ML20178A673
| ML20178A673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/2020 |
| From: | Ameren Missouri, Framatome, Union Electric Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20178A668 | List: |
| References | |
| ULNRC-06586 | |
| Download: ML20178A673 (39) | |
Text
Attachment 3 to ULNRC-06586 Callaway Unit 1 Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Su pport Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1R24 to 1R25, Revision 1 (Redacted)
20004-025 (02/27/2018) framatome Framatome Inc.
Engineering Information Record Document No.:
51 9312589 001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 to I R25 Pagel of 38
For Information Ony framatGme Document No: 519312589OO1 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 to 1R25 Safety Related?
YES NO Does this document establish design or technical requirements?
YES NO Does this document contain assumptions requiring verification?
YES NO Does this document contain Customer Required format?
YES NO Signature Block PageslSections Name and PILP, RILR, M, PreparedlReviewedl Title/Discipline Signature A-CRF, A Date Approved or Comments Craig Kelley CJ KELLEY LP All Supervisory Engineer 5/21/2020 Kent Colgan c4 COLGAN ER All Advisory Engineer 5/21/2020 Wayne Belden WD BELDEN A
All Technical Manager 5/2 1/2020 Carissa Richardson Customer Review SG Program Owner and Acceptance 05/28/2020 Note:
P/LP designates Preparer (P), Lead Preparer (LP)
M designates Mentor (M)
PiER designates Reviewer (R), Lead Reviewer (ER)
A-CRF designates Project Manager Approver of Customer Required Format (A-CRF)
A designates Approver/RTM Verification of Reviewer Independence Project Manager Approval of Customer References (N/A if not applicable)
Name Title (printed or typed)
(printed or typed)
Signature Date JE HARRISON Josh Harrison Project Manager 5/21/2020 Page 2
For Information On!y ftamatGme 20004-025 (02/27/2018)
Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 to I R25 Record of Revision Revision Pages/Sections!
No.
Paragraphs Changed Brief Description ! Change Authorization 000 All Original Issue All Removed proprietary statement from every page and any proprietary content from the document to support a LAR submittal.
Section 4.3.2, Section 5.1.3, Section 5.2.3, Section 5.3, Section 5.4, Section 8.0 001 Table 3-1, Table 3-2, Table 3-4, Table 3-5, Table 5-1, Redacted proprietary information.
Table 5-3, Table 7-1 figure 5-1, Figure 5-2, Figure 5-3, Figure 5-4, Figure 5-5, Figure 5-6 Page 3
For Information Only Irartiatcnie Document No. : 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 tolR25 Table of Contents Page SIGNATURE BLOCK 2
RECORD OF REVISION 3
LISTOFTABLES 6
LIST OF FIGURES 7
1.0 INTRODUCTION
8 1.1 Purpose 8
1.2 Scope 8
1.3 Methodology 8
2.0 ASSUMPTIONS 8
3.0 BACKGROUND
9 3.1 SG Design 9
3.2 PerformanceCriteria 10 3.3 Technical Specification Trending 11 3.4 SG Performance 13 3.5 Degradation Mechanisms 15 3.6 Structural Integrity Limits I 6 4.0 RECENT OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 17 4.1 Primary-to-Secondary Leakage 17 4.2 1 R21 SG Workscope and Condition Summary I 7 4.2.1 Primary and Secondary Workscope 17 4.2.2 Degradation Detected 18 4.2.3 Tube Plugging 21 4.3 Industry Operating Experience 22 4.3.1 Foreign Objects Resulting in Tube Wear 22 4.3.2 Upper Steam Drum Degradation 23 4.3.3 Top-of-Tubesheet Denting 23 4.3.4 Tie Rod Bowing in Once-Through SGs (SGMP-20-04) 23 4.3.5 Potential Post-Weld Heat Treatment Deficiency 23 5.0 OPERATIONALASSESSMENT 24 5.1 AVB Wear (Existing) 24 5.1.1 General Inputs 24 5.1.2 Growth Rates 24 5.1.3 Newlndications 24 5.1.4 FlawParameters 25 5.2 TSP Wear (Existing) 28 Page4
For information Ony IrarriatGrne Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 tolR25 Table of Contents (continued)
Page 5.2.1 General Inputs 28 5.2.2 Growth Rates 28 5.2.3 Newlndications 29 5.2.4 Flaw Parameters 29 5.3 Appul Wear (Potential) 32 5.4 Foreign Object Wear (Potential) 33 5.5 Pitting(Relevant) 33 5.6 Leakage Integrity 34
6.0 CONCLUSION
S 34 7.0 COMPUTER FILES 34
8.0 REFERENCES
37 Page5
For informa
..tion Only franiatcnie Document No. : 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit 1 Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 tolR25 List of Tables Page Table 3-1: Callaway Unit 1 Steam Generator Design Parameters 10 Table 3-2: Callaway Unit I SG Tubing Material Properties 10 Table 3-3: Callaway Unit I Tech Spec Trending Since SG Replacement 12 Table 3-4: Callaway Unit I Degradation Mechanisms 15 Table 3-5: Callaway Unit I Structural Limits 16 Table 4-1 : Callaway Unit I Summary of Degradation Detected at 1 R21 19 Table 4-2: Callaway Unit I Maximum ECT Wear Depths Detected at 1R21 19 Table 4-3: Callaway Unit I ECT Sizing Parameters at I R21 20 Table 4-4: Callaway Unit 1 Repairable Tube Summary at I R21 21 Table 4-5: Callaway Unit I Cumulative Tube Plugging Status 21 Table 4-6: Largest Returned-to-Service (RTS) Indications at I R21 22 Table 5-1: Summary ofAVB Wear Full Bundle Inputs 25 Table 5-2: AVB Wear Full Bundle Probability of Burst (POB) Results 25 Table 5-3: Summary of TSP Wear Full Bundle Inputs 29 Table 5-4: TSP Wear Full Bundle Probability of Burst (POB) Results 30 Table 6-1 : Callaway Unit I Integrity Margin Summary 34 Table 7-1 : Computer Files 35 Page 6
IraniatGrne Document No. : 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit 1 Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 to 1R25 List of Figures Page Figure 3-1: Callaway Unit 1 SG Normal Operating Pressure Differential (NOPD) Since 1R21 14 Figure 5-1 : AVE Growth Rate Distribution for OA Model 26 Figure 5-2: New AVE Indication Depth Distribution for OA Model 27 Figure 5-3: AVE Wear Flaw Parameters for OA Model 28 Figure 5-4: TSP Growth Rate Distribution for OA Model 30 Figure 5-5: New TSP Indication Depth Distribution for OA Model 31 Figure 5-6: TSP Wear Flaw Parameters for OA Model 32 Pagef
For information Only IraniatGrrie Document No. : 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 to I R25
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose This report provides an operational assessment (OA) of the Callaway Unit 1 Steam Generators (SGs).
The purpose is to demonstrate that the primary and secondary side examinations currently planned for the end of cycle 24 refueling outage 1R24 (October 2020) may be safely deferred by one additional operating cycle to the 1R25 outage (2022).
1.2 Scope The OA is prepared in accordance with the requirements of NEI 97-06 [Ref. 1] and EPRI Steam Generator Integrity Assessment, Examination, and In Situ Guidelines [Refs. 2.a, 2.b, 2.c]. The OA is a forward-looking assessment using eddy current and visual examination results from the most recent SG inspection, together with in-outage repairs (e.g., tube plugging) to provide reasonable assurance that the steam generator tubing will meet the technical specification performance criteria until the next scheduled SG inspection.
1.3 Methodology The methodology used in this document is consistent with the OA performed at the last SG inspection at lR2l
[Ref. 4.bJ. This OA also incorporates the following technical information requested by the NRC specifically for SG inspection deferral requests to address personnel exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic [Ref. 3]:
1 Recent operational experience including a.
Primary-to-secondary leakage b.
Summary ofprimary and secondary inspections c.
Summary of degradation detected d.
Summary of tube plugging e.
Relevant operating experience that could impact tube integrity 2.
Previous inspection condition monitoring a.
Most limiting as-found condition compared to tube performance criteria 3.
Operational assessment for additional operating cycle a.
Degradation mechanisms considered b.
Inspection strategy for each mechanism at prior inspection c.
Predicted margin to tube integrity performance criteria 2.0 ASSUMPTIONS There are no assumptions requiring verification used in this document.
All other assumptions used for determining appropriate structural limits or as inputs into the OA evaluations are discussed andjustified in the applicable sections.
Page8
For Information Qfl:y frariiatorne Document No.
51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit 1 Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 to 1R25
3.0 BACKGROUND
3.1 SG Design By design, Callaway Unit 1 is a 4-ioop plant in which the original steam generators were replaced with Framatome Model 73/19T steam generators in 2005 during the lRl4 outage. The thermally treated Inconel Alloy 690 (I-690TT) tubing has a nominal OD of 0.750 inch and nominal wall thickness of 0.043 inch.
There are 5872 tubes within each steam generator arranged in a triangular pitch comprising 1 1 3 rows by 1 3 5 columns. The tubes are hydraulically expanded over the full tubesheet depth and seal welded at the tubesheet primary face. Lateral tube bundle support is accomplished using eight 410 stainless steel ($$) broached tube support plates (TSPs).
The TSP holes are of a trefoil broached design with flat lands.
The U-bends are supported with anti-vibration bars (AVBs) bent into a V shape spanning all rows from 1 to 1 13.
Since a given tube will intersect the same AVB at two separate locations, the AVBs are labeled AV1 through AV6 to designate between the hot and cold sides of the steam generator. Per design, the lowermost AVB set (AV1, AV6) is inserted down to tube row 1, the middle set (AV2, AV5) is inserted down to tube row 25, and the uppermost set (AV3, AV4) is inserted down to tube row 47.
As built, the AVBs can be inserted past the design tube row and eddy current testing (ECT) results for Callaway have identifiçl AV2/AV5 at Row 24. The first 1 8 rows were thermally stress relieved after the bending process to further reduce residual stresses. Key SG design data is summarized in Table 3-1 [Refs. 5.a, Sb].
The tubing material properties identified in Table 3-2 (at 70°f room temperature (RT)) are based on the 1-690 TT tubing material properties specific to the Callaway-l replacement steam generators [Ref. Sc, Table 3-2].
The factors from Section 4.2 of the EPRI Flaw Handbook [Ref. 2.d] were used to convert material strengths from the 70°F room temperature value to the 650°F value. Note that Table 3-2 lists only the room temperature values of the standard deviations. Although conversion factors are available to convert the standard deviation to its value at 650°F, the more conservative room temperature standard deviation is used in generating structural limits.
Page9
For Information Only frarnatome Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1R24 tolR2S NET 97-06 [Ref. 1] and Caliawav Technical Specification TS 5.5.9 [6.a] establish these steam generator performance criteria:
Stnidftwai Integrity Perfonnance Criteria (SIPC)
Margin of 3.0 against burst nuder nonual steady state Ok LI opelation and a margin of I 1 against binst under the most lnrntmg desian basis accident Additional reqnirements are specified for non-pressnre accident loads.
Table 3-1:
I Unit I Steam Generator Design Parameters 3%
Performance Criteria Page 10
For nforrnaUon Oniy frartiatorrie Document No. : 51 -931 2589-00 1 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 to 1.R25 Operational Leakage RC$ operational primary-to-secondary leakage through one steam generator shall not exceed 150 gallons per day (gpd).
Accident Induced Leakage Performance Criteria (AILPC)
Leakage shall not exceed 1 gallon per minute (gpm) total for all four steam generators.
3.3 Technical Specification Trending The Callaway Technical Specifications reflect the requirements of Technical Specification Task force Traveler TSTf-5 10 (Callaway License Amendment 2 1 3 adopted after 1R2 1).
TSTF-5 10 states that the first sequential period shall begin after the first in-service inspection of the SGs (First 151 was 1R15 for Callaway) and that the inspection requirements (for I-690TT tubing) are to inspect 100% of the tubes over each inspection period. The inspection periods under TSTF-510 are 144, 120, 96 and thereafter, 72 EFPMs respectively and that no SG shall operate for more than 72 EFPM, or three refueling outages, without being inspected whichever results in more frequent inspections.
The Callaway Unit 1 SGs are currently in the 120 EFPM period, with outage 1R25 expected to be first in-service inspection of the period. The cycle lengths presented in Table 3-3 for cycles 24 onward are conservative estimates from both site readouts and fuel analysis [Refs. 5.d and 5.e].
Page 11
For Information Only IrarllatGnle Document No. : 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 to I R25 Table 3-3: Callaway Unit I Tech Spec Trending Since SG Replacement End of Cumulative SG TSTF-510 Cumulative I
Cycle Cycle Cycle SG Cycle Cycle EFPD EFPM EFPY 9pt1g Inspection2 EFPM Each Period (1st, Outage Time (EFPM) 2nd) 14 1R14 N/A N/A N/A N/A Replaced 15 lR5 472.72 15.531 1.294 15.53 istiSi 1st 16 1R16 51707 16988 1416 3252 Skip 16988 17 1R17 493 50 16 214 1 351 48 73 Skip 33 202 18 1R18 486.50 15.984 1.332 64.72 2ndISI 49.186 19 1R19 496 09 16 299 1 358 81 01 Skip 65 485 20 1R20 473.89 15.569 1.297 96.58 Skip 81.054 21 1R21 482.00 15.836 1.320 112.42 3rdISI 96.890 22 1R22 505 84 16 619 1 385 129 04 Skip 1 13 509 23 1R23 465.36 15.289 1.274 144.32 Skip 128.798 End of 144 EFPM Period 144 2nd 24*
1R24 501.00 16.460 1.372 160.79 Skip 1.258 25*
1R25 491.00 16.131 1.344 176.92 4thISI 17.389 26*
1R26 501.00 16.460 1.372 193.38 Skip 33.849 27*
1R27 501 00 16 460 1 372 209 84 Skip 50 309 28*
1R28 501.00 16.460 1372 226.30 5thISI 66.769 29*
1R29 501.00 16.460 1.372 242.76 Skip 83229 30*
1R30 501.00 16.460 1.372 259.22 Skip 99.689 31*
1R31 501.00 16.460 1.372 275.68 Skip 116.149 End of 120 EFPM Period 120 Notes:
1.
Cycles 24 through 3 1 are conservative estimates from both site readouts and fuel analysis [Refs. 5.d and 5.eJ.
2.
SG inspections at 1R15, 1R18, and lR2l included primary side inspections, secondary side inspections, and water lancing.
Page 12
IraniatGnie Document No.
51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 to 1R25 3.4 SG Performance A review of the steam generator secondary side pressure trending was performed on plant data to determine appropriate normal operating pressure differentials (NOPD) to be used when performing condition monitoring (CM) and operational assessment (OA) evaluations. Figure 3-1 shows the NOPD since 1R21. An NOPD value of 1295 psid bounds the maximum pressure differential through 1R23.
Page 13
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Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 tolR25 3.5 Degradation Mechanisms The degradation mechanisms targeted by the most recent inspections at IR%I are governed by the following general classifications of tube degradation and are smmuarized in Table 3-4 which identifies the inspection method and scope nsed for detection.
Exisj4g Degradation which has been previously observed in die Callaway Unit I SOs Potential - Degradation which has not been observed in die Cailaway Unit I SOs but is detennineci to have reasonable potential to occur in die near kim based on engineering evaluations. predictive studies, or operating experience of similar steam generators in the indusny population.
Rc!cya Degradation which has not been observed in die (allaway Unit I SOs but that may have been
- reported in other units with SOs of similar design and/or may have sonic potential to occur over die hfe of the SO.
Non-Relevant Degradation which has been observed in odier SOs with differing design, materials of construction, or manufacturing practices; and considered to have essentially no potential to occur at Callaway Unit 1.
Note that per EPN guidelines [Ret %.a] an OA only evaluates existing degradation mechauisms, with other (K aiadation metlianisnis adchessed pci the degradation assessment (D 4) hoe ci the 0 4 in this clocmuent ill evaluate all existing, potential and relevant degradation niechanisms.
Table 34: Callaway Unit I Degradation Mechanisms Ie
+/--- Mechanism Detedbon Strategy AVB Wear 100/0 ibil length Bobbin probe Existing
-_exanunafions TSP Wear iOO% fill length Bobbin probe exannnations Appin ei 1OO° MI kuJIi Bobbin piobe exainniations Hot leg in ty probe exanrnnnons of Potential TTS penphery and no-tube lane Foreign Object rear
%O Sample array probe examinations of slndge pile region 100% flu length Bobbin probe examinations 20% Sample array probe Relevant Pitting at TTS exanunations ofslndge pile region 100% fill length Bobbin probe exainniations Page 15 Notes;
For Information Only IranlatGnle Document No. : 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 to 1R25 3.6 Structural Integrity Limits The appropriate structural limits used for this operational assessment consider only material and relational uncertainties (i.e. no technique sizing uncertainty) and normal operating pressure differential (NOPD) loading and faulted primary-to-secondary differential pressure loading (i.e., feedwater line break).
The limits are created using the EPRI Flaw Handbook Calculator [Ref. 2.d] for the <135° Axial Partial Through-wall model [Ref. 2.eJ This model is appropriate because the maximum circumferential extent for a single lOO%TW wear scar caused by an AVB (in 0.75 inch OD tubing with 0.043 inch wall thickness) would be 55.4°. For double-sided AVB wear or triple-sided TSP wear (trefoil design), this model continues to remain bounding since the Callaway AVB and TSP geometry provides sufficient circumferential separation between the wear scars.
Using the pressure differentials below and the Callaway Unit 1 SG tube properties in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, the appropriate structural limits are created and summarized in Table 3-5.
NOPD Loading:
0 NOPD = 1295 psid (Bounding ofCallaway SGs per Section 3.4) 0 3AP:3x12953885psid Faulted Condition Loading:
0 2606 psid [Ref. Sc, feedwater line breaki I
This bounds the pressurizer safety valve nominal set-point of 2475 psia 0
1.4x2606 = 3648 psid Table 3-5: Callaway Unit I Structural Limits Page 16
For information Only IrarTlatGrlle Document No. : 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit 1 Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 to 1R25 4.0 RECENT OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 4.1 Primary-to-Secondary Leakage Since the SGs were replaced in 1R14 there has been no measured primary-to-secondary leakage.
4.2 1R21 SG Workscope and Condition Summary 4.2.1 Primary and Secondary Workscope The 1R21 work scope included eddy current testing (ECT) inspections, primary side visual inspections, water lancing at the top-of-tubesheet (TTS), and secondary side visual inspections in each of the $Gs [Refs. 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.d].
4.2.1.1 Bobbin Coil ECT Examinations 100% of all in-service tubes, full length tube-end to tube-end 4.2.1.2 Array Coil ECT Examinations Tubesheet Periphery region 3-tubes deep on the hot leg from the tubesheet to the first support plate (TSH 3.00 to O1H+l.00) in all four SGs. The periphery tube region is defined as the three outermost tubes adjacent to the annulus, and all tubes in rows 1 through 6 along the tube free lane.
All cold leg tubes identified as having non-nominal tubesheet drilled hole diameters [4.a, Table 5-5], from the tube end to the 1st support (TEC to O1C+l.0).
0 Tubes with this condition on the cold leg exist only in SGA and SGD.
0 All tubes with non-nominal tubesheet drilled hole diameters (both hot and cold leg) were inspected the full depth with RPC probes during 1R15 (TEH to TSH+3.0, TEC to TSC+3.0) and all those on the hot leg were inspected in iRiS with Array from the tube end to the tubesheet (TEll to TSH+3.0).
20% ofhot leg tubes identified with sludge from the 1R18 sludge analysis in all four SGs.
Select TSP wear indications.
4.2.1.3
+PointTM Coil ECT Examinations All AVB wear with a depth >=28%TW All new AVB wear indications with a depth >=14%TW All AVB wear indications with a growth >14%TW since 1R18 All 1 R2 1 Bobbin DSI indications (i.e., TSP wear)
Select tubes with AVB wear for profiling 4.2.1.4 Primary Side Visual Inspections As-found and as-left visual examinations ofprimary channel heads (both Hot Leg and Cold Leg)
Primary bowl inspections in all four SGs (both Hot Leg and Cold Leg) to satisfy NSAL 12-1 and IN 2013-20 requirements [Refs. 3.e and 4.f].
Visual inspections of all plugs installed in the Callaway SGs.
Page 17
For information Only IrarnatGrrie Document No. : 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 to 1R25 EVT-1 on SG-A primary nozzle inner radius. The area of interest consisted of all accessible surfaces of the nozzle inside radius section.
4.2.1.5 Secondary Side Workscope TTS Water lancing in all four SGs Post-lancing Foreign Object Search and Retrieval (FOSAR) performed in all four SG 0
Hot leg and cold leg TTS annulus area looking in-bundle at the periphery tubes 0
No-tube lane 0
Inner bundle passes in the hot leg TTS sludge pile region Visual inspections of steam drums in SG-A and SG-D 0
Inspections included the loose part trapping screen, the riser barrels, the feedring and I-nozzles 1, 2, 3, 4, 29, and 30 [Ref. 4.c].
0 Inspections were performed in the upper steam drums of SG-B and SG-C during 11.
4.2.2 Degradation Detected At 1R21 the only tube degradation detected was wear at AVB and TSP locations.
Table 4-1 summarizes the number of wear indications identified. The maximum wear depth of each type, conservatively adjusted to account for ECT depth sizing uncertainty (Table 4-3), is listed in Table 4-2.
The table also includes the structural performance criteria from Section 3.6 for comparison purposes.
AVB wear was detected and sized with bobbin ETSS 96004. 1 Rev 13.
Bobbin ETSS 96004. 1 was also used to detect TSP wear. TSP wear sizing was performed using +PointTM ETSS 96910.1 Rev 1 0 [Refs. 4.e, 2.hJ.
The 1R21 visual examinations of the TTS (All SGs) and upper steam drum (SGs A and D) identified no degradation [Ref. 4.d]. The last inspection of upper steam drums in SGs B and C was performed in 1R18 and no degradation was identified [4.c].
Page 18
For Information Only frarnatcrne Document No. :
51 -931 2589-00 1 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 to I R25 Table 4-1 : Callaway Unit I Summary of Degradation Detected at I R21 SG A SG B SG C SG D Total Degradation Tubes Indications Tubes Indications Tubes Indications Tubes Indications Tubes Indications AVB 72 160 47 97 106 240 22 46 247 543 TSP 41 56 23 29 19 30 9
16 92 131 Total iii 216 70 126 124(2) 270 62 335(1)(2)(3) 674 Notes:
1.
SGA Tubes 1 10-66 and 1 1 1-73 have both AVB and TSP wear.
2.
SGC Tube 1 10-72 has both AVB and TSP wear.
3.
SGD Tube 88-72 has both AVB and TSP wear.
Table 4-2: Callaway Unit I Maximum ECT Wear Depths Detected at I R21 AVB Wear Depth (%TW)
TSP Wear Depth (%TW)
SG Upper 95150 Upper 95/50 Max ECT Estimate of Max ECT Estimate of Depth1 Depth1 A
33 42.1 17 32.5 B
30 39.2 16 31.4 C
37 46.0 16 31.4 D
38 47.0 11 26.4 A11SGs 3$
47.0 17 32.5 siic2 59.2 57.6 Notes:
1.
This is the ECT depth adjusted for the technique sizing parameters in Table 4-3 2.
This structural limit accounts for relational and material strength uncertainties.
Page 19
IranlatGnle Document No. : 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 to I R25 Table 4-3: Callaway Unit I ECT Sizing Parameters at 1R21 ETSS Sizing Regression (Actual vs. NDE Depth)
Uncertainty (%TW) 96004.1 Revl3 Depth 0.9$xNDE + 2.89 4.19 96910.1 Rev 101 Depth 1.O1xNDE + 4.30 6.68 Notes:
1.
ETSS 96910.1 was revised to Rev 11 after 1R21 changing the sizing regression and uncertainty slightly; however, the Rev 10 values are conservative and are used in this OA.
Page 20
For Information Only Irarnatcnie Document No.
51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 to 1R25 4.2.3 Tube Plugging There were no tubes that met the Technical Specification plugging limit of >=40% TW in any of the SGs. A total of 25 tubes were removed from service during 1 R2 1.
All plugging was preventive to address AVB wear; however, one tube plugged during 1R2 1 also had TSP wear. To date a total of 55 tubes have been removed from service from all SGs since the replacement SGs were installed (Table 4-4 and Table 4-5). None of the tubes that were plugged during 1R21 required stabilization.
The largest AVB wear and TSP wear indication returned-to-service (RTS) during 1R21 were 30% and 17%
respectively as shown in Table 4-6.
Table 4-4: Callaway Unit I Repairable Tube Summary at 1R21 Location Tube SGA 5GB SGC SGD Total Degradation AVB Wear 9
0 14 2
25 TSP Wear 0
0 0
0 0
Total Tubes Plugged 9
0 14 2
25 Table 4-5: Callaway Unit I Cumulative Tube Plugging Status Outage SGA 5GB SGC SGD Total Pre-Service 1
0 0
0 1
1R15 0
0 0
0 0
1R1$
10 6
12 1
29 1R21 9
0 14 2
25 TotalTubes 20 6
26 3
55 Plugged TotalTubes 5872 5872 5872 5872 23488 Total Percentage 0.34 1 %
- 0. 1 02%
0.443%
0.05 1 %
0.23 0%
Limit (%)
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
Page 21
For Information Only IraniatGnie Document No.
51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit 1 Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 tolR25 Table 4-6: Largest Returned-to-Service (RTS) Indications at I R21 Maximum Return to Service Depth (%TW)
27 17 B
30 16 C
2$
16 B
28 11 A11SGs 30 17 4.3 Industry Operating Experience This section reviews industry operating experience (OE) since 1R21 that may be relevant to tube integrity during cycle 25 operation.
4.3.1 Foreign Objects Resulting in Tube Wear In 2017 Salem 1 identified a primary-to-secondary steam generator tube leak in SG13 that stabilized at approximately 7 gpd and after about 12 days fell below detectable levels allowing them to operate until the fall refueling outage when SG inspections were then performed. The leaking tube was identified as a volumetric wear indication below the 3rd tube support plate on the cold leg side and assumed to be caused by a foreign object; however, neither ECT nor $$I visuals were able to identify any potential loose parts (PLP) in the area of interest.
In 2020 Salem 1 identified a primary-to-secondary steam generator tube leak in SG14, safely shut down and performed a full SG inspection. The leaking tube was identified as a volumetric wear indication at the flow baffle plate on the hot leg caused by foreign object that was visually confirmed and removed from the 5G.
In both situations all affected tubes were in-situ pressure tested and the tests demonstrated that the performance criteria for structural integrity and accident leakage were not exceeded (i.e., the tube did not burst or leak beyond allowable levels).
Unlike Salem 1, Callaway does not have a history of foreign objects entering the 5G.
No potential loose part (PLP) indications or any foreign object wear indications have been identified during any of the SG inspections at 1 Ri 5, 1 Ri 8 and 1 R2 1.
Callaway 1 has a loose part trapping screen installed in the upper steam drums that is designed to prevent the majority of objects entering the 5G.
Visual inspections performed in the upper steam drum during lRi 8 and lR2 1 also identified no foreign objects on the loose part trapping screen, or any degradation on a feedring component that could result in foreign material entering the SG tube bundle Water lancing of the TTS performed during each SG inspection outage has removed only a small number of foreign objects such as tube scale, rubber, plastic, sludge rocks and a small number of tiny metallic pieces; none ofwhich are a concern for tube integrity Visual inspections performed at the TTS in each SG have identified no foreign objects.
Page 22
For Information Only framatome Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 tolR25 Additionally. a review of secondary side work performed during 1R2% and 1R23 have identified no foreign material exclusion (FME) issues that wonid have rntiodnced foteign material nito the SGs 4.3.2 Upper Steam Drum Degradation SLzeweII B Swirl lTane Separator Barrel Dining the 2016 W.F014) SG inspection. Sizeweli B identitkd a through-wall defect on a swirl vane separator barrel üi SGA. The condition was a result of impingement from the J-nozzle feedwater flow onto an anxiliaiy feedwater pipe support bracket. Sizewell was able to stall back up and operate another cycle before repairing the defcct in tiit. follo;rng C RFO1 S [Ref Sj]
In SG inspections at Ghuia (OE%3123). Spanish plants Asco I and 2 and Almaraz I and 2. Slovenian plant Krsko.
and Gennan l)lant Neckanvestheim 2: denting was identified at the TTS in the hard sludge pile region. in the case of Almaraz 1 and 2. Asco 1. and Neckanvestheim 2 which have tubes made of hicoloy 800 modified material, circumferential ODSCC was subsequently identified in a popiilatioii of dented tubes. The denting is thought to have been cansed by tubesheet steel conosion and expansion of the resulting coosion products.
For Callaway Unit I. the hard sludge pile is relatively small and handled with periodic lancing. no denting on the TTS has been identified, and the Alloy 690 tube material has demonstrated no susceptibility to SCC hi the field.
4,3,4 Tie Rod Bowing in Once-Through SGs (SGMP-%O-04) i)ming the David Besse SG inspections üi their spring 2020 outage long absolute drift indications were identified by l)ObbiiI coil probe and were confirmed by anay probe to be indications of tubetotube and tubetotie rod proximity. No tube wear was associated with these proximity indications, and all nibe-to-rnbe proximity is confinned to have been a result of tie rods bowing.
Similar indications ha..d been identified in the Arkansas Nuclear One Unit I (ANO-l) SGs. Both Davis Besse and ANO-l have once-through steam generator (OTSG) designs, the only SO design hi which tie rod bowing has been identified.
The Callaway Unit I recirculating SO (RSG) design has no known susceptibility to tie rod bowing (thicker Pc tods shortei spans between snpports than OTSOs) and no pioxinnt signals have been detected to date in Callaway or any other RSGs in the hidnsny.
4.3.5 Potential Post-Weld Heat Treatment Deficiency hi July 2019 Framatome identified a potential deficiency in post-weld heat treatment parameters in ASME Section III. Class 1 components (Framatome CR 2019-3328). Follow-np evahiations identified the impact to the Callaway SGs lhnited to the upper welds between the conical shell and the steam cinun (Franrntome CR 2020-0075), and concludes the components can continue to perfonn theft hitended safety functions with no additional hispections or conipensatoiy measured required [Ref. 5.kj.
4.3.3 Top-of-Tubesheet Denting Page 23
For Information Only frarnatonie Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 tolR25 5.0 OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT The followinz sections snnunarize the operational assessment (OA) performed üi snppon ofthe effort to defer the 1R24 SG examinations. Per EPRI gnidelines [Ref. Ia] an OA only evalnates existing degradation mechanisms, while potentiat degradation mechanisms are addressed withhi the degradation assessment (DA) process.
However. the OA in this docmnent evaluates all of the existing. potential and relevant degradation mechanisms identified in Section 3.5.
5.1 AVB Wear (Existing)
The 02% for AVB wear was implemented using the Framatome fully probabilistic operational assessment model
[Ref S iJ the 0 & methodolog unlize a probabilistic flU! bnndle approach that samples flom a distubution of stnicflirai effective lengths and depths, for each individnal flaw depth returned to service as well as flaws undetected at lR2l and newly initiated after llUl. to arrive at the overall bundle probability of bnrst (POB) for a gnen steam genelatot This follows the fundamental definition ol the piojeued 04 worst case flaw as stated in the EPRI Integrity Assessment Guidelines [Ret 2.a].
The per-bundle approach whicIi considers each flaw returned to service while also accotmting for multiple flaws of the same depth) is the fimdamentai OA reqnirement.
It is more responsive to extreme value growth rates becanse it explicitly captures the tict that if more deep flaws are renmied to service. there is an increasing probability that large growth rates will be ma..tclied whli large begimihig-of-cycle WOC) depths; making deep end-of-cycle (EOC) flaws more likely.
Each of the key hipnts to the full brindle model are discnssed in the following sections and snnmiarized in Table 5-i. The resnhs for each SG are provided in Table 5-2. These results confmn that the projected POB for each SG is less than the SG Program maxinllnn allowable of 5%. Therefore. defenal ofthe SG inspection to IRIS will not cause the stmcrnral integrity perfonnance criteria to be exceeded.
5.1.1 General Inputs The full bundle model (iOO%000 Monte Carlo simulations) uses tnbe properties (OD. thickness. nmterial strength) and limiting pressnre differentials: from Section 3. 1 and Section 3.6.
5.1.2 Growth Rates Operating experience has demonstrated that AVB wear growth rates attenuate with time and this behavior has been evident at Callaway Uiflt I. AVB wear at Callaway has behaved similarly in each SG; therefore. the OA model samples fiom a gicw di tate piobabilits distribnnon expiessed %itIi a Knmn flinction that is based on the tombmed repeat giowth tates fiom both 1R18 and lR2 I (F igme 5-1)
TIns consenatielv bounds gi ouh tates seen in lR%l and does not considet any negatne giovth iates The gioth iates e also conservatn ely ipphed to each wear indication for a fill fonr cycle nm time of 5.5 EFPY (bomxhng the 5.375 EFPY identified tluough lR2c from Table 33) iathei thin ipplyiiia ho mtenals ith difleient gtowth iates sampled foi e9ch one 5.1.3 New Indications New indications accounting for flaws undetected at lR2l and newly initiated after lR2l r TI_fl at IT?1S1
Si wear at (%&? y
&&f in each SO:
erefore.
of the new ii S hi the model are sampled from a Kunin distrilmrion that bounds all the new indications identified at lR2l folloximg thee cycles of opeiation Figme 5-2)
Page 24
For nformaton Only framatGme Document No: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R%4 tolR25 51.4 Flaw Parameters lEac:li wear indication in the hill bundle model is adjusted by flaw parameters (i.e.. ratio of stn;ctural to maximmu depth and structural length) that are based on sizing profile data from each of the SG inspections [Ref 4rnb]. The flaw parameters ui the model are sampled froiu the 1R2 I data only. which is conservative compared to the entire population offlaws that includes 1R15 and IRI 8 as shown in figure 5-3.
Table 5-1 : Summary of AVB Wear Full Bundle Inputs Table 5-2: AVB Wear Full Bundle Probability of Burst (POB) Results Maximum Allowable SQ POB A
O6%
5.0%
B 04%
5.0%
C 0.9%
5.0%
D 0.2%
5.0%
Parameters 3 x No Operati;ig Pressure Dif Value Tube wall thickness 0043 in Tube outer diameter
- 0. 750 in Flaw Parameters Saiip1ed fron; I R21 data per See Figure 5-3 AVB 1aws Modeled All return to service üidicatio;is from 1R21 Growl!; Rates See Figure 5-I Number ofNew indications (tindetected at 1R2 I and newiy initiated 00 nev tnd;..9tions pioected at IR2S after 1R21)
New Indication Depths See Figure 5-2 Page 25
For Information Oniy frarnatorrie Dcu No.: 519312589-OO1 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 to 1R2%
5-1 : AVB Growth Rate Distribution for OA Model Page 26
For Information Oriy franlatGnle Document No.: 51 -931 %58%-OO1 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R%4 tolR2%
Figure %%: New AVB Indication Depth Distribution for OA Model Page 27
For information Only framatome Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 to 1R25 The OA for TSP wear was implemented using the Framatome fully probabilistic operatioirnl assessment model Ref. %.i] following the same methodology as the AVB wear OA.
Each of the key inputs to the thU bundle model is discussed in the followiug sections and smmuarized hi Table 5-3.
The results for each SG are provided in Table 5-4.
The POB for each SG is less than the SG Program maxilmuir allowable of 5%: therefore. deferral of the SG inspectiou to iR2% will not result iii TSP wear which violates the structural hnegritv perfomiauce.
5.2.1 General Inputs The MU bimdle model (iOO,000 Moute Carlo siuudatious) uses: tube properties COD. thickness. material streugth) and limiting pressure differeutials from Sectiou 3. 1 Section 3.6.
5.2.2 Growth Rates Similar to AVB wear. operating experieuce has demoustrated that TSP wear growth rates attemiate with time.
TSP wear at Callaway has behaved similarly in each SG: therefore, the OA model saiuples from a combined Page 28 Figure 5-3: AVB Wear Flaw Parameters for OA Model 5.2 TSP Wear (Existing)
For Information Only framatorne Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 tolR25 growth rate probability distribution of all SGs. Since Callaway has only had one inspection in which repeat TSP wear was identified. a growth rate distribution wlüch bounds all observed growth rates and does not consider any negative groxtli ames as used for tills analysis (Fignie 5-4)
The giouh rates are also conseivain ci, applied to each wear indication for a flu fonr cycle nm time of %S EFPY (bounding the 5.375 EFPY identified thrrnigh 1R25 from Table 3-3) rather than applying two intervals with different growth rates sampled for each.
523 New Indications New indications acconnthig for flaws undetected at lR2l and newly initiated after lR%l 5.14 Flaw Parameters Each wear indication in the thU bundle model is adjnsted by flaw parameters (i.e.. ratio of stnicrnral to maxiimini depth. and stnicrnral length) based on depth profile data of TSP wear indications from iR2i [Ref. 4.bJ. Due to a limited sample size. the flaw parameters in the model are represented as fixed values that conservatively bound the deepest and longest flaws profiled at lR% I (Figure 5-6).
Tube wall thickziess 0.043 in Tnbe outer diameter 0.750 in Flaw Parameters See Figure 5-6 TSP Flaws Iviodeled All rettuit to service indicatious from IR% I Growth Rates See Figure 5-4 Number ofNew hidIcations (undetected at IR2I and newly initiated
,00 ne. inchauoiis projected it IR2S alter IR21)
New Indication Depths See Figure 5-5 I
- new indications in the 1 indications identified at IRIS and I R% I (Figure 5-5).
from a K a that bounds Table 5-3: Summary of TSP Wear Full Bundle Inputs 3 x Normal Operating Pressure DiLerential Page 29*
For information Only frarnatGnle Document No.: 51 931%589-OO1 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1R24 to IR%5 Df Maximum Allowable
%J I JIJ POB A
O1%
5.O B
0.1%
C O.1°/ó 5.0%
I) 0.1%
5.0%
Table 5-4: TSP Wear Full Bundle Probability of Burst (P08) Results Figure 54: TSP Growth Rate Distribution for OA Model Page 30
For Information Only franlatGnle Document No.: 51931 2589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 tolR25 Figure 5-5: New TSP Indication Depth Distribution for OA Model Page 31
For information Only framatome Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 toIR25 Page 3%
Figure 5-6: TSP Wear flaw Parameters for OA Model
%3 Appul Wear (Potential)
While appui wear has not been identified in the Cailaway SGs. the OA uses a conservative, deterministic ipproaJ1 by assmnmg a niaxn;iu;ii begmiring-of cJe (BOC ) weai sea; depth appl)n;g a boirnclmg gioth iate i1cu1ating the ;esulting end-ot-cstde (FO( ) depth at IR2S and umpa;n;g the EOC depth to the appiopnate structural limit.
Cycle Length = 5.5 EFPY 0
COflSCEWItIVdy bounds 5.375 EFPY identified through 1R25 (Table 3-3).
For information Ony framatGme Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 tolR25 Then the growth rate is applied over the full 4-cycle operating length (conservative5.5 EfPY)to determine the end-of-cycle maximum depth (EOCMD):
5.4 Foreign Object Wear (Potential)
The most recent primary side tube inspections performed in each SG included 100% full length bobbin, and array probe examinations of the hot leg periphery and no-tube lane up to the first support structure. Additionally, water lancing and visual inspections were performed at the TTS on both legs providing added assurance that no foreign objects were left in service in the SGs, particularly in the high flow region (i.e., periphery, no tube lane).
The potential development of new foreign object wear during the operating period through 1R25 must be considered. It is difficult to predict if and when foreign object wear will occur. However, by examining the aggregate operating history of the Callaway SGs, as well as other Framatome replacement SGs with loose part trapping screens installed (Salem 2, St. Lucie 2, P f f object wear, a jw ment of f risk can be develop I
Additionally, the most recent secondary side visual examinations at Callaway identified no objects in the SGs and only a small number of foreign objects in the lancing strainers such as tube scale, rubber, plastic, sludge rocks, etc.; none ofwhich pose a threat to tube integrity Based on Callaway and industry operating experience, it is unlikely that new foreign material introduced into the SGs since 1 R2 1 would cause tube degradation; however, assuming that tube degradation were to occur from a foreign object it is not expected to exceed the structural limit of 57.6%.
In the unlikely event of such an occurrence, primary to secondaiy leakage monitoring procedures in place at Callaway provide a high degree of confidence of safe unit shutdown without challenging the SIPC or AILPC.
5.5 Pitting (Relevant)
Pitting is usually observed at plants using sea or brackish circulating water systems along with the presence of lead or copper in the secondary system during cold shutdown conditions, and does not grow to large volumes due to the small-localized galvanic differences.
South Texas Project is the only SG with Alloy 690 tubing that has experienced degradation that may have been caused by pitting at the TTS (INPO OE 320427).
The BOC NDE depth (BOCNDE) is first adjusted upward to equal the upper 95th percentile metallurgical depth (BOCMD) using ETSS 96004.1 parameters (Table 4-3):
BOCMD BOCNDE
- a + b + 1.645
- Sy,x The EOC maximum depth of is less than the structural limit of 59.2 %TW for a inches. Therefore, the deferral
,d inspections to 1R25 will not result in appui wear that v integrity performance criteria.
5 the structural Page 33
For information Only IraniatGnie Document No. : 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 The Callaway SGs have a very small sludge pile region and no known chemistry concerns that would be conducive to pitting.
In addition, no potential pitting indications have been identified during any of the bobbin probe or array probe inspections.
Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that pitting will not violate the structural or leakage performance criteria through 1R25.
5.6 Leakage Integrity Since wear indications will leak and burst at essentially the same pressure, and since the evaluations above conclude that structural integrity will be maintained throughout the period preceding 1R25, leakage integrity at the much lower faulted pressure differential of 2606 psig is also demonstrated for the degradation evaluated in this OA. Although there are no known conditions of concern, sensitivity to primary-to-secondary leakage events will continue under Callaways conservative monitoring procedures.
6.0 CONCLUSION
S There is reasonable assurance that the structural integrity and leakage integrity performance criteria will remain satisfied throughout the operating period preceding 1R25.
Table 6-1 summarizes the projected margin to SIPC and AILPC at 1R25 for each evaluated mechanism.
Table 6-1: Callaway Unit I Integrity Margin Summary sIpc AILPC Degradation Mechanism Limit 1R25 Projection Limit JR25 Projection AVB wear 5% probability of
< 0.9% probability burst @3NOPD of burst 1.0 gpm Zero Leakage 5% probability of
< 0.1% probability Tsp wear burst @3NOPD of burst l 0 gpm Zero Leakage 56.9 %TW Appui Wear 59.2 %TW Maximum Depth gpm Zero Leakage
<57 /0TW Foreign object wear 57.6 %TW Maximum Depth
° gpm Zero Leakage Pitting No projected pitting.
7.0 COMPUTER FILES This section summarizes the computer files used to perform the operational assessment in this document.
All files were transferred to the following Framatome ColdStor directory:
\\cold\\General-Access\\51\\51-9312589-000\\official Page 34
00 0) to N
Cz C0EzV00 to N
9 N
of:
E0 4-U)C0 V0a U)C V0CC0 Li 0
0a0 0
0C0C E0 0
C D
0 C,
ton 0
C0 C0 aC 0w 0
I
0 E
4-(0 Co Va)
V1 r00 G0 to C4 Co dz CV E
C00
For Information Only frartiatorrie Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit 1 Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from 1 R24 tolR25
8.0 REFERENCES
References identified with an (*) are maintained within Callaway Records System and are not retrievable from Framatome Records Management. References identified with an (**) are maintained within the framatome SAS Records System and are not retrievable from Framatome Records Management. These are acceptable references per Framatome Administrative Procedure 0402-01, Attachment 7. See page [2] for Project Manager Approval of customer references.
1.
NET 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines, Rev. 3, March 2011 2.
EPRI Documents a.
EPRI Report 3002007571, Steam Generator Management Program: Steam Generator Integrity Assessment Guidelines Revision 4, June 2016 b.
EPRI Report 3002007572, Steam Generator Management Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines: Revision 8, June 2016 (Includes Interim Guidance SGMP-1 9-0 1 incorporated April 2019) c.
EPRI Report 3002007856, Steam Generator Management Program: In-situ Pressure Test Guidelines, Revision 5, November 2016 d.
EPRT Report 1019037, Steam Generator Management Program: Steam Generator Degradation Specific Management Flaw Handbook, Revision 2, October 2015 e.
EPRI Report 3002003048, Steam Generator Management Program: Flaw Handbook Calculator (SGFHC) for Excel 2010 vl.0, June 2014 f.
EPRT Report 3002010334, Model Assisted Probability of Detection Using R (MAPOD-R),
Version 2. 1, September 2017 g.
EPRI SG Degradation Database (SGDD). On EPRI Website http://sgdd.epri.com/
h.
EPRI Appendix H Performance Based Database and Appendix I Database. On EPRI Website http://sgmp.epriq.com 3.
NRC Documents a.
ADAMS Accession number ML20097J188, Braidwood Station, Unit 2,Emergency License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Steam Generator Tube Inspections, Dated April 6, 2020 b.
ADAMS Accession number ML20098F341, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 Exigent License Amendment Request 272, One-Time Extension of TS 6.8.4 Steam Generator Inspection Program Response to Request for Additional Information, Dated April 7, 2020 c.
ADAMS Accession number ML20101M879, Comanche Peak, Exigent License Amendment Request (LAR)20-003 Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.9, Unit 1 Model D76 and Unit 2 Model D5 Steam Generator Program, Dated 4/10/2020 d.
ADAMS Accession number ML20105A223,
- Surry, Units 1
and 2,
Proposed License Amendment Request: One-Time Deferral of Surry Unit 2 Steam Generator B Inspection, Dated April 14, 2020 e.
NRC Information Notice 20 1 3 -20, Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation, October 3, 2013 4.
Callaway Prior Inspection Documents Page 37
For Information Only framatGme Document No.: 51-9312589-001 Callaway Unit I Steam Generator Operational Assessment to Support Deferral of Planned Inspections from I R24 toiR25 a.
Framatome Document 51-9253319-000. Callaway 1R21 Degradation Assessment April 2OI6 b.
Framatome Document 51-9259621-000. Callaway Unit I SG Condition Monitorthg for Cycles
- 19. 20 and 21 and Final Operational Assessment for Cycles 22, 23 and 24 c.
Framatome Document 03-9172027-000. Seconclaiy Side Inspection Final Report Cailaway RFOI8 d.
Frarnatome Document 51-9258120-000. Callaway IRF2I Seconckuy Side Visual Inspection Report e
Frarnatome Document 5 1-9251778-000. Site Validation of Eddy CinTent (ET) Examination Techniques for Callaway lICE April 2016 f,
Framatonie Docninent 03-9203864-002. Steam Generator Channel Head Inspection Per Nnclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) 12-i 5.
Framatome Docinnents a.
Framatome SAS Document NFEKIG ](*
, Callaway Nnclear Power Plant 7311%T Replacement Steam Generator Operation and Iviahitenance Mannal. Revision C K
- 72/l9T RSG Lower Internals AntiVibration Bars Assembly c.
Framatome Docnment 32-9044534-000, Callaway liLT 97-06 Flawed Tithe Analysis d.
Framatome Docnment FS I -0049302 Rev I 0, DCF Callaway End of Cycle Exposnre (CAYI 25)
IL Framatome Docnment 51-9193913-000 Appni Wear Detection and Sizing Site Qnalification i,
Framatome Docunwnt 32-9104082-003. MathCad Implementation of SO Full Probabilistic Operational Assessment j,
Franmtome Docmnent 51-9299884-000, Sizeweil B Steam Generator Outage Report RFO 16 (Spring 2019) k.
s Frainatome Letter PCMOP 20-022. From Bernard Magnhi to Ms. Stephanie Baker,
Subject:
Framatomes PWHT Part 21 Assessment Conclndes no Defect for Callaway RSGs, Dated March 19, 2020 6.
Callaway Documents a.
Callaway Tech Spec 5.5.9 Steam Generator ISG) Program Mneudment No. 215 e.
Framatome Document FSl-0041166 Rev 3.0. Callaway: Data for Use in Benchmark Analysis Page 38