ML20035F584
| ML20035F584 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1993 |
| From: | Baxter T, Schori J SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#293-13881 92-633-92-DCOM, DCOM, NUDOCS 9304220054 | |
| Download: ML20035F584 (26) | |
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Ari;Li-J3NhC April 13, 1993 73 APR 14 P3 :29 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d r!D ' :li f 9','
E.nunii N i' e.'
in t.NH Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board In the Matter of
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Docket No. 50-312-DCOM SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY
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DISTRICT
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(Decommissioning Plan)
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(Rancho Seco Nuclear
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ASLBP No. 92-633-92-DCOM Generating Station)
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LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO ECO'S PROPOSED LOOP CONTENTIONS l
l I.
Introduction l
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Sacramento Municipal Utility District (" Licensee" or the
" District") hereby responds to "ECO's Contentions on SMUD's Con-sideration of the Loss of Offsite Power" ("ECO Cont."), which Environmental and Resources Conservation Organization ("ECO")
filed on April 1, 1993.
The District opposes ECO's proposed con-l tentions on Loss of Offsite Power
(" LOOP"), because ECO's conten-l-
tions are vague and confusing and lack factual and legal bases.
In a number of instances, ECO also attempts to raise untimely i
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issues unrelated to the remanded environmental issue of LOOP fre-quency and fails to justify such late-filed contentions as required by the NRC's Rules of Practice.
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II.
Backcround In "ECO's Amendment and Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene and Request for Hearing" (June 29, 1992), ECO com-
.I plained of the lack of reference to a particularized study to allow an independent verification of the conclusion in the Dis-trict's " Supplement to Rancho Seco Environmental Report - Post Operating License Stage" ("ER") that the " probability of a LOOP is less than once in 20 years."
Id. at 25-26.
In a March 3, 1993 Memorandum and Order, the Commission granted ECO discre-tionary intervention, required the District to " provide ECO with the basis for its conclusion regarding the frequency of a LOOP,"
and permitted ECO "to file an amended contention, if it chooses, taking into consideration the information provided by the lic-ensee in accordance with this order."
Sacramento Municipal Util-ity District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-3, 37 N.R.C. __, slip op, at 17, 32-33 (March 3, 1993).
The Commis-sion's Order specifies that ECO may file "an amended contention related to the LOOP issue as affected by SMUD's submittal with i
i the Licensing Board."
Id. at 32-33.
"When filing this amended contention, ECO need not satisfy the criteria for a late-filed contention."
Id. at 17 n.28.
In its April 1, 1993 filing, ECO pleaded the following contention:
ECO contends that SMUD's consideration of the LOOP issues in both its Supplement to Application's Environmental Report-Post Operating License Stage.
at Paragraph 5.3 and its proposed Decommissioning Plan.
. at Paragraph 3.4
. i
2 (transmitted by AGM/NUC 91-081 (May-20, 1991)) (a) fail to comply with 10 CFR S S 50.63 + 51.45 (1992) and the Commis-sion's Station Blackout Rule (53 Fed. Reg. 23203 (June 21, l
1988)), (b) that the calculations expressed in the Supple-ment and the PDP are in part unsupported by and in part con-l tradicted by the calculations furnished ECO by SMUD.in j
accordance'vith the Commission's Order raising questions of j
not only of [ sic) inadequate NEPA disclosure but also ques-i tions of SMUD's integrity.and fitness for licensee'responsi-i bility pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended l
("AEA), and (c) finally, that SMUD's inadequate consider-l ation of LOOP and inadequate preparation to cope with LOOP presents an unacceptable risk to the radiological health and safety of the public.
ECO Cont. at 1-2.
ECO then provides eleven paragraphs as the i
purported bases for these contentions.
Id. at 4-7.
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III. ECO Raises Untimely Issues Without' Justification ECO abuses'the Commission's Memorandum and' Order by attempt-ing to raise untimely issues unrelated to the discussion of LOOP frequency in the ER.
The Commission's March 3, 1993 Memorandum l
and Order remanded an issue relating to the discussion of LOOP s
1! issue..The Com-f frequency in the District's ER--clearly a NEPA mission allowed ECO to file an amended contention on this issue without satisfying the criteria for a late-filed contention.
Without any justification, ECO attempts to expand the remanded l
issue to encompass the adequacy of the LOOP discussion in the District's decommissioning plan ("DP"), and issues ranging from i
sabotage and security to habitability and fuel degradation i
effects.
1/
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 4321 et sec..
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I More specifically, ECO's contentions are not limited to the adequacy of the ER, which was the subject of the remanded issue, but assert that the discussion in the DP fails to comply with the Station Blackout rule (10 C.F.R.
S 50.63) and presents unaccept-able risk to the public health and safety.
ECO Cont, at 1-2.
i similarly, the so-called bases for these contentions are not lin-ited to LOOP frequency but address the " coping period" for a LOOP (Basis 1), diesel generator reliability (Basis 2), spent fuel pool technical specifications (Basis 3), plant security (Basis 4), sabotage (Basis 5), accidental or intentional loss of coolant accidents (Basis 7), habitability (Basis 8), the provisions against LOOP and the consequences of LOOP (Basis 10), and fuel I
degradation effects (Basis ll).
Because these issues exceed the scope of the remanded con-tention, they may not be admitted without a demonstration by ECO that the criteria in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) are met.
ECO has not met this burden, and the extraneous issues it asserts must therefore be rejected.
IV.
ECO's Contentions Do Not Satisfy Pleadino Recuirements ECO's contentions and their bases also fail to satisfy pleading requirements.
The contentions and bases are vague and confusing, lack' legal and factual bases, and fail to establish the existence of genuine material issues.
For the most part, they claim that the District has not analyzed some point, without
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explaining why the point is material or why further analysis is required.
The District's Response to ECO's Proposed Decommissioning P
Funding Plan Contentions (April 1, 1993) at pp. 2-5 sets forth the standards for pleading contentions.
That full discussion will not be repeated here.
It suffices to say that a contention must be specific, must be supported by a basis, must be supported by identification of the alleged facts or expert opinion on which ECO intends to rely, must provide references to the specific sources and documents on which ECO intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion, and must provide sufficient infor-mation to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact.E!
See 10 C.F.R.
S 2.714(b),
(d).
See also 57 Fed. Reg. 9,577, 9,578 (1992).
ECO does not identify any specific expert opinion on which it intends to rely to prove its contentions.
ECO states vaguely 2/
The NRC's Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement
("GEIS") on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (NUREG-0586) concludes that decommissioning activities should have no signifi-cant impacts.
If the impacts for a particular plant are not sig-nificantly different from those assessed in the GEIS, the NRC will prepare a finding of no significant impact.
53 Fed. Reg.
24,018, 24,039 (1988).
The ER confirms that Rancho Seco falls within the envelope of the GEIS and that the environmental effects of its decommis-sioning are insignificant.
ER at 1-10, 1-12, 5-1 and 8-1.
To be material, contentions asserting a need for additional information on accidents in the ER must be supported by a basis indicating that the probability and consequences of a particular accident scenario are sufficiently significant to require preparation of an EIS. -
that it will rely on the expert opinions of David Rossin and David Crespo to support its contentions (ECO Cont, at 2), but does not identify any statement as an expert opinion of either of these individuals in the so-called bases for the contentions.
ECO characterizes the bases of its contentions as including alleged facts "and/or" expert opinion (ECO Cont. at 4), thus mak-ing it impossible to identify any assertion sponsored by Dr.
Rossin or Mr. Crespo.
Moreover, given the number of inaccurate or confused assertions in ECO's contentions, it is difficult to believe that either of these individuals would subscribe to ECO's assertions.
ECO also fails to reference other sources or documents sup-porting assertions in many of the statements of bases.
Most of the references that are included are either inaccurately repre-sented or are irrelevant.
All in all, ECO fails to identify any genuine dispute on a material issue of law or fact.
These deficiencies in ECO's contentions and statements of bases are discussed more fully below.3/
First, ECO's general contentions are addressed.
Then, each of the statements of bases is discussed.
2/
As discussed earlier, ECO's contentions and the statements of bases also raise untimely issues beyond the scope of the remanded contention.
This argument is not repeated below.
3 I
A.
ECO's Contentions ECO's contentions generally allege that the District's dis-cussion of LOOP in the ER and DP fails to comply with 10 C.F.R.
SS 50.63 (Station Blackout rule) and 51.45 (general requirements for environmental reports), are unsupported and contradicted, and present an unacceptable risk to the public health and safety.
ECO Cont. at 1-2.
These assertions are vague and fail to satisfy l
the specificity requirement in the Commission's Rules of Prac-I tice.
One cannot surmise from the contentions how the ER or DP is supposedly inadequate.
The contentions do not place the par-ties on notice of the issues to be litigated, establish any rea-l sonable bounds, or establish the existence of a genuine issue of material law or fact.
l The portions of ECO's contentions alleging non-compliance with the station blackout rule also lack legal basis.
The sta-1 tion blackout rule only applies to reactors " licensed to oper-ate."
10 C.F.R. S 50.63(a).
Because the operating authority was deleted when Rancho Seco's license was converted to a possession only license, the station blackout rule is inapplicable.
ECO makes no showing why the station blackout rule should be applied j
to a permanently shutdown reactor.
ECO's statement of bases bear slightly greater resemblance to contentions than the vague assertions at the front of ECO's filing.
The District submits that the statements of bases, rather than ECO's vague and generalized contentions on pacac 1 - _
and 2 of ECO's filing, should be treated as ECO's proposed con-tentions.
The statements of bases, however, still fail to meet pleading requirements.
B.
Basis 1 ECO's first basis (ECO Cont. at 4-5) is a jumble of inaccu-rate and misleading statements.
It lacks both legal and factual basis.
The gravamen appears to be that the station blackout rule requires a four-hour " coping duration" for Rancho Seco.
As pre-viously pointed out, however, the station blackout rule applies only to reactors licensed to operate, and ECO provides no basis for applying that rule's requirements to a permanently shutdown reactor.
ECO provides no explanation why the coping period appropriate for an operating reactor, which might experience a LOOP while operating at full power with a highly irradiated core, should be applied to a plant where.all fuel has been placed in the spent fuel pool ("SFP".) and even the most recently discharged core has cooled for nearly four years (since the June 7, 1989 shutdown).
Factually, ECO first asserts that the District's decommis-sioning plan at page 3-34 claims a " coping period" of "less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />."
ECO Cont. at 4.
This assertion is vrong.
A " coping j
period" or " coping duration" is the period of time a plant can cope with a station blackout based on the probability of 3
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occurrence of a station blackout at a site, as well as on the i
capability for restoring ac power in a timely fashion for that site.
See cenerally Reg. Guide 1.155 at 2, 4.
Page 3-34 of the decommissioning plan makes no reference to a " coping period" of less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Instead, it states that Rancho Seco "has the capability to receive power from either the District or PG&E in l
less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />."
This is an upper bound of time it might take to restore offsite power, and is not the period of a station blackout with which Rancho Seco could cope.
ECO next asserts that the DP and ER claim " minimum need for restoration for power at variously 6 days or 17.7 days."
ECO Cont. at 4.
This assertion too is inaccurate.
The DP and ER state:
As shown in Table 3-21 [of the DP], upon a loss of SFC
[ spent fuel cooling] on June 7, 1991, the minimum time required to reach boiling in the SFP is 143 hours0.00166 days <br />0.0397 hours <br />2.364418e-4 weeks <br />5.44115e-5 months <br />.
Thus, a minimum of 6 days is available to restore SFC prior to the occurrence of boiling following the loss of SFC.
In addi-tion, if the additional time available through boil-off of 6.75 ft. of the 37-ft. normal minimum water depth is taken into account, a minimum of 17.7 days (as of June 7, 1991) is available to implement corrective actions to restore water level and cooling capability.
If boil-off of the SFP vater were to occur due to a loss of SFC [ spent fuel cooling] the simple addition of water to the SFP would extend time to i
implement corrective actions to restore SFC.
DP at 3-35; ER at 5-6.
These statements make it clear that the 6-day period is the time to boiling (not a " minimum need for res-toration of power") and the 17.7 days is the time available l
l before the SFP level would be decreased by 6.75 feet.E Even more time is available by simply adding water (e.o., by Rancho Seco's fire pump, which is driven by its own diesel).E#
Id.
See also District Letter DAGM/NUC 93-079 (April 1, 1993).
ECO next asserts that the District " presents no documenta-tion or calculations to support these conclusory assertions."
ECO Cont. at 4.
This statement too is misleading.
The DP and ER document the conclusions and methodology in a good amount of detail.
They state that the decay heat load for the SFP in the t
defueled condition was calculated using the methcdology described in ANSI /ANS 5.1-1979 and Branch Technical Position ASB 9-2.
ANSI /ANS 5.1 presents, in tables and equivalent analytical repre-sentations, the values for decay heat power from fission products following shutdown of a reactor.
Branch Technical Position ASB 9-2, contained in section 9.2.5 of the NRC's Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), provides an acceptable methodology for determining 4/
The 6.75 ft. level discussed in the quoted paragraph was chosen because the SFP water level is normally maintained above 37 ft. (the low level alarm level) and would have to be main-tained at 30 ft. 3 in. to limit the dose rate at the SFP surface to 2.5 mR/h if the SFP contained 1080 spent fuel assemblies that had decayed 3 days following irradiation at 100 percent power.
DP at 3-34 to 3-35; ER at 5-6 to 5-7.
This is extremely conser-vative, because there are only 493 assemblies in the pool, and even the most recently irradiated assemblies have decayed for about 1400 days.
E/
It should be noted that the 6-day period before boiling and the 17.7-day period before a 6.75 foot decrease in the SFP level j
are based on 1991 decay heat loads and other conservative assump-tions.
DP at 3-35 to 3-35; ER at 5-6 to 5-7.
Table 3-21 of the DP shaws that at the June 1994 decay heat levels, these periods increase to 8.1 days and 24.1 days respectively.
DP at 3-70. !
f the residual decay heat release rate for a light water reactor for long-term cooling.
The major assumptions used to calculate the decay heat rate are specified at page 3-35 of the DP and include no evaporative or ambient heat loss from the SFP prior to boiling.
The resulting spent fuel decay heat rate (in BTU /Hr) at t
various points in time are tabulated on Table 3-21 of the DP, along with the corresponding times to reach boiling and to boil off 6.75 feet of spent fuel pool water.
ECO does not address any of this information or provide any indication why it is insuffi-Cient.
Nor is there even the slightest indication that ECO or its experts disagree with the results.
ECO then asserts that the "only calculation presented by SMUD states that Rancho Seco requires a coping duration category of not more than four hours."
ECO Cont. at 4.
ECO fails to men-tion that the calculation to which it refers was performed to determine the coping duration under the Station Blackout rule in March 1989, when Rancho Seco was a licensed operating reactor.
ECO makes no showing that this calculation has any bearing on a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor.5/
E/
The District's March 17, 1993 Memorandum on Basis for LOOP Frequency Determination (transmitted to ECO, the Board and other parties by letter dated March 18, 1993, in response to CLI-93-3) provided the District's 1989 Station Blackout analysis, the sup-porting calculation, and other related guidance documents because they formed the basis for the District's determination of LOOP frequency.
These documents have no other bearing on a perma-nently shut down and defueled reactor..-
P Finally, ECO concludes:
l Assuming that SMUD has fully complied with the Commission's Order to furnish all calculations to ECO the conclusion is inescapable that SMUD has misrepresented the conclusion of its calculations to the NRC and that any reliance on the longer coping durations presents a danger to the health and safety of the public and far understates the risk in the i
NEPA analysis.
Id. at 4-5.
Even this conclusion is inaccurate.
ECO mischaracterizes the Commission's order, which did not require the District to furnish "all calculations to ECO" or any informa-tion on coping durations, but instead directed the District to provide ECO with the basis for its determination of " LOOP fre-i quency."
It is particularly inappropriate for ECO to cast asper-sions on the District by asserting the District has "misrepre-l sented the conclusion of its calculations" (id. at 4) and by raising " questions of SMUD's integrity and fitness for licensee responsibility" (id. at 2), when the factual bases for ECO's assertions are so lacking.
In summary, ECO's first basis is inaccurate and unsupported.
It does not establish the existence of a genuine issue of mate-rial law or fact.
C.
Basis 2 ECO's second basis asserts that the District should not be allowed to use a 0.95 reliability factor for its emergency diesel generators in its Station Blackout calculation.
Id. at 5.
The calculation which ECO references is the District's April 17, 1989 -
Station Blackout evaluation performed when Rancho Seco was a licensed operating reactor.
ECO's assertions do not address the current analysis in the ER or DP.
The analysis of a LOOP in the ER and DP does not rely on the availability of diesel generators.
Instead, the analysis demonstrates that weeks are available to restore offsite power.
ECO's second basis does not identify any deficiency in this current analysis.
It does not establish any genuine issue of material fact or law.
D.
Basis 3 ECO's third basis asserts that in the bases for technical specifications relating to the spent fuel pool, SMUD takes credit for operation of a spent fuel /radvaste area exhaust fan to remove heat in the event that SFP cooling is lost.
Id.
ECO contends that this ignores the fact that if spent fuel pool cooling is lost due to the unavailability of electricity, the spent fuel pool /radwaste area exhaust will not be running.
Id.
2/
Because Rancho Seco is no longer licensed to operate, the Station Blackout rule's requirement that operating reactors dem-onstrate diesel generator reliability is no longer applicable.
The discussion of the reliability of onsite emergency ac power in the District's April 17, 1989 submittal, like other operational analyses prepared when Rancho Seco was licensed to operate, was superseded by license amendment 119, issued on March 19, 1992.
Rancho Seco is now governed by the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications, the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR), and other post-defueling licensing basis documents.
There is no longer any reliance placed on diesel generators.
i,
I I
9 ECO confuses two separate analyses.
The District's LOOP l
analysis took no credit for evaporative or ambient heat loss.
DP at 3-35.
That LOOP analysis demonstrates that in the event of a LOOP, there are weeks to restore offsite power without reliance on other systems.
ECO does not address or dispute this analysis.
The document that ECO references (a September 23, 1992 let-I ter relating to the Permanently Defueled Technical Specification Bases #) addresses a different issue.
The letter justifies elim-E l
l ina"ing a prior commitment to put a train of the Decay Heat l
Removal System into service if the primary spent fuel cooling system becomes inoperable.
The justification relies on an analy-l sis showing that the evaporative cooling provided by the opera-tion of a single Radvaste and Fuel Storage HVAC exhaust fan pre-vents the spent fuel pool temperature from exceeding 145*F.
LOOP is irrelevant to this analysis.
If a LOOP disabled the redundant cooling capability provided by the exhaust fan, it would also disable the Decay Heat Removal system.
Thus, the LOOP l
issue does not affect the choice between placing a train of the i
decay heat removal system into service or running an exhaust fan l
in the event primary spent fuel pool cooling is lost.
Again, the situation where all means of cooling are lost because of a LOOP is addressed in the ER and DP analysis, which j
as previously noted assumed no evaporative or ambient heat loss i
E/
A copy of this letter was provided to the Licensing Board along with the other documents served upon ECO by letter dated March 9, 1993. i I
i
prior to boiling.
DP at 3-35.
ECO's third basis does not address this analysis in the DP and ER and is therefore irrele-vant.
It does not establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or law.
E.
Basis 4 ECO's fourth basis alleges that the District ignores the impact of LOOP on plant security systems and the reliability of battery backup.
ECO Cont. at 5.
ECO provides no basis for this assertion.
It provides no basis to assume that battery backup might be unreliable.
ECO did not seek to challenge the Dis-trict's security plan, which was previously approved for the defueled condition by license amendment no. 116 (issued July 5, 1991).
ECO does not allege any facts or expert opinion, or spec-t ify any document or other source that would indicate the exist-ence of a genuine issue of material fact or law.
F.
Basis 5 l
ECO's fifth basis alleges that the District ignores the occasion of LOOP from sabotage.
Id.
ECO provides no basis for this allegation.
ECO points to no requirement that the District evaluate LOOP caused by sabotage.
ECO provides no factual basis to assume that there is any significant risk of sabotage to the offsite power supply, or any likelihood that the all six trans-mission lines, which enter the Rancho Seco plant through two 1
t separate corridors (DSAR at 8.2-1), would be disabled simulta-neously.
ECO alleges no facts or expert opinion supporting its allegation, and references no supporting document or source.
Most importantly, ECO does not explain why the remote and specu-lative possibility of a LOOP caused by sabotage is material.
The analysis in the DP and ER demonstrates that the District would have weeks to take corrective action in the event of a LOOP.
ECO has provided no basis to dispute this analysis and has failed to demonstrate that a genuine material issue exists.
I G.
Basis 6 As its sixth basis, ECO alleges that if a LOOP can be caused by a 75-mile-per-hour vind, the District's calculations indicate that the frequency of such winds is greater than once in 20 years, namely every 18.2 years.
Id. at 5-6.
ECO appears to imply that this is inconsistent with the District's assertion I
that the probability of a LOOP is less than once per 20 years.
ECO fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact because it makes no showing that every occurrence of high winds vill invariably cause a LOOP at Rancho Seco.
ECO fails to dis-i cuss or address the formula in Reg. Guide 1.155, applied by the I
District in its calculations, which translates severe weather into LOOP frequency.
Reg. Guide 1.155 at 13 (note'to Table 6).
That formula indicates that the annual expectation of storms with wind velocities between 75 and 124 miles per hour is multiplied i I
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by 0.012 to determine the frequency of LOOPS occasioned by such storms.
Thus, a one-in-18.2 annual expectation of severe winds corresponds to about a once-in-1500-years LOOP frequency.
ECO provides no basis--no facts, expert opinion, document or other source--to dispute the NRC's methodology.
Consequently, ECO's assertions in Basis 6 are unsupported and irrelevant.
H.
Basis 7 ECO's seventh basis asserts that the District's analysis fails to consider loss of coolant during LOOP due to accidental or intentional
(" insider or outsider threat") draining of the spent fuel pool.
ECO Cont. at 6.
ECO points to no NRC requirement that the District analyze the simultaneous occurrence of a LOOP and a loss of coolant,E!
including losses of coolant caused by sabotage.
ECO provides no indication that such events are likely or significant or must be l
1 2/
Even if Rancho Seco were an operating reactor, it would not be required to evaluate the simultaneous occurrence of a LOOP and 3
a loss of coolant.
The NRC's general design criteria only require consideration of single failures.
See generally 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. A.
The NRC's general design criteria also do not require consideration of spent fuel pool drain down.
See id., GDC 61.
A contention addressing such a scenario therefore raises a "beyond design basis" or Class IX accident.
See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-880, 26 N.R.C. 449, 458-59 (1987), rev'd on other Arounds sub nom., Sierra Club v.
NRC, 862 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.
1988); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-869, 26 N.R.C.
13, 28 (1987). J
i evaluated under NEPA.10/
ECO does not explain how the spent fuel pool could be accidentally drained.
The lowest penetration in the spent fuel pool is at approximately the 23-foot level (DSAR i
at 9.6-9), about nine feet above the top of the spent fuel assem-blies and ten feet above any fuel in those assemblies.
Conse-quently, the pool can not be drained without considerable work to i
lE/
If an accident sought to be considered is sufficiently unlikely that it can be characterized fairly as remote and specu-lative, then consideration under NEPA is not required as a matter of law.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-90-4, 31 N.R.C.
333, 335 (1990).
See also San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd en banc, 789 F.2d 26, cert, denied, 479 U.S.
923 (1986)(NEPA does not require consideration of Class IX accidents if the Commission reasonably believes that such accidents are unlikely to occur).
t As the proponent of a contention seeking to raise a conten-tion addressing a beyond-design basis accident, ECO should have the burden of demonstrating in the basis for its contention that the postulated accident is sufficiently likely to require evalua-tion under NEPA.
ECO has not demonstrated that a loss of coolant coupled with a LOOP, or even an accidental or intentional loss of coolant alone fcr that matter, is a credible accident.
It pro-vides no discussion of probability and points to no study or doc-I ument supporting the need for further evaluation.
Nor should any likelihood of ECO's vaguely postulated acci-dent be assumed.
In NUREG-1353, " Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, 'Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools,'" the NRC examined the risk of a loss of spent fuel pool coolant.
For a PWR, the freggencies of a spent fuel poogfailureareestimatedat3.1x10-gfromhegvyloaddrops, 1.0 x l from missiles, 6.0 x 10-3.0 x10gromaircraftcrashes, drainage,6.0x10-jcsealfailures,1.2x10-from loss of cooling / makeup, and 1.8 x 1 from pneumat from inadvertent from beyond design basis seismic events.
NUREG-1353 at 4-36.
Even the seismic risk has been characterized as " negligibly small."
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-938, 32 N.R.C. 154, 161 (1990).
If a simultaneous LOOP (with a frequency of less than once in 20 years) is further postulated, the probabilities above would be decreased by at least a f resulting in accident fre-quenciesrangingfrom10-9ctorof30, to 10- ;
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set up pumps and piping.
ECO does not explain how an intruder vould be able to drain the spent fuel pool.
ECO does not explain what it thinks would happen even if the spent fuel pools were drained.11!
ECO provides no factual support for its allegations.
It identifies no facts, expert opinion, document or other source suggesting that an evaluation of simultaneous LOOP, loss of cool-ant and sabotage is necessary.
In sum, ECO does not demonstrate that any genuine issue of material fact.
I.
Basis 8 In its eighth basis, ECO asserts that the District fails to address habitability requirements (specifically, thermal and radiation conditions) for areas where operator access may be required to take compensatory measures in the event of loss of water from the spent fuel pool.
ECO Cont. at 6.
This assertion is inaccurate.
Both the DP and ER analyze (with extremely 11/
It should not be assumed without some solid basis proffered by ECO that there vould be any consequence at all.
NRC studies indicate.that the Rancho Seco fuel vould not experience any sig-nificant degradation.
In NUREG-1353, the NRC identified two release scenarios that might result from a complete draining of an SFP.
The more sig-nificant scenario, a zircalloy cladding fire, was determined to be possible if fuel had been discharged less than 250 days.
NUREG-1353 at 4-39.
The spent fuel at Rancho Seco has cooled far longer--nearly four years.
The lesser scenario, involving fuel pin failure, assumed one year since fuel discharge and found the consequences to be small.
Id. at 4-40, 5-14.
Again, Rancho Seco's fuel has been discharged for much longer than a year.
NUREG-1353 states that fuel which has cooled for three years can be air-cooled.
Id. at 1-1.
Rancho Seco's fuel has already cooled this long. __
conservative assumptions) the amount of time necessary to take corrective action to assure the dose rate at the spent fuel pool surface could not exceed 2.5 mR/h.12/
ECO does not explain why this analysis is insufficient.
ECO does not explain why protec-tive clothing and procedures, which allow personnel to work in far more hostile anvironments at operating reactors, would be insufficient at Rancho Seco.
ECO alleges no facts or expert opinion, and identifies no documents or other sources indicating the need for any further analysis.
In sum, ECO does not estab-lish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or law.
J.
Basis 9 In its ninth basis, ECO alleges that the District's analysis omits reference to the significance of hot weather as a serious compounding factor in the event of loss of electricity.
Id.
This assertion is vague, unsupported and does not establish a genuine issue of material fact.
ECO does not explain the signif-icance of hot weather or provide any basis to support its charac-terization as "a serious compounding factor."
Because the Dis-trict's calculations do not take credit for evaporative cooling or other ambient heat loss (DP at 3-35), the ambient temperature (hot weather) has no significance.
ECO alleges no facts or i
12/
As previously discussed, the ER and DP analyze how long it would take for a 6.75 foot decrease in SFP level to demonstrate e
that there is ample time to restore cooling before a 2.5 mR/h surface dose rate (theorized using extremely conservative assump-tions) could be exceeded.
See note 4 supra. ;
j
~
expert opinion, and specifies no documents or other sources dem-onstrating any genuine material issue.
l K.
Basis 10 ECO's tenth basis asserts that the District's presentation of the LOOP is totally inadequate.
ECO Cont. at 6.
ECO's basis is totally inadequate.
It is vague and conclusory.
It is unsup-ported by any facts, expert opinion, document or other source.
It fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of mate-rial law or fact.
L.
Basis 11 4
l I
ECO's last basis alleges that the District's assessment of fuel degradation effects is inadequate because it does not address " fuel fighting" temperatures above 212*F.
ECO Cont. at 7,
citina ER at S 3.4.2.
ECO further alleges that the District presents no analyses indicating that the fuel cladding could not i
significantly exceed 212*F in the event of loss of coolant.
I These assertions are vague, unsupported, and irrelevant.
First, " fuel fighting" temperature is not a meaningful term and j
is unexplained by ECO.
Second, although ECO cites the ER, it does not meaningfully address the District's analysis.
The anal-ysis demonstrates that there are weeks available to take measures to respond to a LOOP before there would be even a 6.75-foot decrease in pool level.
Even if the pool level were decreased to,
i 1
1
)
i this extent, there would still be approximately 16 feet of water covering the spent fuel assemblies and considerably more time to respond before fuel vould be uncovered.13/
During this lengthy period providing plenty of time to restore power and SFP cooling, i
the SFP temperature would not exceed 212 F.
The ER and DP poir-out that the fuel is designed to operate at significantly higher temperatures, and a 212*F SFP temperature does not impose a safety hazard.
ECO provides no basis to dispute this assertion.
The ER and DP do not analyze the spent fuel temperature if fuel were uncovered because of the ample time available to restore SFP cooling in the event of a LOOP or other accident.
Consequently, the possibility of a LOOP causing boil down of the SFP to the point where fuel is uncovered is extremely remote and i
speculative NEPA does not require evaluation of such unrealis-tic scenarios.14/
Nor does any NRC requirement.
ECO does not provide any basis to dispute the time'available for a response to a loss of'SFP cooling.
ECO does not provide any basis to support a further analysis of uncovered fuel temper-atures.
ECO provides no information even suggesting that the l
l I
11/
As noted earlier, the District analyzed the' time before a decrease of 6.75 feet in the SFP level (from 37 feet to 30 ft. 3 in.) would occur because of dose rate considerations.
The top of the fuel assemblies are about 16 feet lover, at approximately the 14 foot mark.
Further, the time available before fuel would be uncovered can be significantly extended simply by adding water from a fire pump.
DP at 3-35; ER at 5-6; District Letter j
l DAGM/NUC 93-079 (April 1, 1993).
11/
See discussion at note 10 supra. l
i possibility of a LOOP causing boil down of the SFP to the point where fuel is uncovered is a credible scenario.
ECO does not even allege, let alone provide a basis to assume, that such boil down would in fact have any adverse effect on the spent fuel.15/
ECO does not establish the existence of any genuine issue of material fact or law.
V.
Conclusion i
As discussed above, ECO's contentions lack basis and fail to demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material fact or law.
Further, the contentions go far beyond the scope of the remanded issue.
The Commission remanded a question concerning the discussion of LOOP frequency in the District's ER.
ECO con-tentions and bases not only go beyond the discussion in the ER but beyond the decommissioning plan as well.
They are not lim-ited to LOOP frequency but address coping periods, diesel genera-tor reliability, spent fuel pool technical specifications, sabo-tage, accidental and intentional loss of coolant accidents, hab-itability, the provisions against LOOP and consequences of LOOP, and fuel' degradation effects.
Contentions on these extraneous topics were not permitted by the Commission's March 3, 1993 Memo-randam and Order.
l l
15/
As noted earlier, there is no basis to assume any signifi-cant fuel degradation would occur during SAFSTOR even if fuel in the SFP vere uncovered.
See discussion in note 11 supra...
i i
For all of the reasons discussed above, ECO's contentions and bases should be rejected.
Respectfully submitted,
(
Thomas A.
- Baxter, P.C.
David R. Lewis Vincent J. Colatriano SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037 (202) 663-8000 l
Jan Schori General Counsel SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 (916) 732-6123 i
Counsel for Licensee Dated:
April 13, 1993 f
! )
l l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
i Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-312-DCOM SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY
)
DISTRICT
)
(Decommissioning Plan)
)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
)
ASLBP No. 92-663-02-DCOM Station)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing " Licensee's Response to ECO's Proposed LOOP Contentions," dated April 13, 1993, are being served upon the persons on the attached Service List by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 13th day of April, 1993.
David R.-Lewis
r 1
$hY i
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'93 TPR 14 P3 :29 i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing BoardKl.
" [:LI
< a ra s e H t& o In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-312-DCOM SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY
)
DISTRICT
)
(Decommissioning Plan)
)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
)
ASLBP No. 92-663-02-DCCM Station)
)
SERVICE LIST l
Administrative Judge Office of the Secretary Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 l
Adjudicatory File t
Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board i
Dr. Richard F. Cole U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D.C.
2')555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Thomas D. Murphy Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board j
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission James P. McGranery, Jr., Esq.
Washington, D.C.
20555 1255 - 23rd Street, N.W.
Suite 750 y
Charles A..Barth, Esq.
Washington, D.C.
20037 i
Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Jan Schori, Esq.
General Counsel i
Sacramento Municipal Utility District f
P.O. Box 15830 f
Sacramento, CA 95813 i
0329/035DRL.93 i
-.