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LER 95-012-00:on 960809,TS Violation Occurred,Due to No Senior Reactor Operator in Cr.Caused by Extensive Remodeling.Cr Remodeling completed.W/960909 Ltr
	ML18065A917
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	09/09/1996
From:	Bordine T, Mathews C; CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:	; NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
	LER-96-012, LER-96-12, NUDOCS 9609170285
	Download: ML18065A917 (5)
	v • d • e

consumers Power Thomas C. Bordine Manager. Licensing POWUU*

llllUllliAll"S ....us Palisades Nuclear Plant: 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway, Covert, Ml 49043 September 9, 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-012 ~TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION DUE TO NO SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR IN CONTROL ROOM License Event Report 96-012 is attached. This condition is reportable to the NRG in -

accordance with 10 CFR 50.73{a}(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant's~

_ Technical Specifications.

SUMMARY

OF COMMITMENTS

_!~is lett~r con~~ins no ~ew commitments and n()__ revisions to_exist~ng commitrT_1_~~ts: _____ _

--~~

Thomas C. Berdine Manager, Licensing CC Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, NRR, USNRC NRG Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment 9609170285 960909

PDR ADOCK 05000255 S PDR A G<<S' ENERGY COMPANY

NRC FOB.M 366 (4195)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/98 ESTIMATED IUIDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION OOUECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AHO FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-3 F33). U.S. MJCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 20555-0001. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (315G-010ol. OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) Page (3)

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255 1 of 4 TITLE (4) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 95-012, "TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION DUE TO NO SENIOR REACTOR.

OPERATOR IN CONTROL ROOM EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 09 09 96 96 - 012 - 00 09 09 96 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE (9) N 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(iii)

II POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 99.6 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below or 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) in NRC Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Clayton M. Mathews (616) 764-2035 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TONPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR I YES If yes COMPLETE EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE I NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On August 9, 1996, at 0430 hours0.00498 days 0.119 hours 7.109788e-4 weeks 1.63615e-4 months , with the Plant at 99.6 per cent power, the Control Room Supervisor left th~ Control Room with no other Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) present. The Control Room Supervisor entered the Viewing Gallery that is directly adjacent to the Control Room. The -time duration that the Control Room Supervisor was out of the Control Room was -

estimated to be less than one minute. Since Technical Specification 6.2.2.b requires at least one licensed SRO to be in the Control Room at all times during conditions other than cold shutdown or refueling, a Technical Specification violation occurred. On August 13, 1996, at 1515 hours0.0175 days 0.421 hours 0.0025 weeks 5.764575e-4 months , with the Plant at 99.6 percent power, a similar occurrence resulted when the Shift Engineer, who temporarily relieved the Control Room Supervisor as the SRO in the Control Room, briefly left the area to file a work order in the adjacent Technical Support Center. The Shift Engineer was out of the Control Room for approximately one minute. A Technical Specification violation did not occur because another SRO was in the Control Room. However, there was no explicit turnover of Control Room responsibilities. Extensive remodeling of the Control Room was in progress at the time of both of these occurrences. In each case, the SRO went to an area that was normally in the Control Room but had been temporarily relocated outside of the Control Room.

NRC FORM 366a' 4195

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME 11)

I DOCKET12\ LER NUMBER 6\ PAGE 13\

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 20F4 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255 96 012 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copie~ of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION The Control Room and the Shift Supervisor's office were undergoing extensive remodeling from July 20, 1996, through August 31, 1996. This project prompted Operations Management to review the requirements for minimum manning, included in Technical Specification 6.2.2.b and Administrative Procedure 4.00 "Operations Organization, Responsibilities, and Conduct," section 5.2.1. Both require that an SRO be present in the Control Room. Under normal circumstances, three SROs work out of the Control Room: the Shift Supervisor, the Control Room Supervisor, and the Shift Engineer.

Administrative Procedures define the Control Room proper to be the area containing the equipment operating panels as well as the Shift Supervisor's office. During the initial phase of the project, the Shift Supervisor's office was demolished, thereby making it inaccessible. The Shift Engineer's desk was temporarily moved from the Shift Supervisor's office to the*adjacent Viewing Gallery area, which is visually part of the Control Room in that only a windowed wall separates the two areas. The normally-closed door between the Viewing Gallery and Control Room was designated as the primary entry into the Control Room, and was propped open. It was decided that redefining the Control Room proper to include the temporary Shift Engineer's area was not neces~ary because of the ability to maintain the Control Room Supervisor's desk in the Control Room during the project.

On August 9, 1996, a relief SRO replaced the normal "A" shift (0000-0800 hours) Control Room Supervisor. A question arose on a Technical Specification Surveillance Procedure operability

determination. This question heightened the Control Room Supervisor's need to seek resolution by consulting with anot~~r SRO. Knowing that he would be briefly leaving the "at-the-controls" (ATC) area, he walked into the temporary Shift Engineer's area, assuming it to be a part of the Control Room much like the former Shift Supervisor's office. The Shift Supervisor inquired why the Control Room Supervisor left the Control Room. The estimated time that the Control Room

Supervisor was out of tre Control Room was less than one minute. Additionally, the Control Room and Control panels were observable from the Viewing Gallery via the large windows constructed between the two areas.

Immediate corrective action was taken by Operations Management by discussing the event with the SRO and entering a reminder in the August 9 Daily Orders for all oncoming shifts that the.

Viewing Gallery (temporary Shift Engineer's area) was not considered part of the Control Room.

An August 13, 1996, a follow-up memo was sent to all SROs advising them of this occurrence; reinforcing the expectation that an SRO has to be in the Control Room, and reiterating that the Viewing Gallery was considered to be outside the Control Room.

NRC FQRM 366cr 4195

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I

FACILITY NAME (1 l DOCKETl2l LER NUMBER 16) PAGE 131 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF 4 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255 96 012 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The second occurrence happened on August 13, 1996, when the normal on-shift Shift Engineer relieved the Control Room Supervisor as the SRO in the Control Room. The Shift Engineer was processing a work order. Normally, the work order would have been processed in the Shift Supervisor's office, but due to the remodeling, the processing location had been temporarily relocated into the adjacent Technical Support Center. Without consciously thinking, the Shift Engineer proceeded out of the Control Room to place the work order in the relocated processing area. The Shift Engineer immediately returned to the Control Room where the Control Room Supervisor had returned and identified the Shift Engineer's error.

Coincidentally, during this second occurrence, another SRO was in the Control Room performing a Control panel walkdown in preparation to take shift turnover. Having this SRO in Control Room technically satisfied the Technical Specification requirement, but did not meet the Operations Department expectation as this individual was not, at the time, an on-duty SRO.

This second occurrence resulted in further corrective actions. First, Operations Management discussed the event with the involved SRO. Second, the door between the Control Room and the

temporary Shift Engineer's desk was closed in an attempt to make it less convenient for an SRO to inadvertently leave the Control Room. The Operations Manager and/or the Shift Operations Supervisor discussed with the immediately available SROs their responsibility to maintain an SRO in the Control Room at all times. SROs were reminded to pay particular attention to the Control Room boundary as it changed with the remodeling. This was captured as an entry on the SRO turnover sheet as a reminder for SROs who did not participate in the discussions.

A review of previous corrective action documents indicated only one other instance where there were no SROs in the Control Room. Licensee Event Report 85-021 documented an occurrence on October 9, 1985, where the Shift Supervisor and the Shift Engineer inadvertently left the Control Room for an approximate period of five minutes. The root cause was a communications*error. ......

ROOT CAUSE Extensive remodeling disturbed the working environment of the Control Room SROs. In each cas*e, an SRO, while in the process of a normal work routine, went to an area that was ordinarily-in* -

the Control Room but was temporarily relocated outside of the Control Room.

NRC FO.RM 31i&a*

4195 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TEXT CONTINUATION I

FACILITY NAME 11 l DOCKETl2\ LER NUMBER 16\ PAGE 13\

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 40F4 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255 96 012 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

A misunderstanding of the defined Control Room boundary was the root cause of an SRO leaving the Control Room by going to consult with the Shift Engineer at his temporary desk. A mental lapse was the root cause of another SRO leaving the Control Room while processing a work order.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS The command and control responsibility of the SRO in the Control Room was not jeopardized due to the brief time the SROs were out of the area and their close proximity to the Control Room. There was no impact on plant operation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED The particular occurrences were discussed with the in,volved individuals. After the first occurrence, an entry was made in the Daily Orders on August 9 reminding SROs. of their responsibility for maintaining the proper shift manning and that the Viewing Gallery is not considered part of the Control *,

Room. A follow-up. memo was issued to all SROs. After the second occurrence, the door between the Control. Room and the Viewing Gallery was closed, impeding the departure of operators from the Control Room. Additionally, the Operations Manager and/or the Shift _Operations* Supervisor discussed with the immediately available SROs their responsibility to maintain an SRO in the Control Room at all times. Additionally, they were reminded that the SROs needed to pay particular attention to the Control Room boundary as it changed with the remodeling. This was captured on .the SRO turnover sheets for any SRO that did not participate in the discussion. AUSROs were also advised of the :second occurrence of an SRO leaving the Control Room. - - . . . - . -- ..... - -,- . - ... ..

The Control Room remodeling project has been completed. The Shift Supervisor, Shift Engineer, and Control Room Supervisor have now been restored to their normal locations.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE No further corrective actions are proposed.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS License Event Report 85-021.

ML18065A917

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SUMMARY

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