05000280/LER-2019-002

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LER 2019-002-00 for Surry Power Station Unit 1, Items Non-Conforming to Design for Tornado Missile Protection
ML20054A141
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 02/04/2020
From: Mladen F
Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
20-041 LER 2019-002-00
Download: ML20054A141 (4)


LER-2019-002,
Event date:
Report date:
2802019002R00 - NRC Website

text

10CFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station 5570 Hog Island Road Surry, Virginia 23883 February 4, 2020 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 20-041 Attention: Document Control Desk SPS: SCN Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Docket No.: 50-280 50-281 License No.: DPR-32 DPR~37

Dear Sir ot Madam:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.7'3, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.

Report No. 50-280, 50-281 / 2019-002-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Facility Safety Review Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee.

Very truly yours, F. Mladen Site Vice President Surry Power Station Enclosure Commitment contained in this letter: None cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Marquis One Tower, Suite 1200 2~5 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 TEZZ

-~'

NRG Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

Reported lessons !earned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to

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.,.,, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) indusby. Send comments regarding burden estimate to U,e Information Services Branch (T-2 F43). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail

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(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and

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.* f~ (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budge~

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Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. Facility Name 2. Docket Number 3. Page Surry Power Station Unit 1 05000 280 1 OF 3
4. Title Items Non-Conforming to Design for Tornado Missile Protection
5. Event Date 6. LER Number 7. Report Date 8. Other Facilities Involved Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year Year I Sequential Number I Rev No.

Month Day Year Surry Power Station Unit 2 05000 Docket Number 281 12 11 2019 2019 - 002 ~

00 02 04 2020 Facility Name 05000

9. Operating Mode 11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 1 O CFR §: (Check all that apply)

D 20.2201(b) D 20.2203(a)(3)(i) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) D 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

D 20.2201(d) D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) [2] 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(B) D 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

N D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iii) D 50. 73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i) D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

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10. Power Level D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) D 73.71(a)(4)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) D 50.36(c)(2) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) *o 73. 71 (a)(5)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) D 50.46(a)(3)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) D 73. 77(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) D 73.77(a)(2)(i)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) [2] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

D Other (Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A)

12. Licensee Contact for this LER Licensee Contact Telephone Number (Include Area Code)

Stephen C. Newman, Nuclear Engineer Ill 757-365-3397

13. Complete One Line for each Component Failure Described in this Report Cause System Component Manufacturer Reportable to ICES Cause System Component Manufacturer IReportable to ICES I I I I I Month Day Year
14. Supplemental Report Expected
15. Expected Submission Date D Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date) [2] No Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces. i.e., approximately 14 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On December 11, 2019, Surry Nuclear Power Plant determined that the certain Unit 1 and 2 Class 1 Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) did not conform with the licensing basis for protection against a design basis tornado generated missile.

The affected equipment was declared inoperable and enforcement discretion invoked in accordance with NRG Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, Rev. 1, "Enforcement Discretion for Tornado Missile Protection Noncompliance." Initial compensatory measures were implemented pursuant to the guidance of NRG Interim Staff Guidance DSS-ISG-2016-01, Appendix A, within the time allowed by the applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation and the associated systems were then declared operable, but nonconforming.

Since the condition was part of the original plant design and licensing of the station, there was no specific cause identified.

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. Actions are underway to address the condition.

NRC FORM 366 (04-2018)

l I

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CONTINUATION SHEET Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnfonmation and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an infonmation (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRG may not conduct or http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staffisr1022/r3/) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the infonmation collection.

2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER
1. FACILITY NAME SEQUENTIAL REV I c:lYEAR NUMBER NO.

Surry Power Station Unit 1 05000- 280 I ~-I 002 1-0 NARRATIVE

Background:

Surry Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, are Westinghouse 3-Loop Pressurized Water Reactors [EIIS: AC] with a licensed maximum power level of 2546 megawatts thermal. Surry Unit 1 received its initial operating license on May 25, 1972, and Surry Unit 2 received its initial operating license on January 29, 1973, based in part on the design as described in Surry Power Station's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

As described in Chapter 2.0 of the UFSAR, Class 1 structures and systems, or parts thereof, whose failure might prevent the simultaneous cold shutdown of both reactor units during a loss-of-power incident will withstand by design a tornado missile with the following characteristics and associated effects:

  • Missile equivalent to a wooden utility pole 40-foot long, with 12-inch diameter, weighing 50 lbs/ft3, and traveling in a vertical or horizontal direction at 150 mph.
  • Missile equivalent to a 1-ton automobile traveling at 150 mph.

A: Plant Operating Conditions Prior to Event:

Units 1/2 Date: December 11, 2019 Power level: 100 percent/100 percent Mode: N/f\J There were no SSCs out-of-service that contributed to this event.

B: Description of Event:

On December 11, 2019, at 1356 [EST], it was concluded that certain Class 1 SSCs are vulnerable to design basis tornado missiles which could render the equipment inoperable and unable to perform its design function. Specifically, this condition affected the following equipment:

1. Component Cooling Water [cl IS: CC] piping for the 'A' Spent Fuel Cooling Water system heat exchanger [El IS: DA-HX]. This heat exchanger is vulnerable to a horizontal missile traveling through the fuel building roll-up door.
2. All three (3) Emergency Service Water (ESW) pumps [EIIS: BI-P] and their diesel fuel oil supply tank [EIIS: DC-TK].

The ESW pumps and diesel fuel oil tank are vulnerable to a horizontal missile penetrating the tornado missile screens

[EIIS: SCN].

3. Certain Component Cooling Water system pump discharge piping is vulnerable from a vertical missile penetrating the auxiliary building [EIIS: NF] roof.
4. The Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system pumps [EIIS: BA-P] and the pump suction and discharge piping are vulnerable to a missile traveling through the tornado missile screens on the sides and roof of the main steam valve [EIIS:

SB-VJ house. This vulnerability also exists for the Unit 2 AFW system.

5. The Unit 2 Service Water (SW) supply valves [EIIS: KE-V] to the river water make-up pump are vulnerable to a vertical missile traveling through the turbine building roof.

NRC FORM 366A (04-2018) Page 2 of 3

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CONTINUATION SHEET Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnfonmation and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an infonmation (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRG may not conduct or http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rrn/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/l sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the infonmation collection.

2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER
1. FACILITY NAME YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV

~ NUMBER NO.

Surry Power Station Unit 1 05000-1 280 I ~-I 002 1-~

NARRATIVE The affected equipment was declared inoperable and enforcement discretion invoked in accordance with NRC Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, Rev. 1, "Enforcement Discretion for Tornado Missile Protection Noncompliance." Initial compensatory measures were implemented pursuant to tlie guidance of NRC Interim Staff Guidance DSS-ISG-2016-01, Appendix A, within the time allowed by the applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and the associated systems were then declared operable, but nonconforming. An 8-hour ENS notification was submitted [Event Notification 54437].

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specification and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) as an event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. These reporting criteria were selected based on the historical nature of the issue.

C: Cause of Event:

This condition was part of the original plant design and licensing of the station. There was no specific cause identified.

D: Safety Consequences:

As documented EGM 15-002 (Rev. 1), tornado missile scenarios that may lead to core damage are very low probability events because safety-related SSCs are typically designed to withstand the effects of tornados. In addition, because plants are designed with redundancy and diversity, the tornado missiles would have to affect multiple trains of safety systems and/or means of achieving safe shutdown. -*

E: Corrective Action:

For the Surry Power Station, enforcement discretion provided by EGM 15-002 remains in effect until June 10, 2020, at which time modifications, analysis, license amendments, or other actions must be implemented to resolve the missile vulnerabilities.

F: Previous Occurrences:

There have been no previous Licensee Event Reports at Surry Power Station on this issue.

G: Component Failures:

None.

NRC FORM 366A (04-2018) Page 3 of 3