ML19256A615
| ML19256A615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1978 |
| From: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256A612 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-43320, NUDOCS 7901090095 | |
| Download: ML19256A615 (7) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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. " _ '. ' ' f W ASHINGTON, 0. C. 20555 h,,,.kN/l FIRE PROTECTION SMETY EVALUATION RE30RT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCi?1ISSION IN THE MATTER 0F SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-312 SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 Cate:
December l a, 1978
..a e =
7901090095
- :ntroduction By letter dated Dece-ber 1,1978, the Sacramento "unicioal L'tility District (the licensee) recuested changes to Facility Operating License No. DPR-54 for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station (the facility).
The proposed changes would extend the ccmpletion date for certain modifications required to improve the level of fire protection at the facility.
Backnround On February 28, 1978, the Commission issued Amendment No.19 to -
the faci ~. ity operating license.
This arencment added a condition to the license which re1Jired ccmpletion of the modifications identified in Paragraohs 3.1.1 through 3.1.40 of the NRC's Fire Protection Safety Evaluation (FPSE) for the facility, cated February 28, 1978 This amendment also added a license condition which requires completion of these modifications in accordance with the schedule given in Table 3.1 of the FPSE.
Of tnese modifi-cations, the schedule calls for completion of 20 items by the end of the 1978 refueling outage at Ranche Seco which is currently underway and nearing its conclusion.
By letter dated December 1,1978, the licensee requested amendment of the facility license to permit completion of three of these 20 moaifications at a later date.
For two of these items, the re?. son given for not effecting completion on schedule is the difficulty experienced in obtaining sufficient skilled craftsper ons to permit completion in the limited period of time when the verk can be done (curing the refueling outage).
For the third item, the reason for the licensee's inability to complete the modification on schedule is that the scope of the r adification was increased since the licensee originally submitted his schedule.
This increase in scope was the result of recently concluded discussions between the licensee and staff which clarified the staff's position relative to the areas requiring installation of fire detectors. Based on these discussions, the licensee has agreed to provide additional fire detectors in the facility, but needs additional time to procure the detectors and to design and install this addition to the original modi fica tion.
The specific modifications for which the licensee requests the completion date be amended are as follows:
3.1.33(1)
Provide all cable trays which cross or wnich can propagate a fire acros; a fire zone lir.e..ith a fire barrier.
At Cresent Table 3.1 scecifies that 50t of these carriers snall be installed by :ne end of :ne 1973 refueling outage and ne other 505 shall be installed by the end of the 1979 refuelinc cutage.
The licenses has re-quested that this be changed to 30. for 1978 and 70% for 1979.
3.1.37 The licensee has pro osed that smoke dete:: ors be installed so that detectors are located in all safety-related areas containing comtustibles.
At present Table 3.1 specifies that tnese detectors shall be installed oy the end of the 1978 refueling outage.
The licensee has requested that the completion date for instal-lation of the recently added detectors (to be installed in Fire Areas 34, 35, 39, 40 and 42) be extended to "as soon as possible, but no later than the end of the 1979 refugling outage."
3.1.39 The licensee has proposed to provide capability to communicate to the control room ' rem the reactor building using portable radio communications units.
At present Table 3.1 requires that this be completed by the end of the 1978 refueling outage. The licensee recuests that this be changed to the end of the 1979 refueling outage.
tvaluation Modification 3.1.33(11 On December 13, 1978, the licensee advised the staff by telephone that contrary to earlier expectations, he had been able to complete installation during the current refueling outage of more than 50%
of the fire barriers scheduled for installation in the reactor building. Accordingly, he stated, there was no further need for response to this portion
- of his recuest. We are, therefore, treating this portion of his request as having been withdrawn.
Modification 3.1.37 The substance of this change is to pennit a delay in the completion of installation of fire detectors in Fire Areas 34, 35, 39, 40 and 42.
As noted earlier, the reason the licensee is requesting an extension in the completion date for installing these additional
' detectors is because the need for detectors in these areas has only recently been identified in discussions between the staff and the licensee. Because the licensee will complete on schedule the instal-lation of fire detectors in the 37 fire areas previously identified, and since safe shutdown would not be affected by fires in any of the areas where an extension of time for installation of detectors is being requested, we conclude that the licensee has substantially improved the level of fire protection at his facility and that the granting of additional time to install fire detectors in these five additional fire areas will not significantly affect the total level of fire prctection provided. To minimize the period of time until detectors are installed in these five areas, however, the licensee has proposed to complete the installation as soon as possible but not later than the end of the next refueling outage. We have discussed this schedule with the licenste and based on these discussions he has agret:J to move up the latest date of completion from the next refueling (approximately December 1979) to July 1,1979. We believe such a date more realis-tically defines "as soon as possible," and therefore conclude that a latest date of completion of July 1,1979, is acceptable.
Modification 3.1.39 The subject of this modification is an antenna system designed to facilitate radio connunications between the interior of the reactor building and the control room. The licensee states that he has been unable to complete this modification on schedule due to the limited time available for implementing the modification (during the re-fueling outage), due to the shortage of qualified craftspersons (electricians) and because the modification has proven to be more difficult to implement than originally conceived.
Accordingly, the licensee has requested that the facility license be amended such that the date for completion of this modification is extended to the next refueling outage.
To support the acceptability of this deferral, the licensee cites that fire hoses have been installed in the reactor building in accordance with their commitment (Section 3.1.33(2)). The licensee also cites the following additional factors which make a significant fire unlikely in the reactor building:
(1) The oil catch basins installed on the reactor coolant pumos which collect and protectively contain a potentially large source of combustibles; (2) The flame retardant cable used in the reactor building which inhibits cable tray fires from propagating; and
-4.
(3) The existing ionization chambers in the reactor building which would provide early warning of fires.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the occurrence of a large or rapidly spreading fire in the reactor building is highly unlikely, and that means are available fer detecting and combatting a fire in this area.
In addition, the licensee cites the availability of conventional and sound-powered telephone systems which can be used for comuni-cation between the reactor building and the control room. He also cites closed circuit television with cameras in the area of the reactor coolant pumps as another possible comunication medium.
In addition, in discussions with the licensee he has verbally describec tests wherein portable radio transceivers (walkie-talkies) were successfully used for communication through the walls of the reactor building when both parties were in the vicinity of the electrical penetration area.
Pending completion of the antenna system such an arrangement could be used as part of a relay system and thus provide another potential conTnunication link.
The licensee will fully complete 18 of the 20 modifications scheduled for implementation by the end of the current refueling outage, and has partially com ieted the remaining two.
Of the modifications scheduled for completion during the current refueling outage, we find that the licensee will fully complete all those which provide protection of redundant safe shutdown equip-ment. Accordingly, we conclude that he has made a conscientious effort to fulfill all of his commitments. With respect to the incomplete status of Modification 3.1.39 and the deferral of its completion until the next refueling outage, we conclude C at there are several alternative corrmunication links between th' ictor building and the control room that could be used in the interim, if needed. Accordingly, we conclude that deferral of completion of this modification until the next refueling outage would not signifi-cantly affect the ability to combat fires in the reactor building, and therefore, such deferrat is acceptable.
Accordingly, the attached Table 3.1 supersedes Table 3.1 of the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation dated February 28, 1978 Environmental Consideration We have detennined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in pcwer level and will not result in any significant environmental imcact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insicnificant from the standocint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 951.5(d)(a), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
. Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendrant does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the prooosed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and Security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: December 14, 1978 i
TABLE 3.1 IMPLEMENTATION DATES FOR PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS ITEM DATE 3.1.1 Control and Computer Room........end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.2 Instrument Shop..................end of 1979 refuel ing outage 3.1.3 Chemical Storage Room............end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.4 Reactor Building Entrance Area...end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.5 Turbine Deck Corridor............end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.6 Wes t Ba ttery Room................end of 1979 refuel ing outage 3.1.7 West AC/DC Panel Room............end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.8 West 480 Volt Switchgear Room....end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.9 Wes t Cable Shaf t.................end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.10 East Cable Shaf t.................end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.11 East 480 Volt Switchgear Room....end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.12 East AC/DC Panel Rooms...........end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.13 Air Conditioning Equipment Room..end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.14 South Comunications Room........end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.15 Ventilation Equipment Room and Electrical Penetration Area....end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.16 Electrical Penetration Area Mezzanine Level................end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.17 Main Corridor Mezzanine Level....end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.18 West 4 KV Switchgear Room........end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.19 East 4 KV Switchgear Room........end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.20 East Nuclear Service Battery Room..end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.21 Electrical Penetration Area-Grade Level..end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.22 Main Corridor-Grade Level........end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.23 North Diesel Generator Room......end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.24 South Diesel Generator Room......end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.25 Waste Solidification Area........end of 1978 refuelino outage 3.1 26 Main Corridor-Below Grade........end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.2/
Corridor to (-) 47 Level-Below Grade..end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.28 High Pressure Injection Pump "A" Room..end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.29 Containment Penetration Valvr. Area West..end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.30 Containment Penetration Valve Area East..end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.31 Makeup Pump Rocm................{nd of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.32 High Pressure Injection Pump "B" Room..end of 1978 refueling cutage 3.1.33 Reactor Building. 50% by end of 1978 r.o.; 50% by end of 1979 r.o.
3.1.34 Fenced Yard Area.................end of 1978 refueling outage 3.1.35 Turbine Building.................end of 1978 refuel ing outage 3.1.36 General..........................end of 1979 refueli ng outaca 3.1.37 Smoke Detectors..................end of 1978 refueling outage '
l 3.1.38 Emergency Air Supply.............end of 1979 refueling outage 3.1.39 Radio Comunications-Reactor Bu'lding..end of 1979 refueling outage 1
3.1.40 Fi re Doors....................... end of 1978 refuel ing outage
- Except completion date for Fire Areas 34, 35, 39, 40 and 42 is July 1, 1979.
DATE: DECEMBER 14 1978