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CALLAWAY - SA9.0-iTABLE OF CONTENTSCHAPTER 9.0AUXILIARY SYSTEMS Section Page9.2WATER SYSTEMS.........
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.....................9.2-19.2.1STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM...........
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.....................9.2-19.2.1.2Essential Service Water System.............
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................9.2-29.2.3DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM.......
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.....................9.2-79.2.3.2System Description..........
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.....................9.2-79.2.3.3Safety Evaluation...........
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..........................9.2-109.2.4POTABLE WATER AND SANITARY WASTE WATER SYSTEM...........9.2-109.2.4.1Design Bases.......
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..........................9.2-139.2.5ULTIMATE HEAT SINK.........
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.....................9.2-199.5OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS....
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.....................9.5-19.5.1FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM...
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.....................9.5-19.5.2COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS (OFFSITE)............
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.....................9.5-1 CALLAWAY - SATABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
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.....................9.5E-1 CALLAWAY - SA9.0-iiiRev. OL-1412/04LIST OF TABLES NumberTitle9.2-1Service Water System Component Data9.2-2Essential Service Wate r System Component Data9.2-3Deleted 9.2-4Ultimate Heat Sink Component Data9.2-5Design Comparison to Regulatory Positions of Regul atory Guide 1.27, Revision 2 Dated January 1976, Titled "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants"9.2-6Deleted9.2-7Deleted CALLAWAY - SA9.0-ivRev. OL-1412/04LIST OF FIGURES NumberTitle9.2-1Circulating & Service Water System9.2-2Deleted 9.2-3Demineralized Wa ter Makeup System9.2-4Deleted9.2-5Deleted9.5-1Deleted 9.5-2Deleted CALLAWAY - SA9.2-1Rev. OL-21 5/159.2WATER SYSTEMS9.2.1STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEMThe station service water system consists of the Service Water System (SW) and the Essential Service Water System (ESW).
The SW system is used during normal operating and normal shutdown conditions in conj unction with portions of ESW system piping and valves. The ESW system is used during normal shutdow n conditions when the SW system is not available and abnormal conditions, such as loss of off-site power or a LOCA.9.2.1.1Service Water System9.2.1.1.1Design Bases9.2.1.1.1.1Safet y Design Basis The SW system serves no safety-related function.9.2.1.1.1.2Power Ge neration Design BasesPOWER GENERATION DE SIGN BASIS ONE -
The SW system provides sufficient cooling water to nonessential auxiliary plant equipment and to the ESW system over the full range of normal reactor operation and normal shutdown.9.2.1.1.2System Description9.2.1.1.2.1General DescriptionThe SW system outside the Power Block is shown in Figure 9.2-1. It consists of pumps, piping, valves, and associated instrumentation.
The SW system of each unit provides pumped circulation of approx imately 38,000 gpm of cooling water from the c ooling tower basin th rough various main plant auxiliary heat exchange equipment and returns it to the circulating water sy stem return line inside the plant. This flow is sufficie nt to remove heat at a rate of 189.9 million BTU/
hr during full load operation with water at 95°F enter ing the system and 105°F leaving the system. Heat dissipation of water returned to the cooling tower is described in Section 10.4.5
.Standard Plant FSAR Table 9.2-1 lists the components within the power block which are cooled by the SW system. Re spective SW system flow rate s and heat l oads are also given.SW system components are not des igned to seismic Category I criteria. Failure of the SW system components will not prohibit use of the ESW system for safe shutdown of the plant.
CALLAWAY - SA9.2-2Rev. OL-21 5/159.2.1.1.2.2Component DescriptionSW pumps - The three 50 percent system capacity service water pumps are single-stage, double-suction, vertical, constant-s peed dual-volute centrifugal type. Each pump is equipped with a hydraulically operated butterf ly valve on the discharge for isolation of the pump from the system. The valve is also progra mmed for quick closure to prevent reverse flow of water and pressure surge in the event of a pump trip. Refer to Table 9.2-1 for SW system component data.Controls are provided to automatically start the remaining pump if a protective relay trips any one of the running pumps.Design data for the SW components outsi de the Power Block are provided in Table 9.2-1.9.2.1.1.3Safety Evaluation The SW system performs no safety-related function. T he SW system is not required for safe shutdown of the plant.9.2.1.1.4Tests and Inspection
Refer to Section 9.2.1.1.4 of the Standard Plant FSAR.9.2.1.1.5Instrumenta tion ApplicationsStarting and stopping the service water pumps is a manual operation from the main control room. Upon loss of a service water pump, a backup pump automatically starts.9.2.1.2Essential Service Water System9.2.1.2.1Design Bases9.2.1.2.1.1Safety Design Bases Section 9.2.1.2 of the Standard Plant FSAR provides the gener al safety design bases met by this system.SAFETY DESIGN BASIS ONE - The components of the ESW system are sized to deliver, as a minimum, the requi red flow rates of water for safe shutdown of the plant.
Continuation of the minimum required cooling water flows to the engineered safety features equipment served by the system and continuation of the availability of water supplies for the Auxiliary F eedwater System, for the spent fuel pool standby makeup, and for makeup to the Component Cooling Water System are essential to ensure safe operation and safe shut down of the plant.
CALLAWAY - SA9.2-3Rev. OL-21 5/15The components of the system ar e designed to meet seismic Category I requirements and the single failure crit erion, as discussed in Section 9.2.1.2 of the Standard Plant FSAR.SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TWO - The ESW system is desi gned so that postulated environmental occurrences cannot impair the system's ability to meet its functional requirements. Failure of any adjacent nonseismic Ca tegory I structure will not constitute a hazard to the ESW system.9.2.1.2.1.2Power Ge neration Design BasisThe components of the ESW system located outside the Power Block have no power generation design basis.9.2.1.2.2System Description 9.2.1.2.2.1General DescriptionThe ESW system outside the Power Block, shown in Standard Plant FSAR Fig. 9.2-2 Sht. 3, consists of pumps, pump prelube storage tanks, pipi ng, self-cleaning strainers, valves, and associated instrumentation.The system consists of two 100-percent redundant flow paths with one pump supplying cooling water to each flow path. Each flow path is fed from the ultimate heat sink retention pond (refer to Site Addendum Sections 9.2.5 and 3.8.4.1.5).The ESW pumps are located in a seismic Category I pumphouse (refer to Site Addendum Section 3.8.4.1.1). Each flow path is prot ected from internally generated missiles, jet impingement, and flooding that may result from cracks in adjacent flow path piping by interior walls. Equipment protection from high winds and floods is discussed in Site Addendum Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Tornado missile protection is discussed in Section 3.5.2
.The ESWS pumphouse forebay inlet openings are intrinsically protected from blockage by credible tornado missiles or debris. Each individual opening is 8 feet wide by 7 feet 6 inches high. As designed, the ESWS is capable of withstanding the blockage of a single pumphouse forebay inlet opening. System r edundancy provides a ssurance that the remaining unblocked train will pr ovide the necessary flow for safe shutdown. This is based on the single failure criterion listed in Standard Plant Section 3.1.2
.Therefore, tornado debris must completely block both forebay openings to affect the system. However, as shown on Figures 3.8-1 and 3.8-2 for the ESWS pumphouse, a concrete stop log guide is located between each opening. These guides project 3 feet, 3 inches into the forebay. The total width across two adjacent forebay openings is 31 feet.
The design UHS retention pond water level is 26 feet above the forebay floor. Therefore, CALLAWAY - SA9.2-4Rev. OL-21 5/15 no credible tornado debris can completely cover both foreba y inlet openings blocking all flow to the ESW pump suction.9.2.1.2.2.2Component Description ESW PUMPS - Each of the two ESW pumps has a capacity of 100 percent of the flow rate required during accident conditions. The pumps are of the vertical centrifugal type. Pumps are sized to include an additional one perc ent margin on the fl ow at the design head to accommodate degrada tion of performance due to impeller wear.ESW PUMP PRELUBE STORAGE TANKS - Each ESW pump is provided with a prelube storage tank. The tank supplies the pump lineshaft bearings with water to prevent the bearings above the pit water level from running dry during startup. Tank size is based on supplying a minimum of a 5-minute supply of water, at 6 gpm, with no makeup from the pump discharge line. W hen the pump is operat ing, the bearings ar e lubricated by the pumped fluid.
ESW SELF-CLEANING STRAINERS - One self-cleaning strainer is provided for each ESW flow path. One hundred per cent of the ESW flow is fi ltered through the strainer element. On high differential pressure, the strainer element is automatically backwashed to eject the a ccumulated debris.PIPING AND VALVES - Yard piping outside the Power Block is carbon steel, stainless steel, or polyethylene. Two entirely separate and redundant lines are provided.Design data for the ESW pumps, prelube storage tanks, se lf-cleaning strainers, and piping and valves is provided in Table 9.2-2. Codes and standards applicable to the ESW system are listed in Table 3.2-1 of the Standard Plant FS AR. The ESW system outside the Power Block is quality group C and is seismic Category I.9.2.1.2.3System Operation Following an accident which results in generat ion of an SIS and/or loss of offsite power, the ESW system is automatically isolated from the SW system by motor-operated valves. Both ESW pumps are automatically started by the emergency diesel load sequencer. Pump A starts 32 seconds and pump B starts 37 seconds after receipt of the SIS or loss of offsite power signal. The pumps supply cool ing water from the ulti mate heat sink to the Power Block components. After cooling the equipment, the heated water is returned to the ultimate heat sink cooling tower. Refer to Standard Plant FSAR Section 9.2.1.2.2.3 for a description of the system operation in the event of loss of only one Class-1E 4160-V bus.The ESW system provides emergency suction supply to the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFS) upon failure of the condensate storage tank. In addition to the SIS and loss of offsite power signals, the ESW pump start logic includes the open signal to the ESW supply valves to AFS (auxiliar y feedwater low suction pressure, LSP). The auxiliary CALLAWAY - SA9.2-5Rev. OL-21 5/15 feedwater LSP signal also closes the ESW/
SW system isolation valves. This assures ESW supply to the AFS follo wing an SSE without an accompanying a ccident or loss of offsite power (refer to Standard Plant FSAR Section 10.4.9). Following an SSE, operator action lines the discharge of the ESW system to t he ultimate heat sink.
The ESW pump discharge piping includes a vent line with a normally open, motor-operated valve. This valve remains open until 15 seconds after pump start. This vents the air in the pump co lumn and discharge piping to prevent system water hammer.The prelube storage tank is continuously supplied with wa ter by a conne ction on the ESW pump discharge, downs tream of the check valve and self-cleaning strainer. Tank level can be automatically maintained by acti on of the supply line to the pump lineshaft bearings and stuffing box, and the open tank overflow, and by the manual se tting of the globe valve in the tank supply line. The tank provides water to the lineshaft bearings and stuffing box continuously (p rovided that the di scharge line is pressurized) even during periods when the ESW pumps are idle. The discharge lines are normally pressurized by the SW pumps. When the ESW pump is running, flow in the supply line from the tank reverses and discharges through the overflow. If an undetected failure of the SW pumps is assumed, this could result in loss of prelube supply prior to operator action to start the ESW pump. However, the pump will start and c ontinue to run sati sfactorily in an emergency situation with dry bearings. Bronze lineshaft bearings are provided in the ESW pumps because of this possibility. The alternate bearing material (cutless rubber) would have a greater tendency to seize during this transient.
The self-cleaning strainers filt er the supply water to the Power Block. High differential pressure caused by accumulated debris on the strainer el ement is corrected automatically by backwas hing the element to th e ultimate heat sink.9.2.1.2.4Safety Evaluation Safety evaluations are numbered to corr espond to the safety design bases in Section 9.2.1.2.1. Safety evaluations for the general safety design bases are provided in Standard Plant Section 9.2.1.2.4
.SAFETY EVALUATION ONE - The ESW system services two identical trains of engineered safety features equ ipment which are required for safe shutdown of the reactor. Only one train of the redundant plant component s is required for the safe shutdown of the plant after any postulated accident condition. Water is supplied to each train of components by a separate pump and header.
Both essential service water trains are capable of individually supplying the required cooling water flows to meet the single failure criterion.The single active failure analysis is presented in Table 9.2-5 of the Standard Plant FSAR.
This provides the basis for t he technical specifications with regard to limi ting conditions for operation and surveillance.
CALLAWAY - SA9.2-6Rev. OL-21 5/15SAFETY EVALUATION TWO - The ESW pumps, prelube storage tanks and self-cleaning strainers are located in a seismic Category I pumphouse which is designed to protect the pumps against adverse environmental occurr ences of tornado, missiles, and safe shutdown earthquake. Other parts of the system located outside the Power Block are either buried undergr ound or located in seismic Category I stru ctures. All structures and components of the system are located so that t he failure of any nonseismic Category I structur e would not constitute a haz ard to the ESW system. The location of the ESW system structures and components is such that:a.It is adequately separated from al l non-seismic Cate gory I structures.b.The essential service water lines and seismic Category I electrical duct banks are placed below non-seismic lines at points of intersection, or are otherwise analyzed to be acceptable cons idering failure of the nonseismic lines.c.It precludes any hazard to the syst em from the fail ure of man-made structures, such as the failure of slopes or the postulated rupture of storage tanks.The seismic Category I essential servic e water pumphouse, de signed as a unitized redundant facility, is located app roximately 575 feet south-sout heast of the centerline of the reactor as shown in Figure 1.2-44. The routing of the e ssential service water pipe lines, as shown in Figure 1.2-45 , is designed to avoid interfer ences with t he circulating water lines which approach t he Power Block from the nort heast direction. The ESW system lines are located to minimize the num ber cross-overs with the SW lines and with the pipes within the ESW system itself. The ESW lines are buried at such a depth to preclude any hazard from a postulated fail ure of any nonseism ic Category I pipes located above.9.2.1.2.5Tests and Inspections Refer to Section 9.2.1.2.4 of the Standard Plant FSAR.9.2.1.2.6Instrumenta tion ApplicationsRedundant controls are provided to initiate the start of the essential service water pumps following an accident and/or loss of offsite power.
Redundant and independent power supplies for controls and instrumentation are provided from Class 1E busses. Refer to Standard Plant Chapter 8.0. Indicating and alarm devices for the system are provided in Standard Plant FSAR Table 9.2-6
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CALLAWAY - SA9.2-7Rev. OL-21 5/159.2.3DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEMThe demineralized water system consists of the Demineralized Water Makeup System (DWM) and the Demineralized Water Storage and Transfer S ystem (DWST). This section provides information on the demineralized water makeup system to be constructed external to the Power Block unit.9.2.3.1Design Bases9.2.3.1.1Safety Design Bases
The DWM system serves no safety func tion and has no sa fety design basis.9.2.3.1.2Power Gener ation Design BasesPOWER GENERATION D ESIGN BASIS ONE - The DWM syst em provides water to the demineralized water storage tank at the Power Block to suppo rt power generation.POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS TWO - The DWM system provides water meeting the specif ications noted in Section 9.2.3 of the Standard Plant FSAR.9.2.3.1.3Codes and Standards The DWM system is designed and fabricated to confor m to applicable codes and standards.9.2.3.2System Description9.2.3.2.1General Description The DWM system is shown on Figure 9.2-3. It consists of fi ltration pretreatment equipment, two demineralizer trains in parallel, local demineralized water holding tanks, regeneration systems, bulk r egenerant chemical storage tanks, a waste neutralization tank, a waste equalization bas in, regeneration waste lagoon, and all associated pumps, piping, and controls.The DWM system treats clarified river water or water from an on-site well to meet the water quality referenced abov e and transfers the treated water to the demineralized water storage tank near the Power Block.
The system remove s suspended solids, dissolved organic matter, resi dual chlorine, and dissolved i onic mineral impurities from the clarified water.
CALLAWAY - SA9.2-8Rev. OL-21 5/159.2.3.2.2Component Description9.2.3.2.2.1Filtration Pr etreatment Equipment The filtration pretreatment equipment consists of a wet well, chlorinator, clarified water pumps, gravity sand filters, clearwell, service and backwash pumps, auxiliary service pumps, and activated carbon filters. The gr avity sand filters remo ve suspended solids from the influent. Chlorine is periodically applied to prevent biological growth in the filters. The activated carbon filters remove residual chlorine and most dissolved organic matter in the water, and pr otect the demineralizer ion exchange resins from organic fouling. The effluent from the activated car bon filters feeds the dem ineralizer trains and also provides 8 gpm to the Potable Water System while th e demineralizer trains are operating, and 15 gpm from auxiliary service pumps when the demineralizer trains are not operating.9.2.3.2.2.2Demineralizer Trains Each demineralizer train consists of one weak acid cation exchanger, one strong acid cation exchanger, one degasifier and forced draft blower, one degasified water booster pump, one strong base anion exchanger, one mixed bed exchanger, piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls.
Each demineralizer train is sized to provide 300,000 gallons per day of demineral ized water to the Power Block and 8 gpm to the Potable Water System while either demineralizer train is operating. Each demineralizer train has its own monitoring and contro l system enclosed in a single demineralizer control panel.
The ion exchanger vessels ar e equipped with access manholes, vents, drains, sight glasses, and flanged openings to permi t sluicing of resin. The internals are of corrosion resistant material a nd are designed to adequatel y distribute and collec t the flow without channeling or short-circuiting.
Each mixed bed exchanger is provided with a flanged resin trap in its effluent line. The resin traps are designed to retain all particles larger than 50 mesh and to withstand a differential pressure of 150 psig.9.2.3.2.2.3Demineralizer Regeneration Equipment The demineralizer regeneration equipment consists of acid pumps, caustic pumps, dilution water pumps, mixed bed blowers, demineralized water holding and hot water tanks, caustic dilution water heating equipment, regenerant in-line dilution piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls. Each demineralizer train has its own independent acid and caustic regeneration system.
Concentrated sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide are stored in tanks common to both trains. Instrumentation and controls automatically regulate the required amo unt of regeneration chem icals, concentration, and temperature. Conditi ons deviating from the specified ranges so und a local alarm and stop regeneration.
CALLAWAY - SA9.2-9Rev. OL-21 5/159.2.3.2.2.4Neutralization TankThe neutralization tank is an above-grade, open top, rubber-lined steel tank, located outside the demineralized water system building. It collects the waste streams produced during regeneration of the demineralizer trains. The tank is sized to hold the waste water from two regenerations. In addition, floor drainage from the demineralized water system building is collected in a sump and pumped to the neutralization tank. A mechanical agitator is used to mix the contents to a hom ogeneous pH. If necessary, dilute acid or caustic is automatically added to neutralize the waste. After the proper pH is attained, the tank outlet valve is automatically opened and the contents are discharged by gravity to the equalization basin.9.2.3.2.2.5Equalization Basin The equalization basin is a below grade, open top, concrete basin located outside the demineralized water building. It collects the backwash from the filtration pretreatment equipment, and wet well overflow. The contents are dischar ged by gravity at a uniform flowrate to the Water Treatment Plant Sludge Disposal System.9.2.3.2.2.6Demineralizer Waste Pump StationThe Demineralizer Waste Pump Station is a below grade concrete pump station located outside the Demineralized Wate r System Building. It accepts overflow from the equalization basin and pumps the waste to the regeneration waste lagoon. After settlement, the supernatant fl ows by gravity to the Supernatant Pump Station, which recycles the water to the Water Treatment Plant.9.2.3.2.2.7System Operation Flow of demineralized water to the Power Block is cont rolled by an open-close valve operated by level switches on the associated demineralized water tank. When the valve is open, the flow through each train is modulated by an auto/manual controller located in the main control room. In the auto mode, flow to the DWST is modulated proportionally to DWST level to minimize tank level fluctuations.Effluent quality from each deminer alizer train is monitored by instruments, and a service rinse is initiated autom atically if conductivity levels increase above preset limits. A demineralizer train is taken out of service automatically if exhaustion is indicated by flow totalizer, silica level, or conductivity level. Exhaustion of the train is signaled on the main control panel located in the main control room.
Regeneration of a demineralizer is automatic after being init iated manually in the Unit 1 main control room or locall y at the demineralizer control panel. After completion of regeneration, including filling of the local demineralized water holding tank and hot water tanks, the train remains on standby until manually returned to service.
CALLAWAY - SA9.2-10Rev. OL-21 5/159.2.3.3Safety Evaluation The DWM system serves no safety related function.9.2.3.4Tests and Inspections The DWM system equipment is initially inspected and tested in accordance with preoperational test procedures as described in Chapter 14 to insure system integrity and completeness.9.2.3.5Instrumentation Applications Local and remote indicators and alarms are provided to monitor the system and to protect the system components. Pressure differential, turbidity, pH, conductivity, silica, flow, and temperature monitors and alarms are provided for ea ch applicable point in the system. High and low level alarms are installed on the tanks in the system and the degasifiers. The regeneration por tion of the system is fully monitored and protected by pressure, flow, temperatur e, and conductivity alarms.9.2.4POTABLE WATER AND SANITARY WASTE WATER SYSTEMThe Potable Water (PW) and Sanitary Waste Water (S WW) system described herein is for the site-related portion of the system.9.2.4.1Design Bases9.2.4.1.1Safety Design Bases The PW and SWW system serv es no safety function and has no safety design basis.9.2.4.1.2Power Gener ation Design BasisPOWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS ONE - The bacteriological and chemical quality of the potable water meets the requirements of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations (1975) and the Missouri Public Drinking Water Regul ations (1979).POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS TWO - DeletedPOWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS THREE - DeletedPOWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS FOUR - DeletedPOWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS FIVE - There ar e no physical connections between the potable water supply system and a sanitary sewer or process water line, or appurtenance thereto which would permit the passage of any sewage or process water CALLAWAY - SA9.2-11Rev. OL-21 5/15into the potable water supply. Instrument ation and positive contro l are provided to protect the PW system from contamination by demineralizer regener ant chemicals that may unintentionally enter the demineralizer effluent.Where possible, sanitary and process wate r sewers are locat ed at least 10 feet, horizontally, from any potable water distribution system pipi ng. Where local conditions prevent a lateral separation of 10 feet, a sewer may be laid closer than 10 feet under either of the foll owing conditions:a.It is laid in a separate trench.b.It is laid in the same trench with the wate r mains located at one side on a bench of undist urbed earth.
Wherever sewers cross under wa ter mains, the sewer is laid at such an elevation that the crown of the sewer is at least 12 inches below the invert of the water main. No sewer crosses over a water main.POWER GENERATION DE SIGN BASIS SIX - The SWW system treats the waste from up to a flow of 40,000 gallons per day.9.2.4.2System Description9.2.4.2.1Potable Water SystemThe potable water system provides chlorinated water for the domestic water needs of the Power Block, and other per manent plant buildings.9.2.4.2.1.1Deleted9.2.4.2.1.1.1Deleted The main supply to the storage tank is an on-site well. The tank has a usable volume of 23,000 gallons and is made of unpigmented fibergla ss-reinforced plastic.9.2.4.2.1.1.2Deleted 9.2.4.2.1.1.3Deleted9.2.4.2.1.2System OperationThe potable water system is predominantly automat ic and requires per iodic monitoring and sampling.The potable water distribution system is kept under constant pressure. Pressure control valves maintain distribution pressure at approximately 62 psig for the proper operation of CALLAWAY - SA9.2-12Rev. OL-21 5/15 fixtures and equipment throughout the site. The automatic control of the pumping system reacts to changes in system demand by monitori ng the pressure in the distribution system, and starts or stops pumps as required to maintain the required pressure throughout t he distribution system.9.2.4.2.2Sanitary Waste Water System
The SWW system provides for collection treatment and discharge of sanitary waste water generated during the operation of Callaway Plant. The SWW system consists of a gravity sewer collection system, force mains, a raw sewage wet well/dry well lift station, three flow through sewage tr eatment lagoons, and a wetlands.9.2.4.2.2.1Component Description9.2.4.2.2.1.1Raw Sewage Lift StationThe raw sewage lift station takes suction from the wet well and pumps the collected sanitary waste to the primar y sewage treatment lagoon. It consists of a duplex pump system controlled by a liquid le vel sensor in the wet well.9.2.4.2.2.1.2Flow Through Sewage Treatment Lagoons The flow through sewage tr eatment lagoons consist of three separate unaerated lagoons. The sewage treatment lagoon system is designed and constructed in accordance with the Missouri Code of State Regulations, 10 CSR 20 - Chapter 8. The effluent from the lagoons is discharged to the sew age treatment wetlands.9.2.4.2.2.1.3Sewage Treatment Wetlands The sewage treatment we tlands is located at the former site of water treatment plant sludge lagoons #1 & #2. The sludge lagoons evolved into wetlands from silt deposited in the sludge lagoon as a re sult of the operation of the water treatment plant. Aquatic plants such as cattails, willows, duck weed, bulrush and ot hers created a natural wetlands after the lagoon was no longer used as a settling pond for silt. The wetlands is now used as a polishing area for the SWW system to comple te the treatment process.9.2.4.2.2.2System OperationThe sanitary sewer system collects sanitary waste water generated throughout the plant area and transports it to the raw sewage lift station. The lift station conveys the waste water to the sewage treatment lagoons.The waste stream is discharged into the primary lagoon where it is processed by bacteria under natural conditions. Effl uent from the primar y lagoon will then gravity flow into the secondary pond where the waste water will continue to be processed by aerobic bacteria.
CALLAWAY - SA9.2-13Rev. OL-21 5/15The effluent from the secondary lagoon will then gravity flow to the tertiary lagoon which is primarily a stilling chamber to allow any remaining solids to settle out. The resulting clear water will then gravity flow to the wetlands lift station where it is pumped to the wetlands for fi nal treatment.The wetlands polishes the water received from the lagoons by natural processes. Water in the wetlands is maintained at a depth which allows the natural process of plants, sunlight and bacteria to clean the water. Effluent from the wetla nds is combined with supernatant from the Water Treatment Pl ant Sludge Lagoon system. This is then recycled to the Water Treatment Plant. 9.2.4.3Safety Evaluation The PW and SWW system serve no safety-relat ed function.9.2.4.4Tests and InspectionsThe PW system equipment is initially inspected and tested in accordance with applicable codes and preoperational test procedures to insure system integrity and completeness. The effluent of the sewage treat ment system is monitored for flow, biochemical oxygen demand, suspended solids, and pH in accordance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit issued by the Missouri Depart ment of Natural Resources.9.2.4.5Instrumentation Applications Local and remote indicators and alarms are provided to monitor the systems and to protect system components. Pressure, flow, and level instruments and alarms are provided as necessary to adequately monito r the system.9.2.5ULTIMATE HEAT SINK
The ultimate heat sink (UHS) for the plant consists of a 4-cell seismic Category I mechanical draft cooling to wer and a seismic Category I source of makeup water (retention pond) for the tower. Heat from the Essential Service Water Systems (ESW), as discussed in Standard Plant FSAR Section 9.2.5, is rejected to the UHS to permit a safe shutdown of the unit following an accident.
Using conservative analytical methods, the appropriate UHS wa ter level for the plant is determined. This calculation results in a minimum initial UHS water level Technical Specification limit of 16.0 feet (this level incl udes 12% margin by volume).
CALLAWAY - SA9.2-14Rev. OL-21 5/159.2.5.1Design Bases9.2.5.1.1Safety Design BasesStandard Plant Section 9.2.5 provides the general de sign bases met by the UHS.SAFETY DESIGN BASIS ONE -
The UHS furnishes the cooling water source allowing the ESW system to supply a pproximately 15,000 gpm of c ooling water per train to remove the heat loads of the components listed in Standard Plant FSAR Section 9.2.5. The maximum UHS retention pond and ESW supply water temperature reached due to post-LOCA heat load removal will not exceed 92.3°F.SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TWO - The UHS is designed to meet the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.27, Ultimate Heat Sink.SAFETY DESIGN BASIS THREE - The UHS retention pond capacity is sufficient to permit the safe shutdown of t he reactor following a design basis large break LOCA as well as cooling the loads associated with a normal plant shutdown.
The design and operational parameters of the UHS provide the required 30 day supply of cooling water following a desig n basis large break LOCA.9.2.5.1.2Power Gener ation Design Basis The UHS is not requir ed for power generation.9.2.5.2System Description9.2.5.2.1General DescriptionThe UHS consists of one se ismic Category I mechanical draft cooling tower with redundant cells and a seis mic Category I excava ted retention pond.Standard Plant FSAR Figure 1.2-48 , Site Addendum FSAR Figure 3.8-12, and Site Addendum FSAR Figure 3.8-15 show the locati on and arrangement of the UHS cooling tower and the retention pond.A piping and instrumentation diagram for t he UHS is shown in Standard Plant FSAR Figure 9.2-2 Sht. 3.9.2.5.2.2Component Description COOLING TOWER - The cooling tower is safety-related, seismic Category I, mechanical draft type, sized with 100-per cent redundancy to pr ovide heat dissipation for safe shutdown following an accident. The cooling tower is prot ected from horizontal and vertical tornado missiles. Details of the tower structural design and missile protection are CALLAWAY - SA9.2-15Rev. OL-21 5/15 provided in Section 3.8.4.1.4. Tornado missile pr otection design criter ia are provided in Section 3.5.3.1
.Design data for all cooling tower components is provided in Table 9.2-4. The cooling tower is divided into four ce lls with one fan asse mbly (fan, gear reduc er and motor) per cell. Two of the four cells (one train of the ESW) are required for safe shutdown. Backup electric power to the fan motors is s upplied from the emer gency diesel generators located in the Power Blocks.
Supply headers and spray pi pes for each train of ESW from the Power Block are separated by interior walls. A passive failure of the spra y pipe for one train of the ESW will not affect the pipi ng for the other train.
Figure 3.8-12 provides the arrangement for the cooling tower components. Refer to Standard Plant Section 9.4.8 for a description of the c ooling tower electrical room ventilation equipment.
FREEZE PROTECTION - Freeze pr otection of the tower fill is provided by automatic bypass of the spray system. ESW from the power block is diverted directly into the cooling tower basin (refer to Section 9.2.5.5
). Freeze protection of the spray system when the tower is idle is provided as follows:a.Piping above El. 1998'-6" is prov ided with a continuous drain.b.Piping from the basin floor (El. 1996'-6")
to El. 1998'-6" is heat traced to keep all the supply pipe ab ove the maximum frost depth free from ice closure.During periods when the tower is idle, the fan stack missi le protection design shown on Fig. 3.8-12 is intrinsically protected against excessive ice, snow or debris blockage. The drip ledge along the bottom periphery of the 28'-4" diameter concrete missile shield support beams will prevent damaging ice formation above the fan. Th e grating design (2 1/2 inches deep with 2 1/8 inches clea r openings) and open beam supports which surround the missile shield c ontribute to prevention of ic e blockage. The grating is completely shadowed by the co oling tower roof with the r oof opening diameter being 6 inches less than the di ameter of the missile shield. Th is will protect the grating from contact with vertical sleet or snowfall. Oblique precipitation or debr is entering the roof opening will contact only a fraction of the grating. Fan design static pressure exceeds missile protection and tower losses by a margin of 15 percent to account for this possibility. Ice blockage of the grating which causes its static loss to exceed the fan rating could result in degr adation of cooling to wer performance. However, low UHS retention pond initial temperature (compared to design ca se) will provide additional cooling capability.Water from the cooling tower basin is fed by gravity through two 36-inch pipes to the retention pond. Normal level in the retention pond results in standi ng water in the basin CALLAWAY - SA9.2-16Rev. OL-21 5/15sumps. Two immersion heaters per basin su mp are provided to prevent ice blockage when the towers are idle.RETENTION POND - The UHS retention pond which contains makeup water for the UHS cooling tower is an exca vation in existi ng and fill soils.
The approximate dimensions of the pond at grade El.
1999.5 feet are 33 0 by 680 feet. The bottom of the pond elevation is 1977.5 feet, and the side slopes are 3 horizontal to 1 vertical. The side slopes are protected by riprap from the surrounding grade elevation to El. 1987.5 feet. The design wa ter level in the pond is El.
1995.5 feet. The target (nominal) UHS retention pond level is mainta ined between levels co rresponding to the low and high level alarms. Tw o submerged, reinforced c oncrete discharge structures discharge water into the pond from the UHS cooling tower.
A reinforced concrete outlet structure is provided for outflow from the pond.
Approximately 56 acre-feet of water is maintained below th e design water level of 18 feet, plant El. 1995.5. The minimum initial Technical Specification water level is 16.0 feet, plant El. 1993.5, which maintains a volume over 48.2 acre-feet in the UHS. The UHS was analyzed for the des ign basis LOCA in acco rdance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.27 assuming two ESWS trains in operation for the first 7 days and single train operation thereafter. The total inventory loss from the UHS duri ng the 30 day period under the most limiting meteorological conditions (maximum evaporation conditions) was conservatively calculated to be 40.9 acre-feet. The total water volume remaining after 30 days is greater than 7.3 acre-feet. The usable portion of this volume is greater than 4.97 acre-feet which prov ides a margin of 12% above the total volume requirement.
Degradation due to silt ation will not occur bec ause of the normal quiet state of the pond and the composition of the in situ clay materials.
The in situ clays have very low permeabilities which make seepage negligible. The capacity of the pond is sufficient to accommodate any expected ice formation.Structural design of the UHS retention po nd is described in Section 3.8.4
.A 14-inch-diameter, non-seismic Category I make-up line provides normal makeup water for the pond. Source of the makeup water is the water treatment plant cl earwell. Plant procedures control makeup to the pond from the clearwe ll deepwell or service water systems. No blowdown fo r the pond is provided.Typical plans and sections for t he UHS retention pond are shown on Figures 3.8-15 , 3.8-16 , and 3.8-17.9.2.5.2.3System Operation Normal cooling of the safe ty-related equipment is by t he service water system, as described in Section 9.2.1. When the ESW system is put in to operation, water is drawn from the UHS retenti on pond by means of the ESW pumps. It is then pumped through CALLAWAY - SA9.2-17Rev. OL-21 5/15the Power Block components and returned to the cooling tower basin. The spray system is bypassed until UHS inlet water temperatur e from the Power Block reaches 84°F. The fans remain de-energized until UHS inlet water temperature from the Power Block reaches 95°F after which the fans will start in slow speed. The fans wi ll switch to high speed when the UHS inlet wa ter temperature reaches 105F. After the EFT-0061 and EFT-0062 ESW pump discharge (ESW supply) temperature control loops are enabled by control room operators using handswitches EFHS 0067 and EFHS0068 (one switch per train), the actuation temperatures are, in ascending order, 79F (bypass valves close), 84.5 F (cooling tower fans st art in low speed), and 89.5 F (cooling tower fans switch to high speed). The water flow s from the cooling tower bas in to the retention pond by gravity through two 36-inch pipes, one per train of the ESW. Refer to Section 9.2.1.2 for a description of the ESW pumps and piping outside the Power Block. Standard Plant FSAR Section 9.2.5 provides the heat loads on t he UHS cooling to wer and the UHS water chemistry analysis.9.2.5.3Safety EvaluationSAFETY EVALUATION ONE - The UHS is sized to dissipate the maximum heat loads post DBA listed in Standard Plant FSAR Section 9.2.5 while providing an ESW supply water temperature less than or equal to 92.3°F. It is assumed that the DBA occurs at the time that the most adverse me terological conditions for towe r performance prevail. The UHS pond temperature reached under these conditions will not exceed 92.3°F. The design-basis maximum ESW supply temperat ure from the UHS re tention pond is 95F. That value was used in the design of the UHS cooling tower cells (FSAR Site Addendum Table 9.2-4 of Reference 1) and is the assumed ESW inlet te mperature to all loads served by ESW except for the electrical penetration room coolers. However, the maximum ESW supply and UHS ret ention pond temper ature of 92.3F establishes the upper acceptance criterion in the minimum heat transfer and maximum evaporation cases in the analysis supporting the 30-day UHS inventory requirement per RG 1.27 (Ref. 2). In addition, an ESW inlet temperature of 92.3F is also assumed in the analysis of the electrical penetration room temperatures (room coolers supplied by ESW). The 92.3 F value is the maximum te mperature allowed in t hese analyses to support UHS operability assuming an initia l maximum temperature of 89 F.SAFETY EVALUATION TWO - The UHS retention pond meets the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.27 for a single UHS water source.The UHS cooling tower is designed to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake or design basis tornado and for single failure, either active or pa ssive, without loss of function. Additionally, due to the manner in which emer gency power is supplied to the pumps and cooling tower fans from the emergency diesels, the system functions are unimpaired by an active diesel failure.
Since the UHS pond is an excavated depressi on and the water is not retained by man-made structural features , the postulation in NRC Re gulatory Guide 1.27 of the single failure of man-made st ructural features does not apply. The UHS pond is CALLAWAY - SA9.2-18Rev. OL-21 5/15designed to withstand the most severe natural phenomena expected. See Section 2.4.3 for coincident wind wave activity and Section 2.4.5 for surge and seiche sources. Slope stability is discussed in Section 2.5.5. The UHS pond is so located that its function is not to be affected by postulated accidents incurred by traffic on vehicle access roads or other site-related events.
Non-seismic, non-Category I st ructures near the se ismic Category I ultimate heat sink cooling tower include the fire pumphouse, the portable water plant and the Maintenance Training Annex/Operations Support Facility, as shown in Fig 1.2-44. A postulated structural failure of these non-seismic buildings would not impose a hazard to the cooling tower since the tower enclosure is des igned as a tornado-resistant structure.
Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.27 is tabulated in Table 9.2-5. A single failure analysis for the UHS cooling tower is contained in Standard Plant FSAR Table 9.2-5
.SAFETY EVALUATION THREE - The UHS retent ion pond volume at the design level is approximately 56 acre-feet.
At the minimum level required by the plant Technical Specifications the contained volume is 48.2 acre-feet of water.
40.9 acre-feet is needed to provide a 30 day supply of cooling and makeup water post LOCA under maximum evaporation conditions for this period. The total pond water volume remaining after 30 days is 7.3 acre-feet. The usab le portion of this volume is 4.97 acre-feet, which is the volume of water above the minimum level needed to mainta in the required net positive suction head for the ESWS pumps. This remaining volume provides a margin that is greater than 12% of the total water volume. In the event normal plant facilities are not in operation within 30 days after an emergency shutdown, approximately 13 acre-feet of water are availabl e from the water treatment plant clarifiers. This wate r can be pumped into the UHS retention pond by portable pumps for UHS heat dissipation purposes.
In the event the clarifiers have been damaged, water can be trucked from offsite. An adequat e number of 40,000 to 45,000 pound capacity bulk liquid carrier s are available in the metropolitan ar ea. These trucks would be mobilized to obtain water from Fulton (10 miles), Jefferson City (25 miles), or Columbia (32 miles). In the extremely unlikely event water would not be av ailable from any of the above cities, portable pumps will be obtai ned and water ca n be pumped from the Missouri River (6 miles) to fill the trucks.9.2.5.4Testing and Inspections The UHS is designed to include the capability for testing through the fu ll operational sequence that brings the system into operation for reactor shutdown and for loss-of-coolant accidents, incl uding operation of applicabl e portions of the protection system and the transfer between normal and standby power sources.The components of the UHS, i.
e., fans, valves, tower fill , and piping (to the extent practicable), are desi gned and located to permit preser vice and inservice inspections.
CALLAWAY - SA9.2-19Rev. OL-21 5/159.2.5.5Instrument ApplicationsThe UHS instrumentation is designed to facilitate automatic operation, remote control, and continuous indication of system parameters. R edundant and i ndependent power supplies for cooling tower fan controls and instrumentation are provided fr om Class 1E sources (refer to Chapter 8.0
).Discharge water from the powe r block is directed into the cooling tower basin through a normally open spray system bypass valve. The bypass valve is c ontrolled by cooling tower inlet water temperat ure and ESW pump run time.
This arrangement provides freeze protection for the tower fill. The bypass valve will automatically close when UHS inlet water temperature is at or above 84°F to direct the water through the cooling tower fill. If the UHS inlet water temperature increases to 95°F, the cooling tower fans will automatically start in slow speed.
In addition, if temperatur e continues to rise, the fans will automatically shift to high speed at 105°F. The design setpoint s for the UHS cooling tower fans provide freeze protection in cold weather and protect t he UHS retention pond temperature from exceeding 92.3F in warm weather post-LOCA. After the EFT-0061 and EFT-0062 ESW pump dischar ge (ESW supply) temperature control loops are enabled by control room operat ors using handswitches EFHS0067 and EFHS0068 (one switch per train), the ac tuation temperatures are, in ascending order, 79F (bypass valves close), 84.5F (cooling tower fans star t in low speed
), and 89.5F (cooling tower fans switch to high speed). Fan status and valve position indi cation is provided locally and in the control room.
Level sensors located in the UHS provide control room in dication of low pond level and high pond level. Makeup to the pond can also be accomplished by manual operation.Refer to Standard Plant FSAR Figure 9.2-2 Sht. 3, for a description of UHS instrumentation.
CALLAWAY - SA Rev. OL-13 5/03TABLE 9.2-1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA (1)Service Water Pump (all data is per pump)Quantity3 (50% each)TypeVertical centrifugal-single stageCapacity (gpm)19,000 TDH, ft165 MaterialCaseCast ironImpellerBronze Shaft416 S.S.Design CodeHydraulic Institute Standard DriverTypeElectric motorHorsepower1000RPM1180 Power Supply4160 V, 60 Hz, 3-phaseDesign CodeNEMASeismic DesignNoneNOTE: (1)The values specified in this table are nominal SW flow rates. Actual SW flow rates are maintained to ensure the design temperature and pressure of equipment served by the SW are maintained.
CALLAWAY - SA Rev. OL-1812/10TABLE 9.2-2 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DATAEssential Service Water Pump (all data is per pump)Quantity2 (100% each)
TypeVert turbine - 2 stg. with packed stuffing boxesCapacity15,000TDH, ft328 Submergence required ft8Submergence available, ft (min)8MaterialCaseCarbon steel or Stainless SteelImpellerBronzeShaftStainless steelDesign CodesASME Se ction III Cl. 3 DriverTypeElectric motor Horsepower1,750RPM885Power Supply4160 V, 60 Hz, 3-phase, Cl.IEDesign CodeNEMASeismic designCategory IEssential Service Water Pump Prelube Storage Tanks (all data is per tank) Quantity2TypeVerticalCapacity, gallons43 Design pressureAtm.
Design temperature,F122Shell materialCarbon steel or Stainless Steel Corrosion Allowance1/16 inchDesign codeASME Section III, Cl. 3Seismic designCategory I Essential Service Water Self-Cleaning Strainers (all data is per strainer)Quantity2Capacity, gpm15,000
Pressure drop, clean4.7 psi Pressure drop, dirty*6.7 psiStrainer openings1/16 inchDesign pressure, psig200
Design temperature,F100Design CodeASME Section III, Cl. 3 CALLAWAY - SATABLE 9.2-2 (Sheet 2)
Rev. OL-1812/10 DriverTypeElectric motor Horsepower1.3 hp RPM1700Power supply480 V, 60 Hz 3-phase Cl. IEDesign CodeNEMASeismic designCategory IPiping, Fittings, and ValvesDesign pressure, psig200 (maximum)
Design temperature, F200 (maximum)MaterialCarbon Steel, Stainless Steel, or PolyethyleneDesign CodeASME Section III Cl. 3Seismic DesignCategory I*At start of backwash CALLAWAY - SA Rev. OL-21 5/15TABLE 9.2-3 DELETED CALLAWAY - SA Rev. OL-21 5/15TABLE 9.2-4 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK COMPONENT DATACooling TowerNumber of towers1Number of cells per tower4Design Point Each CellWater flow rate, gpm7,500 Heat rejection rate, Btu/hr 145 x 10 6 Hot water temperature, F133.7 Cold water temperature, F95 Entering wet bulb temperature, F81 Range, F38.7 Approach, F14Tower Performance Data Each CellDry air flow, lb/hr 2.587 x 10 6 lb D.A./hr/fanWater/air ratio, L/G1.45Performance characteristic, KaV/L2.04 Evaporation loss, lb/Btu0.00088 lb H 2 O/Btu/fanDrift loss, % of flow0.02%Tower FillFill materialCrosspa ck corrugated asbestos cement board (ACB)Effective cooling surfacePlan area per cell1,293.3 sq ft
Surface area of fill per cell190,120 sq ftFill support spacing4.042 ftNumber of fill deck layersOne Packing height7 ftDrift EliminatorsMaterialCorrugated ACB or Corrugated Cellulose Silica Cement Board (CSCB)Number of passesOne Mechanical Equipment FanQuantity4 (1 per cell)Diameter24 ft Number of blades12 Speed164/82 rpmTip speed12,365 fpm CALLAWAY - SATABLE 9.2-4 (Sheet 2)
Rev. OL-21 5/15Blade materialGlass re inforced polyesterFan horsepower165 bhp Fan capacity692,700 cfm Fan efficiency71.8Seismic designCategory I Fan PressureStatic0.9449" H 2 OVelocity0.10" H 2 OTotal1.0449" H 2 OAir velocity entering tower900 fpm Air velocity leaving tower1,167 fpmEntering air density0.07040 lbs/ft Leaving air density0.06650 lbs/ftSpeed ReducerTypeRight angle Quantity (per tower) 4Service factor2.0 @ 200 bhpGear materialSAE 4620 Casing material ASTM A 48Gear ratio10.83:1Horsepower at base design165 bhp Seismic designCategory IDrive ShaftDiameter6-5/8" O.D.
Length11'-1 1/2"Critical speed2,750 rpmMaterialStainless steel Fan MotorQuantity (per tower)4Power supply required480 V, 3-phase, 60 cycleRated horsepower200 hp/50 hpRated ambient50 CSpeed1,800 rpm/900 rpm Design codeNEMA Seismic designCategory IPower supplyClass 1E*External Static Pressure CALLAWAY - SATABLE 9.2-4 (Sheet 3)
Rev. OL-21 5/15 Distribution System Piping Number of inlet connections1 per cellNominal size of connections 20"Type of connections Raised face flangeSeismic designCategory I CoatinggalvanizedMaterialCarbon steel (SA 106 GR B)Design pressure50 psig Design temperature200 FDesign codeASME Section III, Cl.3 NozzlesQuantity542Size.601 sq in/nozzleMaterialBronze Pressure Drop Pressure drop through inlet0.102" H 2 O Pressure drop through outlet0.3729" H 2 O Pressure drop through fill,spray system, and drifteliminators0.471" H 2 OTotal pressure drop through tower0.9449" H 2 O Retention PondQuantity1 Dimensions, L x W, ft330 x 680Target level**
Minimum Technical Specification initial levelEl. 1993'-6" Normal water volume, acre-feet 51.2 at a level of 1994'-6"
- Target (nominal) UHS re tention pond water level is maintai ned between levels corresponding to the low and high level alarms.
CALLAWAY - SA(Sheet 1 of 4)
Rev. OL-21 5/15TABLE 9.2-5 DESIGN COMPARISON TO REGULATORY POSITIONS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.27, REVISION 2 DATED JANUARY 1976, TITLED "ULTIMATE HEAT SINK FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS"Regulatory Guide 1.27 PositionCALLAWAY-SA-Callaway PositionI.1.The ultimate heat sink should be capable of providing sufficient cooling for at least 30 days (a) to permit simultaneous safe shutdown and cooldown of all nuclear reactor units that it serves and to maintain them in a safe shutdown condition, and (b) in the event of an accident in one unit, to limit the effects of that accident safely, to permit simultaneous and safe shutdown of the remaining units, and to maintain them in a safe shutdown condition. Procedures for ensuring a continued capability after 30 days should be available.I.1.Complies Refer to Section 9.2.5.2.2
.Sufficient conservatism should be provided to ensure that a 30-day cooling supply is available and that design basis temperatures of safety-related equipment are not exceeded. For heat sinks where the supply may be limited and/or the temperature of plant intake water from the sink may eventually become critical (e.g., ponds, lakes, cooling towers, or other sinks where recirculation between plant cooling water discharge and intake can occur), transient analyses of supply and/or temperature should be performed.2.The meteorological conditions resulting in maximum evaporation and drift loss should be the worst 30-day average combination of controlling parameters (e.g., dewpoint depression, windspeed, solar radiation).The meteorological conditions resulting in minimum water cooling should be the worst combination of controlling parameters, including diurnal variations where appropriate, for the critical time period(s) unique to the specific design of the sink.The following are acceptable methods for selecting these conditions:a.Based on regional climatological information, select the most severe observation for the critical time period(s) for each controlling parameter or parameter combination, with substantiation conservatism of these values for site use. The individual conditions may be combined without regard to historical occurrence.2.Twenty-five years of meteorological data are used as the basis for the retention pond transient analysis. The worst consecutive 30-day maximum evaporation period is used to determine maximum pond evaporation and cooling tower evaporative loss. Meteorological data used are wet-bulb depression, windspeed and net solar radiation. Cooling tower evaporation loss and discharge water temperature are calculated using conservative methods. Guaranteed maximum drift loss for the cooling tower is included.The initial pond temperature on the first day of the accident is based upon the maximum pond temperature allowed by plant technical specifications. The transient temperature performance during the minum heat transfer period has been simulated by using the worst single day (7/12/69) meteorological conditions as the first day of the worst 30-day period 7/7/55 to 8/5/55). The diurnal fluctuation for the worst single day is accounted for by use of three-hour time increments, using the appropriate 3-hourly meteorological data. The peak pond outlet temperature occurs on the first day following a LOCA.
CALLAWAY - SATABLE 9.2-5 (Continued)(Sheet 2 of 4)
Rev. OL-21 5/15b.Select the most severe combination of controlling parameters, including diurnal variations where appropriate, for the total of the critical time period(s), based on examination of regional climatogical measurements that are demonstrated to be representative of the site. If significantly less than 30 years of representative data are available, other historical regional data should be examined to determine controlling meteorological conditions for the critical time period(s). If the examination of other historical regional data indicates that the controlling meteorological conditions did not occur within the period of record for the available representative data, then these conditions should be correlated with the available representative data and appropriate adjustments should be made for site conditions.c.Less severe meteorological conditions may be assumed when it can be demonstrated that the consequences of exceeding lesser design basis conditions for short time periods are acceptable. Information on magnitude, persistence, and frequency of occurrence of controlling meteorological parameters that exceed the design basis conditions, based on acceptable data as discussed above, should be presented.The above analysis related to the 30-day cooling supply and the excess temperature should include sufficient information to substantiate the assumptions and analytical methods used. This information should include actual performance data for a similar cooling method operating under load near the specified design conditions or justification that conservative evaporation and drift loss and heat transfer values have been used.3.A cooling capacity of less than 30 days may be acceptable if it can be demonstrated that replenishment or use of an alternate water supply can be effected to assure the continuous capability of the sink to perform its safety functions, taking into account the availability of replenishment equipment and limitations that may be imposed on "freedom of movement" following an accident or the occurrence of severe natural phenomena.3.Not applicable.II.1.The ultimate heat sink complex, whether composed of single or multiple water sources, should be capable of withstanding, without loss of the sink safety functions specified in regulatory position I, following events:II.1.Compliesa.The most severe natural phenomena expected at the site, with appropriate ambient conditions, but with no two or more such phenomena occuring simultaneously,Regulatory Guide 1.27 PositionCALLAWAY-SA-Callaway Position CALLAWAY - SATABLE 9.2-5 (Continued)(Sheet 3 of 4)
Rev. OL-21 5/15b.The site-related events (e.g., transportation accident, river diversion) that historically have occurred or that may occur during the plant lifetime,c.Reasonably probable combinations of less severe natural phenomena and/or site-related events,d.A single failure of manmade structural features, 2.Ultimate heat sink features, which are constructed specifically for the nuclear power plant and which are not required to be designed to withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake or the Probable Maximum Flood, should at least be designed and constructed to withstand the effects of the Operating Basis Earthquake (as defined in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A) and waterflow based on severe historical events in the region.2.Not applicable.III.1.The ultimate heat sink should consist of at least two sources of water, including their retaining structures, each with the capability to perform the safety functions specified in regulatory position I, unless it can be demonstrated that there is an extremely low probability of losing the capability of a single source.III.1.A water source for the unit is contained in the retention pond. The retention pond is seismic Category I and below grade. Hence, there is an extremely low probability of losing its capability. Operator actions are credited after a large break LOCA to diagnose and mitigate a postulated single failure of a UHS cooling tower bypass valve to close based on indications from NG07 and NG08 bus voltage annunciators and proper equipment status (bypass valve position, UHS cooling tower on/off status and fan speed) for the prevailing ESW return (UHS inlet) temperature and to switch temperature control loops for the UHS cooling tower bypass valves and cooling tower fans from the ESW return temperature to the ESW pump discharge (ESW supply) temperature. This is discussed in greater detail in Standard Plant FSAR Section 9.2.5.2.2.1
.2.For close-loop cooling systems there should be at least two aqueducts connecting the source(s) with the intake structures of the nuclear power units and at least two aqueducts to return the cooling water to the source, unless it can be demonstrated that there is extremely low probability that a single aqueduct can functionally fail entirely as a result of natural or site-related phenomena.2.Complies3.For once-through cooling systems, there should be at least two aqueducts connecting the source(s) with the intake structures of the nuclear power units and at least two aqueducts to discharge the cooling water well away from the nuclear power plant to ensure that there is no potential for plant flooding by the discharged cooling water, unless it can be demonstrated that there is extremely low probability that a single aqueduct can functionally fail as a result of natural or site-related phenomena.3.Not applicable.Regulatory Guide 1.27 PositionCALLAWAY-SA-Callaway Position CALLAWAY - SATABLE 9.2-5 (Continued)(Sheet 4 of 4)
Rev. OL-21 5/154.All water sources and their associated aqueducts should be highly reliable and should be separated and protected such that failure of any one will not induce failure of any other.4.CompliesIV.The technical specifications for the plant should include provisions for actions to be taken in the event that capability of the ultimate heat sink or the plant temporarily does not satisfy regulatory positions I and III during operation.IV.No plant technical specifications are required for this regulatory position because: (1) Operator actions are credited after a large break LOCA to diagnose and mitigate a postulated single failure of a UHS cooling tower bypass valve to close based on indications from NG07 and NG08 bus voltage annunciators and proper equipment status (bypass valve position, UHS cooling tower on/off status and fan speed) for the prevailing ESW return (UHS inlet) temperature and to switch temperature control loops for the UHS cooling tower bypass valves and cooling tower fans from the ESW return temperature to the ESW pump discharge (ESW supply) temperature. This is discussed in greater detail in Standard Plant FSAR Section 9.2.5.2.2.1 and (2)the plant satisfies Regulatory Positions I and II during operation.The UHS mechanical draft cooling tower is designed to permit periodic determination of proper system operability, as specified in Technical Specifications.The UHS retention pond temperature and level will be monitored as specified in Technical Specifications.Regulatory Guide 1.27 PositionCALLAWAY-SA-Callaway Position CALLAWAY - SA Rev. OL-21 5/15TABLE 9.2-6 DELETED CALLAWAY - SA Rev. OL-13 5/03TABLE 9.2-7 DELETEDTABLE 9.2-7 has been deleted CALLAWAY - SA9.5-1Rev. OL-215/159.5OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS9.5.1FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM See Section 9.5.1 of the Standard Plant.9.5.2COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS (OFFSITE)
See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant.9.5.2.1See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.2See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.2.1See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.2.2See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.2.3See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.2.4See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.2.5See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.2.6See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.2.7See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.2.8See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.3See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant9.5.2.4See Section 9.5.2 of the Standard Plant CALLAWAY - SA Rev. OL-21 5/15APPENDIX 9.5A - DELETED CALLAWAY - SA9.5B-1Rev. OL-21 5/15APPENDIX 9.5B - DELETED CALLAWAY - SA Rev. OL-21 5/15 APPENDIX 9.5C - DELETED CALLAWAY - SA Rev. OL-21 5/15 APPENDIX 9.5D - DELETED CALLAWAY - SA9.5E-1Rev. OL-215/15APPENDIX 9.5E - DELETED