|
---|
Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18066A6271999-09-0202 September 1999 LER 98-011-01:on 981217,inadequate Lube Oil Collection Sys for Primary Coolant Pumps Was Noted.Caused by Design Change Not Containing Appropriate Level of Rigor.Exemption from 10CFR50,App R Was Requested.With 990902 Ltr ML18066A6221999-08-20020 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990722,TS Surveillance Was Not Completed within Specified Frequency.Caused by Failure to Incorporate Revised Frequency Into Surveillance Schedule in Timely Manner.Verified Implementation.With 990820 Ltr ML18066A3781999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-013-00:on 981222,safeguards Transfer Tap Changer Failure Caused Inadvertant DG Start.Caused by Failed Motor Contactor.Contactor Was Replaced.With 990120 Ltr ML18068A4851998-10-29029 October 1998 LER 97-011-01:on 971012,starting of Primary Coolant Pump with SG Temps Greater than Cold Leg Temps Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures & Operator Decision.Sop Used for Starting Primary Coolant Pump Enhanced ML18066A2831998-08-18018 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980721,reactor Manually Tripped.Caused by Failure of Coupling Which Drives Feedwater Pump Main Lube Oil Pump.Main Lube Oil Pump Coupling & Associated Components Replaced & Satisfactorily Tested ML18066A2261998-06-30030 June 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980531,small Pinhole Leak Found on One of Welds,During Leak Test Following Replacement of Pcs Sample Isolation Valves.Caused by Welder Error.Leaking Welds Repaired ML18066A1781998-06-0909 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980511,noted That Procedure Did Not Fully Satisfy Requirement to Test High Startup Rate Trip Function. Caused by Misunderstanding of Testing Requirements.Revised TS Surveillance Test Procedure & Reviewed Other Procedures ML18065B2451998-05-13013 May 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980413,HPIS Sys Was Noted Inoperable During TS Surveillance Test.Caused by Performance of Flawed Procedure.Operators & Engineers Will Be Trained to Improve Operational Decision Making Through Resources & Knowledge ML18065B1151997-12-0909 December 1997 LER 97-013-00:on 971110,failure to Closure Test Two Check Valves Resulted in Violation of TS 6.5.7 Occurred.Caused by Close Function for Check Valves.Check Valves Tested to Confirm Proper Closure Capability ML18067A7751997-11-11011 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971012,primary Coolant Pump Was Started W/Sg Temperatures Greater than Cold Leg Temperature.Caused by Inadequate Procedures & Operator Decision Making.Critique of Event Conducted W/Operators Involved ML18067A7581997-10-30030 October 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970930,determined That Inadequacy in App R Analysis Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Missing Cable in Circuit & Raceway Schedule. Developed New Evaluation Re ASD Valves Validation ML18067A7461997-10-23023 October 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970923,discovered Procedure Weakness Re Implementation of App R Shutdown Methodology.Caused by Human Error.Revised Off-Normal Procedure ONP-25.2, Alternate Safe Shutdown Procedure. ML18067A7191997-10-10010 October 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970912,spurious Valve Operation Could Result in Loss of Shutdown Capabilities Per 10CFR50,App R, Section Iii.L,Was Discovered.Caused by Failure to Validate Info from App R.Design Bases for SW Backup Reviewed ML18067A6951997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970826,discovered Inadequate Testing of DG Sequencer Control Relay Contacts.Caused by Oversight on Part of Personnel Involved in Installation of Facility Change FC-800.Tested 106D-1/XL & 106D-2/XL Relay Contacts ML18067A5651997-06-0303 June 1997 LER 96-013-01:on 961115,DC Breaker Failed During Testing for as-found Trip Setting.Failure Caused by Oversight within Preventive Maint Program.Breaker Was Replaced & Tested ML18067A5461997-05-12012 May 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970412,overtime Limits Were Exceeded for Radiation Protection Technicians.Caused by Inadequate Design,Review & Proper Verifications of Overtime Work Schedule.Communicate Overtime Limitation Responsibilities ML18067A4431997-03-24024 March 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970221,trip of High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Occurred While Filling Safety Injection Tank Resulting in TS Violation.Caused by Particle Lodged Between Surface of Indication disk.Y-phase Relay Was OOS ML18067A4391997-03-21021 March 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 961220,operation of Plant Outside Design Basis Occurred Due to an Unacceptable Repair on Main Steam Isolation Valves.Pipe Plugs Permanently Repaired ML18067A4401997-03-21021 March 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 961101,four Piping Lines Were Determined to Be Potentially Susceptible to Pressurization Due to Containment Temperature Increase During an Accident.Cac Discharge Piping Will Be verified.W/970321 Ltr ML18066A8931997-02-21021 February 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970123,failure to Meet TSs 4.5.2d(1)(b) for Testing of Emergency Escape Airlock Occurred.Caused by Missed Surveillance.Emergency Escape Air Lock Testing Was Completed & Declared operable.W/970221 Ltr ML18066A8751997-02-0505 February 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970106,TAVE Temp Dropped Below Minimum Temp for Criticality.Caused by Control Rod Withdrawal Rate to Increase Power Not Sufficient to Match Increase in Steam. Turbine Bypass Valve Actuator repaired.W/970205 Ltr ML18066A8041996-12-23023 December 1996 LER 96-014-00:on 961124,class 1E Raychem Cable Splices Were Installed Incorrectly.Caused by Incorrectly Made Electrical Splices.Total of 270 Splices Have Been Replaced within Containment ML18066A7831996-12-16016 December 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961115,DC Breaker Failure During Testing for as-found Trip Setting Occurred.Cause Under Investigation.All molded-case Circuit Breakers in DC Distribution Panels Were Replaced ML18065A9951996-10-0404 October 1996 LER 96-002-01:on 960116,initiated TS Required Shutdown Due to Safeguards Cable Fault.Both Sets (Six Cables) of Cables Were Replaced & Installed Through Turbine Generator Bldg ML18065A9171996-09-0909 September 1996 LER 95-012-00:on 960809,TS Violation Occurred,Due to No Senior Reactor Operator in Cr.Caused by Extensive Remodeling.Cr Remodeling completed.W/960909 Ltr ML18065A8961996-08-29029 August 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960730,CR Continuous Air Monitor Alarm Setpoint Improperly Established.Caused by Failure to Utilize Mod Process in 1988 Leading to Failure to Properly Select & Calibrate Instruments ML18065A8811996-08-20020 August 1996 LER 96-005-01:on 960207,determined Fuse on Main Supply to Two Safety Related DC Panels & Panel Branch Circuit Breakers Not Properly Coordinated.Caused by Lack of Thorough Associated Circuits Analysis.Supply Fuse to Panels Replaced ML18065A8741996-08-16016 August 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960717,high Pressure Safety Injection Pump Tripped While Filling Safety Injection Tank.Caused by Faulty 150/151Y-207 Time Overcurrent Relay.All Similar Relays in Time Overcurrent Application Have Been Inspected ML18065A8651996-08-12012 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960712,identified Penetration Seal Deficiency on Fire Barriers Caused by Failure to Perform & Document Comprehensive Fire Barrier Evaluation.Developed Basis document.W/960812 Ltr ML18065A8601996-08-0202 August 1996 LER 96-006-01 on 960207,discovered Limits of Design Analysis Could Have Been Violated.Subsequent Tests & Analyses Facility Did Not Exceed Basis.Operating Procedures Have Been Revised to Treat 2530 Megawatts Limit as Absolute Limit ML18065A8321996-08-0101 August 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960115,alternate Shutdown Panel Inverter Resulted in Unavailability of Panel.Replaced Defective Inverter Alarm Logic Board ML18065A7691996-06-12012 June 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960513,fire Door Not Maintained Open in Accordance W/Design Basis.Cause Under Investigation. Engineering Evaluation Performed & Revised Documents, Surveillance & Test procedures.W/960612 Ltr ML18065A6901996-05-0101 May 1996 LER 95-001-01:on 950302,malfunction of Left Channel DBA Sequencer Resulted in Inadvertent Actuation of Left Channel Safeguards Equipment.Replaced microprocessor.W/960501 Ltr ML18065A6681996-04-22022 April 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960321,inadequate Emergency Lighting & Ventilation in post-fire Safe Shutdown Areas.Caused by App R Program Documentation Insufficient to Demonstrate Regulatory Compliance.Lighting modified.W/960422 Ltr ML18065A5721996-03-11011 March 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960207,average Reactor Power Level Exceeded License Limit Due to Insufficient Procedural Guidance. GOP-12 Revised to Treat 2,530 Mwt Limit as Absolute Limit Requiring Immediate Corrective Action If Exceeded ML18065A5261996-03-0101 March 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960202,fuse on Main Supply to Two SR DC Panels & Panel Branch Circuit Breakers Not Properly Coordinated.Caused by Inadequate Electrical/App R Design Review.Implemented Hourly Fire tours.W/960301 Ltr ML18065A5111996-02-19019 February 1996 LER 94-012-02:on 940427,determined That Internal Ground in Thermal Margin Monitor Causes Nonconformance W/Rps Design Basis.Incorporated RPS Failure Modes & Effects Analysis in Plant DBD.W/960219 Ltr ML18065A5061996-02-19019 February 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960118,SIS Disabled W/Primary Coolant Sys Greater than 300 F.Caused by Personnel Error.Permanent Maint Procedure to Disable/Enable SIS Actuation on Low Pressurizer Pressure Will Be Revised to Align W/Ts ML18065A5021996-02-15015 February 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960115,technicians Found Low Voltage cut- Off for Alternate Shutdown Panel Inverter Set That Resulted in Unavailability of Panel.Caused by Inadequate Post Mod. Readjusted Set Point to Minimum setting.W/960215 Ltr ML18065A4581996-01-31031 January 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960103,failed to Test Duplicate Equipment. Caused by STS No Longer Containing Requirement for cross- Train Testing of Duplicate Components.Will Submit Request to Delete Subj Requirements from TS.W/960131 Ltr ML18065A4421996-01-19019 January 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951226,did Not Analyze Primary Coolant Samples within 72 H.Caused by Belief Acceptability to Save Pcs Samples for Choride Analysis Past 72 H.Counseled Chemistry Supervision.W/960119 Ltr ML18065A4041996-01-15015 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 950119,PCP Oil Collection Deficiencies Created by FC-860 Piping Mod.Caused by Inadequate DBD for Sys & Lack of Review by Experienced Fire Protection Personnel.Updated Design Basis documentation.W/960115 Ltr ML18065A3291995-12-0404 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951103,circuit Fuse Coordination Deficiency Which Affects App R Safe Shutdown Equipment Noted.Design of Fuse Coordination in Potential Transformer Circuits Will Be Evaluated & Modified as required.W/951204 Ltr ML18065A2361995-11-0202 November 1995 LER 95-012-00:on 950701,discovered Unqualified Electrical Connection in Containment SW Outlet Valve Controller.Caused by Failure of Assigned Engineers to Available Info.Replaced Wire Nuts W/Inline Butt connections.W/951102 Ltr ML18065A2051995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-008-01:on 950728,discovered That None of Four Containment High Pressure Channels Would Initiate Reactor Trip Due to Programmatic Deficiencies.Administrative Procedure (AP) 9.44,AP 9.45 & AP 10.44 Will Be Revised ML18065A0841995-09-18018 September 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950817,CR 40 Withdrawal Occurred When Given Insertion Signal Due to skill-based Error in Crimping & Removing Foreign Matl from CRDM Motor Connection Box.Crd Package replaced.W/950918 Ltr ML18065A0681995-09-14014 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950815,ESFA Resulted in Manual Rt Following Isolation of Pcs.Replaced Failed Instrument Line ML18065A0651995-09-0808 September 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950728,discovered Lack of Procedural Guidance for Pump Repair Following Fire.Proposed Use of Power Supply Breaker Did Not Adequately Address Effect of Loss of Control Power.Performed Independent Assessment ML18064A8781995-08-28028 August 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950728,discovered During Design Change Testing That None of Four Containment High Pressure Channels Would Initiate Rt.Caused by Programmatic Deficiencies. Reviewed Selected Tests & Mods from Recent Refueling Outage ML18064A8831995-08-21021 August 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950720,discovered That 12 Instrument Loops Had V-bolted Type Qualified Cable Splices Connected to Wires W/Exposed Kapton Insulation.Caused by Human Error.All V- Bolted Splices Replaced w/in-line design.W/950821 Ltr 1999-09-02
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18066A6271999-09-0202 September 1999 LER 98-011-01:on 981217,inadequate Lube Oil Collection Sys for Primary Coolant Pumps Was Noted.Caused by Design Change Not Containing Appropriate Level of Rigor.Exemption from 10CFR50,App R Was Requested.With 990902 Ltr ML18066A6221999-08-20020 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990722,TS Surveillance Was Not Completed within Specified Frequency.Caused by Failure to Incorporate Revised Frequency Into Surveillance Schedule in Timely Manner.Verified Implementation.With 990820 Ltr ML18066A3781999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-013-00:on 981222,safeguards Transfer Tap Changer Failure Caused Inadvertant DG Start.Caused by Failed Motor Contactor.Contactor Was Replaced.With 990120 Ltr ML18068A4851998-10-29029 October 1998 LER 97-011-01:on 971012,starting of Primary Coolant Pump with SG Temps Greater than Cold Leg Temps Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures & Operator Decision.Sop Used for Starting Primary Coolant Pump Enhanced ML18066A2831998-08-18018 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980721,reactor Manually Tripped.Caused by Failure of Coupling Which Drives Feedwater Pump Main Lube Oil Pump.Main Lube Oil Pump Coupling & Associated Components Replaced & Satisfactorily Tested ML18066A2261998-06-30030 June 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980531,small Pinhole Leak Found on One of Welds,During Leak Test Following Replacement of Pcs Sample Isolation Valves.Caused by Welder Error.Leaking Welds Repaired ML18066A1781998-06-0909 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980511,noted That Procedure Did Not Fully Satisfy Requirement to Test High Startup Rate Trip Function. Caused by Misunderstanding of Testing Requirements.Revised TS Surveillance Test Procedure & Reviewed Other Procedures ML18065B2451998-05-13013 May 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980413,HPIS Sys Was Noted Inoperable During TS Surveillance Test.Caused by Performance of Flawed Procedure.Operators & Engineers Will Be Trained to Improve Operational Decision Making Through Resources & Knowledge ML18065B1151997-12-0909 December 1997 LER 97-013-00:on 971110,failure to Closure Test Two Check Valves Resulted in Violation of TS 6.5.7 Occurred.Caused by Close Function for Check Valves.Check Valves Tested to Confirm Proper Closure Capability ML18067A7751997-11-11011 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971012,primary Coolant Pump Was Started W/Sg Temperatures Greater than Cold Leg Temperature.Caused by Inadequate Procedures & Operator Decision Making.Critique of Event Conducted W/Operators Involved ML18067A7581997-10-30030 October 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970930,determined That Inadequacy in App R Analysis Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Missing Cable in Circuit & Raceway Schedule. Developed New Evaluation Re ASD Valves Validation ML18067A7461997-10-23023 October 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970923,discovered Procedure Weakness Re Implementation of App R Shutdown Methodology.Caused by Human Error.Revised Off-Normal Procedure ONP-25.2, Alternate Safe Shutdown Procedure. ML18067A7191997-10-10010 October 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970912,spurious Valve Operation Could Result in Loss of Shutdown Capabilities Per 10CFR50,App R, Section Iii.L,Was Discovered.Caused by Failure to Validate Info from App R.Design Bases for SW Backup Reviewed ML18067A6951997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970826,discovered Inadequate Testing of DG Sequencer Control Relay Contacts.Caused by Oversight on Part of Personnel Involved in Installation of Facility Change FC-800.Tested 106D-1/XL & 106D-2/XL Relay Contacts ML18067A5651997-06-0303 June 1997 LER 96-013-01:on 961115,DC Breaker Failed During Testing for as-found Trip Setting.Failure Caused by Oversight within Preventive Maint Program.Breaker Was Replaced & Tested ML18067A5461997-05-12012 May 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970412,overtime Limits Were Exceeded for Radiation Protection Technicians.Caused by Inadequate Design,Review & Proper Verifications of Overtime Work Schedule.Communicate Overtime Limitation Responsibilities ML18067A4431997-03-24024 March 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970221,trip of High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Occurred While Filling Safety Injection Tank Resulting in TS Violation.Caused by Particle Lodged Between Surface of Indication disk.Y-phase Relay Was OOS ML18067A4391997-03-21021 March 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 961220,operation of Plant Outside Design Basis Occurred Due to an Unacceptable Repair on Main Steam Isolation Valves.Pipe Plugs Permanently Repaired ML18067A4401997-03-21021 March 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 961101,four Piping Lines Were Determined to Be Potentially Susceptible to Pressurization Due to Containment Temperature Increase During an Accident.Cac Discharge Piping Will Be verified.W/970321 Ltr ML18066A8931997-02-21021 February 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970123,failure to Meet TSs 4.5.2d(1)(b) for Testing of Emergency Escape Airlock Occurred.Caused by Missed Surveillance.Emergency Escape Air Lock Testing Was Completed & Declared operable.W/970221 Ltr ML18066A8751997-02-0505 February 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970106,TAVE Temp Dropped Below Minimum Temp for Criticality.Caused by Control Rod Withdrawal Rate to Increase Power Not Sufficient to Match Increase in Steam. Turbine Bypass Valve Actuator repaired.W/970205 Ltr ML18066A8041996-12-23023 December 1996 LER 96-014-00:on 961124,class 1E Raychem Cable Splices Were Installed Incorrectly.Caused by Incorrectly Made Electrical Splices.Total of 270 Splices Have Been Replaced within Containment ML18066A7831996-12-16016 December 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961115,DC Breaker Failure During Testing for as-found Trip Setting Occurred.Cause Under Investigation.All molded-case Circuit Breakers in DC Distribution Panels Were Replaced ML18065A9951996-10-0404 October 1996 LER 96-002-01:on 960116,initiated TS Required Shutdown Due to Safeguards Cable Fault.Both Sets (Six Cables) of Cables Were Replaced & Installed Through Turbine Generator Bldg ML18065A9171996-09-0909 September 1996 LER 95-012-00:on 960809,TS Violation Occurred,Due to No Senior Reactor Operator in Cr.Caused by Extensive Remodeling.Cr Remodeling completed.W/960909 Ltr ML18065A8961996-08-29029 August 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960730,CR Continuous Air Monitor Alarm Setpoint Improperly Established.Caused by Failure to Utilize Mod Process in 1988 Leading to Failure to Properly Select & Calibrate Instruments ML18065A8811996-08-20020 August 1996 LER 96-005-01:on 960207,determined Fuse on Main Supply to Two Safety Related DC Panels & Panel Branch Circuit Breakers Not Properly Coordinated.Caused by Lack of Thorough Associated Circuits Analysis.Supply Fuse to Panels Replaced ML18065A8741996-08-16016 August 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960717,high Pressure Safety Injection Pump Tripped While Filling Safety Injection Tank.Caused by Faulty 150/151Y-207 Time Overcurrent Relay.All Similar Relays in Time Overcurrent Application Have Been Inspected ML18065A8651996-08-12012 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960712,identified Penetration Seal Deficiency on Fire Barriers Caused by Failure to Perform & Document Comprehensive Fire Barrier Evaluation.Developed Basis document.W/960812 Ltr ML18065A8601996-08-0202 August 1996 LER 96-006-01 on 960207,discovered Limits of Design Analysis Could Have Been Violated.Subsequent Tests & Analyses Facility Did Not Exceed Basis.Operating Procedures Have Been Revised to Treat 2530 Megawatts Limit as Absolute Limit ML18065A8321996-08-0101 August 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960115,alternate Shutdown Panel Inverter Resulted in Unavailability of Panel.Replaced Defective Inverter Alarm Logic Board ML18065A7691996-06-12012 June 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960513,fire Door Not Maintained Open in Accordance W/Design Basis.Cause Under Investigation. Engineering Evaluation Performed & Revised Documents, Surveillance & Test procedures.W/960612 Ltr ML18065A6901996-05-0101 May 1996 LER 95-001-01:on 950302,malfunction of Left Channel DBA Sequencer Resulted in Inadvertent Actuation of Left Channel Safeguards Equipment.Replaced microprocessor.W/960501 Ltr ML18065A6681996-04-22022 April 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960321,inadequate Emergency Lighting & Ventilation in post-fire Safe Shutdown Areas.Caused by App R Program Documentation Insufficient to Demonstrate Regulatory Compliance.Lighting modified.W/960422 Ltr ML18065A5721996-03-11011 March 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960207,average Reactor Power Level Exceeded License Limit Due to Insufficient Procedural Guidance. GOP-12 Revised to Treat 2,530 Mwt Limit as Absolute Limit Requiring Immediate Corrective Action If Exceeded ML18065A5261996-03-0101 March 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960202,fuse on Main Supply to Two SR DC Panels & Panel Branch Circuit Breakers Not Properly Coordinated.Caused by Inadequate Electrical/App R Design Review.Implemented Hourly Fire tours.W/960301 Ltr ML18065A5111996-02-19019 February 1996 LER 94-012-02:on 940427,determined That Internal Ground in Thermal Margin Monitor Causes Nonconformance W/Rps Design Basis.Incorporated RPS Failure Modes & Effects Analysis in Plant DBD.W/960219 Ltr ML18065A5061996-02-19019 February 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960118,SIS Disabled W/Primary Coolant Sys Greater than 300 F.Caused by Personnel Error.Permanent Maint Procedure to Disable/Enable SIS Actuation on Low Pressurizer Pressure Will Be Revised to Align W/Ts ML18065A5021996-02-15015 February 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960115,technicians Found Low Voltage cut- Off for Alternate Shutdown Panel Inverter Set That Resulted in Unavailability of Panel.Caused by Inadequate Post Mod. Readjusted Set Point to Minimum setting.W/960215 Ltr ML18065A4581996-01-31031 January 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960103,failed to Test Duplicate Equipment. Caused by STS No Longer Containing Requirement for cross- Train Testing of Duplicate Components.Will Submit Request to Delete Subj Requirements from TS.W/960131 Ltr ML18065A4421996-01-19019 January 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951226,did Not Analyze Primary Coolant Samples within 72 H.Caused by Belief Acceptability to Save Pcs Samples for Choride Analysis Past 72 H.Counseled Chemistry Supervision.W/960119 Ltr ML18065A4041996-01-15015 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 950119,PCP Oil Collection Deficiencies Created by FC-860 Piping Mod.Caused by Inadequate DBD for Sys & Lack of Review by Experienced Fire Protection Personnel.Updated Design Basis documentation.W/960115 Ltr ML18065A3291995-12-0404 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951103,circuit Fuse Coordination Deficiency Which Affects App R Safe Shutdown Equipment Noted.Design of Fuse Coordination in Potential Transformer Circuits Will Be Evaluated & Modified as required.W/951204 Ltr ML18065A2361995-11-0202 November 1995 LER 95-012-00:on 950701,discovered Unqualified Electrical Connection in Containment SW Outlet Valve Controller.Caused by Failure of Assigned Engineers to Available Info.Replaced Wire Nuts W/Inline Butt connections.W/951102 Ltr ML18065A2051995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-008-01:on 950728,discovered That None of Four Containment High Pressure Channels Would Initiate Reactor Trip Due to Programmatic Deficiencies.Administrative Procedure (AP) 9.44,AP 9.45 & AP 10.44 Will Be Revised ML18065A0841995-09-18018 September 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950817,CR 40 Withdrawal Occurred When Given Insertion Signal Due to skill-based Error in Crimping & Removing Foreign Matl from CRDM Motor Connection Box.Crd Package replaced.W/950918 Ltr ML18065A0681995-09-14014 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950815,ESFA Resulted in Manual Rt Following Isolation of Pcs.Replaced Failed Instrument Line ML18065A0651995-09-0808 September 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950728,discovered Lack of Procedural Guidance for Pump Repair Following Fire.Proposed Use of Power Supply Breaker Did Not Adequately Address Effect of Loss of Control Power.Performed Independent Assessment ML18064A8781995-08-28028 August 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950728,discovered During Design Change Testing That None of Four Containment High Pressure Channels Would Initiate Rt.Caused by Programmatic Deficiencies. Reviewed Selected Tests & Mods from Recent Refueling Outage ML18064A8831995-08-21021 August 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950720,discovered That 12 Instrument Loops Had V-bolted Type Qualified Cable Splices Connected to Wires W/Exposed Kapton Insulation.Caused by Human Error.All V- Bolted Splices Replaced w/in-line design.W/950821 Ltr 1999-09-02
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML18066A6901999-11-0101 November 1999 Rev 5 to Palisades Nuclear Plant Colr. ML18066A6761999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A6271999-09-0202 September 1999 LER 98-011-01:on 981217,inadequate Lube Oil Collection Sys for Primary Coolant Pumps Was Noted.Caused by Design Change Not Containing Appropriate Level of Rigor.Exemption from 10CFR50,App R Was Requested.With 990902 Ltr ML18066A6351999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A6771999-08-31031 August 1999 Operating Data Rept Page of MOR for Aug 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A6221999-08-20020 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990722,TS Surveillance Was Not Completed within Specified Frequency.Caused by Failure to Incorporate Revised Frequency Into Surveillance Schedule in Timely Manner.Verified Implementation.With 990820 Ltr ML18066A6061999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990803 Ltr ML18066A5201999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990702 Ltr ML18066A4841999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990603 Ltr ML18066A6371999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18068A5941999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990503 Ltr ML18066A4161999-04-0101 April 1999 Rev 4 to COLR, for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A4501999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990402 Ltr ML18066A4671999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 0 to SIR-99-032, Flaw Tolerance & Leakage Evaluation Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger E-53B Nozzle Palisades Nuclear Plant. ML18068A5351999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990302 Ltr ML18066A3931999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990202 Ltr ML18066A3781999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-013-00:on 981222,safeguards Transfer Tap Changer Failure Caused Inadvertant DG Start.Caused by Failed Motor Contactor.Contactor Was Replaced.With 990120 Ltr ML20206F6131998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Consumers Energy Co Annual Rept. with ML18066A3651998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990105 Ltr ML18066A3421998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 981202 Ltr ML18066A3301998-11-11011 November 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Safety Hazard Associated with Wrist Pin Assemblies for FM-Alco 251 Engines at Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.Caused by Insufficient Friction Fit Between Pin & Sleeve.Supplier of Pin Will No Longer Be Used ML18068A4921998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 981103 Ltr ML18068A4851998-10-29029 October 1998 LER 97-011-01:on 971012,starting of Primary Coolant Pump with SG Temps Greater than Cold Leg Temps Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures & Operator Decision.Sop Used for Starting Primary Coolant Pump Enhanced ML18066A3181998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A2901998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.With 980903 Ltr ML18066A3191998-08-31031 August 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept Data for Aug 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A2831998-08-18018 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980721,reactor Manually Tripped.Caused by Failure of Coupling Which Drives Feedwater Pump Main Lube Oil Pump.Main Lube Oil Pump Coupling & Associated Components Replaced & Satisfactorily Tested ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML20237E0301998-07-31031 July 1998 ISI Rept 3-3 ML18066A2701998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980803 Ltr ML18066A2311998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A2261998-06-30030 June 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980531,small Pinhole Leak Found on One of Welds,During Leak Test Following Replacement of Pcs Sample Isolation Valves.Caused by Welder Error.Leaking Welds Repaired ML18066A3061998-06-18018 June 1998 SG Tube Inservice Insp. ML20249C4951998-06-17017 June 1998 Rev 1 to EA-GEJ-98-01, Palisades Cycle 14 Disposition of Events Review ML18066A1781998-06-0909 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980511,noted That Procedure Did Not Fully Satisfy Requirement to Test High Startup Rate Trip Function. Caused by Misunderstanding of Testing Requirements.Revised TS Surveillance Test Procedure & Reviewed Other Procedures ML18066A1711998-06-0101 June 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Impact of RELAP4 Excessive Variability on Palisades Large Break LOCA ECCS Results.Change in PCT Between Cycle 13 & Cycle 14 Does Not Constitute Significant Change Per 10CFR50.46 ML18066A1741998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980601 Ltr ML18066A2321998-05-31031 May 1998 Revised MOR for May 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18068A4701998-05-31031 May 1998 Annual Rept of Changes in ECCS Models Per 10CFR50.46. ML18065B2451998-05-13013 May 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980413,HPIS Sys Was Noted Inoperable During TS Surveillance Test.Caused by Performance of Flawed Procedure.Operators & Engineers Will Be Trained to Improve Operational Decision Making Through Resources & Knowledge ML18066A2331998-04-30030 April 1998 Revised MOR for Apr 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18068A3461998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980501 Ltr ML18066A3411998-04-22022 April 1998 Rev 0 to EMF-98-013, Palisades Cycle 14:Disposition & Analysis of SRP Chapter 15 Events. ML18065B2071998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980403 Ltr ML20217C2741998-03-31031 March 1998 Independent Review - Is Consumers Energy Method (W Method) of Determining Palisades Nuclear Plant Best Estimate Fluence by Combining Transport Calculation & Dosimetry Measurements Technically Sound & Does It Meet Intent of Pts ML18066A2341998-03-31031 March 1998 Revised MOR for Mar 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18068A3041998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980302 Ltr ML18066A2351998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised MOR for Feb 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18065B1641998-02-0505 February 1998 Rev 0 to Regression Analysis for Containment Prestressing Sys at 25th Year Surveillance. ML18067A8211998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980203 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
- POWERINli MICHlliAN'S PROliRESS General Offices: 1945 West Parnall Road, Jackson, Ml 49201 * (517) 788-0550 October 19, 1989 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT -
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 89-022 - RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A SIRW TANK RUPTURE Licensee Event Report (LER)89-022 (Radiological Consequences of a SIRW Tank Rupture) is attached. The information does not meet the criterion specified in 10CFR50.73, however, due to the nature of this issue a voluntary Licensee Event Report is being submitted.
Brian D Johnson Staff Licensing Engineer CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment
- 9101-
- ;i O::i000:25~5 PDC OC1089-0011-NL02
llllllC C"~I- -
U... llUCLIAlll llllQUUTOlllY cc*- -~
~YID C-. llD. J1I0~1CM IXPllllll. 11,1 . -
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
DOCttlT ....a111 IZI f r-~* 1:a
'ACILITY IUMI 111 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT TITLI l'I Io 15 I o Io I o I 21 515 1 loF 0 17 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A SIRW TANK RUPTURE IVINT DATI Ill Lllll 111~1111111 llll'OlllT CATI 171 OTHllll 'ACILITIU INVOLYID 181 MONTH QAY YEAR *ACIL.ITV ...... u DOCXIT lllUlllllllllll NIA 0111010101 I I o I 1 2 l:s s 9 s 19 - d 212 - ol o 1 I o 119 sl 9 NIA THIS llll'OlllT 11..,_ITTID l'UllllUAlllT TO THI lllQUlllllllllNTI OF 10 C,11 §: I~ - or,,,_ of 11118 leJ,_,,_ 1111 DPllllATlllCI llDDI Ill
=~I 1 r Sr o --
N . . . . . .1
. . . . .(ell11111 20.Glel I0.7SWIC2lllol
-- 71.71C.I 71..711*1 I0.7SWll211*1 I0.***1111 1101 lll.Glell1llMI I0.*1*1121 lll.711111C211olll I v OTHllll ,,_,,_,, "' Aboftcr
'"""r _,,,.,,, rur. NllC'-
211.a1e111111111 I0.711all21111 I0.711elllllo110IAI lllAJ NAMI!
10.ac.111111w1 20.GC.11111*1 - I0.7:11ell211MI 111.7311112111111 -
LICINIH CONTACT FOlll THll Lllll 1121 I0.711ell211tlllllll I0.7111111111*1 TILll'HONI NUMlllll AllllA CODI!
C S Kozup, Technical Engineer, Palisades COM'LITI ONI LINE FOlll EACH COMl'OlllENT FAILUllE OllCllllllD IN THll llll'OlllT 1111 CAUSI SYSTEM COMPONENT lo4ANUFAC*
TUllll!lll x B1 F T1K1 No
\.:::.:.**.::::*y::::.:::
/:,**** . :::.::
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
!*>: :}....):-::y. :) . . ?
- I I I I I I I IUPPLIMINTAL llll'OllT IX,.CTID 11*1 MONTH CAY YJA~
rx, ~o IXl'ICTID IUIMIAION h YU '" ,...., - - - IJ(l'fCTfD SIJ*lllSSION DA rr1 CATI 1151 I I I On. July 23, 1989 it was determined that no licensing basis existed which defined the radiological consequences of a safety injection refueling water (SIRW) tank (BP; TK] rupture. *consequently, no radionuclide concentration limits have ever been established. The potential for having an unidentified licensing basis was identified by Corporate Health Physics and Plant Licensing personnel while reviewing documentation associated with radioactive releases from the SIRW tank. The reactor was critical with the Plant at 80 percent of rated power when it was determined that no licensing basis existed.
The SIRW tank is located above the main Control Room at approximately the 643 foot elevation and is not physically enclosed by any other Plant structure. While it was recognized during both original Plant licensing and the Systematic Evaluation Program that the tank was not designed to withstand tornado wind forces or resultant missiles, the only consequence determination performed involved potential effects on other equipment due to deluge and non-availability of a boron injection source. A licensing analysis performed has determined the criterion of 10CFRl00.11 to be applicable. Preliminary dose consequence analyses for tank rupture, based on past tank concentrations going back to 1975 have re~ul~ed in doses only a fraction of 10CFRl00.11.
llllllC , _ _
...,. '.a. .&..4..L.V .L If.al
NAC For"' lllA U.I. NUCLEAR llEOULATORV COMMISllQl\l 19-831 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEA) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMll NO. 3150--0104 EXPIRES: 8/31185 FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMaEll 121 Liii NUM9111 Ill PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 0 15 IO IO IO 12 1515 8 19 - 01212 - 010 012 OF 0 j7 TEXT l/f ,,_. - it_...,, .,.. tldtllfJone/ NltC Fotrn .m..'*11171 Description On July 23, 1989 it was determined that no licensing basis existed which defined the radiological consequences of a safety injection refueling water (SIRW) tank [BP;TK] rupture. Consequently, no radionuclide concentration limits have ever been established. The potential for having an unidentified licensing basis was identified by Corporate Health Physics and Plant Licensing personnel while reviewing documentation associated with radioactive releases from the SIRW tank. The reactor was critical with the Plant at 80 percent of rated power when it was determined that no licensing basis existed.
The SIRW tank T-58 is located above the main Control Room at approximately the 643 foot elevation and is not physically enclosed by any other Plant structure. The tank stores the borated water used to fill the refueling cavity during refueling operations. The tank is sized to provide a useable volume capable of filling the refueling cavity to a depth of 24 feet. Upon initiation of emergency safety injection, the high and low pressure safety injection pumps P-66 A&B and P-67 A&B respectively, and the containment
- spray pumps P-54 A,B&C, take suction from the SlRW tank. During Plant _.
operation at least 250,000 gallons of borated water are maintained available for safety injection. The useful tank capacity exceeds the 250,000 gallons and provides at least 20 minutes of safety injection time with all pumps operating at their design flow rates. Pump suction is automatically transferred to the containment sump upon a low SIRW tank level signal via the recirculation initiation actuation signal logic.
The tank contents are maintained at a boron concentration in the range of 1720 ppm to 2000 ppm. This concentration is sufficient to provide a five percent shutdown margin with all control rods withdrawn for beginning of core life at 60 degrees F.
The SIRW tank is designed for a wind loading of 30 pounds per square foot and a roof loading of 40 pounds per square foot to account for loads due to snow. It is additionally designed for seismic loads of 0.23g horizontal and 0.07g vertical with~ut ~xceeding material yield stress. The tank was fabricated to ASA Standard B96.l and is constructed of aluminum with cathodic protection provided at all interfaces with dissimilar metals.
Heating steam is provided to the SIRW tank heat exchanger E-57 in order to maintain the tank above 40 degrees F to prevent freezing.
During the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) evaluation of Consumers Power's application for an operating license, they identified the need for additional information. The additional information, categorized into groups corresponding to the original Palisades FSAR, was requested by letter dated May 28, 1969. Request 5.32 was presented as follows:
N,.c *o,..., 308A LER i:s,u::ll-LlUl 19-831
NllC For"' 3MA IU31 U.I. NUCUAll llEGULATOllY COMNlll!llON LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMll NO. 3150-0IOIJ EXPIRES: 8/31185 FACILITY NM!IE 111 DOCKET NUMHll 121 Lill NUMalll 111 l'AGE 131 PALISADES NUCLEAR PL.ANT 0 15 I 0 I 0 I 0 12 I 515 8 I 9 - 01 212 - 010 Ol 3 OF 0 I 7 TEXT !If - - II ....... _ .,,,_,. NltC Fonn .m..'111171 5.32 The SIRW tank is located on the roof of the Auxiliary Building, directly over the Control Room, Cable Spreading Room and emergency diesel generators, and it is not designed to resist tornadoes. What are the potential consequences of a major rupture of this tank?
Consumers Power provided a response to this request on August 26, 1969 as Amendment 15 to our "Application For Reactor Construction Permit and Operating License". Within this response it was identified that in the event of a major rupture of the SIRW tank, water would not be maintained on the roof surrounding the tank and that most of the water would flow down the north wall of the Auxiliary Building. After detailing all the hypothesized flow patterns, it was concluded that "rupture of the SIRW tank would require an orderly Plant shutdown with no effect on other safety-related equipment". This response was revised on May 18, 1978, however, neither version provided any discussion regarding the potential radiological consequences of the hypothesized tank rupture.
Within the original FSAR, all associated amendments to the original license application, subsequent revisions to the FSAR*and the updated FSAR, the only radiological consequence from a SIRW tank rupture evaluated was that associated with tritium accumulation. Amendment 21 to the Reactor Construction Permit and Operating License dated February 26, 1971 described planned modifications to I the condenser cooling and liquid radioactive waste systems. These -- '
modifications were agreed to by Consumers Power in our settlement agreement with interveners. As a result, in Section 11.3.3.2 on Amendment 21, Consumers Power committed to submit to the AEC an evaluation of potential operating and accidental releases associated with tritium accumulations based on the final design of the modified "liquid radwaste system.
On June 22, 1972 Consumers Power met the above commitment by submitting to the AEC the "SIRW Tank Rupture Accident Analysis". This analysis concluded that the average dose to an individual in S~uth Haven would be 0.056 Rem. The SIRW tank was chosen as the source for this analysis since its volume was larger than that of the primary system makeup water tank and the spent fuel pool.
Additionally, during refueling, a portion of the primary coolant is mixed with SIRW tank water and spent~fuel pool water causing an increase in tritium concentration. The bases and results of this analysis were input into the FSAR (Section 11.1.3.3) by revision on December 15, 1973. No radionuclides other than tritium were identified as being considered during this evaluation even though primary coolant was identified to be mixed with SIRW tank water.
Applicable accident analyses identified within both the original and updated FSAR include; FSAR 14.20, "Liquid Waste Incident" and FSAR 14.21, "Waste Gas Incident". These analyses do not appear to have been revised since they were originally presented in the license application. Within FSAR 14.20 it is identified that "accidents which might result in releas~ of.activity to the environs involve rupture or leakage from the liquid waste system components, or the accidental release to the circulating water discharge canal of the contents NllC FOllM 111*831
- Jee* LER 89021 LIOl
NRC Far111 3MA U.I. NUCLEAll llEGULATOllY COMMl!!ilOI'>!19-631 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMll NO. 3150--0104 EXPIRES: 8/31185 FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMllEll IZI Liii NUMHll Ill PAGE 1:11 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 0 I5 I 0 I 0 I 0 12 I 51 5 8 I 9 - 01 21 2 - 0 I0 0 I 4 OF 0 I1 TEXT /If men - ii...,.,...,,, - eddlllot9I NllC F.m .-..*a1 1171 of one of the treated waste monitor tanks. All components of the liquid radwaste system are located within the Containment and Auxiliary Buildings."
This analysis concluded that plant design insures that radioactive liquid leakage or spillage will be retained within the facility and that adminis trative controls and automatic interlocks together with the failsafe design of the instrumentation and control devices provide assurance against any release of liquid waste to the environs in excess of 10CFR20 limits. As the SIRW tank is clearly not within the Containment or Auxiliary Buildings, is part of the safety injection/emergency core cooling system and not part of the liquid system described in the FSAR, and has been hypothesized to rupture and release its contents to Lake Michigan, this analysis is not applicable.
FSAR 14.21, while entitled Waste Gas Incident" does address the rupture of a liquid containing tank, the volume control tank. This FSAR section is directly referenced by FSAR 14.20 within the statement, "activity release from the liquid waste system to the environs can occur only by accidental discharge to the circulating water discharge canal or by a rupture of the volume control tank with the ensuing gaseous release as discussed in Section 14.21". FSAR 14.21 recognizes that any failure in the chemical and volume control system is very unlikely, however, it was analyzed to define the radiation dose that mig~~
result. This analysis concludes that a rupture of the volume control tank would not present any undue risk as resu~tant doses for this hypothesized event are well below the limits specified in 10CFRl00.11.
The next consideration given to the hypothesized rupture of the SIRW tank arose during the Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation ?rogram (SEP). The final report from this effort, NUREG-0820, was issued in April 1982. Three topics within this program addressed the loss of the SIRW tank and/or operation plant effluents. The first, Topic III-2, "W:fnd and Tornado
.Loadings" concluded that the SIRW tank was not shown to be able to withstand tornado wind and pressure loadings prescribed by the requirements of 10CFRSO Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2 as implemented by Regulatory Guide 1.117 and Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.3. This Topic further presented that the effect of safe shutdown of the Plant is minimal because alternate water sources could be made available. The alternate sources of water were to be prescribed during the Emergency Operating Procedure rewrite in accordance with CEN-152. This Topic did not consider radiological consequences of a tank failure. The NRC staff concluded that backfitting of the SIRW tank would not be required and prescribed actions within the Topic were acceptable. The second, Topic III-4.A, "Tornado Missiles", drew exactly the same findings and conclusions as Topic III-2.
The third, Topic XI-2, Subtask 3, "Effects Of Accidental Liquid Releases On Nearby Water Supplies", was to perform a generic analysis of the consequences of liquid tank failures for those plants which received their license prior to the issuance of the SRP. This Topic was *deleted as a Palisades specific review as "experience in performing SRP analyses for newer plants has indicated that NllC FOllM 311*A 19-831 LER 89021-LIOl
NRC For111 lMA 19.i;l31 U.S. NUCLEAll llEQULATOllV COMMISllON LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILEA) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMll NO. 31 !i0-4104 EXPIRES: 8/31185 FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMIEll (21 Liii NUMlll'I (II PAOI 131 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 0 IS I 0 I 0 I 0 12 I 5 15 819 - 0 12 1 2 - 0 I 0 0 15 OF 0 I 7 TEXT l/f - - /9 ,.,..._ - -1dlliotwl NlfC Fomt ....., 1171 it is highly unlikely that radioactive concentrations in the nearest potable water supply could exceed 10CFR20 values".
In addition to the documents reviewed above, a search of NRC Safety Evaluation Reports was conducted. This search did not reveal any report which gave consideration to the radiological consequences of a SIRW tank rupture.
Cause Of The Event The failure to define the licensing basis for the radiological consequences of a rupture of the SIRW tank has been attributed to an oversight by all participants during initial Plant licensing. This failure resulted in no radionuclide concentration limits being established for SIRW tank contents.
Corrective Actions The SIRW tank was placed in the fast recirculation mode to provide demineralized cleanup of existing radionuclides. This practice will continue as much as practical until appropriate concentration limits for SIRW tanks i concentration are established. Operating Procedures were reviewed to determine the practicality of revising procedures to minimize the ingress of primary coolant system (PCS) activity into the SIRW tank. Operational activities reviewed included; safety injection tank sampling and bpron concentration adjustments, clean waste receiver tank content transfer and PCS drain down evaluations. Due to the minimal Technical Specifications Action Statement time allowance for safety injection tank sampling and inadequate alternative storage tank capacity to support PCS draining during outage activities, no further procedural action was deemed necessary to minimize contaminated water influx to the SIRW tank. Currently, established long-term actions for upgrading in-plant filtration are being evaluated utilizing SIRW tank cleanup as a desired output.
An evaluation of the radiological consequences of a SIRW tank rupture utilizing past radionuclide concent~ations is in-progress. Preliminary results indicate that even with the highest past concentration (5.34E-2 micro-curies/ml; December 1975) used as the source term, dose consequences represent less than one percent of 10CFRl00.11 limits.
Based on the above historical review and the fact that no radioactive concen tration limits have ever been imposed for the contents of the SIRW tank, it is apparent that no licensing basis was ever documented. After review of 10CFR50 Appendix I, 10CFR20 Appendix B and 10CFRl00.11 it is apparent that the dose criterion delineated by 10CFRl00.11 are the applicable acceptance criterion for the radiological consequences of the hypothetical SIRW rupt~re. This conclusion is based on the following:
.... c ~OllM llJ.1131 389A LER 89021-LIOl
NRC t'or111 311A 19-~31 U.I. NUCLEAll llEGULATOllY COMMlll!i.llOl\l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERt TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMll NO. 3150-'11°'3 EXPIRES: 8131185 FACILITY NAME C1I DOCKET NUM8111 121 Liii NUM8111 Ill PALISADES NUCLEAR PL.ANT 0 1s I 0 I 0 I 0 I 2 15 15 819 - 0 I q2 - o, 0 0 I 6 OF 0 I7 TEXT l/f - - ii ~ .,. eddlllotW NllC Foml JllBll'1I 1171
- 1. 10CFR50 Appendix I was not a section of the Code of Federal Regulations until approximately 1974 and therefore, cannot define the Circa 1969 licensing basis.
- 2. 10CFR50 Appendix I is intended to provide limitations on the amount of radioactive waste released such that doses to the public are maintained ALARA during operation. The SIRW tank is not part of the radioactive waste system defined with either the original or updated FSAR.
- 3. 10CFR20 Appendix Bas implemented by 10CFR20.106 provides radionuclide concentrations for controlling releases of radioactivity such that when concentrations are averaged over a period not greater than one year, a whole body dose to an individual at the site boundary will not exceed 0.5 Rem. This implies an operational limit and not a limit associated with an event stemming from a natural phenomenon (ie, a tornado/tornado missile) rupturing the tank.
- 4. The location of the SIRW tank and Plant operating description (eg, SIRW contents are mixed with primary coolant) provided during Plant licensing do not allow compliance with the operational limits provided by 10CFR20 Appendix B_as implemented by 10CFR20.106.
Therefore, a modification beyond the original Plant design and licensing basis would be required to attain compliance.
- 5. 10CFRl00.11 prescribes acceptable dose criterion for reactor siting against plant design for events other than operational occurrences.
This criterion is utilized for demonstrating acceptability for events detailed within Section 14 of the FSAR. While dose consequences of fluid release by a SIRW tank rupture was apparently not considered within the licensing basis of Palisades, the rupture of tanks, other than radioactive waste system components, were considered and the limits specified within 10CFRl00.11 are the stated licensing bases acceptance criterion.
Limits will be establisheft for allowed radionuclide concentrations within the SIRW tank to ensure continued compliance with 10CFRl00.11. The Palisades FSAR will be updated after the completion of the radiological consequence analyses.
Analysis Of The Event As presented above, the catastrophic failure of the SIRW tank has only been hypothesized to occur as the result of tornado wind forces or resultant tornado missiles. Based on the low probability of this event and the insignificant dose consequences (ie, a fraction of 10CFRl00.11) which would have resulted had the tank ruptured, no threat to the health and safety of the public was presented, Nl!C FOl!M :JffA 19-831 LER 89021-LIOl
NRC 19..:JI f"'"' lMA U.I. NUCLEAll REGULATOllY COMMISllO~
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMI NO. 3150-0104 EX" RES: 8/31 /85 FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMHll 121 Liii NUMalll Ill PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT O 5 O O O 2 5 5 8 9 _ 0 2 2 _ 0 0 0 7 OF 0 7 TEXT flt,,,_ -
- 1811Ui9d. - etltllflotWI NllC Fonn .m.il'1J 1171 This event does not meet the criterion specified in 10CFRS0.73, however, due to the nature of this issue a voluntary Licensee Event Report is being submitted.
'll'IC FO .. M 38tlA 19*831