05000281/LER-1988-001, :on 880127,discovered That Leakage Through Containment Isolation Valves TV-SS-201A & TV-SS-201B Greater than ASME Section XI Spec.On 880202,wrong Leads Lifted for Trip Valves.Caused by Impurities in Sys

:on 880127,discovered That Leakage Through Containment Isolation Valves TV-SS-201A & TV-SS-201B Greater than ASME Section XI Spec.On 880202,wrong Leads Lifted for Trip Valves.Caused by Impurities in Sys

ML18153C038
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	12/28/1989
From:	Kansler M VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
88-001B, LER-88-001, NUDOCS 9001080281
Download: ML18153C038 (5)

LER-1988-001, on 880127,discovered That Leakage Through Containment Isolation Valves TV-SS-201A & TV-SS-201B Greater than ASME Section XI Spec.On 880202,wrong Leads Lifted for Trip Valves.Caused by Impurities in Sys

Event date:
Report date:
2811988001R00 - NRC Website

text

.

ACCELERATED D.11l!BUTION DEMONS.TION SYS REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION :N'BR:9001080281 DOC.DATE: 89/12/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #

FACIL:50-281 Surry Power Station, Unit 2, Virginia Electric & Powe 05000281 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION KANSLER,M.R.

Virginia Power (Virginia Electric & Power Co.)

~CIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION SUBJEcrr: LER 8 8-0 O 1-02: on 8 8 O 12 7, improper admin control of containment isolation valves due to personnel error.

W/8 ltr.

I DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL j_ SIZE:~

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER),-Yncident Rpt, etc. f \\

NOTES:lcy NMSS/FCAF/PM.

5000281 INTERNAL:

EXTERNAL:

NOTES:

REC!PIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-2 LA 1

1 BUCKLEY,B 1

1 ACRS MICHELSON 1

1 ACRS WYLIE 1

1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1

1 DEDRO 1

1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1

1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFBll 1

1 NRR/DOEA/OEABll 1

1 NRR/DST/SELB SD 1

1 NRR/DST/SPLB8D1 1

1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1

1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1

1 EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4

4 LPDR 1

1 NSIC MAYS,G 1

1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1

1 1

1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENfS:

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 PD ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DET/ESGB SD NRR/DLPQ/LPEBlO NRR/DREP /PRPBll NRR/DST/SICB 7E

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RGN2 FILE 01 L ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MURPHY,G.A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

2 1

2 1

1 1

2 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 2

1 2

1 1

1 2

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 i !.

• 1 PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE.DOCUMENT CONTROL qESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 'lJXJ"/9) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR OOCUMENfS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 39 ENCL 39

1\\.,

J i

I I

December 28, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

Serial No.:

Docket No.:

License No.:

88-001'8 50-281 DPR-37 Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following updated Licensee Event Report for Unit 2.

REPORT NUMBER 88-001-02 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Corporate Nuclear Safety.

Very truly yours, M. R. Kansler Station Manager Enclosure cc:

Regional Administrator Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 9001080281 891228 PDR ADOCK 05000281 S

PDC

~--------- ----------

- - ~

Updc.ted Report - Previous ~t Dated 03/04/88 POW 28-06-01

"',IIC Fer111..

,~,

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

U.S. W"-LEAII IIEGULATORY ~ISIION

"""ROVED 0MB NO. 311i1M110ol EXl'IIIES: 1/31/a PACILITY NAIii n1 Surry_Power Station, Unit 2 I

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, I oFI o, 3 TITLE'" Improper Administrative C.:ontro.L of Containment Isolation Valves Due to Personnel Error IVINT DATI I.II LEA NUMBEII Ill

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COMPONENT X

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Jt M It SI VI COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH coa.oNENT FAILUIIE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPOIIT 1131 MANUFAC-TURER COMPONENT I

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I MJ""LEMENTAt. IIEPOIIT !'lll'eCTID il41 MONTH DAY r-, Yl!I (ff IIW. ~

EXl'ECfEIJ SIJIIAlliS:i/fiN DA TEI EXPECTED SUI MISSION DATE.1151 NIIC Form..

fQO'II On January 27, 1988, with Unit 2 at 100% power, it was determined at 1944 hours0.0225 days <br />0.54 hours <br />0.00321 weeks <br />7.39692e-4 months <br /> that leakage through containment isolation valves TV-SS-201A and TV-SS-201B (pressurizer vapor space sample) (EIIS-JM ISV) was greater than the ASME Section XI specification.

The valves were declared inoperable at that time-.- The valves were maintained closed and placed under administr.ative control at 2241 hours0.0259 days <br />0.623 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.527005e-4 months <br /> by lifting a-lead on TV-SS-201A (a solenoid operated valve) and by lifting a lead and isolating instrument air to TV-SS-201B (an air operated valve).

However, on February 2, 1988 at 2225 hours0.0258 days <br />0.618 hours <br />0.00368 weeks <br />8.466125e-4 months <br />, it was discovered-that the wrong leads had been lifted for the trip valves, and that TV-SS-201A, had not ** been properly administratively controlled.

The correct leads were lifted at 2324

hours, and the trip valves w~re verified to be properly controlled.

Electricians have been instructed as to which are the proper leads to lift to disable these valves.

The leakage* through the valves has been attributed to impurities in the system.

TV-SS-201A was replaced and TV-SS-201B was repaired.

I I 9 I

NRC FORM 368A [6-891 FACILITY NAME (1)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l.lCENSE.E EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER C21 APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS ANO REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH [P-5301, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, ANO TO 1'HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-01041. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LER NUMBER (61 PAGE (31 Surry Power Station, Unit 2 o 15 I o I o I o I 2 I 8 I 1 8 I 8 -

ol o I 1 -

o 12 o I 2 oF o I 3 TEXT IN,_. 1/Mt:fl i$ -,ulml, u#... 'idllioMI NRC Fom, 36tl,4~J C17l.

1.0 Description of the Event On January 27, 1988, with Unit 2 at 100% power, it was determined at 1944 hours0.0225 days <br />0.54 hours <br />0.00321 weeks <br />7.39692e-4 months <br /> that leakage through containment isolation valves TV-SS-201A and TV-SS-201B (pressurizer vapor *space sample)

(EIIS-JM ISV) was greater than the ASME Section XI specification.

The valves were declared inoperable at that time.

Technical Specifications require administrative control of inoperable automatic containment isolation valves.

The valves were maintained closed and placed under administrative control at 2241 hours0.0259 days <br />0.623 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.527005e-4 months <br /> by lifting a lead on TV-SS-201A (a solenoid operated valve) and by lifting a lead and isolating instrument air to TV-SS-201B (an air operated valve).

Also, the manual isolation valve downstream of the penetration, l-SS-113, was closed under. administrative control.

However, on February 2, 1988 at 2225 hours0.0258 days <br />0.618 hours <br />0.00368 weeks <br />8.466125e-4 months <br />, it was discovered that the wrong leads had been lifted for the trip valves, and that TV-SS-201A had not been properly administratively controlled.

Since air was isolated to TV-SS-201B, it was effectively administratively controlled.* The correct leads were lifted at 2324 hours0.0269 days <br />0.646 hours <br />0.00384 weeks <br />8.84282e-4 months <br />, and the trip valves were verified to be properly controlled.

2.0 Safety.Consequences and Implications The pressurizer vapor space sample system trip valves provide containment isolation in the event of a loss of coolant accident.

Although the leakage through the trip valves exceeded the ASME Section XI allowable leakage for operable containment isolation"""valves, the leakage was well within the total allowable leakage for containment integrity.

Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0

Cause

Electrical maintenance personnel misinterpreted the electrical sketches and lifted the wrong leads when attempting to disable the trip valves.

Maintenance engineering has determined

.that the

• subject valves are susceptible to leakage due to the entrapment of system impurities in the valve internals.

NRCFORM:.&A 16-691 FACILITY NAIIIIE Ill U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUM!IER 121 N'l'flOVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BUROEI\\I PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COU.ECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGAADING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND. REPORTS w..u.AGEMENT BRANCH IP-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY a-1SSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20!555, AND TO 11lE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT A.ND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LEAN~II (II l'AOE 131 Surry Power Station, Unit 2 o 1s101010121811 818 o lo I 1 TEXT (If men -

• ~

u*iedtlltioMI NRC Fann.'111&4'*11171 NRC F-:.A 16,118) and pitting of the internals caused by the impurities.

Pitting of the valve disc was the cause of leakage through TV-SS-201B.

Valve TV-SS-201A could not be disassembled, however, it is suspected that the leakage was due to small system impurities trapped under the valve seat.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action(s)

When it was discovered that the wrong leads had been lifted, the electricians lifted the proper leads and reconnected the leads.

that had been lifted incorrectly.

Operations then verified that the trip valves could not be opened.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action(s)

TV-SS-201A was and reinstalled satisfactorily.

replaced and TV-SS-201B was repaired and both valves were tested 6.0 Action(s) Taken to Prevent Recurrence Electricians have been instructed as to which are the proper leads to lift to disable these valves.

The present foreign material exclusion controls which.

were enhanced in 1989 and system cleanliness requirements are considered adequate to prevent impurity induced leakage.

7.0

Similar Events

None.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Number(s)

TV-SS-201A Rock/86V~001 TV-SS-201R Asco/Kx2063803RF 0 I 2 0 I 3 OF O f 3