ML18102B389

Forwards Response to NRC Request for Addl Info Re Addition of New Spec 3/4.7.10, Chilled Water Sys - Auxiliary Bldg Subsystem.

ML18102B389
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/12/1997
From:	Eric Simpson Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML18102B390	List: ML18102B389 ML18102B391
References
LCR-S97-05, LCR-S97-5, LR-N970362, NUDOCS 9706180349
Download: ML18102B389 (18)

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!1 ' Electric and Gas 1 * ' Company E. C. Simpson Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609-339-1700 Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering

, . LR-N97 03 62 JUN 1 2 1997LcR S97-05 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR EXIGENT REQUEST FOR CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHILLED WATER SYSTEM - AUXILIARY BUILDING SUBSYSTEM SALEM GENERATING STATION NOS. 1 AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.90, on February 11, 1997, Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) Company submitted letter LR-N97087, requesting a revision to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Salem Generating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2. In accordance with 10CFR50.91(b) (1), a copy of this submittal was sent to the State of New Jersey.

The proposed TS changes represented the addition of a new Specification 3/4.7.10, "Chilled Water System - Auxiliary Building Subsystem." This change was submitted to address the support function this system provides to other necessary safety systems. The proposed changes were evaluated in accordance with 10CFR50.91(a) (1), using the criteria in 10CFR50.92(c) and PSE&G concluded that the request involved no significant hazards considerations.

Supplemental letter LR-N970269 was submitted on May 1, 1997 to revise the proposed Allowed Outage Times (AOTs) included in the original submittal. The supporting information and revised proposed technical specification pages were provided in that submittal. The submittal did not impact the no significant hazards considerations.

Attachment 1 to this letter provides further information the NRC staff has requested in regard to the previous two submittals.

Attachment 2 provides a one line simplified diagram of the Auxiliary Building Chilled Water subsystem. The information in

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Document Control Desk

' LR-N970362 2

• JUN 12 1997 the proposed Bases section is being amplified. Attachment 3 provides a new proposed Bases page for each Salem Unit's Technical Specifications. This information does not change the requested Allowed Outage Times (AOTs) or the no significant hazards considerations evaluation previously docketed.

Should you have any questions regarding this request, we will be pleased*to discuss them with you.

• sincerely, Affidavit Attachment C Mr. H. Miller, Administrator - Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. L. Olshan, Licensing Project Manager - Salem U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 14E21 Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. C. Marschall (X24)

USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering 33 Arctic Parkway CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625 95-4933

STATE OF NEW JERSEY SS.

COUNTY OF SALEM E. C. Simpson, being duly sworn according to law deposes and says:

I am Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and as such, I find the matters set forth in the above referenced letter, concerning Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this /~ day f 1997 ELIZABETH J. KIDD NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY My Commission Expires April 25, 2000 My Commission expires on 3

Docµment Control Desk

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 QUESTION #1:

The NRC staff requested a system description, including power supplies interfaces, component and system capacities, component and system loads, and a system diagram.

RESPONSE #1:

The following provides a system description of the Chilled Water System. This proposed technical specification is applicable to a subsystem of the Chilled Water System identified as the Auxiliary Building Chilled Water (ABCW) subsystem.

The Chilled Water (CH) System consists of six closed loop cooling subsystems which provide cooling to their designated areas and components. The six Chilled Water subsystems are described as follows:

Auxiliary Building Chilled Water subsystem - This closed loop system for each Salem Unit removes heat from various safety related and non-safety related equipment and rejects the heat to the ultimate heat sink via service water. There is one loop for each Salem Unit. System interfaces are discussed below.

Service Building Chilled Water subsystem - This non-safety closed loop system provides cooling to non-safety heat loads such as office areas and machine shops. The loop does not tie into any other CH subsystem.

Administration Building Chilled Water subsystem - This non-safety closed loop system provides cooling to non-safety heat loads such as office areas and the cafeteria. The loop does not tie into any other CH subsystem.

Controlled Facilities Building Chilled Water subsystem - This non-safety closed loop system provides cooling to the controlled facilities area. The loop does not tie into any other CH subsystem.

Clean Facilities Building Chilled Water subsystem - This non-safety closed loop system provides cooling to the non-safety clean facilities area. The loop does not tie into any other CH subsystem.

1

Docµment Control Desk Attachment 1

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 Turbine Building Chilled Water - This non-safety subsystem removes heat from secondary water chemistry process samples. The loop does not tie into any other CH subsystem.

The following information describes the ABCW subsystem:

Attachment 2 provides a simplified one line diagram of the ABCW subsystem. The other five non-safety chilled water loops do not interface with the ABCW subsystem, are not included in the proposed technical specification and are not discussed further.

The ABCW Subsystem includes three packaged liquid chillers and two chilled water pumps. Each pump circulates nominally 370 gpm of chilled water at 200 feet total head in a closed loop from the chillers to the heat loads and then back to the pump suction header. The chillers are packaged refrigeration units with a nominal capacity of 60 tons. Each chiller evaporator removes heat from returning chilled water and, in the chiller condenser, rejects the heat to the ultimate heat sink via service water flow. The chillers are designed to supply chilled water at 44 °F and load based on chilled water return temperature. An expansion tank is installed at the suction of the ABCW pumps to accommodate chilled water inventory, thermal expansion and provide adequate head to ensure pump net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements are met. The chiller compressor motors are powered from separate 460 VAC Vital Buses. The two chiller pumps are powered from separate 230 VAC Vital Buses. The heat loads serviced by the ABCW subsystem for each Salem Unit are as follows.

Safety Related Heat Loads:

• Control Area Air Conditioning (CAAC) Cooling Coils

• Emergency Air Conditioning (EAC) Cooling Coil

• Emergency Control Air Compressor (ECAC) Coolers Non-Safety Heat Loads:

• Penetration Area Cooler Units (PACUs)

• Main Steam Radiation Monitors (R46's)

• Miscellaneous Room Coolers - (Salem Unit 2 ABCW subsystem only provides cooling to the primary lab room cooler, secondary lab room cooler, counting room cooler and post-accident sampling room cooler) 2

Docµment Control Desk

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 The Control Room Envelope is common for Salem Units 1 and 2. The ABCW subsystem for each unit provides chilled water flow through their respective CAAC coils to remove heat from the Control Room Envelope, Relay Rooms and Electrical Equipment Rooms based on maintaining a normal inside temperature of 76 °F. The chilled water flow through the CAAC coils is controlled by a three way control valve (CH74) which is located on the discharge side of the coils. The CH74 control valve is normally controlled based on the outside air and CAAC air handling unit cold deck discharge air temperature. The CAAC air handling unit is a multi-zoned unit with cold deck CAAC cooling coils and a hot deck heating coil. Individually ganged hot and cold deck mixing dampers regulate air temperature to individual zones. The CH74 fails full open to the CAAC coils on loss of air or power.

Chilled water flow through the EAC coil is controlled by the CH168 control valve located on the discharge side of the coil.

This valve is normally closed but opens on a safety injection signal or radiation monitoring initiated signal (RMS). The valve modulates to maintain the control room envelope temperature within the design limit (a later discussion identifies a design change to the CH168). The CH168 control valve fails in the open position on loss of air or power.

Chilled water flow to the ECAC coolers is normally isolated and is provided when the ECAC is operating by an automatic isolation valve that opens when the compressor starts.

Chilled water flow is provided to the penetration area cooler units (PACU) as required to maintain the environmental conditions in the mechanical penetration area for protection of equipment.

Room thermostats are provided to modulate three-way control valves to each PACU. The supply of chilled water to the non-safety PACU cooling coils is automatically isolated by redundant isolation valves (CH151 and CH30) on a safety injection signal.

Chilled water flow is provided to the main steam radiation monitors to cool main steam sample flow. Flow is maintained to the radiation monitors during all modes of ABCW subsystem operation. These loads are isolated only on low chilled water supply or return header pressure.

The Salem Unit 2 ABCW subsystem provides chilled water to the miscellaneous room coolers in addition to the uses described above. Three-way control valves modulate flow to each room cooler based on room temperature. Chilled water flow to these 3

Doc.ument Control Desk Attachment 1

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 non-safety room cooling coils is automatically isolated by redundant isolation valves on a safety injection signal.

The ABCW subsystem operates in the following operating modes:

Normal Mode During normal plant operation, the ABCW subsystem provides chilled water to the CAAC coils, PACUs and main steam radiation monitors. In addition to these loads the Unit 2 ABCW subsystem supplies chilled water to the miscellaneous room coolers.

Abnormal Mode During power operations when the ECAC is operated for testing or when the Station Air Compressors are not available or not operating, the ABCW subsystem provides chilled water to the ECAC coolers in addition to the loads identified for the normal mode.

Accident Safety Injection (SI) Mode During the accident SI mode, the Control Area Ventilation (CAV) system is automatically switched to the ~Accident - Pressurized mode" which starts the EAC fans and opens the EAC chilled water control valve to the EAC coil. The CAAC coils continue to receive chilled water and the ECAC is assumed to be operating (with chilled water flow to the ECAC coolers) due to a loss of power or loss of station air compressors. The main steam radiation monitors continue to receive chilled water since they are not isolated by the SI signal. On an SI signal, redundant isolation valves automatically isolate chilled water flow to the PACUs and the miscellaneous room coolers.

Both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 EAC coils provide cooling to the common Control Room Envelope (CRE) and each Unit's CAAC coils provide cooling to their respective Relay and Electrical Equipment Rooms. System calculations assume one Unit's EAC coil is operating to provide the entire cooling load for the CRE and maintain it below 85 °F (referred to as CAV maintenance mode).

This assumption establishes the maximum cooling load and higher chilled water flow requirements for accident conditions.

4

Doc,ument Control Desk Attachment 1 LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 Accident High Radiation (RMS) Mode During the accident RMS mode, the Control Area Ventilation (CAV)

System is automatically switched to the "Accident- Pressurized mode" which starts EAC fans and opens the EAC chilled water control valve, providing chilled water to the EAC coil. The CAAC coils continue to receive chilled water and the ECAC is assumed to be operating (with chilled water flow to the ECAC coolers) due to a loss of power or loss of station air compressors. The main steam radiation monitors continue to receive chilled water since they are not isolated by the RMS signal. The PACUs and the miscellaneous room coolers are not automatically isolated by the RMS signal and continue to receive chilled water flow until manually isolated by procedure. Both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 EAC coils provide cooling to the common CRE. Chilled water to each Unit's CAAC coils provides cooling to their respective Relay and Electrical Equipment Rooms. On initiation of an accident high radiation (RMS) signal when the CAV system is in the maintenance mode, the operating EAC coil will continue to receive chilled water and maintain the common CRE at a maximum temperature of 85 °F.

Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) Mode

• During a LOOP, chilled water flow is maintained to Units 1 and 2 CAAC coils to provide cooling to the CRE and their respective Relay and Electrical Equipment Rooms. Each Unit's ECAC is started and chilled water is supplied to the ECAC coolers. The main steam radiation monitors continue to receive chilled water flow. The PACU's and miscellaneous room coolers are isolated.

Fire Outside Control Room Area Mode During a postulated fire outside the control area, the CAV System is manually switched to the full recirculation mode. This initiates the EAC fans and opens the control valve, providing chilled water to the EAC coil. The CAAC coils and main steam radiation monitors continue to receive chilled water. The PACU's and miscellaneous room coolers are manually isolated. Both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 EAC coils provide cooling to the common CRE and the CAAC coils provide cooling to their respective Relay and Electrical Equipment Rooms.

5

Doc.ument Control Desk

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 ABCW Subsystem Interfaces with other Systems The ABCW subsystem interfaces with the systems it supports through heat transfer across cooling coils.

Control air is required for operation of ABCW Subsystem control valves.

Service water supplies cooling water to each packaged chiller condenser. The chillers eject heat to the ultimate heat sink via service water flow.

The Safeguards Equipment Control (SEC) circuits provide automatic control of the ABCW Subsystem during accident conditions. The interfaces between the ABCW subsystem and SEC circuits occur at the SEC contacts in the ABCW Subsystem control circuits.

The Potable Water system provides make-up water to the ABCW Subsystem expansion tank. Nitrogen is supplied to the expansion tank.

The Building and Equipment Drains system provides for transport and disposal of excess fluids from the ABCW Subsystem.

There is a cross tie between the Unit 1 ABCW subsystem and Unit 2 ABCW subsystem. The valves in this cross tie are maintained closed and the cross tie is not utilized by procedure. No credit is taken for this cross-tie in any mode of operation.

QUESTION #2:

The NRC staff requested a description of the benefits of the proposed technical specifications over the current method of operation.

RESPONSE #2:

In support of the unified control room envelope modifications completed during the current Salem Unit outages, the ABCW subsystem design and performance as a support system to control area HVAC systems was firmly established in documented calculations and procedures. The proposed technical specifications and compensatory actions have been identified consistent with these calculations. PSE&G's intent to submit this proposal was identified in Licensee Event Report 272/97-002 dated February 10, 1997.

6

Doc.ument Control Desk

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 In the past, the ABCW subsystem role as a safety support system to control room area HVAC systems was recognized in that inoperable ABCW subsystem chiller or pump components were assigned, scheduled and worked to a high priority such that components were returned to service generally within the AOTs in the proposed technical specifications. A sample review of work history indicates that each chiller was out of service for corrective maintenance approximately once per year and each pump approximately once every other year.

However, these component outages did not include specific limiting AOTs, and the compensatory actions required in the proposed technical specifications were not completed in the interim. These AOTs and compensatory actions, firmly backed up by reconstituted calculations, represent an enhanced safety response to ABCW chiller and pump outages. In addition, the proposed technical specifications simplify the operator response to ABCW subsystem chiller and pump outages by removing the burden to develop and coordinate operability determinations on a case by case basis for these components.

The significance of the ABCW subsystem support role is recognized in that the Combustion Engineering vendor improved standard technical specifications include a technical specification for this system (NUREG-1432, LCO 3.7.10). This proposed technical specification requests that the Salem ABCW subsystem be subject to this level of control.

QUESTION #3:

The NRC staff requested clarification on the chilled water loop subsystems and their interfaces.

RESPONSE #3:

This has been addressed in item #1.

QUESTION #4:

The NRC staff requested a clarification of the statement in the February 11, 1997 submittal that two chillers and one pump can meet the normal heat load requirements.

RESPONSE #4:

The original submittal stated that the ABCW subsystem is equipped with two 100% capacity chilled water pumps and three 50% capacity 7

r Doc.ument Control Desk Attachment 1

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 chillers. The chilled water pumps are 100% capacity pumps. With regard to chillers, during accident conditions (SI) non-essential heat loads are automatically isolated such that two chillers are designed to service the essential heat loads. However during maximum normal summer temperature conditions three chillers are required to be in operation to service the normal heat loads.

This indicates that during normal maximum summer conditions the chillers are not 50% capacity. The proposed technical specifications require three chillers to be operable. If less than three chillers are operable, the proposed technical specifications require appropriate non-essential heat loads be removed from the chilled water system such that two chillers are capable of servicing the remaining heat loads. This is discussed in Question #8. The proposed technical specifications ensure that the chiller capacity can service the required loads during both maximum normal summer conditions and accident conditions.

UFSAR Section 9.4.1.3 currently states that the chillers are 50%

capacity machines with no clarification as to their mode of operation. The UFSAR description of the chilled water system capacity will be clarified in accordance with 10CFR50.59 requirements.

QUESTION #5:

The NRC staff requested a description of the assumptions and actual probabilities for the postulated scenarios.

RESPONSE #5:

The PSE&G submittal dated February 11, 1997 proposed the following allowed outage times (AOTs) for the ABCW subsystem:

a. 1 Chiller out of service: 30 days

b. 2 Chillers out of service: 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (with EACS in Maint. Mode)

c. 1 Chilled Water Pump out of service: 14 days The proposed AOTs were derived from PSA analyses. The PSA analyses assumed procedures were available to take manual actions where required. Procedures are available and this assumption is valid. The PSA analysis determined the effects on core damage frequency for the above equipment out of service. A conditional core damage probability was determined for each combination of equipment unavailable. The durations assigned to the AOTs listed above result in conditional core damage probabilities of lE-6 or less. This is considered non-risk significant in accordance with 8

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Doc.ument Control Desk Attachment 1 LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 EPRI Final Report "PSA Application Guide," TR-105396, dated August 1995.

With regard to a single chiller out of service, the limiting chiller (Unit 2) had a conditional core damage frequency of 1.00E-4. With a Unit 2 baseline core damage frequency of 9.06E-5/year, a 30 day AOT was calculated to result in an increase in conditional core damage probability of 7.87E-7 which is less than lE-6. A single chiller out of service for 30 days is therefore non-risk significant.

With regard to two chillers out of service, the two limiting chillers were on Unit 2 and assumed to be out of service with non-essential loads removed prior to the initiating event. For simplicity the ECAC was assumed to be unavailable during the AOT, although it would be available when aligned from chilled water to service water. This assumption had little impact on the results.

For two chillers out of service the conditional core damage frequency is 1.86E-4/year. With a Unit 2 baseline core damage frequency of 9.06E-5/year, a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AOT was calculated to result in a conditional core damage probability of 7.81E-7 which is less than lE-6. Two chillers out of service for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is therefore non-risk significant.

With regard to one chilled water pump out of service, the limiting chilled water pump (Unit 2) had a 1.04E-4/year conditional core damage frequency. With a Unit 2 baseline core damage frequency of 9.06E-5/year, a 14 day AOT was calculated to result in a conditional core damage probability of 5.24E-7 which is less than lE-6. A single chilled water pump out of service for 14 days is therefore non-risk significant.

Based on discussions with the staff, the supplemental submittal dated May 1, 1997 conservatively revised the AOT for one chiller out of service from 30 days to 14 days. Also, the AOT for one chilled water pump out of service was conservatively revised from 14 days to 7 days. These AOT revisions decrease by half the conditional core damage probabilities for these equipment outages.

9

DoGument Control Desk

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 QUESTION #6:

The NRC staff requested clarification on the chiller surveillance test and the verification of heat removal capability.

RESPONSE #6:

The surveillance tests in the proposed technical specifications require that each chiller be periodically verified to start and run every 92 days. This surveillance test ensures that a chiller previously in a standby condition will automatically start and run and be observed to pick up the available heat load. This surveillance does not test the capability of the chiller to remove design heat loads. This surveillance is not included in the standard technical specification for the essential chilled water system. Therefore, it is more conservative than accepted guidance and appropriate for the chiller component.

QUESTION #7:

The NRC staff requested clarification as to the testing of chillers and the role of manual actions.

RESPONSE #7:

The February 11, 1997 submittal stated that during maintenance and testing, preplanned operator actions may take the place of automatic actions. Preplanned operator action is limited to testing where a chiller may be removed from automatic operation in order to test the remaining chiller or chillers.

Outside of summer temperature conditions, the normal heat load serviced by the chillers is low. The chillers automatically start on increasing return chilled water temperature. During non-summer conditions the available heat load may be too low to observe automatic start of a chiller unless the other chiller or chillers are manually removed from service. During the time the chillers are removed from service, an operator will be dedicated to take manual action to restore the chiller(s) to automatic service if required. Manual operator action to restore a chiller to automatic service is a very short term evolution which includes oil level checks and local switch manipulations.

The reference to manual operator actions during maintenance will be removed from the Bases. A revised page for each unit is enclosed in Attachment 3.

10

Doc,ument Control Desk

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 QUESTION #8:

The NRC staff requested a discussion of chiller capacity relative to heat loads.

RESPONSE #8:

The proposed technical specifications require that three chillers be maintained operable or the action statement entered with associated compensatory actions completed. The basis for maintaining three chillers operable and the compensatory actions specified is demonstrated in the following table. The table lists nominal Salem Unit 2 essential heat loads for illustrative purposes only.

Two chillers have the capacity to remove the remaining essential heat loads with the compensatory action taken to remove appropriate non-essential heat loads (PACUs and miscellaneous room coolers).

One chiller on either Salem Unit and two chillers on the other Unit have the capacity to remove the essential heat loads with appropriate non-essential heat loads removed, if the EACS loads are shifted to the unit with two chillers.

By shifting the ECAC heat loads to service water, fewer non-essential heat loads must be isolated to maintain loading within the capacity of the chillers.

These compensatory actions ensure that while in the action statement the available compliment of ABCW subsystem components can perform the system design function. No single failure is assumed within the allowed outage time of the action statement.

DESCRIPTION: HEAT LOAD: (1000 BTUs/Hr)

CAACS 635 EACS 182.5 (Note 1)

ECAC 334 Main Steam Radiation Monitors 2.5 TOTAL: 1154 Capacity of One Chiller: 712 (Note 2)

Capacity of Two Chillers: 1424 11

Document Control Desk

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 Note 1 - This is one half of the common control room heat load.

Note 2 - Chiller capacity based on service water supplied to the chiller condenser at 90 °F.

During discussions with the NRC staff, two additional items of clarification were requested:

QUESTION #9:

Please clarify the TS Bases for the proposed action statements.

RESPONSE #9 The Bases section has been revised to include statements that describe the bases for compensatory actions identified in the proposed action statements. This is an enhancement to the Bases section previously submitted.

QUESTION #10 What is the justification for the Technical Specification, i.e.,

which Policy Statement [10CFR50.36(c) (2) criterion] requires it to be in Technical Specifications?

RESPONSE #10:

Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 provides for, "A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier."

"Discussion of Criterion 3" outlined in the section titled, "10 CFR 50, Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" of 58 FR 39132, states in part, "Also captured by this criterion are those support and actuation systems that are necessary for items in the primary success path to successfully function." Thus, a structure, system or component that provides a function, without which a

'primary success path structure, system or component' could not function, is included under Criterion 3.

The Control Room Envelope is common for Salem Units 1 and 2. The ABCW subsystem for each unit provides chilled water flow through 12

Document Control Desk Attachment 1

• LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 their respective CAAC coils to remove heat from the Control Room Envelope, Relay Rooms and Electrical Equipment Rooms based on maintaining a normal inside temperature of 76 °F. For this reason the Chilled Water Systems and in particular the ABCW satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 for inclusion in the Salem Technical Specifications.

The significance of the ABCW subsystem support role is recognized in that the Combustion Engineering vendor improved standard technical specifications include a technical specification for this system (NUREG-1432, LCO 3.7.10). This proposed technical specification requests that the Salem ABCW subsystem be subject to this level of control.

Clarification Lastly, we would like to clarify the single failure vulnerability to the air operated chilled water control valve on the outlet of the EACS coil for each Salem Unit (1CH168 and 2CH168), described in our February 11, 1997 submittal. As stated in our submittal, PSE&G has implemented temporary compensatory actions to remove the single failure vulnerability from these valves. This involved removing the air supply and maintaining the valve open.

PSE&G has now identified this as a long term solution to remove the single failure vulnerability from these valves. This solution is currently implemented as a temporary modification.

PSE&G intends to implement this as a long term design change on Salem Unit 2 prior to the Unit 2 entering mode 2 (startup).

13

"Document Control Desk LR-N970269 LCR S97-05 ATTACHMENT 2 ABCW Subsystem Simplified Diagram 1

Document Control Desk LR-N970269 1~ \.

• LCR S97"-05 iNFORMATlON ONLY Chilled Water Flow Sketch Expansio Tank Potable Wate*

Lab, PASS, and Supply 1CH2 1CH168 Count Am. Coolers (2CH2) 1CH55 (2CH168) (Ul"\lt 2 only) (2CH55) 1CH132 1

1CH74 (Unit 2 only)

C2CH74) 1CH74

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\ (2CH74} 1 CH6 1 1CH260 (2CH61) (2CH260)

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I,  :

Rad Monitors 1CH216 (2CH216) 1 . l.

9

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14

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11 (21)

Chiller 11CH13 (21 CH13) 1

~i 'H i i

t 11 (21) Chilled I 12 (22) Water Pump

/

Chiller

/

. 1CH,150 1CH151 I i2CH"3

• CH252 (22CH13)

(Unit 2 only) (2CH151)

CROSS TIE (2CH252) 1 CH117 TO OTHER UNIT (Unit 2 only) 13 (23) 1CH30 Ch Iller 1CH253 12 (22)

(2CH30) Chilled Water (2CH253)

Pump