ML19095A638

LER 1976-002-03 for Surry Unit 1 Failure of Auxiliary Feedpump Discharge Valve MOV-FW-151A to Open When Main Feedpump Breakers Were Opened

ML19095A638
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	04/15/1976
From:	Stallings C Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:	Moseley N NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II
References
LER 1976-002-03
Download: ML19095A638 (3)

Text

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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC A.ND POWER COMP.A.NY RIOHMOND, VIRGINIA *23261 Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcem U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio Region II - Suite 818 50-280 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest License No. DPR-32 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Report-able Occurrence No. USRE-S1-76-02.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meetin~ of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours, H

c.

~

M. Stallings ~

Vice President-Power Supply and Production Operations Enclosures 40 copies USRE-Si-76-02 cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 4 401.5

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I IC ENS EE EVENT REPORT* **.1 CONTROL BLOCK: I I~ . I I I . . [PLEA,PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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'" 1 6 LICENSEE LICENSE EVENT NAME LICENSE NUMBER TYPE TYPE

@El lvlAlsl Pl sl 7 8 9 ii 15Io Io 1-1 oI oI oI oI ol-1 o I o25I l411l1l1lol 14 26 30 lo31 I332I REPORT REPORT Ct.TEGORY TYPE. SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE 7

@Ii]coN'T 8

Ip Io I 57 58 w 59

!.LI 60 l..9lslol~lo12l al 68

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69 74 lol4!1!3bl6l 75 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION

@lg] I With the unit shutdown, Auxiliary Feedpump Discharge Valve MOV-FW-151A failed to 7 8 9 80

!ol31 I open when the main feedpump breakers were opened. This is in violation of Technical I 7 8 9 80 joj4! I Specification 3.6. The redundant valve opened satisfactorily. A similar event I 7 8 9 . . . 80 jol5! I occurred on 12-11-75 and is described in A0-81-75-28. I 7 8 9 80

@I§J 7 8 9 PRIME 80 SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT COMPONENT CODE CODE COMPONENT CODE SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER VIOLATION

@EllclHI 7 8 9 10 W

11 IRI 12 E!L IA IY lxJ 17 w 43 I A I 11 0 I 9l47 44 Lu 48 CAUSE DESCRIPTION

~ j An investigation*revealed that the valve.malfunction was caused by the timing relay 7 B 9 80

@Jsl I which is a part of the control circuit. The relay plunger failed to activate a micro I 7 8 9 80 l2:@I I switch necessary for the valve opening operation. The timing relay/micro switch(Cont'd~

7 B 9 BO FACILITY METHOD OF STATUS  % POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY

• DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

~ lg_] lo Io Io I l N/A ~ IN/A 7 8 9 FORM OF 10 12 13 44 45 46 80 ACTIVITY CONTENT

• I OF RELEASE LOCATION OF RELEASE rn w RELEASED AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY I 7 8 9

~10 I11 N/A 44 45 N/A 80 I

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 7

~

8 9 lo lo lol11 uj 12

"--"N=A'---------------------~__;_-__;_~--1 13 80 PERS'Di-JNEL. INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION EEi8 9I ol o I o11J 7

."::---=Nc..;;.A=-------------------------_..J 12 80 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

.[ill! N A 7 8 9 80

.LOSS DR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 12)),

7 8 9 wTYPE 10 DESCRIPTION IN/A 80 PUBLICITY Elz] NA 7 8 9 80 ADDITIONAL FACTORS EJfil l The health and safety of the public were not *affected by this occurrence because the 7 8 9 80 IT@! l redundant valve opened, as did all of the other similar valves.

7 8 9 80 N A M E = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - PHONE: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

GPO 081*667'

e CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED) assembly was removed and bench tested. The plastic plunger was binding.with the plunger guide plate. Af.ter positioning the guide pl.ate properly and lubricating it, the relay operated satisfactorily SO.times during 50 tests. A replacement timing relay/micro switch assembly was obtained fr.om inventory. The same problem was initially found. Corrective adjustments were made, bench testing was satisfactorily completed, and this assembly installed in the circuit. The valve was returned to service following operational testing. Since the valve is normally open during power operation and all other valves operated properly, it is felt that no further corrective action is required at this time. However, plunger action will be verified monthly until such a time that the cause of plunger binding can be isolated and corrected.

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