ML23052A049

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Enclosure 7 - Holtec International Report HI-2230125, Revision 0, Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station, Revision 0, Dated February 14, 2023
ML23052A049
Person / Time
Site: Callaway Ameren icon.png
Issue date: 02/14/2023
From: Anton S
Ameren Missouri, Holtec, Union Electric Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML23052A041 List:
References
ULNRC-06796, EPID L-2022-LLA-0132 HI-2230125, Rev 0
Download: ML23052A049 (1)
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Enclosure 7 to ULNRC-06796 Page 1 of 15 ENCLOSURE 7 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL REPORT 111-2230125 (NON-PROPRIETARY VERSION)

HI-2230125, Supplementa1 Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station,?? Revision 0, dated February 14, 2023

[NON-PROPRIETARYJ 14 pages follow this coversheet

Nuclear Power Division 3225 HOLIEC NTE R NAIt 0 NAC Sponsoring Company Project No.

HI-2230125 0 14 Feb 2023 Company Record Number Revision No. Issue Date Report Copyright Record Type Proprietary Classification Nuclear No Quality Class Export Control Applicability Record

Title:

Non Proprietary Version of Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SEP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by:

S.Anton, 14 Feb 2023 V.Makodym, 14 Feb 2023 D.Mitra-Majumdar, 14 Feb 2023 Signature histories are provided here for reference only. Company electronic signature records are traceable via the provided Verification QR Code and are available for review within the secure records management system. A j valid Verification QR Code and the presence of this covering page indicates this record has been approved and .

accepted. 2 :i-;

Proprietary Classification This record oes not contain confidential or Proprietary Information. The Company reserves all copyrights.

Export Control Status Not applicable.

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station [-fNiERNAIIO Q L T ENAC Holtec Proprietary Information Revision Log Revision Description of Changes 0 Initial issue.

Proprietary Information Proprietary Information is annotated in this document by placing the information in bold square brackets [ 1. The annotation of the proprietary information corresponds to the specific reasons(s) for claiming the information as proprietary as delineated in the respective Affidavit executed by the owners of the information. The annotations used are provided as follows:

1) Holtec proprietary information denoted with 4a,4b superscript, which provides the reference the corresponding subsection of the Holtec Affidavit providing the reason(s)

HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page of II Copyright (C 2023 Hottec International, at! rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station H 0 LTE C INIERNAIIONAt Holtec Proprietary Information EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

This report documents the supplemental criticality safety analyses of the spent fuel pooi performed for the Caflaway Unit 1 that contains a single type of BORALTM spent fuel racks designed for storage of the PWR 17x17 fuel assemblies. The criticality analyses are performed to justify the bounding interface configurations between Region 1 and Region 2 previously established, and to evaluate a multiple misloading accident of Region 1 fuel into Region 2.

Additionally, the reactivity effect of the maximum number of the IEBA rods (200) with an absorber content of 3.0 mg 10B/inch is evaluated.

H1-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page Ii of II Copyright © 2023 Hottec International, alt rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station LT E C N E NNA1 OJAL Hoftec Proprietary Information Table of Contents EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

II

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2 2.0 ADDITIONAL REGION 1 TO REGION 2 INTERFACE CALCULATIONS 2 3.0 ADDITIONAL MISLOADING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS 4 4.0 CALCULATIONS WITH A DIFFERENT IFBA LOADING 4

5.0 REFERENCES

5 HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page 1 of 11 Copyright © 2023 Holtec International, ott rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station if Q L T E C Holtec Proprietar Information

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The following chapters provide the detaIls and results of criticality calculations that were performed in addition to those documented in [1], predominantly to address certain questions on the calculations in [1j. The following cases and configurations are presented:

Chapter 2: Additional Region 1 to Region 2 interface configurations Chapter 3: Additional misloading accident conditions Chapter 4: Calculations with a different IEBA loading 2.0 ADDITIONAL REGION 1 TO REGION 2 INTERFACE CALCULATIONS In [lj, acceptable interface configurations are defined based on specific rules (see Appendix B of

[1]) rather than on certain interface patterns. This allows larger flexibility, while at the same time avoiding any ambiguity. For example, the term checkerboard is known as ambiguous, and this has led to spent fuel misloading operating experience at other stations. The rules avoid using terms such as checkerboard.

The rules can potentially qualify a large number of different configurations. Hence the qualification of the rules is performed using a bounding case each for the Region 1 to Region 2 and Region 2 to Region 1 interfaces.

HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page 2 of 11 Copyright © 2023 Holtec International, ott rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station [-f11ERNA1 Q L T OJAL EC Holtec Proprietary Information I 4a, Overall, these evaluations confirm that the configurations in [1) are bounding, and that the specifics of the rules, namely the number of empty cells around a Region 1 assembly, and the number of Region 1 assemblies around an Region 2 assembly, are appropriate and justified.

HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page 3 of 11 Copyright © 2023 Holtec Internationat, alt rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station [-j Q LTE C IN1RNA1IOAL Hottec Proprietary tnformation 3.0 ADDITIONAL MISLOADING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS As the multiple misloading accident, [1] analyses a condition for Region 2 where the burnups are met, but the cooling times are viotated. The additional case presented here is where the burnup requirement is violated instead. This could be the case when once-burned (low burned) assemblies are placed in Region 2 cells that require a higher burnup. Note that loading multiple fresh assemblies instead of burned assemblies is typically not considered a credible condition, since fresh (unburned) assemblies are visually different from burned assemblies. However, the same is not true for low (once) burned assemblies. As a bounding case, a uniform arrangement of low burned assemblies with the maximum enrichment (5 wt%) and minimum cooling time (0 years) is analyzed. Instead of determining the reactivity for an assumed burnup of once-burned assemblies, a limiting case is established by analyzing several burnups, at the minimum required soluble boron level of the pool, and then the burnup that still meets the regulatory limit is calculated by interpolation. The analyzed cases are listed in Table 2. The resulting burnup is about 1 6 GWd/mtU. This is significantly below the typical burnup of once-burned assemblies, so this proves that this assumed misloading scenario will not result in a condition where the regulatory limit is exceeded.

4.0 CALCULATIONS WITH A DIFFERENT IFBA LOADING In [1], the bounding condition with respect to reactivity effect of burnable absorbers on spent fuel is the condition with 200 IFBA rods with a B-i 0 loading of 2.25 mg/inch, combined with the presence of a WABA inserts. In the future, it may be desirable to use fuel with IFBA rods with higher B-b loading, however, they would not be paired with WABAs. To support this, calculations with a B-10 loading of 3.0 mg/inch have been performed, without WABAs. Results are presented in Table 3, in comparison with the bounding cases presented in [1j. The results show that this higher B-10 loading level of IFBAs, without the presence of a WABA, is bounded by the bounding cases in [1], and therefore acceptable.

HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page4 of 11 Copyright © 2023 Hottec Internationat, alt rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station H 0 LT E C Holtec Pronriet.rv Information

5.0 REFERENCES

[1] Criticality Safety Analysis of SEP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station, Hl-2220020, Revision 2, Holtec International.

[2j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Request for Additional Information Related to the Review of Proposed Amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-30, Union Electric Company Callaway Plant Unit 1, Docket No. 50-483, EPID: L-2022-LLA-0132, 1/25/2023 HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page 5 of 11 Copyright © 2023 Hottec Internationat, alt rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SEP for Callaway Nuclear UIS Generating Station HOLTEC iNif- RNA1IONAL Holtec Proprietary Information Table 1 Results of Calculations for Interface Configurations Configuration Max k-eff Max k-elf difference to Reference Boundllng case from [1], 2x2 Region 1 within Region 2 0.9938 Reference Alternative Case from [1], 2x2 Region 2 within Region 1 09382 -0.0556 4a, 4b HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page 6 of 11 Copyright © 2023 Hottec International, alt rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station j-f Q L T E C ONAL Holtec Proprietary Information Table 2: Results for l..ow Burnup Multiple Misloading Evaluations Burnup, GWd/mtU Max k-eff 5 0.9930 10 0.9704 15 0.9496 20 0.9305 Interpolation 15.6 0.945 HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page 7 of 11 Copyright © 2023 Hottec Internationat, alt rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station [f Q LT E C INTFRNATIONAI Table 3: Alternative IFBA loading Fuel Enrichment and IFBA I insert configuration k-calc k-caic Burnup difference to Reference 2.0 wt%, 5 GWd/mtU 200 IFBA Rods, 0.9587 Reference 225 mg B-1O/inch -i- WABA [1]

200 IFBA Rods, 0.9520 -0.0067 3.0 mg B-10/inch 3.5 wt%, 30 GWd/mtU 200 IEBA Rods, 0.9552 Reference 225 mg B-10/inch + WABA [1]

200 IFBA Rods, 0.9477 -0.0075 3.0 mg B-10/inch 5.0 wt%, 45 GWd/mtU 200 IFBA Rods, 0.9586 Reference 225 mg B-10/inch -- WABA [1]

200 IFBA Rods, 0.9524 -0.0062 3.0 mg B-10/inch HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page 8 of 11 Copyright (0 2023 Holtec International, att rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station H 0 LT E C INTERNAl IO4AL Hoftec Pronrietarv Information 4a, 4b HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page 9 of 11 Copyright © 2023 Hottec Internationat, alt rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station H 0 LT E C N I f RNAI OJAL Holtec Proprietary Information 4a, 4b Ht-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page 10 of 11 Copyright © 2023 Hottec International, alt rights reserved

Supplemental Criticality Safety Analysis of SFP for Callaway Nuclear Generating Station -j LT E C IFTENATIONAL Holtec Proprietary Information 4a, 4b HI-2230125 Rev. 0 Project No. 3225 Page 1 1 of 11 Copyright © 2023 Hottec Internationat, all rights reserved

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