against tne minimum qualifications for education described in the employment announcement.
Work experience of the prospective candidate is also com-pared to the minimum qualifications detailed as applicable in the employment announcement.
The physical health requirements are evaluated by a licensed physician for SMUD and that physician's overall evaluation will deter-mine wnetner or not SMUD considers the applicant physi-cally healthy for employment.
Likewise, physical attri-butes of tne individual, which were descrioed in the employment announcement, will be evaluated by tne physi-cian during the examination of the candidate.
Mental 1666 260
health and emational stability measurements are conducted utilizing the Gordon personnel profile examination.
This examination is graded and the individual's grade compared to a range previously established.
If the candidate's grade falls witnin that range, he or she continues as a candidate for employment.
If tne candidate's score is outside that range, a personal interview by a senior member of the security organization is conducted.
If the interview indicates tnat tnere may be some mental or emotional difficulty, the candidate will be referred to a licensed psychologist for additional screening.
Special skills identified in the employment announcements are evaluated in the course of the personal interviews conducted during the pre-selection screening.
Typically a personnel screening board of three members is convened to interview the candidates orally with pre-selected ques-tions.
Also, the applications submitted by candidates are reviewed for relevant experience and an assessment is made with regard to identified required skills.
20.
INTERROGATORY:
Describe the training which is given to prospective operators before they are allowed to partici-pate in the operation of the f acility.
In responding to tnis question, a.
Identify all documents provided to trainees or used by training personnel; b.
Describe any classes trainees are required to attend, including the number of hours, subjects taught, location of the classes, and the qualifications of tne instructors; c.
Describe any written, oral, physical or other tests which operator trainees must pass, including the minimum passing grade, a
1666 261
summary of all test scores for all operators taking the tests within the last tnree years, any opportunities to retake the same or similar tests, and discussions of grading procedures; d.
Describe any reactor simulator training, including location of simulator, a comparison of the simulator to Rancho Seco, number of hours required, types of events simulated; and e.
Identify any other instruction or practice provided the trainees before they partici-pate in the operation of the facility.
ANSWER 20-a:
The documents normally provided or used by training personnel will be provided pursuant to Licen-see's Response to the California Energy Commission's First Request for Production of Documents.
ANSWER 20-b:
The training provided to prospective licensed operators is described in tne Sacramento Munici-pal Utility District's Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Topograpnical Report TI-76, entitled " Operator Training Program for NRC Hot License Candidatas".
Instruction of personnel is carried out under the super-vision of the Training Supervisor, Mr.
J.
Mau, whose background and experience are addressed in tne answer to Interrogatory No. 15.
Currently, General Physics Corpora-tion (GPC) is providing instructors to carry out the classroom phase of the training.
GPC is well experienced in providing training programs to nuclear power plant operators throughout the industry and has been involved in various pnases of SMUD's training program since 1973.
GPC instructors have expertise in areas of health physics, instrument and control, reactor safety, safety analyses, 1666 262
operating cnaracteristics, systems and procedures.
Tney have experience either as previous operators at commercial power plants, througn a Navy Nuclear Power training back-ground, or from a combination of power plant st artup ex-perience and formal educational degrees.
That portion of the training program carried out at the Babcock & Wilcox simulator facility in Lynchburg, Virginia, is done by instructors wno have been licensed by the Nuclear Regula-tory Commission for the B&W Training Simulator.
Many of these instructors also have been previously licensed on commercial generating facilities or have been qualified reactor operators on a Navy nuclear power plant. The classroom phase of instruction at the simulator is con-ducted oy these same instructors, augmented in partic-ular areas by other B&W professionals.
ANSWER 20-c:
During the course of the operator training program, written examinations are given during various phases to test the operator's retention and progress through the program.
These progress examinations are used to judge whether or not an individual needs additional nelp and empnasis in certain areas and whetner or not tne particular individual should be retained in the class.
No specific pass or fail criteria is assigned to these particular examinations.
Tne results are reviewed by management to determine whether or not the individual demonstrates the potential for learning sufficient infor-mation to be a safe operator.
Upon conclusion of the 1666 263
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overall training program, and prior to examination by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a comprehensive examination is administered by SMUD to the prospective licensed operator. This exam is administered to the candidate in both written and oral form.
The written examination in the past has required that the operator receive an overall average of 70%.
If that written score is attained he will tnen receive an oral examination, after which the examiner will decide wnether or not the candidate has passed or failed the oral answers.
If the candidate passes the audit exam he will then be scheduled for an examination by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
If the candidate fails the audit exam and a determination is made that some additional training in selected areas will bring his level of knowledge to a satisfactory level, a retraining program will be initiated, and a second examination, similar in form but different in content, will subsequently be given.
If the candidate can pass this second examination, witn an overall average score of greater tnan 70%, the candidate will then be scheduled for an exam by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission assigns an examiner to prepare and administer a written and oral examination to the license candidate.
In the past, successful comple-tion of that examination required an overall average score of greater than 70%.
As a result of a recent change, all future candidates will be required to pass the Nuclear 1666 2A4,
Regulatory Commission exam witn an overall average of greater than or equal to 80%, and a minimum score of 70%
in any section.
A summary of the scores for the SMUD written examinations given to candidates during the last three years is in-cluded in the answer to Interrogatory No. 15.
The scores for tne examinations administered by the Nuclear Regula-tory Commission have not been made available to SMUD.
Actual grading procedures for the written exams are estab-lished on a point basis for each question.
Tne trainee's response is compared to a predetermined acceptable answer.
Partial credit may be given for answers that, while not totally complete, do indicate that the operator has know-ledge in the particular area being questioned.
Prior to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's examination of a prospective operator candidate, a complete physical examination is conducted by a licensed physician. The re-sults of the physician's examination are provided on a Certificate of Medical History, NRC Form 396.
The Certi-ficate of Medical History is forwarded to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a part of the application for examination.
ANSWER 20-d:
The reactor simulator program conducted at B&W f acilities in Lynchburg, Vi rg in ia, :.s described in 1666 265
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Topographical Repor t T1-7 6.
The simulator course covers a 120-nour period, which includes 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> of on-simulator training experience and 60 nours of in-classroom discus-sion and lecture training.
The Babcock & Wilcox simulator is very similar in design and layout to the Rancho Seco control room.
Tne arrangement of controls, and the types of controls in the areas tnat deal directly witn feedwater control and reactor coolant system control, are essen-tially identical to those at Rancho Seco.
The B&W simulator can simulate a wide variety of normal and emergency conditions.
This wide variety of conditions includes, but certainly is not limited to, the following:
a.
normal startup, shutdown, heatup and cooldown operation from various power levels b.
emergency conditions which include:
1.
instrument or component degradation
- 2. instrument or component failure
- 3. system failure Some of the examples of emergency conditions are:
1.
loss of coolant accidents including both large and small breaks 2.
reactor coolant pump (s) trip 3.
nuclear instrumentation failures 4.
non-nuclear instrumentation failures 5.
electrical power supply failures 6.
reactor or turbine trips 7.
once-through steam generator tube failures 1666 266 8.
loss of feedwater or loss of feedwater pumps 9.
integrated control system failures 10.
various failures in auxiliary systems to the reactor coolant systems.
ANSWER 20-a:
Other instruction and practices provided to prospective licensed operators include tne following:
1.
instruction in fire fighting techniques and the various types of fires that might be encountered in the power plant 2.
standard and/or advanced first aid training and CPR instruction by a qualified nurse.
3.
explosive and sabotage devices and search methods 4.
" hands on" practical training for limited chemistry analyses, specific plant system walk-throughs, and plant system operating techniques.
5.
classroom and practical demonstration of the use of radiation detection instrumentation as part of the healtn physics training program.
21.
INTERROGATORY:
Describe the training and instruction or operators wnich SMUD requires after operators begin participating in the operation of the facility.
In responding to this question provide tne same degree of detail as is requested in Interrogatory No. 20.
1666 267 4
ANSWER 21-a:
In addition to the documents which will be provided as described in the answer to Interrogatory No. 20, pertinent portions of drawing change notices, the Rancho Seco Startup Report, Rancho Seco Reload Reports, and NRC License Event Reports are discussed with licensed operating personnel in tne course of the retraining.
ANSWER 21-b:
Administrative Procedure AP 25,
" Licensed NRC Operator Retraining", discusses the classes, subjects, and number of hours to be covered during the retraining cycle.
Tnese classes are all located at Rancho Seco.
Instruction is provided by licensed senior reactor operator training personnel, qualified health physics personnel, qualified contractor personnel, and profes-sional engineers in areas of their expertise.
Retraining in items of general safety and first aid are conducted by the Safety Technician or the Plant Nurse.
The administrative procedures identified will be provided pursuant to Licensee's Response to the California Energy Commission's First Request for Production of Documents.
ANSWER 21-c:
Administrative Procedure, AP 25, delin-eates evaluation and observation of licensed operators to ensure a high degree of competency in the operation of the facility.
Written and oral examinations are structured to follow close1y the NRC licensing examinations.
This administrative procedure establishes minimum passing. }bbb 2bb
grades and opportunities for reexamination in tne event these minimums are not obtained.
A summary of test scores for licensed operator requalifi-cation i3 tabulated in the answer to Interrogatory No. 15.
Tne grading procedures for requalification exams are iden-tical to those discussed in the answer to Interrogatory No. 20.
ANSWER 21-d:
Reactor simulator training for licensed operators is used in the retraining program to enhance the training experience.
The B&W simulator described in tne answer to Interrogatory No. 20 is used for requalification training.
The simulator course consists of 20 hourc of classroom lecture training and 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> of on-simulator training.
Time spent on the simulator is comprised primarily of performing normal operating evolutions and practice at mitigating the consequences of of f-normal transients in emergency conditions.
The simula*3r training provides the opportunity for the operator to participate as a control room operator and also as a supervisor of control room operators.
Consequently, opportunity is given for participation in the details of manipulating controls, for observation of the overall transient, for performance of evaluations based on instrumentation information, and for providing direc-tions to tnose doing control manipulations.
Some of the events which are capable of being simulated are iden.-
tified in the answer to Interrogatory No. 20. 1666 269
ANSWER 21-e:
Licensed operators also receive the training which is described in the answer to Interrogatory No. 20e. They also receive amplifying information on transients at other units, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bulletins and Information Notices, and pertinent informa-tion from vendors as it applies to operation of the station.
22.
INTERROGATORY:
Describe how facility operators are made aware of significant developments or events (relating to safety) at the facility or other reactors.
ANSWER:
Operators are made awate of significant events occurring at Rancho Seco or other reactors through a variety of means.
For tnose significant events which occur at Rancho Seco, the report prepared for submittal to the NRC is reviewed and, if this report pertains to plant operating conditions, a copy of this report is provided to the operating crews via the Standing Order program.
Under enis program each shift supervisor is required to discuss tne contents of each Standing Order witn nis operating crew and document accomplishment of this discussion.
Events wnich occur at other units and come to the atten-tion of the f acility management can also be promulgated to operating shift crews through the use of the Standing Order program.
A second means of making operating crews aware of signifi-cant events is through the requalification program conduc-ted on site by tne training organization.
Significant events or potential problems can also be discussed in the 1666 270 routine retraining program.
In addition, the annual one-week simulator course at the B&W Training Simulator provides an opportunity for operators to see and practice transients whicn have occurred at other B&W units.
The Operations Supervisor may also provide input to operating crews by short lectures on particular topics.
This tech-nique is used fundamentally to elucidate new operating procedures and to explain the reasons behind the procedure changes.
This program was also used immediately after the Three Mile Island accident to increase operator awaren.ss and to provide them with information that was received in the form of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bulletins and Orders.
23.
INTERROGATORY:
Describe SMUD's procedures for evaluating operator performances.
Identify all documents relating to these procedures.
Describe any prescribed standards of performance and how they are implemented ANSWER:
Each operator is evaluated annually by a supervisor using a SMUD Employee Performance Evaluation Report form.
This form is comprised of seven specific areas intended to evaluate the accuracy of the indi-vidual's work, the quantitative output of his effort, his abi.lity to absorb and understand instructions, his ability to generate cooperation and influence the actions of otners, tne state of his health, his attitude toward safe working habits, and his leadership skills.
The evaluation also allows a supervisor to discuss the individual's strong and weak points, and to identify formal training whicn would oenefit the employee.
The form identified 1666 271
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will be provided pursuant to Licensee's Response to the California Energy Commission's First Request for Production of Documents.
In addition, the operator is required to take an annual written and oral examination as described in the answer to Interrogatory No. 21.
Both of these examinations are structured to determine whether or not the operator under-stands and has retained sufficient knowledge to perform nis assigned tasks properly.
The oral examination, in particular, requires the operator to walk through the means for carrying out a particular operation.
The exam is given by a senior licensed instructor who is familiar with tne system and makes an evaluation of the individual's response.
An evaluation is also conducted during the operator's annual simulator training.
In the course of the one-week program operator performance on each event is evaluated.
Tne operator's performance on a particular event is discussed with him and, if necessary, the event may be repeated to improve the operator's proficiency.
This evaluation provides an opportunity to describe to the individual any weak areas he may have and to make any recommendations for additional training which the oper-ator's supervisor may feel is prudent.
Upon completion of the course, the simulator training group issues SMUD a Certificate of Completion, documenting the events that the individual completed during the course of the training. 1666 272
24.
INTERROGATORY:
Identify all documents in SMUD's possession evaluating operator perf ormance during feed-water transients and related unusual events occurring at the facility during the past three years.
Identify any such events not reported to tne N?.C and the reason the event was not reported.
ANSWER:
No documents are in SMUD's possession spe-cifically evaluating operator performance during feedwater transients and related unusual events occurring at the facility.
All feedwater transients resulting in power reductions of greater than 20% have been reported to the NRC as part of the normal licensee event report program for the monthly operational reporting program.
25.
INTERROGATORY:
Describe the working hours of operators at tne facility, including typical and maximum amount of hours per day, per week, and per month.
Describe the working hour patterns (i.e.,
shifts and days worked) cur-rently in ef fect at the f acility.
ANSWER:
This answer discusses the shif t rotation pattern and actual hours worked since Rancho Seco returned to power in July, 1979.
Licensed operators are assigned to a five-shift, rotating schedule.
Four of those shifts are on a plant operation rotation schedule.
Tne fifth shift is on a nine-week, day shift to provide a cadre for fuel nandling, retraining, and relief.
A typical rotation pattern is as follows.
A crew will begin the day shift, 08:00 to 16:00 on Friday, and work that shift for six consecutive days.
That crew will then have two days off and return at midnight Friday nigh.t to work the midnight to 08:00 shift for seven consecutive 1666 273
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4 days. Tney will then be off for four days, returning to work the 16:00 to midnight shift for seven days.
Follow-ing two days off, the crew returns to the beginning of the rotation cycle.
The crew that is on the nine-week, day shift pattern will normally be assigned control room responsibilities on Thursday each week on the 08:00 to 16:00 snift.
That same crew will also provide for relief shift operation to cover sicknesses and vacation.
Over the last few months, oper-ators have also worked overtime to cover for sickness, vacation and training when other individuals have been sent out of the area to participate in simulator training.
To the extent practicable, the general policy is to limit to twelve the number of hours an individual works on any given day.
On rare occasions this limit may be exceeded.
On extremely rare instances, actual work may involve as much as sixteen hours.
However, every attempt is made to keep the actual control room watch responsible time to a maximum of twelve hours per day.
Since the return to power in July, 1979, the maximum hours worked in any given day was sixteen (on one occasion); the maximum number of hours worked in any seven-day period was 79, and the maximum number of hours worked in any month was 214.5.
26.
INTERROGATORY:
For every operator wno has left employ-ment or has oeen placed on probation at the facility in tne last three years, provide the following data:
a.
The individual's name; b.
That individual's reason for leaving o.r the reason the individual was placed on probation; 1666 274 c.
The subsequent employment of that individual at the facility or with SMUD, if any; d.
That individual's subsequent employment with any organization whose activities are related to nuclear power, if applicable, and e.
Identify any documents pertaining to the departure of this individual or of operators generally.
ANSWER:
In the past three years there has been only one licensed operator who has left SMUD's employment. No operators have been placed on probation.
The following data pertains to the one operator who left SMUD's employ:
a.
Kenneta O. Byers.
b.
Mr. Byer s lef t SMUD's employ to accept the position as Operations Engineer with the Washington Public Power Supply System.
c.
No such subsequent employment was involved.
d.
The individual reported tnat he was to be-come an Operations Engineer for a nuclear unit being constructed by Washington Public Power Supply System.
e.
Tne documents available pertaining to Mr.
Byers' departure include his signed resigna-tion and the Employee Status Notification officially terminating his employ.
27.
INTERROGATORY:
Describe all additional instruction, training, or testing which has been or is being provided to operators at the facility to acquaint them with the accident at the TMI or subsequent related procedures.
Identify the dates of such instruction, training, or test-ing and any documents wnich were distributed to operators to acquaint them with that accident or such procedures.
ANSdER:
All testing given as a result of the TMI acci-dent is described in the answer to Interrogatory No. 28.
1666 275
_23_
Tne following describes additional instructions and train-ing which have been conducted.
A.
Group discussions were conducted by tne Operations Supervisor with each operating crew during tne period between March 28 and approximately May 30.
Tnese discussions include topics described below:
1.
Sequence of events at TMI.
2.
Answers to items 3, 4 and 6 of the NRC's I&E Bulletin 79-05.
3.
Saturated and subcooling operations curves.
4.
Procedure changes to Procedure B-4,
" Plant Snutdown and Cooldown".
5.
Cnanges to Procedure D-3,
" Reactor Trip".
6.
Changes to Procedure D-5,
" Loss of Reactor Coolant / Reactor Coolant System Pressure."
7.
Procedure changes in response to NRC I&E Bulletin 79-05A.
8.
Safety features actuation system operation.
9.
Prompt notification of the NRC.
10.
Procedure changes required by NRC I&E Bulletin 79-05B.
11.
Clarification of the Technical Specifications in light of the NRC I&E Bulletins.
12.
Auxiliary feedwater system operation.
13.
Control of tne reactor trip relay which provides for reactor trip on turbine trip and loss of both feedwater pumps.
B.
Formal training classes were conducted between the period of April 10 and April 30, 1979, by the Rancho Seco training supervisor for all operat-ors.
This training was conducted to upgrade the 1666 276
understanding of the TMI accident and its cause, the voiding pnenomenon, procedure changes made to reflect the lessons learned from the TMI accident, natural circulation phenomenon and changes to the plant tnat were contemplated or actually being made.
C.
Informal discussions were given to operating crews by the NRC inspectors covering the same general areas tnat had oeen covered by the Rancho Seco training supervisor.
The purpose of this program was to assure that the operating personnel understood the instructions relating to the TMI accident and to preclude recurrence of such an accident at another operating plant.
These discussions were conducted between April 10 and April 30, 1979.
D.
Formal training classes were provided by the Rancho Seco training supervisor specifically emphasizing the subject matter of NRC I&E Bulletins79-05A and 79-05B.
This included a review of the TMI accident enronology, resultant procedure changes at Rancno Seco, and additional emphasis on the seriousness of a void formation.
This specific training was carried out in the period between April 15 and April 20, 1979.
E.
Informal training was given by each Shif t Super-visor to his crew on plant modification and procedure changes.
This training included a 1666 277
_25_
plant walk-through to locate new instrumentation and to assure familiarity with the location of active components in the auxiliary feedwater system.
This training was conducted between April 14 and April 17, 1979.
F.
Formal training classes were conducted at the B&W training center at Lynchburg, Virginia.
These sessions included classroom discussions of the TMI accident, with emphasis on the seriousness of failing to maintain subcooling, and recognition of the existence of subcooling and natural circulation.
Included in this training was the simulator practice on tne TMI accident and plant response to that accident.
This training was conducted for licensed operators between April 20 and June 22, 1979.
G.
Formal training was conducted by General Physics Corporation with respect to the TMI accident scenario, small break LOCAs, plant modifications made as a result of TMI, procedural changes to mitigate the consequences of a small break LOCA, void formation theory, and initiation and recog-nition of natural circulation.
This training was conducted between June 8 and June 15, 1979.
Documents distributed to operators to acquaint them with the training and instructions were included with Standing Orders 5-79 through 15-79.
In addition, a post-TMI-2 training supplement was 1666 278 issued by the training supervisor to all licensed
- operators.
- 28. INTERROGATORY:
Describe the performance of facility operators on tests given by SMUD, NRC, and/or any other organization regarding the accident at TMI, including the following:
a.
Identify the tests which were given, or in the case of oral tests, describe tne questions asked; b.
The number of operators taking each test; c.
The minimum passing score; d.
The number of operators successfully passing the test on their first attempt;
'e.
Whether tnose failing this test on their first attempt were permitted to retake the same or substantially the same test on subsequent occasions; f.
The date of the original tests and the date of any subsequent administration of the same or substantially similar tests; g.
The number of operators failing the first test who passed on subquent occasions and the number of attempts wnich were necessary for successful passage for each such operator; h.
The number of operators, if any that never passed ene test.
ANSWER 28-a:
Tests were given to operators by SMUD, by NRC, and by General Physics Corporation as an outside consultant.
The combination of testing given by these enree separate organizations included both written tests and oral examinations.
Specifically, those tests given by SMUD were written, and thoc<* tests conducted by the NRC and General Physics Corporation were oral.
Two separate but similar examinations were prepared by SMUD, addressing the TMI accident in the following areas:
1AAA
?70
_27_
1.
Identification of numan, design, and equipment failures that resulted in core damage.
2.
Tne concept of subcooling and the ef fect on vessel integrity.
3.
Procedure changes resulting from lessons learned from tne TMI accident 4.
Natural circulation detection and operation, and 5.
Specific plant modifications.
The oral examinations given by the NRC were conducted without tne presence of SMUD management personnel.
The oral examination performed by the General Physics Corporation covered:
1.
The TMI accident scenario a.
sequence of events b.
original equipment malf unctions c.
operator actions and consequences d.
control room information and interpretation 2.
NRC I&E Bulletin information a.
comparable Rancho Seco transients b.
operating procedures for transients to include:
(1) core void recognition (2) operator action to prevent voiding (3) operator action to assure cooling if voids do exist 1666 280 9
c.
consideration for emergency safeguards override d.
procedures for correct valve lineups of engineered safeguard systems e.
procedure and equipment to prevent inadvertent pumping of radioactive gas or liquid, particularly:
(1) interlocks (2) containment isolation f.
NRC notification requirements 3.
Changes to the Rancho Seco design as a result of lessons learned from the TMI accident 4.
Specific procedure changes and additional action in response to emergency procedures as a result of lessons learned from the TMI accident 5.
Understanding of
- a. high pressure injection shutdown criteria
- b. subcooling determination
- c. natural circulation verification.
ANSWER 28-b tnrough g:
See Table 28-1.
Table 28-1 identifies two oral audit examinations by the NRC.
After conducting the oral audit in early June, 1979, the NRC was not satisfied with the level of understanding of phenomena specifically related to increasing pressurizer level and natural circulation control.
During a management interview with SMUD, the NRC requested that additional training in the areas of pressurizer level phenomenon and natural cir-culation control be given to all operators.
Subsequent to 1666 281
additional training, and an oral audit exam by General Physics Corporation, the NRC conducted a second oral audit and was satisfied with tne level of operator understanding.
29.
INTERROG ATORY.
Identify any operators at the facility (past or present) that SMUD considers incapable, for any reason, to safely operate the facility or to assess its safety.
ANSWER:
There are no licensed operators at Rancho Seco whicn SMUD considers incapable for any reason to safely operate Rancno Seco, or to assess the safety of the facility.
30.
INTERROGATORY:
Identify each person who SMUD expects to call to testify at the nearing in this proceeding.
For each person identified, provide: the subject (s) upon which the person may testify; a description of the substance of the testimony; and a description of the person's educational background and professional qualifications.
ANSWER:
Ronald J.
Rodriguez, Manager of Nuclear Operations for the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, is expected to provide testimony on contentions identified below relating to the operation of Rancho Seco.
Mr. Rodriguez is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, with a Bachelor of Science degree in Naval Science.
He has completed tn'e Navy nuclear power grad-uate-level technology course, the six-week Babcock &
Wilcox reactor technology course, and a ten-week Nuclear Steam Supply System Simulator Training Program presented by Babcock & Wilcox.
For eight years Mr. Rodriguez was a commissioned naval officer, serving primarily in the Navy Submarine Program.
For three years he served in engi-neering positions onboard an operating nuclear-powered 1666 282
submarine.
His areas of responsibility varied among reactor plant systems, main propulsion systems, electrical and reactor instrumentation systems, chemistry, and health physics control for maintenance and personnel protection.
For two years he was assigned as a training officer, responsible for training Navy Nuclear Power Officer and Enlisted candidates at the Navy's training facility located in Windsor, Connecticut.
This assignment gave him responsioility for administration of all classroom train-ing, in-plant training progress, and final examination for qualification for Nuclear Power Plant Operators and Watch Officers.
His final responsibility in the Navy was as Chief Engineer of a nuclear puwer submarine.
In tnis capacity he had responsibility for the administration of an Engineering Department, which included qualification and training of reactor operators and power plant watch standers.
After joining SMUD in 1968, he served as Assistant Superintendent for Nuclear Operations until February, 1970.
During this period of time, he was responsible for establishing the initial phases of the Rancho Seco Operator Training Program and the selection and hiring of plant operating personnel.
From March, 1970, until January, 1978, he was Plant Super-
--intendent, with direct responsibility for the testing and startup program for Rancho Seco, including the staffing 1666 283
for Operations, Technical Support and Maintenance person-nel.
He was also responsible for tne overall direction of vendor personnel assisting in the startup program, and served as chairman of the group established to provide final approval of tne functional test program.
Since January, 1978, he has been Manager of Nuclear Operations, with department level responsibility for the safe and proper operation of Rancho Seco.
Mr. Rodriguez has participated in the entire Licensing Training Program at Rancho Seco and currently holds a Senior Reactor Operator License.
He is currently a member of the Electric Power Research Institute's Engineering and Operations Task Force, a 7.ber of tne American Nuclear Society's Reactor L
Operations and Support System Management Committee, and a member of the Atomic Industrial Forum's operational committee involved in the initial establishment of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.
The specific contentions to which Mr. Rodriguez is expected to testify are listed below with descriptions of the substance of his testimony.
Issue CEC 1-1 Despite the modifications and actions of Subparagraphs (a) through (e) of Section IV of the Commission's Order, will reliance upon the High Pressure Injection System to 1666 284 9
mitigate pressure and volume control sensitivities in the Rancho Seco primary system result in increased challenges to safety systems beyond the original design and licensing basis of the facility?
Issue CEC 1-12 Despite or because of the modifications and actions of Sub-paragrapns (a) through (e) of Section IV of the Commis-sion's Order of May 7, will Rancho Seco experience an increase in reactor trips resulting from feedwater tran-sients tnat will increase challenges to safety systems beyond the original design and licensing basis of the facility?
Description of Substance of Testimony Tnis testimony will describe the methods employed at Rancho Seco to log the history of transients and operating cycles.
This will ensure that design limits are not exceeded for equipment which has incorporated in its design basis a specific number of such events.
(See also Licensee's Answers (Set No. 3).]
Board Question CEC 1-2 Can poor understanding of natural convection in the Rancho Seco system result in a situation that will lead to inade-quate cooling despite the modifications and actions of Subparagraphs a-e?
Description of Substance of Testimony Tnis testimony will show that the Rancho Seco licensed operators have adequate training and available procedures to initiate and confirm natural convection in the Rancho Seco system and to prevent inadequate core cooling.
(See also Licensee 's Answers (Set No. 3). ]
Board Question CEC 1-6 Will the modifications of Subparagraphs a-e still leave the Rancho Seco emergency feedwater system in a condition of low reliability?
1666 285 Hursh-Castro Contention 7 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, nas insufficient timeliness and reliability of the emer-gency feedwater system, and therefore is unsafe and endan-gers tne health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Description of Substance of Testimony This testimony will show that the Rancho Seco auxiliary feedwater system has operated with a high degree of reliability and that the modifications made in accordance with Subparagraphs a through e will serve to enhance this r eliability.
[See also Licensee's Answers (Set No. 1).]
Board Question CEC 1-7 Do the operating training actions responding to Subparagraph (d) of Subparagraphs a-e for Rancho Seco fail to give sufficient attention to providing appropriate analytical bases for operator actions?
Hursh-Castro Contention 10 Rancno Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, nas not completed an adequate analysis for potential smp11 breaks in a loss-of-coolant accident nor developed and implemented operating instructions to define' operator action in such event, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the,nealth and safety of Petitioners, contituents of Petitioners and the public.
Description of Substance of Testimony Operator training and operating procedures which address operator actions following a small break, los s-o f-coo lan t accident will be described.
Emphasis will be placed on the training and procedure changes which have taken place following B&W small break loss-of-coolant accident analysis and operating guidelines development.
It will be shown that this training and these procedures adequately cover the operator actions following a small break necessary to 1666 286
_3,_
protect tne nsalth and safety of the public.
[See also Licensee's Answers (Set No. 3).]
Issue CEC 3-1 Whether personnel adequately understand the mechanics of tne facility, basic reactor physics, and other fundamental aspects of its operation ?
Description of Substance of Testimony An overview of operator training and testing will be pro-vided which will show that Rancho Seco licensed operators meet all federal and industry standards.
It will be shown that the level of understanding of the mechanics of the facility, basic reactor physics, and other fundamental aspects of plant operation are adequate for the safe opera-tion of the f acility.
Issue CEC 3-2 Whether personnel are properly apprised of new information pertinent to the facility's safe operation and ability to respond to transients, particularly information on operating experience of otner reactors?
Descriptica of Substance of Testimony This testimony will describe existing and proposed means for tne exchange of information and the methods used to advise plant operators of experience at other facilities.
It will be snown that this ongoing retraining of operators is adequate for the safe operation of Rancho Seco.
Issue CEC 3-3 Whetner NRC and SMUD adequately ensure that emergency instructions are understood by and are available to plant personnel in a manner that allows quick and effective implementation during an emergency?
I666 287 Description of Substance of Testimony This testimony will describe operator training on emergency procedures and show that tne operator understanding of these procedures is sufficient to ensure their quick and effective implementation.
Board Question CEC 5-3a Are the special features and instruments installed at Rancho Seco adequate to aid in diagnosis and control after an of f-normal condition engendered by a loss-of-f eedwater transient?
Hursh-Castro Contention 29 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has insufficient instrumentation and capability to immedi-ately retrieve necessary information or data during a loss of feedwater transient and therefore is unsafe and endan-gers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Description of Substance of Testimony This testimony will identify the parameters to be monitored to diagnose and control the plant af ter a loss of feedwater transient and will show that existing instrumentation provides this information.
Hursh-Castro Contention 8 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor does not nave operating procedures for initiating and controlling the emergency feedwater system independent of the integrated control system control, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Desription of Substance of Testimony This testimony will snow tnat the Rancho Seco operating procedures for initiating and controlling the auxiliary feedwater system independent of the integrated control system are adequate for the protection of the health and safety of the public.
1666 288 Hursh-Castro Contention 22 Rancno Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, does not provide control room operators with sufficient data on the water level in the pressurizer and vessel because tne operators must interpret information on temper-ature and pressure in the primary loop and extrapolate water level, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petition-ers and tne public.
Description of Substance of Testimony This testimony will demonstrate that pressurizer level indication does exist and that reactor vessel water level indication is not required since the important parameters in assuring core cooling are reactor coolant pressure and temperature.
Hursh-Castro Contention 25 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, does not have control room instrumentation which would indicate if the auxiliary feedwater or pressurizer relief valves are open,or closed or the instrumentation to open or close such valves automatically, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Description of Substance of Testimony This testimony will show that auxiliary feedwater flow indication does exist at Rancho Seco and that pressurizer relief valve position indication is not required since the important parameters in assuring core cooling are reactor coolant pressure and temperature.
Pressurizer relief valve position indication will be installed, however, during tne refueling outage scheduled for January, 1980, as an additional operator aid.
Hursh-Castro Contention 30 SMUD, the licensee, has conducted insufficient analysis of what operations of the facility should be required to. be automated or hard equipment responsibilities and what can 1666 289
be conducted manually or by plant personnel, and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Description of Substance of Testimony This testimony will present the general philosophy under-lying those control functions which are automated and those which rely upon operator action in a nuclear power facil-ity.
In addition, tne testimony will describe the auto-mated control features wnich respond to a normal feedwater transient, and manual actions which are required.
An explanation will be provided of the manner in which these features and actions assure tne safe operation of the facility.
Hursh-Castro Contention 31 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a control room configuration which is poorly and inade-quately designed for plant operators to avoid a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and endangers tne health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
Description of Substance of Testimony This testimony will demonstrate that control room design does not have any significant effect on the availability of feedwater.
Hursh-Castro Contention 32 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, is operated by personnel and management whose competence has not been adequately tested and evaluated, namely testing has not been conducted as to wnether such employees can act. responsibly and appropriately to make judgment decisions during a loss of feedwater transient, personnel interviews have not been conducted to properly evaluate the test results with cuch employees and some employees nave never been tested because of grandf athering, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and tne public.
1666 290 FOE Contention III(d)
The NRC orders in issue do not reasonably assure adequate safety because no procedures nave been taken to assure facility management competence.
FOE Contention III(e)
The NRC orders in issue do not reasonably assure adequate safety because no procedures exist or have been taken for the determination of the adequacy of operator competence.
Description of Substance of Testimony This testimony will describe the competence of licensed operating personnel and their management and will show that training and testing have been performed to verify that employees can act responsibly and appropriately during a loss of feedwater transient.
Testimony will also be provided to snow that operator licenses are never obtained by "grandfathering".
Hursh-Castro Contention 34 Rancno Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has not adequately trained unlicensed operators to respond to orders necessary for action which would be required in tne event of loss of feedwater transient, and enerefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners and tne public.
Description of Substance of Testimony The duties of unlicensed operators will be described and it will be shown that their training, together with the training provided to licensed operators, is adequate for an operating crew to respond properly to a loss of feedwater transient.
1666 291 TABLE 15-1 Cold License Group Examinations and Results I
Phase (I)
Pnase II(2)
Phase III(3)
Phase IV(4)
Phase VI (5)
(Appendix A.1)
(Appendix A.2)
(Appendix A.3)
(Appendix A.4)
(Appendix A.6)
Avg.
Group 1 Group 2 OPERATOR Prog.
Final Avg Final Avg.
Avg.
Final 5
NA f4A NA 89 86 88 96 7
NA NA NA 89 88 88 98 8
90 92 94 NA 87 85 90 12 86 91 77 NA 82 78 93 16 NA NA NA 82 82 80 86 22 85 92 78 NA 79 75 90 NOTE:
Appendix references are to Appendices of the license application letter of January 2,1974.
( 1)
Phase I:
Operating Nuclear Plant Observation Training Six progress examinations and one final examination were given.
Average of progress examinations and final examination grades are given. Operators marked NA did not participate in this phase.
Not all operators took all progress examinations.
(2)
Phase II:
Basic Reactor Physics and Engineering Course This course was given to two different operator groups. NA indicates an operator was not in that group. Group 1 was given examinations in each of the course's three phases.
The score shown as " Avg" is the average of the test results; in addition, Group 2 was given a final examination representing 25% of the overall grade.
The final course grade is presented.
1666 292
TABLE 15-1 (Continued)
(3)
Phase III: B&M PWR Technology Course Examinations were given in each of the 22 sections of the course.
The average grade shown is the average of the 22 examinations.
(4)
Phase IV:
88M PWR Simulator Course Examinations were given in most general lecture subject areas.
The Avg score indicated is the average of these scores.
(5)
Phase VI:
Review Training Program At the conclusion of this program, an overall examination was given which was similar in content to the NRC licensing examination.
The
" Final" scores are tabulated as the results of this examination.
1666 293 O
TABLE 15-2 9
Hot License Group 1 Examinations and Results Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix OPERATOR A.1 ( 1)
A.2 (2)
A.3 (3)
A.7 (4) l NA NA 63 70 26 NA NA 96 92 9
NA NA 71 78 13 NA NA 73 70 14 67 78 NA 74 19 68 78 NA 77 24 NA NA 86 87 25 NA NA 52 62 NOTE:
Appendix references are to Appendices of the license ar; plication letter of September 17, 1974.
(1)
Appendix A.1: Basic Reactor Physics and Engineering Course Only operators 14 and 19 participated in this course.
They took the course with the initial cold license group.
Periodic examinations and final examination with 25% of the final grade were given.
The final course grade is presented. NA means the operator did not take the course.
(2) Appendix A.2: B&W PWR Technology Course Only operators 14 and 19 participated in this course.
They took the course with the initial cold license group. Examinations were given in each of 22 sections of the course. The grade shown is the average of the 22 examinations. NA means the operator did not take the course.
(3) Appendix A.3:
Seven Week Academic Program Operators 14 and 19 did not take this course and are marked NA.
The grade presented is the average of eight two-hour examinations.
Examinations were given in each section of the course.
1666 294
TABLE 15-2 (continued)
(4) Appendix A.7: Academic Training Program The exam grade presented is the overall grade on the final examination.
The final examination was similar in scope to the NRC licensing examination.
1666 295
TABLE 15-3 Hot License Groups 2 and 3 Examinations and Results Courge Final Operator Avg i Exam 2 11 93 87 15 90 82 18 86 79 23 93 81 1)
The course Avg grade shown is the average of daily quizzes.
2)
The Final Examination grade shown is the overall grade of the Final examination which is similar in scope to the NRC licensing examination.
1666 296
TABLE 15-4 Annual Licensed NRC Operator Requalification Examination Results This table presents the overall grade received in the annual examination.
This examination is a comprehensive examination similar in scope to the initial NRC license examination.
Operator 1977 1978 1979 5
86 89 87 7
86 90 94 8
(1) 93 94 12 89 92 87 16 (1)
(1)
( 1) 22 77 84 81 1
71 79 78 9
80 80 83 13 85 93 88 14 86 91 84 19 74 81 83 24 89 92 86 25 78 78 78 26 93 95 (2) 11 81 80 83 15 79 92 87 18 81 94 85 23 86 89 85 1666 297
TABLE 15-4 (continued)
(1) Excused.
These individuals prepared and/or reviewed the examination.
Up to three persons per examination may be excused for this purpose.
(2) Terminated employment.
1666 298 8
O e
TABLE 28-1
( a)
( b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
( h)
Test
- of Opera-Minimum
- of Operators Opportunity tors Taking Passing Passing Test to Retest Test Score 1st Try SMUD Post Between 5/27/79 & 6/1/79 TMI-2 for Original Examination.
Five on one Audit Quiz 21 90%
16 Yes (2)
Between 6/9/79 & 7/6/79 At temp t.
0 (written) for Make-up Examination.
NRC Not NA NA NA 6/1/79 NA NA Oral Audit Available Oral Audit Independent 8
NA NA NA 6/15 & 16/79 NA NA Training Company Approx-NA All NA 6/17 & 18/79 NA NA Oral Audit imately 7 Assigned Ch Ch N<
D RESUME D. E.
Gardiner September 1964 to February 1972:
Employed by United States Navy.
Gained experience during the following assignments:
1.
Assigned as Radiation Control Supervisor at a nuclear submarine base with responsibility for radiation control of maintenance activities on nuclear systems installed on submarines.
2.
Assigned as an instructor at a reactor prototype facility with responsibilities to train future nuclear submarine operators in the subj ects of mathematics, radiation and chemistry control, and plant systems.
3.
Assigned as Administrative Assistant to the training officer at a reactor prototype facility with duties to act as a representative in planning and implementation of programs to standardi:e qualifying requirements for navy engineering laboratory technicians.
4 Assigned duties on an operating nuclear submarine as a Senior Engineering Laboratory Technician responsible for the performance of radiation control duties including monitoring for gaseous and particulate contamination and airborne activity.
February 1972 to July 1974:
Employed by the Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant.
Gained ex-perience during the following assignments:
1666 300
2-1.
Responsible for writing and implementing procedures relating to emergency and normal operations, to forms and records planning, to the radiological protection program, and to related surveillance.
2.
Responsible for the Kewaunee plant personnel and area the rmoluminescent dosimetry program.
August 19 74 through the present:
Employed by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
Gained experience during the following responsibilities:
From 1974 through October of 1978, functioned as a Senior Radiation and Chemistry Assistant responsible at various periods of time for secondary chemistry control, nuclear chemistry control, and radiation protection responsibilities within the assigned depart-ment.
This includes training and work assignments to individuals working under his charge.
October 1978 to present:
Assigned the primary responsibility of training of all personnel coming to Rancho Seco in the areas of health physics and radiation protection.
1666 301 RESUME Steve J. Redeker June 1968 to June 1973:
Employed by the United States Navy.
Satisfactorily completed the Navy nuclear power training program and assigned to the fleet ballistic missile submarine.
Responsibilities included assignment as the reactor and pro-pulsion plant division officer responsible for the maintenance and operations of the ship's reactor and main propulsion plant systems.
Also responsible as the ship's radiation protection officer which included responsibility for proper health physics control of all ship-related maintenance functions and proper radiation protection of all ship's company.
November 1973 to September 1979:
Employed by PGGE Humboldt Bay Nuclear plant.
Responsibilities included:
1.
Training duties and plant familiarization to qualify for and receive Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Senior Reactor Operator License.
2.
Schedule, write and conduct equipment test operations for both startup and refueling programs.
3.
Supervise reactor refueling operations.
4 Design and evaluate necessary plant modifications.
5.
Conduct operator training programt.
September 1979 to the present:
Employed by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
Primary responsibility to prepare 1666 ~302
2-for and obtain a Senior Reactor Operator License in prepara-tion for conducting initial training of licensed operating personnel at Rancho Seco.
1666 303
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
)
Docket No. 50-312
)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF R. J. RODRIGUEZ County of Sacramento)
SS State of California )
R. J. Rodriguez, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is Manager, Nuclear Operations Department of the Sacramento Municipal Utility District; and that the answers contained in " Licensee's Answers (Set No. 2) to the First Set of Interrogatories of the California Energy Commission dated November 15, 1979" are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
9
,3 gs
\\3 w h.a e s
Ro}rigue: \\)
R. J.
)
Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of December, 1979.
Notarv Public
(
OFFICIAL SF.AL
)
j JAMES A. CONNICK g My Commission expires "U
j wc$"ca$$$5E$I,S"" p 4
-.m., ocm.=ca u.oa s 1666 504