05000281/LER-1996-002-02, :on 960408,EDG Fire Suppression Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Submitted Station Deviation Rept

:on 960408,EDG Fire Suppression Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Submitted Station Deviation Rept

ML18153A456
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	05/07/1996
From:	Christian D VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
96-246, LER-96-002-02, LER-96-2-2, NUDOCS 9605200389
Download: ML18153A456 (7)

LER-1996-002, on 960408,EDG Fire Suppression Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Submitted Station Deviation Rept

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2811996002R02 - NRC Website

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ACCESSION NBR:9605200389 DOC.DATE: 96/05/07 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET#

FACIL:50-281 Surry Power Station, Unit 2, Virginia Electric & Powe 05000281 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION CHRISTIAN,D.A.

Virginia Power (Virginia Electric & Power Co.)

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION SUBJECT: LER 96-002-00:on 960408,EDG fire suppression sys declared inoperable due to personnel error.Submitted station Deviation Rept.W/960507 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL J SIZE:

lo TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER),--Yncident Rpt, etc.

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~7, 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

e 10CFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station 5570 Hog Island Road Surry, Virginia 23883 Serial No.:

96-246 SPS:BAG Docket No.: 50-281 License No.: DPR-37 Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Unit 2.

REPORT NUMBER 50-281 /96-002-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours,

~300_

D. A. Christian Station Manager Enclosure cc:

Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 M. W. Branch NRG Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station 9605200389 960507 PDR ADOCK 05000281 S

PDR

e e

NRC FC9M 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92)

EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER)

COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

ER (2)

~(3)

SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000 - 281 F 5 TITLE (4)

Inoperable EOG Fire Suppression Svstem Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE 51 LEA NUMBER (6 REPORT DATE (71 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8}

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 05000

• 04 08 96 96

-- 002 --

00 05 07 96 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000

• OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR:(Check one or more) (11)

MODE (9)

N 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(c)

POWER 20.405(a)(1 )(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 100%

20.405(a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

OTHER 20.405(a)(1 )(iii)

X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

(Specify in Abstract below and 20.405(a)(1 )(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) in Text, N RC Form 366A) 20.405(a)(1 )(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2}(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12)

NAME I (~~4r3~;~; ~184ing Area Code)

D. A. Christian, Station Manager COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 113)

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TONPRDS N

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14)

I EXPECTED I MONTH I DAY I YEAR I YES (If ves comolete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE\\

XI NO I

SUBMISSION DATE (15)

I I

I ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On April 8, 1996, at approximately 1317 hours0.0152 days <br />0.366 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.011185e-4 months <br />, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100%, the rear exit door to Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) room number 2 was found open.

The door was verified to be closed at approximately 1130 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br />.

Personnel exit through this door after approximately 1135 hours0.0131 days <br />0.315 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.318675e-4 months <br /> allowed a welding lead to become caught between the door and its doorjamb. This condition, which limited the ability of the EOG number 2 carbon dioxide fire suppression system to perform its intended function, had existed for a period in excess of that allowed by Technical Specification (TS) 3.21.8.4. At 1322 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.03021e-4 months <br />, Operations personnel entered EOG room number 2 to remove the welding lead from the doorjamb and close the door. The cause of the event was cognitive personnel error in failing to ensure that the door was closed upon exit. To prevent recurrence, construction management reviewed the event with craft involved in the construction work and the construction foreman. The doors were posted to restrict egress. The event resulted in negligible safety consequences since no fire had occurred, the condition existed for a short duration, and the swing EOG (number 3) was fully operable. Therefore, the health and safety of the public was not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), since the condition was prohibited by TS 3.21.B.4.

NRG FORM 366 (5*92)

NRG FORM 366 (5-92)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000 - 281 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LEA NUMBER 161 PAGE (3).

YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 96

-- 002 --

00 2~0F 5 Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) [EIIS-DG] room number 2 doors are posted as Carbon Dioxide Boundary Fire Doors.

Blocking or holding the doors open is not permitted and Operations Shift Supervisor permission is required prior to putting the door on its automatic blow off device. Access into EOG number 2 is provided from the Unit 2 turbine building hallway and is restricted by the use of a keycard. The EOG number 2 rear exit door leads to the Unit 2 alleyway and provides no access from the outside.

During recent construction work, welding leads were supplied from the Unit 2 alleyway and supported along the outside wall above the rear exit door to EOG number 2. To support the tie-in of new EOG fuel oil supply lines, the welding leads were run through the doorway into EOG room number 2. While the door was open, a fire watch was posted as a compensatory measure to comply with Technical Specification (TS}

3.21.B.4. On April 8, 1996, following the completion of construction work, the welding leads were removed from the doorway and coiled outside the rear door for temporary storage. The door was closed and the Operations Shift Supervisor was notified. The fire watch was released at approximately-0850 hours.

At approximately 1130 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br />, the rear door to the EOG room number 2 was verified to be closed by Safety and Loss Prevention personnel. Another entry was made into the EOG room number 2 at 1135 hours0.0131 days <br />0.315 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.318675e-4 months <br /> by construction personnel and the individual exited the rear exit door at approximately 1145 hours0.0133 days <br />0.318 hours <br />0.00189 weeks <br />4.356725e-4 months <br />.

When interviewed, the individual indicated he saw the door closing but did not verify that it was fully shut. It is believed that the welding leads supported above the rear exit door had loosened and, upon the exit, the leads fell between the door and doorjamb.

Other entries were made into the EOG room number 2 after this exit, however, none of the personnel exited through the rear exit door. At 1317 hours0.0152 days <br />0.366 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.011185e-4 months <br />, an entry was made into EOG room number 2 and the rear exit door was found open approximately 2-3 inches.

Operations was notified and at 1322 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.03021e-4 months <br /> an operator entered EOG room number 2 to remove the welding leads and close the door.

NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95.

LICENSING EVENT REPORT {LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER 12)

LEA NUMBER 16)

PAGEl3l YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000 - 281 96

-- 002 --

00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) This event is being reported pursuant to 1 OCFR50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B), conditions prohibited by plant Technical Specifications, since the open rear exit door to EDG number 2 limited the ability of the carbon dioxide fire suppression system to perform its intended function and a continuous fire watch was not established within one hour.

2.0 SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

The EDG number 2 room has a heat detection system [EIIS-IC] which alarms in the control room and a manually actuated total-flooding carbon dioxide fire suppression system [EIIS-KQ]. In addition, backup fire fighting capability is provided by portable extinguishers in the diesel generator room and manual hose stations serving this area are provided in the turbine building.

Had a fire occurred during this period, the heat system would have alarmed in the control room and an operator would have responded to investigate and actuate the fire suppression system. The control room would have also initiated a response by the station's fire brigade to provide additional suppression capability to backup the carbon dioxide fire suppression system.

This event resulted in negligible safety consequences and implications since a fire did not occur, the condition existed for a short duration, and the swing EDG (number 3) was available. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0 CAUSE

The cause of this event is attributed to cognitive personnel error on the part of the personnel who secured the welding leads above the EDG room number 2 rear exit door and by the individual who exited the door without ensuring that the door was fully closed. The rear exit doors are labeled as carbon dioxide boundary fire doors and instructions on the door state that the door is not to be blocked or held open. Planning and implementation of the EDG number 2 construction work recognized that the doors 3oF5

e NRG FORM 366 (5-92)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000 - 281 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366A) (17) 3.0 CAUSE (continued}

APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 96

-- 002 --

00 4 OF 5 could not be blocked open without compensatory actions and all individuals interviewed concerning this event were aware of the requirements. The error leading to this event was created when the rear exit door was used as an egress doorway. No alarms are provided if the door is not secured in the closed position.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

.upon discovering that the rear exit door was not closed, the control room was notified and an operator responded to the EOG room number 2 to remove the welding leads from the doorway and close the door.

A station Deviation Report was submitted.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The welding leads were removed from the area above the EOG room number 2 rear exit door. Construction management reviewed the event with personnel involved with EOG fuel oil line replacement construction work in the EOG rooms, the pipe fitter craft, and the construction foreman. This review stressed the requirement to maintain the carbon dioxide boundary fire door closed.

During the fuel oil line replacement construction work, no restrictions were placed on personnel exiting through the EOG rear exit doors. To reduce the risk of recurrence, the rear exit doors were posted as emergency exit only.

NRG FORM 366 (5-92)

. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000 - 281 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 6.0 ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20503.

LER NUMBER 161 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 96

.. 002..

REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGEl31 50F5 Prior to the fuel oil line construction work, personnel egress through the EOG room rear exit doors was prohibited. To expedite the fuel oil line replacement work, restrictions on personnel access were relaxed. Upon completion of the work, restrictions on personnel egress through the EOG room rear exit doors will be re-established.

7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS

91-021-00 Emergency Diesel Generator Number 1 Room Fire Suppression System Inoperable Due to Personnel Error in Administratively Controlling the Exit Door.

8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL #

None

9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

None