ML18046A892

Analysis of Postulated High Energy Line Breaks Outside of Containment, Revision 3

ML18046A892
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	06/30/1975
From:	BECHTEL GROUP, INC.
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ML18046A891	List: ML18046A890 ML18046A892
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SR-6, NUDOCS 8109010338
Download: ML18046A892 (113)

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Consumers Power Company PALISADES PLANT Special Report No. 6 ANALYSIS OF POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 SR-6 Revision 3 June 30, 1975 Revision 2 July 27, 1973 Revision 1 July 13, 1973 May 1, 1973

__er~p~rt!_d_hy Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation

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TABLE OF CONTENTS HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAK REPORT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Palisades Plant History 1.2 Plant Description 1.3 Radwaste and Circulating Water Systems Modifications in Progress 1.4 Summary of High Energy Pipe Break Analysis Criteria 2.0 MODIFICATIONS

SUMMARY

3.0 PLANT DESIGN CRITERIA 3.1 Main Steam and Feedwater Systems 3.2 High Energy Pipe Break Modifications Design 3.2.1 Structural 3.2.2 Pipe Restraints 3.2.3 Encapsulation Sleeves 4.0 PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES 4.1 Normal 4.2 Emergency 5.0 ESSENTIAL STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS 5.1 Class 1 Structures and Systems 5.2 Systems Essential for High Energy Pipe Breaks Outside Containment 6.0 HIGH ENERGY SYSTEM 6.1 Main Steam 6.2 Steam Generator Blowdown 6.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System 6.4 Main Feedwater and Condensate 6.5 Turbine Extraction System 6.6 Sampling System 6.7 Reactor Coolant Letdown System 7.0 EVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY PIPING SYSTEMS FOR LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT 7.1 Evaluation of the Main Steam High Energy System 7.2 Evaluation of the Steam Generator Blowdown High Energy System 7.3 Evaluation of the Auxiliary Feedwater High Energy System 7.4 Evaluation of the Feedwater and Condensate High Energy System 7.5 Evaluation of the Turbine Extraction High Energy System 7.6 Evaluation of the Sampling System High Energy System 7.7 Evaluation of Main Steam High Energy Breaks on MSIV Operability ii

8.0 DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 Failure No. 8.1 - Line No. EB-1-36" - MSPR Failure No. 8.2 - Line No. EB-1-6" & EB-1-8" - MSPR Failure No. 8.3 - Line No. EB-1-36" & EB-1-26" - Turbine Building Failure No. 8.4 - Line No. EB-13-4" - MSPR Failure No. 8.5 - Line No. EB-6-12" - Turbine Building Failure No. 8.6 - Line No. EB-9-18" - MFPR Failure No. 8.7 - Line No. EB-14-6" - MFPR DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATIONS 9.1 Main Feedwater Encapsulation Elbows and Restraints 9.2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation 9.3 Main Steam Supply for Auxiliary Feed water Pump Turbine 9.4 Protection for Essential Controls and Instruments 9.5 New Concrete Wall and Roof Slab at Hatchway Above MSPR 9.6 Control Room Ventilation 9.7 Close Openings at the Northeast Corner of the MFPR 9.8 Pipe Restraint for Main Steam Supply to Reheater 9.9 Additional Vent Area Provisions 9.10 Main Steam Line Pipe Restraints 9.11 SIRW Pipe Restraints ANALYTICAL METHODS OF BREAK EV ALDA TION 10.1 Piping Stress Analysis 10.2 Piping Blowdown Model 10.3 Pipe Whip Model 10.4 Jet Impingement Model 10.5 Compartment Pressure Analysis Model 10.6 Structural Analysis of Battery Room Wall 10.7 Stresses at MSIV Pipe Connections Due to Failure No. 8.3 10.8 Structural Design of Main Steam Line Restraints GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FIGURES REFERENCES iii

Table No.

4-1 5-1 6-1 6-2 7-1 7-2 7-3 8-1 LIST OF TABLES Title Availability of Shutdown Systems Systems Essential for High Energy Pipe Breaks Outside Containment Main Steam Piping System Main Feedwater and Condensate System Summary of Operating Stresses - Main Steam Summary of Operating Stresses - Feed water Summary of Operating Stresses - Main Steam Dump Significant High Energy Pipe Breaks iv

Figure No.

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 LIST OF FIGURES Description or Title Pipe Whip Restraints and Encapsulation Sleeves Safety Injection, Containment Spray, and Shutdown Cooling System (Sheet 1 of 2)

Safety Injection, Containment Spray, and Shutdown Cooling System (Sheet 2 of 2)

Chemical and Volume Control System Main Steam, Main and Auxiliary Turbine Systems Feedwater and Condensate System Component Cooling System Service Water System Circulating Water, Screen Structure, Chlorinator, and Fire Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Extractions, Heater Vents, and Drains Systems Process Sampling System Equipment Location - Reactor Building Plan of El. 570'-0" Equipment Location - Reactor Building Plan of El. 590'-0" Equipment Location - Reactor Building Plan of El. 607'-6" Equipment Location - Reactor Building Plan of El. 625'-0" Equipment Location - Reactor Building Plan of El. 649'-0" Equipment Location - Reactor Building Sections A-A, B-B, C-C, D-D, and E-E Equipment Location - Reactor Building Section F-F Equipment Location - Reactor Building Section G-G Equipment Location - Reactor Building Plan of El. 602'-0" and Sections H-H, J-J, and K-K v

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 l

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41A 41B Equipment Location - Reactor Building Plan of El. 700'-0" Equipment Location - Turbine Building Plan of El. 590'-0"

• Equipment Location - Turbine Building Plan of El. 607'-6" Equipment Location - Turbine Building Plan of El. 625'-0" Equipment Location - Turbine Building Sections Equipment Location - Turbine Building Sections Main Steam Piping Isometric Main Feedwater Piping Isometric Main Stea:m Dump Piping Isometric Deleted Plan at El. 590'-0" Plan at El. 607'-6" Plan at El. 625'-0" General Section Compartment Pressurization Models Heating and Ventilating Air Flow Diagrams P&ID Heating, Ventilating, and Cooling Auxiliary Building Addition HV Auxiliary and Containment Building Plan at El. 625'-0" HV Auxiliary and Containment Plan at El. 639'-0" and 649'-0" Summary of Modifications Summary of Modifications vi

1.0 INTRODUCTION Special Report No. 6, Revision 3, dated June 30, 1975, presents the facility modifications to be constructed by Consumers Power Company at the Palisades Plant in respons~ to the Directorate of Licensing letter of December 15, 1972 to Consumers Power Company m regard to the Palisades Plant, containing attachment titled "General Information Required of the Effects of a Piping System Break Outside Containment" as modified by errata dated January 10, 1973. On January 22, 1973, a meeting was held in Bethesda, Maryland, with the AEC T~sk Force assigned to investigate the problems associated with high energy line breaks outside containment. During the meeting further clarification of the criteria outlined in the letter referenced above was provided.

Consumers Power Company submitted earlier revisions of Special Report No. 6 dated May 1, 1973, July 13, 1973, and July 27, 1973, to the Directorate of Licensing. The Directorate of Licensing letter of August 7, 1973 to Consumers Power Company accepted the scope and schedule of the proposed facility modifications and general scope of the proposed augmented inservice inspection program. The Directorate of Licensing letter of October 9, 1973 to Consumers Power Company in regard to the Palisades Plant accepted the alternate solution--of the augmented inservice inspection program in lieu of the proposed encapsulation sleeves and restraints at two elbows in the feedwater lines.

1.1 1.2 Palisades Plant History Application for Construction Permit was filed before the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on June 2, 1966 and given docket number 50-255. The ABC Safety Evaluation for construction permit was issued on January 18, 1967, and Consumers Power Company was granted ABC Construction Permit No. CPPR-25 on March 13, 1967.

Interim Provisional Operating License No. DPR-20 was issued by the ABC March 24, 1971 and Provisional Operating License by ABC Amendment on September 1, 1972.

The Reactor Plant achieved initial criticality on May 24, 1971 and the plant was declared commercial November 20, 1971. The plant is currently licensed to 2200 Mwt power rating. Consumers Power Company applied to the Directorate of Licensing for the Full Term Operating License on January 22, 1974 as Amendment No. 28.

Plant Description The Palisades Plant consists of a two-loop pressurized water reactor system provided by Combustion Engineering Inc. and designed to operate initially at 2200 thermal megawatts. Steam produced drives an 1800 rpm tandem-compound, three-cylinder, four-flow, indoor, condensing turbine having a maximum expected capacity of 845 electrical megawatts. Major plant structures consist of the reactor building which contains the reactor plant; the turbine building enclosing the turbine-generator and associated secondary plant pumps and heat exchangers; and the auxiliary building which provides protection for the reactor auxiliary and emergency systems, the control room, radwaste system, emergency diesel generators, and other emergency electrical supply and distribution systems.

1.3 Radwaste and Circulating Water Systems Modifications Two major modifications (additions) are in operation to increase the plant capability of the Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems to limit off-site radioactive releases to values "as low as practicable" and the conversion of the "once through" condenser cooling system to a closed-cycle mechanical draft cooling tower system.

1-1 J

1.4

• 1 Summary of High Energy Pipe Break Analysis Criteria The design is based primarily on the criteria outlined in the AEC Document "General Information Required of the Effects of a Piping System Break Outside Containment,"

and the subsequent meeting with the AEC task force. Additional assumptions were required to further define the design. These assumptions and a summary of the criteria set forth in the above-mentioned AEC document are presented in the following subsections:

1.4.1 High energy p1pmg systems are those whose operating temperature exceeds 200°F and whose operating pressure exceeds 275 psig.

1.4.2 Seismic Category I high energy piping systems are postulated to fail by full circumferential or longitudinal slot break at the following locations:

a.

Terminal ends (except main steam and feedwater lines at containment penetration terminal ends as discussed in Section 3.1)

b.

Branch connections

c.

Two intermediate locations of highest combined stress

d.

Any locations where either the circumferential or longitudinal stress derived on an elastically calculated basis exceeds 0.8 (Sh+ SA) or the expansion stress exceeds 0.8 SA-Additionally, critical crack failures in Seismic Category I piping are postulated to occur at those locations where such cracks could adversely affect essential structures and components. The critical crack size is equal to one-half the pipe diameter in length and one-half the wall thickness in width.

1.4.3 High energy systems not qualified to Seismic Category I criteria are postulated to fail by full circumferential or longitudinal slot breaks at those locations where such breaks might adversely affect essential structures and components.

1.4.4 Concurrent loss of station off-site power is assumed for those accidents which cause protection system actuation effecting a plant trip.

1.4.5 A single active component failure is assumed within the combined systems required to effect cold shutdown. Cold shutdown is achieved when the reactor coolant system is lowered to and maintained at 21 o°F.

1.4.6 Pipe failure effect analysis performed on each failure postulated includes the following, except as noted:

a.

Pipe whip

b.

Jet impingement and thrust reaction

c.

Water flooding

d.

Steam flooding

e.

Compartment pressurization

f.

Pipe stress at main steam isolation valve 1.4.7 No other accident is assumed to occur concurrently with the pipe failure outside containment.

1.4.8 Plant conditions prior to a high energy pipe failure outside containment are assumed to be normal steady state or hot standby, whichever presents the more severe condition.

1-2

2.0

• 1 i

MODIFICATIONS

SUMMARY

The following summarizes the facility modifications required to protect essential structures, systems, and components from the effects of high energy line breaks as postulated and evaluated in Sections 7.0 and 8.0. Additional information on each modification is given in Section 9.0 of this report.

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

Augment inservice inspection program for the main feedwater line at two elbows in the penetration room (Ref. 1 7).

Reinforce exhaust plenum; install jet impipgement baffle to protect plenum and modify the ventilation ductwork penetrating between main steam and feedwater penetration rooms and adjacent compartments to prevent steam flow to rooms containing essential components. Install self-contained ventilation system for main steam, feed water penetration, and fan rooms.

Install main steam supplies EBD-6-4"/EBD-7-4" to EB-13-4" for the auxiliary feed water pump turbine driver.

Reroute instrument piping in area of main steam dump lines and blowdown lines for protection from jet impingement. For the main steam isolation valve solenoids SV-0508, 0510, 0512, 0513, 0502, 0506, 0514 and 0524 and steam dump valve solenoids whose existing seats and seals were not qualified for the postulated environment following a steam line break, install a third set of main steam isolation valve solenoids SV-0505 A&B and SV-0507 A&B outside the main steam penetration room in the turbine building and relocate steam dump valve solenoids and electropneumatic converters SV & EP 0779 through 0782 outside the fan room. The above-mentioned main steam dump valve SVs and EPs have been located in a weathertight cabinet outside the fan room in a tornado-protected enclosure. The steam dump control valves were modified to qualify for the postulated steam environment.

Reinforce concrete block wall and install concrete slab surrounding the ceiling hatchway of the main steam penetration room.

Relocate vent duct from the control room to the main steam penetration room and seal the wall opening to wall design pressure to prevent steam entering the control room.

g.

Install blast doors in the existing openings between the auxiliary building and penetration rooms to prevent steam flow to rooms containing essential components.

h.

Add a bumper restraint at the auxiliary building wall J-line to one elbow of.the main steam line, EB6-l 2", to the reheater.

i.

Add wall opening in the west wall of the feedwater penetration room to provide additional floor drainage and vent area for pipe breaks: Add a door in the southwest wall of the fan room to provide additional egress.

j.

Add a total of four pipe restraints to the main steam lines EB-1-36" and EB-1-26" in the turbine building and two pipe restraints to lines EB-1-36" at the auxiliary building wall J-Iine as required to maintain pipe stresses within all9wable limits for the lines EB-1-36" at their connections with the main steam isolation valves in the main steam penetration room thereby supporting MSIV operability.

k.

Add pipe restraints to the safety injection and refueling water (SIRW) line and heat exchanger E-57 in the main steam penetration room to provide protection to the SIRW system from postulated jet impingement.

2-1

3.0 PLANT DESIGN CRITERIA 3.1 Main Steam and Feedwater Systems The main steam lines and components from the steam generators up to the terminal points at the high pressure turbine have been analyzed and are qualified for Seismic Class 1 design loads, and are Class 1 (Ref. 1) systems up to and including the main steam isolation valves. The main feedwater lines and components from the terminal point at feedwater heaters E-6A and B up to the steam generators have also been analyzed and are qualified for Seismic Class 1 design loads, and are Class 1 (Ref. 1) systems from, and including, the feedwater isolation check valves to the steam generators.

All components in the system are designed and fabricated in accordance with applicable codes, e.g., the moisture separators-reheaters and the closed feedwater heaters are in accordance with the ASME Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, and the piping and valves are to ASA B3 l.1 Code for Pressure Piping.

In addition, the main steam and main feedwater piping wall thicknesses were increased and more stringent inspection requirements imposed in the pipe sections through the containment penetration areas during plant construction. In accordance with Appendix A, page A-5 of Reference I, the wall thickness of these pipe sections was increased approximately 25% above minimum required wall thickness for the piping design pressure. In addition to the increased wall thickness, these piping sections were 100% ultrasonic inspected, welds (pipe seams and butt welds) were 100% radiographed, and ASTM Supplementary Tests were performed. The supplementary tests performed on the main steam line sections consisted of the following from ASTM A-155:

a.

S-1, Chemical check analysis

b.

S-2, Tension and bend tests (tensile properties and transverse guided weld bend tests)

c.

S-3, Hardness tests across the welded joints

d.

S-4, Magnetic particle examination of all welded joints The supplementary tests performed on the main feedwater line sections consisted of the following from ASTM A-106:

a.

S-2, Chemical check analysis

b.

S-3, Transverse tension tests

c.

S-4, Flattening tests The anchor cones were subjected to 100% ultrasonic inspection and a magnetic particle inspection of the weld end bevels.

In comparing the existing piping against present requirements, it is found that this piping meets or exceeds the present minimum requirements of ASME Section III, Class 1, for material, testing, and fabrication.

3-1

This procedure ensured that these pipe sections were of greater strength and higher quality than the rest of these systems and that any failure of these systems by over-pressure or material defect would occur outside these sections. Consequently, a pipe break between the main steam and main feedwater penetrations and the isolation valves is not considered credible and pipe restraints were not provided (Ref. 12). For further details concerning surveillance to be conducted during the life of the plant, refer to the transmittal letter of this report, Rev. 1, dated July 13, 1973.

Except as noted in the preceding paragraph, the main steam and feedwater systems were evaluated in accordance with* the criteria summarized in Section 1.4 herein to establish possible line failure locations and the effect of postulated failures on the structures, systems, and components essential to safe shutdown of the reactor.

Loss of feedwater and main steam are analyzed in the Palisades FSAR. None of the failures postulated herein endanger the structures, components, or systems required to effect a reactor trip or the capability to absorb and dissipate the heat required to prevent excessive reactor coolant temperature. Thus, the primary functional criterion for this study is to assure the capability to remove decay heat over the period required to reach the cold shutdown conditions in accordance with the criteria summarized in Section 1.4 herein.

3.2 High Energy Pipe Break Modifications Design 3.2.1 3.2.2 Structural Existing Class 1 structures and the proposed modifications were evaluated -for-structural adequacy following a high energy pipe break in accordance with the design basis shown in Appendix A to the Palisades FSAR (Ref. 1 ). The ultimate strength design method was used for concrete. Design stresses are proportioned such that the combined stresses are within limits established in the FSAR, Appendix A.

Pipe Restraints Existing and proposed pipe restraints are Class 1 structure using the design basis shown in Appendix A to the FSAR (Ref. 1) and analytical methods outlined in Section 10.0 of this report.

3.2.3 Encapsulation Sleeves The requirement for encapsulation sleeves has been subsequently waived by Directorate of Licensing for an adopted augmented inservice inspection program (Ref. 17).

3-2

4.0 PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES The sequence of events followed to shut down the plant from normal full power operation and the proposed emergency procedure to be used following a high energy line break outside containment are described in the following sections.

The emergency procedure described covers the most severe break considered for purposes of this study. Each significant break, analyzed in Section 8.0, would require different operator actions depending on the severity of the break and automatic action, if any, occurring following the break. The most severe break considered for purposes of establishing an emergency shutdown procedure for high energy pipe breaks outside containment is one which most rapidly depletes the secondary system heat sink and causes an automatic trip.

Table 4-1 identifies and summarizes the various shutdown systems as they relate to the significant pipe breaks analyzed in Section 8.0. Notation is provided to identify those systems required and/or available to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition for each break. Table 4-1 shows that the plant can be safely shut down following any of the significant line breaks postulated, if the modifications proposed in Section 2.0 are made.

4.1 Normal Shutdown from Full Power Operation The following sequence of events describes the procedure for a normal shutdown from full power operation.

4.1.1 Proceed as follows to hot standby condition:

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

k.

I.

Reduce load on turbine generator at prescribed rate with EH turbine control.

Observe that T avg is being controlled within acceptable limits either automatically or manually.

Observe that pressurizer level is being controlled within acceptable limits either automatically or manually.

Observe that pressurizer pressure is being maintained within acceptable limits either automatically or manually.

Observe that steam generator water level is being maintained within acceptable limits either automatically or manually.

Observe that regulating rods are moving in their prescribed sequence and that individual rods within the groups are moving together.

Adjust boron concentration, if required, to maintain regulating rods within operating band.

Remove second feed pump when power level is less than 40%.

At approximately 20% load, open turbine drains, and change EH to IMPULSE OUT.

At approximately 15% load:

1.

Transfer auxiliary loads to the startup transformers.

2.

Transfer reactor regulating control to manual.

At approximately 10% load:

1.

Close reheater control and shutoff valves.

2.

Check loss of load trip bypassed, and SUR trip active.

At approximately 8% power, place the power range neutron monitor gain sensitivity switch to the XlO position (10.7% trip).

4-1

4.2

m.

n.

o.

p.

q.

r.

s.

Check turbine bypass valve open and controlling at 900 psia as turbine load is reduced below 5%.

Trip turbine with reactor power at approximately 4% and the turbine bypass valve controlling secondary pressure at 900 psia.

Check CV0730 open, and trip one condensate pump.

Maintain T avg at 532°F by reducing reactor power as necessary by insertion of regulating rods and/or by bypassing steam.

Start auxiliary feedwater pump and trip remaining main feed pump.

Close MSIVs and open their bypass valves, if necessary, to maintain T avg if MSIV s are closed, verify all 12 solenoids.

Insert regulating group rods in "Manual Sequential" and verify that all inserted rods reach their lower rod stop as indicated by rod position indication systems.

t.

Check that wide range log channels and startup channels are operating properly and control room audio signal is on.

u.

Boron concentration shall be adjusted to maintain Keff less than or equal to 0.98, assuming the strongest rod is withdrawn.

v.

Continually ".heck boron concentration via boronmeter to ensure Keff is maintained as prescribed above.

w.

If condenser vacuum must be broken, decay heat must be relieved through steam dump valves.

x.

If MSIVs are closed, verify all 12 solenoids tripped, and then return MSIV control switches on OPEN to de-energize the solenoids. Proceed as follows to establish cold shutdown.

4.1.2 Proceed as follows for cooldown from hot standby:

a.

Set up CVCS for degasification.

b.

Borate the primary coolant system to the cold shutdown concentration.

c.

Observe boronmeter and primary coolant gas analyzer to ensure that boration and degasification are proceeding properly.

d.

When proper boron concentration is reached, primary coolant system cooldown may proceed.

e.

Stop two PCPs (preferably PSOA and D).

f.

Insert shutdown and part length rods.

g.

Maintain cooling rate within limits.

h.

Block SIAS at 1600 psia on PCS.

i.

Block MSIV closure at 550 psi on SG.

j.

Close SI tank outlet MOVs at 500 psia on PCS.

k.

When system pressure reaches 250 psig and temperature is 300°F, place shutdown cooling system in operation. Secure steam dump when cooling rate permits.

1.

Stop third primary coolant pump; cool down pressurizer if necessary.

m.

Observe differential temperature limitations for auxiliary spray valve operation each time auxiliary spray is operated.

Emergency Shutdown from Full Power Operation The following emergency shutdown procedure follows a plant trip, with loss of off-site power, which may be automatic or operator induced depending on size of break and control conditions.

4-2

1-In the following emergency procedure it is assumed that the component cooling pumps have been made inoperative due to a high temperature environment of 320°F as a result of a feedwater line break downstream of the 18" check valves. For steam line breaks that do not affect the component cooling system, the normal cooldown procedure can be followed after the prim:ary coolant temperature is reduced to 300°F.

On a reactor trip with loss of off-site power the diesel generator starts automatically.

Following this start the charging pumps are first in order in the loading sequence.

• After a high energy break and consequent automatic reactor trip, the procedure is as follows: If the break is not large enough to initiate an automatic trip, the procedure will begin as a manual trip.

4.2.1 Operator will note the following systems:

a.

An obvious long loud noise indicative of a high energy line break outside containment.

b.

Penetration room temperature indicating break location~

c.

A sudden substantial increase in steam and feedwater flow indication.

4.2.2 Operator will take immediate action and check the following within the first 60 seconds:

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

Reactor trip.

Turbine/generator trip.

Closure of main steam isolation valves.

Start of diesel generators.

Start of available charging pumps.

Start of HPSI pumps on low primary coolant pressure, if available.

Note: If reactor trip has not occurred, operator shall decide if the size of break warrants a reactor trip. If the reactor is tripped, he shall continue the emergency procedure as follows.

4.2.3 Station an operator at the auxiliary power panel (C-30) to check the following and ensure emergency power:

a.

Diesels start and come up to speed.

b.

Station and startup power to supply breakers all tripped.

c.

Automatic load shedding.

d.

Sequential loading of 2400 volt buses to diesel generators.

4.2.4 Proceed with emergency shutdown as follows:

a.

Determine if the component cooling system has failed.

b.

Open service water standby control valves CV0879 and CV0880, if available.

c.

Start motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump if available and verify diesel generator operation. If riot available, start steam-driven feed water pump.

4-3

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

k.

1.

m.

Verify that all available charging pumps are operating.

Verify that at least one automatic dump valve is operating and controlling the main steam pressure at 900 psia.

If the control room cooling system has failed due to failure of service water supply, place system in ventilation mode.

If required, block auxiliary feed water flow to the failed steam generator by closing CV0736 or CV0737.

Commence control of auxiliary feed water rate for cooldown as follows:

1.

Place dump valves on manual control for each steam generator available (CV0779 through 0782).

2.

If both steam generators are available, ma!ntain approximately equal water levels in both units.

3.

Gradually open one dump valve for each steam generator until the level in the pressurizer is decreased a few inches below normal control level.

4.

Carefully control auxiliary feedwater rate and steam pressure by means of the dump valve or valves to control primary coolant temperature and volume by observing and maintaining the lower level in the pressurizer established in item i-3.

As cooldown proceeds, operator is to observe the level in the condensate storage tank T2. If the component cooling system has not been restored at the time that condensate storage is depleted, fire pump 9B (diesel-driven) is to be started as backup water supply to the auxiliary feedwater pump.

Check boronmeter periodically for boron content of primary coolant.

When boron content has been increased to 1750 ppm, shut down charging pumps.

Check HPSI pumps for automatic start. These pumps may be shutdown if not required to supplement the charging pumps for boron and volume makeup to the primary coolant system.

When line break blowdown has subsided and temperatures are permissible, operators should be dispatched to open all exterior doors to the auxiliary building.

When permissible and if necessary, maintenance should make efforts to restore the component cooling system.

4-4

TABLE 4-1 REVISI.ON 1. (CCMPLEI'ELY REVISED)

AVAILABILITY OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS TO PLACE AND *MAINTAIN THE PLANT IN A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION (210°F REACTOR COOLANT)(l)

POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (See Table 8.1 <2l 8.2.1 8.2.2 8.2.3 8.3.1 min <n;eam vump Line Main Steam SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Main Steam Break in Intermediate Crit. Crack Full Breal Crit. Crack Pene. Room Break in Pene. Room Turbine B dg SIRW Tank B,G B,G B,G B,G B,G HPSI Pumps B,G B,G B,G B,G B,G LPSI Pumps B

B B

B B

Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger B

B B

B B

ccw Pumps B

B B

B B

CCW Heat Exchanger B

B B

B B

Aux. F, W, Pumps A

A A

A A

Condensate Storage Tank A

A A

A A

Boric Acid Pumps A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F Boric Acid iltorage Tank A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F Charging Pumps A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F Service Water Pumps A

A A

A A

Diesel Generator & Auxiliaries A

A A

B,G A

Batteries A

A A

B,G A

480 Volt Bus A

A A

A A

2400 Volt Bus A

A A

A A

MCC For Above Equipment A

A A

A A

Switchgear Room A

A A

A A

Cable Spreading Room A

A A

A A

Control Room A

A A

A A

Control Room HVAC A

A A

A A

Isolation Valves, Main Steam A,C,D A,C,D A,C,D A,C,D A

Steam Generator Dump Valves A,C,D A,C,D A,C,D A,C,D A

Service Water to Safe~rds Pumps B,C,D,G B,C,D,G B,C,D,G B,C,D,G B,G Legend A.

System Operation Required and Available B.

System Operation not Required for Purpose of this Study C.

System Exposed to Resulting Steam Environment D.

System Qualified to Operate in Resulting Steam Environment 13, 15~ ei;em Net.Q.. s.lif'iea te Qfeps;\\;e iR Jlee-.H;t;,,,!! gte.... l!:R"i>'BllH!BRt (deleted)

F.

Operable Alternate System Available G.

System Available as Alternate System 8 - 1 for full description of break) 8.3.2 8.4 <2l 8.5 8.6.1 8.6.2 8.7 <2l Main Steam Steam to Pump Steam to Feedwater in Aux. Bldg. Aux. Feedwater Sub Hdr Break Drive, Break in Reheater Brk.

Intermediate Critical Break Turbine Blcl.B:

Pene. Room Turbine Blcl.B:

Break Crack in Aux. Blcl.B:

B,G B,G B,G B,G B,G B,G B,G B,G B,G B,G B,G B,G B

B B

B B

B B

B B

B B

B B

B B

B B

B B

B B

B B

B A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A,F A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A B,G A

A A

A A

B,G A

A A

A A

A,F A

A A

A A

A,F A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A,C,D A

A,C,D A,C,D A,C,D A

A,C,D A

A,C,D A,C,D A,C,D B,G B,C,D,G B,G B,C,D B,C,D B,C,D Notes (1)

The above data is based on conditions a~er completion of proposed modifications.

(2)

The control tolerance of reactor trip is ~ 5.5%. Accordingly, the considered line break may or may not cause a reactor trip.

For this study, it was assumed the reactor tripped.

5.0 ESSENTIAL PLANT STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS In this report (Special Report No. 6), "essential" means required for safe shutdown, and essential systems are given designation "A" in Table 4-1 Revision 1, 7-13-73.

5.1 Class 1 Structures and Systems 5.2 The following structures, systems, and components outside of containment are designated Class 1 (Ref. 1), including the containment shell, and were considered essential in the FSAR.

5.1.1 Class 1 structures are as follows:

a.

Portions of the auxiliary building that house safeguards systems, control room, fuel storage facilities, and radioactive materials.

b.

Enclosures for the service water pumps and auxiliary feedwater pumps.

c.

Supports for Class 1 system components.

5.1.2 Class 1 systems and equipment are as follows:

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

Containment penetrations up to and including the first isolation valve outside containment.

Atmospheric dump and main steam safety valves and associated piping from main steam headers.

New and spent fuel storage racks and fuel handling equipment.

Motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, condensate storage tank, and associated piping.

Emergency generators, including fuel supply.

Control boards, switchgear, load centers, batteries, and cable runs serving Class 1 equipment.

5.1.3 Class 1 auxiliary systems are as follows:

a.

Critical service water.

b. -

Component cooling (outside containment).

c.

Containment spray including SIRW tank.

d.

Low-pressure safety injection.

e.

High-pressure safety injection.

f.

Safety injection tanks and piping.

g.

Chemical and volume control.

h.

Radioactive waste treatment.

i.

Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup.

Systems Essential for High Energy Pipe Breaks Outside Containment Not all systems and components listed in 5.1 above are required concurrently for various pipe failures postulated for this study. Table 5-1, and corresponding subsections, are provided to further define and describe the systems and components which are considered essential to high energy pipe failures outside containment.

5-1

Descriptions contained in the following corresponding subsections are not complete descriptions, but rather emphasize system function and capability pertinent to this study.

5.2.1 Emergency AC Power Supplies (Ref. 2)

The emergency diesel generators are designed to provide a dependable on-site ac power source capable of starting and supplying the essential loads to safely shut down the plant and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition under all conditions. The reliability of this on-site power is provided by its duplication whefein each emergency generator supplies redundant loads and each is capable of providing power to the minimum necessary safeguards. Each emergency generator supplies a separate 2400 volt bus and a redundant group of engineered safeguards consistent with the two-channel power concept. The equipment location is shown on Figure 14.

Each diesel engine has its own self-contained jacket cooling and heating system.

Each heat exchanger is fed from a separate critical service water header.

The emergency diesel generators and their auxiliaries are designed to withstand Seismic Class 1 acceleration forces without malfunction. The units are separated by a wall, as shown on Figure 14.

Four preferred ac systems are energized from the station battery systems through inverters to power vital instrument and control loads.

5.2.2 Emergency DC Power Supplies (Ref. 2)

The station batteries are Class 1 and are designed to furnish continuous power to certain normal plant control and instrumentation circuits and to control any instrumentation circuits associated with the engineered safeguards systems.

They are also used to supply emergency plant lighting. Two identical batteries feeding separate de control centers are provided to assure reliability. Each battery is housed in its own ventilated room in a tornado protected area.

5.2.3 Reactor Protective System (Ref. 3)

The reactor protective system contains sensor instrumentation, amplifiers, logic, and other equipment necessary to monitor selected nuclear steam supply system conditions, and to reliably effect a rapid reactor shutdown if conditions deviate from preselected operating ranges.

The parameters and conditio~s which will initiate a trip are the following:

a.

High neutron level (reactor power).

b.

High startup rate (low power level only).

c.

High pressurizer pressure.

d.

Thermal margin-pressure (variable low pressure).

e.

Loss of turbine load.

f.

g.

h.

Low reactor coolant flow.

Low steam generator level.

Steam generator low pressure.

5-2

5.2.4 Safety Injection System (Ref. 4)

The safety injection system is designed to protect the reactor core during a LOCA and to provide rapid injection of borated water following rupture of a main steam line. The components and the flow paths are shown on Figures 2 and 3 and the equipment location on Figures 13, 18, 19, and 20.

The system and each of its components are designed to the Class seismic criteria as delineated in Appendix A of Reference 1. The system is designed to withstand the appropriate seismic loads simultaneously with other applicable loads without loss of function.

5.2.5 Chemical and Volume Control System (ReJ. 5) 5.2.6 The chemical and volume control system, shown on Figure 4, is a Seismic Class 1 system designed to maintain the required volume, chemistry, and purity of water in the primary coolant system during normal plant operation.

Redundancy is provided for essential equipment.

The charging and boric acid pumps are powered by the diesel generators under emergency conditions. One diesel generator supplies charging pumps A and B and boric acid pump A. The other diesel generator supplies charging pump C and boric acid pump B. Physical separation and barriers are provided between the power and control circuits for the redundant pumps. Standby starting features are provided so that at least one charging pump is running. If both diesels are available, both boric acid pumps will be running. The charging pumps may be controlled locally at their switchgear. The boric acid pump may be locally controlled at the pumps. Separate power supplies for pump power and separate control circuits ensure that this system satisfies the single failure criterion.

Under emergency conditions, the charging pumps are used to inject concentrated boric acid into the primary coolant system. Either the pressurizer level control or the safety injection signal will automatically start all charging pumps. The safety injection signal will also cause the charging pump suction to be switched from the volume control tank to the discharge of the boric acid pump. If the boric acid supply from the boric acid pump is not available, boric acid from the concentrated boric acid tanks may be gravity-fed into the charging line. If the charging line inside the reactor containment building is inoperative, the line may be isolated outside the reactor containment, and the safety injection system may be used to inject concentrated boric acid into the primary coolant system.

Auxiliary Feedwater System (Ref. 6)

The auxiliary feedwater system is designed to provide a supply of feedwater through the steam generators during startup operations and to remove primary system sensible and decay heat during initial stages of shutdown operations.

Equipment in the system required for safe shutdown is designed to Seismic Class 1 requirements (steam supply piping and turbine driver excluded).

5-3

The auxiliary feedwater system consists of one electric motor-driven and one turbine-driven feedwater pump with

ptpmg, valves, and associated instrumentation and controls. Auxiliary feedwater is fed into each main feed water header by a connection downstream of the main feedwater isolation check valve and the high-pressure heater. A manual switch for starting and stopping the motor-driven pump is located at the main control board and another is located locally at the switchgear. A manual switch for opening and closing of the steam supply valve for the turbine-driven pump is located in the main control room.

The motor-driven pump is on one of the 2400 volt buses which can receive power from the diesel generator.

The pumps take suction from the 125,000-gallon condensate storage tank of which 60,000 gallons are required to achieve primary system cooldown in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> if all of the steam is blown to atmosphere. The condensate storage tank level is monitored in the control room. In addition, a low-level switch is provided to alarm at low water level of 60,000 gallons. A crosstie from the fire system provides a backup water supply.

The pumps are located in a tornado-proof Seismic Class 1 portion of the turbine building. The supply header from the condensate storage tank and the tank are not protected from tornadoes; but the 'backup supply from the diesel engine-driven fire pump is located in a protected area. The discharge header from the auxiliary feedwater pumps to the auxiliary building is buried underground.

System reliability is achieved by the following features:

a.

One motor-driven and one turbine-driven pump are provided, either of which completely satisfies the requirements of primary system cooldown. The turbine-driven pump can receive steam from either steam header.

b.

Pump motor power is supplied from normal and standby sources with backup supplied from the emergency diesel generators.

c.

The condensate storage tank capacity is 125,000 gallons and is monitored to maintain a minimum storage of 60,000 gallons. A backup supply from the fire and makeup systems is provided to the auxiliary feed pump suction.

d.

The condensate pumps may be used to pump water through the normal feed water train to the steam generators in the event of a failure of the auxiliary feedwater piping system. The steam generator pressure may be relieved by the steam dump system to accommodate this mode of operation.

The auxiliary feedwater system is shown on Figures 5 and 6, and the equipment location on Figures 23 and 26.

5-4

5.2.7 Main Steam Isolation, Dump and Relief Valves, and Actuation Systems (Ref. 7)

See Figures 5 and 6 for diagrammatic representation of these systems.

a.

One main steam line isolation valve is provided on each main steam header. Each valve consists of a swing disc held open against flow by a pneumatic cylinder. The valves are provided to isolate the steam generators in the unlikely event of a steam generator tube failure following a main steam line break accident to prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. Closure of these valves also prevents a rapid uncontrolled cooldown of the primary coolant system. The valves are normally open, and close in 4 to 6 seconds upon receipt of a low steam generator pressure signal. An accumulator is provided to hold the valve open in case of a loss of air supply to the valve operator.

b.

The main steam dump system consists of four automatically-actuated atmospheric dump valves which exhaust to the atmosphere and a turbine bypass valve which exhausts to the main condenser. The total capacities of the atmospheric steam dump and turbine bypass valves are 35% and 5%, respectively, of steam flow with reactor at full power. The capacity of the atmospheric steam dump valves is adequate to cool the plant to the cold shutdown condition when using auxiliary feedwater as the cooling medium.

c.

Each main steam header is provided with 12 springloaded safety valves upstream of the main steam isolation valves. The safety valves discharge to atmosphere and are in accordance with the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII.

5.2.8 Feedwater Check Valves (See Figure 6)

Each main feed water line is provided with a check valve upstream of the steam generators and outside the containment. These valves will act to prevent a flow reversal and steam generator blowdown should a feed water line break upstream of these valves.

5.2.9 Component Cooling Water System (Ref. 8)

The component cooling water system is designed to cool components serving the primary coolant system and normally provides a monitored intermediate barrier between these systems and the service water system which transfers the heat to the lake. The system is shown on Figure 7 and the equipment location on Figures 14 and 18~

The system is a closed loop consisting of three motor-driven component cooling pumps, two heat exchangers, a surge tank, associated valves, piping, instrumentation, and controls.

5-5

The component cooling pump motors are connected to two separate 2400 volt buses, with one pump on one bus and the remaining two on the other. The

• pumps can be started and stopped from the main control room and also locally at the switchgear.

The gland cooling water for the safety injection pumps and charging pumps is b~cked up by service water from the critical service water system in case of failure of the component water supply. Low cooling water flow in the supply header to each engineered safeguards equipment room is annunciated in the control room. Changeover from one supply to the other is performed by remote-manual opening of the service water supply header valve.

System reliability is achieved by the following featmes:

a.

b.

c.

d.

Any one of three pumps is capable of supplying component cooling requirements during normal plant operation. During shutdown, one pump can furnish at least 50% of the maximum shutdown cooling water requirements.

Pump motor power is supplied from normal and standby sources with backup supplied from the emergency diesel generators.

Two 50% capacity heat exchangers (based on maximum duty during shutdown cooling) are provided; each exchanger alone is capable of primary system cooldown at a reduced rate.

Two full-capacity header valves installed in parallel in the component cooling water supply header valves to the shutdown heat exchangers ensure a reliable supply of cooling water for shutdown.

5.2.10 Critical Service Water System (Ref. 9)

The service water system is designed to supply lake water as the cooling medium for removal of heat from the plant auxiliary systems during normal, shutdown, or emergency conditions. Separate service water lines serve the plant critical and noncritical systems. The service water pumps which are located in the intake structure, and the part of the system serving the plant critical systems, as defined in the FSAR, are Seismic Class 1 and tornado-protected.

Three half-capacity electric motor-driven pumps draw water from the intake structure. Two motors are connected to one 2.4 kV bus and the third motor is connected to a separate 2.4 kV bus. Each pump can be started or stopped remotely from the main control room or locally at the switchgear.

The critical systems associated with this study which are supplied from the service water system are as follows:

a.

Emergency diesel generator lube oil coolers and cooling water.

exchangers

b.

Control room air conditioning condensing units

c.

Air compressor aftercoolers and jackets 5-6

d.

e.

f.

Component cooling water heat exchangers Engineered safeguards room coolers Engineered safeguards pump seals System reliability is achieved with the following features:

a.

Each of the three service water pumps is capable of supplying 50%

service water during normal and shutdown conditions.

b.

Pump motor power is supplied from normal and standby sources with backup from the emergency diesel generators.

c.

Fully redundant service water lines supply critical systems. Loss of one header does not compromise plant safety.

d.

The fire pumps can be valved into the service water pumps' common header thereby serving as a partial backup to the service water system.

The service water system is shown on Figures 8 and 9, and the equipment location on Figures 23 and 27.

5.2.11 Main Control Room Including HV (Ref. 10)

The main control room is accessible from the auxiliary and turbine buildings. It houses the control console, vertical duplex boards, and switchyard supervisory board for operating and monitoring all critical systems.

All control console and panel sections containing devices associated with Seismic Class 1 systems are designed to prevent device malfunction by Seismic Class 1 loads.

The control room is air conditioned and served by two completely separate units. Their operation is as follows:

a.

Air is recirculated and fresh air is added to provide a surplus of air and a slight positive pressure to the control room. The fresh air inlet damper and exhaust damper are modulated to provide a static pressure differential of 0.10 inch water gauge between the viewing gallery and the control room.

b.

A manual station is provided which activates a purge mode in which the pressure differential controls are overridden and 100% outside air is supplied to the control room and exhausted out of doors.

c.

Control room isolation is initiated by the containment high pressure or high radiation signal. The following actions occur:

1.

Both supply and exhaust dampers close.

2.

The dampers in the filter bypass open.

3.

The control room isolation filter fan starts.

All the makeup air for the control room is drawn through the high efficiency charcoal filter.

See Figure 10 for diagrammatic representation of HV system. Figure 16 shows the control room location.

5-7

5.2.12 Miscellaneous Ventilation Systems for Essential Equipment (Ref. 11)

See Figure 10 for the flow diagram applicable to the following subsystems.

a.

Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System The supply units for the diesel generator room supply recirculated air or fresh air as the cooling load requirements demand. These fans are started automatically in sequence by thermostats.

b.

Engineered Safeguards Rooms Ventilation System c.

d..

Fresh air is supplied to the west engineered safeguards equipment room by the radwaste area supply fan and associated duct work, and to the east engineered safeguards equipment by natural circulation from the dirty waste tank room. Isolation valves are provided on the inlet and outlet ducts of each room and close manually or on high radiation.

Additional room coolers are provided and start by a signal from wall-mounted thermostats. They provide additional cooling for the protection of the engineered safeguards equipment. Service water is automatically admitted to the fan cooling coils when each starts.

Exhaust air is routed to the radwaste area exhausters.

Component Cooling Equipment Room Ventilation Fresh air is provided by the radwaste area supply fan and the duct work serving the west engineered safeguards room. Exhaust air is routed by a separate duct, serving only the equipment room, to the radwaste area exhausters.

Charging Pump Room Ventilation System Fresh air to the charging pump equipment room is by natural circulation from the east corridor which is supplied by the radwaste area supply fan. Exhaust air is routed by duct work to the radwaste area exhausters.

5-8

TABLE 5-1 SYSTEMS ESSENTIAL FOR HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (FSAR designations)

1.

Emergency AC Power Supplies

2.

Emergency DC Power Supplies

3.

Reactor Protective System

4.

Safety Injection System

5.

Chemical and Volume Control System

6.

Auxiliary Feedwater System

7.

Main Steam Isolation, Dump and Relief Valves and Actuation System

8.

Feedwater Check Valves

9.

Component Cooling Water System

10.

Critical Service Water System

11.

Main Control Room

12.

Miscellaneous Ventilation. Systems for Essential Equipment Rooms 5-9

6.0 HIGH ENERGY SYSTEMS High energy systems considered for purposes of this study are those meeting the criteria s.ummarized in Section 1.4 herein. Lines whose operating temperature exceeds 200°F and whose operating pressure exceeds 275 psig are included. Piping systems meeting these criteria are further defined and listed in the following subsections. Figures 13 through 27 show the plant general arrangement and are referenced in the following sections.

6.1 Main Steam 6.2 Main steam produced in the steam generators is routed through two 36" headers exiting the reactor building. Within the auxiliary building, takeoff connections from each header provide for: steam dump to atmosphere (2 - 8"), 12 code safety valves (6"), and an auxiliary feedwater pump turbine steam supply (4"). Within this same room each steam line contains a main steam isolation valve which consists of a swing disc held open against flow by a pneumatic cylinder. Exiting the auxiliary building and within the turbine building the headers are routed to the turbine with each line branching and reducing to two 26" subheaders each feeding one of the four turbine stop valves. Routed upstream of the stop valves is a 12" branch connection from the north header and a 1 O" connection from the south header for reheater heating steam.

The 12" branch also supplies the turbine bypass.

The main steam system operates at a temperature of 524°F and a pressure of 750 psig with a moisture content of 0.2%. During hot standby, system conditions are 532°F and 900 psig. Design steam flow through each header is 5.4 x 106 lb/hr.

The main steam system is shown diagrammatically on Figures 5 and 6, and the location of equipment on Figures 15, 18, 24, and 25. Table 6-1 identifies the major lines and branch lines considered for purposes of this study.

Steam Generator Blowdown Two l" connections from each steam generator, expanded to 2" lines inside the containment, are routed through the auxiliary building to the steam generator blowdown tank located in the turbine building. The lines are normally in operation at a temperature of 514°F and a pressure of 750 psig. The steam generator blowdown lines are designated EB~l l-2" and are shown on Figure 6. The location of the steam generator blowdown tank is shown on Figure 23.

Subsequent to Revision 2, July 27, 1973, of this report, the steam generator blowdown system has been modified to include a flash tank before the blowdown tank.

6.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System A 4" line from the main steam header downstream of the main steam isolation valve but inside the auxiliary building, is routed through the west engineered safeguards equipment room to the turbine building and then to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine driver to the condensate pump pit at the 571' elevation. The line is shown on 6-1

~6.4 Figure 5 and is designated EB-13-4". The line conditions during normal reactor power operation are 750 psig and 5 l 4°F up to the first control valve. The line is in service for short periods at a pressure of 900 psig and temperature of 532°F during hot standby, startup, and shutdown operation when the auxiliary feedwater pumps are used for steam generator feedwater supply. The auxiliary feedwater lines EB-14-6" are also routed from the auxiliary feedwater pumps through the west engineered safeguards room. These lines are not normally energized as check valves upstream at the connection to the main feedwater lines isolates them from the high energy feedwater flow. The auxiliary feedwater pumps and turbine driver location is shown on Figure

23.

Subsequent to Revision 2, July 27, 1973, of this report, two new lines EBD-6-4" and EBD-7-4" have been added in the MSPR to connect to EB-13-4" in the turbine building.

Main Feedwater and Condensate Main feedwater from the condensate pumps is routed through a two-train parallel low pressure feedwater heater system to the suction of the turbine driven main feedwater pumps at an operating pressure of 430 psig and temperature varying from 97°F at the condensate pump suction to 380°F at the feedwater pump suction. The headers through the feedwater heaters are 188" up to the point of tie-in with the heater drain pumps where they expand to 20" for the feedwater pump suction. The heater drain pumps take suction from the moisture separator drain tank at 200 psia and 380°F and discharge to the feedwater pump suction at 430 psig. All of the above piping and components are located in the turbine building.

The main feedwater pumps discharge into 18" lines and are routed through the feedwater control valves, high pressure feedwater heaters, feedwater check valves, and to the steam generators in parallel systems, one to each steam generator. A short run of piping including the feedwater check valves is located in the auxiliary building. All other equipment and piping is located in the turbine building. The normal operating conditions are 905 psig and 382°F from the pump discharge to the regulating valves, and 850 psig and 435°F downstream of the control valve and high pressure feedwater heaters.

The main feedwater and condensate system is shown diagrammatically on Figure 6, and the equipment locations are shown on Figures 14, 18, and 23 through 27. Table 6-2 identifies the major lines and branch lines considered for purposes of this study.

6.5 Turbine Extraction System Extraction steam is supplied to the feedwater heaters from the HP and LP turbines as required by the plant thermal cycle. Feedwater heating stages 1 through 4 are supplied by the LP turbines at pressures ranging from 7.14 psia to 91.9 psia and temperatures from l 80°F to 320°F during normal operation.

Feedwater heating stage 5 is supplied from the HP turbine exhaust crossover to the moisture separator reheater at operating conditions of 203 psia and 383°F. Feedwater heating stage 6, high pressure, is supplied by HP turbine extraction at 385 psia and 6-2

4400F and. reheater at 725 psia pressure is throttled to the proper shell pressure in route to the heater from the reheater drain tanks.

Feedwater heater 6 drains cascade to heater 5 and then to the moisture separator drain tank which supplies the heater drain pumps. Feedwater heaters 4, 3, 2, and 1 are also arranged in a cascaded drain system, but ultimately discharge to the main condenser.

All piping and components are located in the turbine building. Location of major equipment is shown on Figures 23 through 27. The system is shown diagrammatically on Figures 5 and 11.

The extraction lines from the HP turbine and the reheater drains to feedwater heaters E-6A and B are routed in the vicinity of the containment structure as they terminate at heater E-6B. These lines are designated GB-1-8" and GB-1-12" as shown on Figures 5 and 11.

6.6 Sampling System 6.6. l Pressurizer, Quench Tank and Primary Coolant Loop Sample Points SX-1023, 1034, 1045, 1049, and 1053, Line CC-16-12".

This line is routed through the auxiliary building but not in any area containing safe shutdown systems.

The line is shown diagrammatically on Figure 12.

6.6.2 Steam Generator Blowdown Sample Points SX-0738, 0739, 0770, and 0771.

Lines EB-11-1/2".

These lines are inside the turbine building, but no safe shutdown system would be endangered by a break in these lines.

These lines are shown diagrammatically on Figure 12.

6.6.3 Main Steam Sample Points SX0571 and 0575. Lines EB-1-1/2".

These lines are located in the turbine building, but no safe shutdown system would be endangered by a break in these lines.

These lines are shown diagrammatically on Figure 12.

6.6.4 All Other Sample Points None of the other sample lines outside containment meet the high energy criteria of 200°F and 275 psig.

6.7 Reactor Coolant Letdown System. Line EC-2-2".

This line is routed in the Auxiliary Building.

In normal operation, the letdown system is cooled by two sets of heat exchangers and the pressure redl;lced by restricting orifices, all of which are located within the containment building. The normal temperature and pressure entering the auxiliary building is l 20°F and 470 psig. This does not meet the high energy criteria of 200°F and 275 psig.

6-3

TABLE 6-1 MAIN STEAM PIPING SYSTEM LINE NUMBER DESCRIPTION EB-1-36" Main steam header EB-1-8" Steam dump lines EB-1-6" Main steam header relief valves EB-6-12" & EB-6-8" Main steam supply to reheaters E-9B and E-9D EB-2-6" Main steam bypass to condenser EB-6-1 O" & EB-6-8" Main steam to reheaters E-9A and E-9C EB-5-6" & EB-5-4" Main steam to main feed water pump turbine drivers (high pressure)

EB-13-4" & EBD-6-4" Main steam to auxiliary feed water pump turbine driver EBD-7-4" EB-1-26" Main steam subheaders to HP turbine stop valves EB-4-6" Main steam to turbine gland seals EB-3-8" Main steam to steam jet air ejectors 6-4

LINE NUMBER GB-5-18", GB-5-24" GB-5-14" GB-5-12" GB-5-6" GB-2-16" GB-9-6", GB-9-1 ",

GB-9-4", GB-9-3",

GB-91 Yi" GB-6-12" GB-6-16" GB-7-20" DB-1-18" DB-1-8" DB-2-6" DB-1-12" EB-9-18" EB-9-16" EB-14-6" EB-10-6" EC-1-6" TABLE 6-2 MAIN FEEDW ATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Condensate pump discharge lines and header to air ejector and gland seal condenser through low pressure feedwater heaters to main feed water pump suction Condensate pump recirculation to main condenser Condensate reject to condensate storage tank Heater drain pump suction Bypass from condensate pump discharge to heater drain pump suction and seals, and to main feedwater seals Discharge from heater drain pumps to feed water pump suction header Feedwater pump suction header Feedwater pump suction Feedwater pump discharge Feedwater control valve bypass lines and header Feedwater pump recirculation to main condenser Feedwater pump discharge header upstream of control valves Feedwater line downstream of control valve to steam generators High pressure feedwater heater feedwater bypass Auxiliary feedwater pump discharge to main feed water lines Auxiliary feed water pumps discharge lines and headers above grade Auxiliary feedwater pump discharge header below grade 6-5

7.0 EVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY PIPING SYSTEMS FOR LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Pipe break, slot, and crack failures in the high energy piping systems described in Section 6.0 are postulated in accordance,**ith the criteria summarized in Section 1.4. The main steam, main feedwater, and main steam dump lines were stress analyzed and failures postulated at terminal ends, and two intermediat~ high stress points for each main and branch line for these major high energy piping systems, except as discussed in Section 3.1.

Tables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 show the resultant stress values for each point analyzed as shown on the piping isometrics Figures 28, 29, and 30 for the main steam, main feedwater, and main steam dump lines, respectively. These tables also include the allowable stress values for each point based on the criteria applicable to this study and the code allowable stress values on which the original piping design was based (see Section 10.1 for code identification). None of the stress values calculated exceeds either the criteria applicable to this study or the code allowable stresses.

The following sections describe, define, and evaluate the break locations postulated for the existing high energy systems as identified in Section 6.0, and their relation to essential structures, systems, and components. Many of the breaks postulated are not significant by reason of size and/or location and therefore are eliminated from further consideration in these evaluations. The remaining significant breaks which required further analysis are identified herein, and the detailed analysis is presented in Section 8.0.

7.1 Evaluation of the Main Steam High Energy System The main steam lines from the containment penetration to the isolation valve are not postulated to fail in any manner. The 25% increased wall thickness and added quality control and inspection as previously discussed in FSAR Amendment 14, Question 5.2, and Section 3.1 herein, ensures that any main steam line failure will occur outside of these sections.

Main steam line critical cracks are postulated in the main steam penetration room downstream of the isolation valves on a worst case basis, and there are essential components in the area. A detailed evaluation was required.

The main steam lines, EB-1-36" and EB-1-26", are assumed to fail at the terminal points, except as explained previously, on the HP turbine, points 16, 23, 39, and 47 on Figure 28; and at the two highest intermediate stress locations on each header, points 6, 8, 15, 18, 22, 29, 37, 38, and 46 on Figure 28. The failure mode is assumed as a full circumferential break or slot failure at each location. All. of the above postulated breaks are in the turbine building which is of sufficient size to dissipate any steam release without significant pressurization or other adverse environmental effects. The battery room wall, however, is adjacent to the main steam headers and a detailed analysis of pipe whip was required. Jet reaction forces from these breaks also required evaluation as to the adequacy of the existing restraints.

7-1

Subsequent to Revision 2, July 27, 1973, of this report, it was determined that it is necessary to analyze the effect of postulated main steam line failures downstream of the isolation valves for their resulting pipe stress at the EB-1-36" main steam line connection to the main steam isolation valves. The purpq~e of this analysis, which includes the six new main steam line restraints, is to assure'* that the main steam line stress at the connection to the MSIV does not exceed a conservatively selected stress criterion, thereby supporting MISV operability under postulated failure conditions.

Branch lines from the main steam lines between the containment and isolation valve are assumed to fail at the branch connections. Branch lines in this category are the steam dump lines, EB-1-8", and relief valve lines, EB-1-6". Additionally, the steam dump lines have been stress analyzed, as previously stated, and failures are postulated at the three highest intermedi~te stress points, points 6, 7, and 8 on Figure 30, and terminal points I and 9 on Figure 30. The failure mode is assumed as a full circumferential break or slot failure at each location. Critical cracks are also postulated in the steam dump lines on a worst case basis. There are essential structures and systems in the immediate and adjacent areas and a detailed analysis was required.

The only branch line from the main steam line downstream of the isolation valve and inside the auxiliary building main steam penetration room is the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine driver steam supply, EB-13-4". A full circumferential or slot break of this line is postulated at the connection to the main steam line. Adverse effects will be similar to those resulting from other branch line failures in the main steam penetration room. A detailed analysis was required, however, as this line is a component of both a high energy and an essential plant shutdown system.

Branch lines from the main steam lines outside the auxiliary building steam line penetration room are EB-2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (see Table 6-1 for description). Breaks were postulated at connection points and fittings, and critical cracks postulated at any location which might subject essential components to adverse loads or conditions.

None of these lines, except EB-6, are routed in the proximity of essential components and, therefore, none of the postulated breaks or cracks can adversely effect essential components. Additionally, the failure of these lines cannot produce effects as severe as those resulting from the failure of larger lines in the system as previously discussed, and no further consideration or analysis was required.

Branch line EB-6-12", supplying main steam to reheaters E-9B and E-9D, is connected to the main steam lines just after entering the turbine building and is routed next to the auxiliary building wall. Failure at the connection to the main steam line could result in pipe whip into the auxiliary building wall and a detailed analysis was required.

A full circumferential break is also assumed at other fittings in EB-6-12" downstream of the connection to the main steam line, which could also result in pipe whip into the auxiliary building wall.

7.2 Evaluation of the Steam Generator Blowdown. High Energy System The steam generator blowdown lines, EB-11-2", are routed through the auxiliary building in the main steam and feedwater penetration rooms. Any breaks or cracks 7-2

postulated for these lines are not as severe as those postulated for the larger high energy lines routed in the same areas and, therefore, no further consideration or analysis was requir~d.

Subsequent to Revision 2, July 27, 1973, of this report, the steam generator blowdown system has been modified by the addition of a flash tank before the blowdown tank; however, the preceding paragraph remains valid.

7.3 Evaluation of the Auxiliary Feed water High Energy System 7.4 The auxiliary feedwater pump turbine driver steam supply line, EB-13-4", from the main steam lines, and the auxiliary feedwater supply from the auxiliary feedwater pumps, lines EB-14-6", to the main feedwater lines are routed through the west engineered safeguards equipment room as discussed in Section 6.3.

The modification discussed in Section 9.3, and its justification explained in Section 8.4, will move the steam shutoff valve for the steam supply line from its present location in the west engineered safeguards room to the main steam penetration room.

This will cause the line to be normally isolated from the main steam system and consequently remove it from the high energy classification. The auxiliary feedwater supply lines are also normally not high energy lines and are isolated from the main feed water lines by check valves installed just upstream of their connections to the main feed water lines.

The system is normally used only during startup and shutdown operations for short periods at conditions exceeding 200°F and 275 psig. Consequently, a failure in this system downstream of its steam shutoff valves or upstream of its feedwater check valves is not considered credible.

Evaluation of the Main Feed water and Condensate High Energy System The main feedwater lines from the isolation check valve to the containment penetration are not postulated to fail in any manner. The 25% increased wall thickness and added quality control and inspection as previously discussed in FSAR Amendment 14, Question 5.2, and Section 3.1 herein, assures that any main feedwater break will occur outside of these sections.

The main feedwater lines downstream of the feedwater pumps to the containment penetrations, DB-1 and EB-9, are postulated to break at the terminal points, except as explained above, and at the two highest intermediate stress locations for each line.

Terminal points 16, 26, 46, 67, 86, and 110 and intermediate stress points 6, 8, 14, 22, 23, 27, 31, 32,41,43, 45,48, 61, 64, 66, 73, 74, 80, 82, 83,84,88,89,90,91,92, 95, 108, and 109 as shown on Figure 29 were postulated to fail by full circumferential break or slot failure. All of the postulated failure points, except point 6, are in the turbine building, which is of sufficient size to dissipate any energy release without significant pressurization or other adverse environmental effects. The containment wall, however, is adjacent to the feedwater line from feedwater heater E-6B and pipe whip analysis is required.

7-3

7.5 7.6 7.7 Point 6 is within the auxiliary building main feedwater penetration room and a failure could result in compartment pressurization and loss of the component cooling equipment located in this room. Main feedwater critical cracks are postulated in the penetration room on a worst case basis. There are critical components in the immediate and adjacent areas and a detailed analysis was required.

Branch lines from the main feedwater line downstream of the isolation check valves and upstream of the containment penetration are assumed to fail at the connection point by full circumferential break or slot failure. The auxiliary feedwater supply lines, EB-14-6, and a 3/4" vent line are the only branch lines in this category, and failure*at the connection to the feedwater lines will release feedwater and allow reverse tlow, blowdown, of the steam generator into the penetration room exposing the compbnent cooling equipment to adverse environmental conditions. The more severe case will be the break of the 6" auxiliary feedwater supply line and the 3/4" vent line break does not require further consideration. There are no other branch connections to the main feedwater lines in the penetration room.

Branch lines from the main feedwater lines inside the turbine building include all other lines listed on Table 6-2. There are no critical structures or components in the proximity of these lines and, consequently, no further analysis was required. None of the feedwater line failures postulated herein result in conditions as severely adverse as those previously considered in the Palisades FSAR for a complete loss of feedwater.

Evaluation of the Turbine Extraction High Energy System The turbine extraction system to the various feedwater heating stages as described in Section 6.5 is normally a high energy system; however, all components are in the turbine building which is of sufficient size to dissipate any energy release from a pipe failure without significant pressurization or other adverse environmental effects.

Evaluation of the Sampling System High Energy System The sampling system is used periodically for short periods to provide samples for chemical and radiochemical analysis. The sample valves and containment isolation valves are normally closed. The system is a high energy system, temperature exceeding 200°F and pressure exceeding 27 5 psig, only during the sampling period which requires 10 to 15 minutes per sample.

Because high energy operation is periodic and of short duration, a failure in these systems is not credible. Further, these systems are under strict administrative control when in operation, and flow can be terminated immediately should a break occur.

For these reasons the sampling system will not endanger critical structures, systems, or components.

Evaluation of Main Steam High Energy Breaks on MSIV Operability As stated in Section 7.1 and described in Section 8.3.1, an analysis was made to evaluate the stresses in the main steam lines, EB-1-36", at their connections to the MSIVs resulting from any of the postulated guillotine or slot failures in the turbine building enumerated in Section 7.1. This analysis included the six new main steam line restraints as described in Section 2.0 (j). The postulated failure which results in the highest stresses was identified, and it is concluded that the resulting stresses are sufficiently low so as to have no deleterious effect upon the ability of the MSIVs to perform their safety function.

The analytical methods used are described in Section 10. 7.

74

-.l I Vl CONSUMERS PQo1ER COMPANY PALISADES PIAN.r *

.HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILU1ill3 OUTS.IDE CONTAINMENT -

SUMMARY

OF OPERATTI~ SIRESSES System:

MAIN STEAM (EB-1-36")

Sheet 1 of 3 TABLE 7-1 Revision 1 (Completely Revised)

POINT PRESSURE WEIGHT p + w sh (1)

SEISMIC P+W+S l.2S~

2

)

EXPANSION SA (3)

P+W+S+T 0.8(Sh+SA(4)

NO.

STRESS p

STRESS. W STRESS s STRESS, T 1

5813 167 5980 15000 7197 13177 18000 2966 22500 16143 30000 2

II 184 5997 II 4863 10860 II 6189 II 17049 II 3

II 196 6009 II 4266 10275 II 5399 II 1;674 II 4

7431 102 7533

-11 4916 12449 II 4010 II 16459 II 5

II 186 7617 II 4294 11911 II 5215 II 17126 II 6

II 536 7967 II 6108 14075 II 3949 II 18o24 II 7

7389 1286 8675 II 5o63 13738 II 5855 II 19593 II 8

II 767 8156 II 5860 14016 II 6942 II 20958 II 9

II 369 7758 II 4462 12220 II 2749 II 24969 II 10 II 359 7748 II 4378 12126 II 2628 II 14754 II 11 II 694 8083 II 4988 13071 II 3917 II 16988 II 12 II 517 79o6 II 5287 13193 II 5148 II 18.341 II 13 II 334 7723 II 5072 12795 II 3541 II 26336 II 14 II 142 7531 II 6656 14187 II 2903 II 17090 II 15 II 310 7699 II 9250 16949 II 5004 II 21953 II 16 4942 233 5175 II 3654 8829 II 2927 II 11756 II 17 7389 366 7755 11*

7511 15266 II 3351 II la517 II 18 II 658 8047 II 10191 18238 II 5651 II 23889 II 19 II 575 7964 II 5302 13266 II 6929 II 20195 II 20 II 3o6 7695 II 4740 12435 II 4992 II 17427 II

HIGH El'i"ERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE COiwrAINMENT -

SUMMARY

OF OPERATrnG STRESSES System:

MAIN STEAM (EB-1-36")

CONSUMERS roIBR COMPANY

. PALISADES PIAN.r

• Sheet 2 of' 3 TABLE 7-1 Revision 1 (Canpletely Revised)

POINT PRESSURE WEIGHT p + w sh (1)

SEISMIC P+W+S l.2S~

2

)

EXPANSION SA (3)

PtW+S+T 0.8(Sh+SA(4)

NO.

STRESS. P STRESS. W STRESS, S STRESS, T 21 7389 140 7529 15000 6145 13674 18000 5021 22500 18695 30000 22 II 269 7658 II 9057 16715 II 8951 II 25:66 II 23 4942 215 5157 II 3823 8980 3044 II 12<E4 II 24 5813 534 6347 II 5845 12192 II 2428 14620 25 241 6054 4468 10522 II 5367 15889 26 158 5971 3770 9741 4726 14467 II 27 7431 151 7582 II 4933 12515 4934 II 17449 28 54 7485 II 3966 11451 5759 17210 29 351 7782 II 3953 11735 II 2286 14<El 30 7389 954 8343 4165 12508 II 5408 17916 31 II 422 7811 3119 10930 3013 139+3 32 II 410 7799 3081 10880 II 2910 13790 II 33 863 8252 3769 12021 II 5004 17<E5 34 II 531 7920 II 5833 13753 II 5077 18830 II 35 II 389 7778 4290 12o68 II 4711 16779 36 II 478 7867 3477 11344 3309 II 14653 37 II 419 7808 5495 13303 II 5847 II 19150 II 38 4942 118 5o60 II 7896 22956 II 7800 20756 39 II 529 5471 II 8778 14249 8867 II 23ll6 II

CONSUMERS PCWER COMPANY PALISADES PIANT HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE COI'l"TAINMEI'IT -

SUMMARY

OF OPERATING STRESSES System:

MA.IN STEAM (EB-l.-36")

Sheet 3 o:f 3 TABLE 7-l. Revision 1 (Completely Revised)

POINT PRESS UBE WEIGHT p + w sh (l.)

SEISMIC P+W+S l.2s~

2

)

EXPANSION SA (3)

P+W+S+T o.8(sh+sAC4)

NO.

STRESS. P STRESS. W STRESS s STRESS, T 40 7389 319 7708 15000 4753 12461 18000 983 22500 13444 30000 41 II 722 8lll.

II 6785 14896 II 1667 II 16563 11 42

• 11 435 7824 II 5367 13191 II 820 II 1401.1 II 43 II 436 7825 II 4294 12ll9 11 1383 II 13502 II 44 II 426 7815 II 3518 ll.333 II 423 II ll.756 II 45 11 501 7890 11 5282 13172 11 1621 II 14793 II "46 4942 94 5036 II 7741 12777 II 3222 II 15999 II 47 II 553 5495 11 8752 14247 II 3486 II 17733 II IDI'ES:

1.

Sh = Allowable Limit of P + W per Applicable Code

2.

l.2Sh =Allowable Limit of P + W + S per Applicable Code

3.

SA= Allowarle Limit of T per Applicable Code

4.

O.B(Sh+ SA) =Threshold of Stress for Mandatory Break Location in this Study, AEC

-.l I

00 CONSUMERS PCWER COMPANY PALISADES PIANT

• HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTA:rnMENT -

SUMMARY

OF OPERATING STRF.SSES System:

FEEDWATER (DB-1-18"

& EB-9-18")

Sheet 1 o:f 7 TABLE 7-2 Revision 1 (Completely Revised)

POINT PRESSURE WEIGHT p

+ w sh (1)

SEISMIC P+w+S l.2S~

2

)

EXPANSION SA (3)

P+W+S+T o.8(sh+sAC4>

NO.

STRESS. P STRESS w STRESS. S STRESS, T 1

3660 1500 5160 15000 3052 8212 18000 2646 22500 10858 30000 2

It It It.

It 1757 6917 It 971 It 7888 It 3

4735 II 6235 It 18o6 8041 It 586 It 8627 It 4

It II It It 2785 9020 It 4976 It 13996 It 5

It It It It 2797 9032 It 5135 It 14167 It 6

It It It It I 2180 8415 It 8735 II 17150 It 7

It It It II

.1945 8180 It 6999 It 15179 It 8

It It It It 4282 10517 It 5177 It 15694 It 9

It It II II 3812 10047 It 965 It 11012 It 10 II II It It 3634 9869 It 2615 It 12484 It 11 It II It It 1464 7699 It 3959 It 11658 It 12 It It It It 2672 8907 It 3629 It 12536 II 13 It It It It 5254 11489 It 2489 It 13978 It 14 It II II II 7814 14049 II 3010 It 17059 It 15 It II It II 4445 lo68o It 727 It ll.407 It 16 4913 II 6413 II 22o6 8619 It 867 II 9486 It 17 4822 It 6322 II 5828 12150 It 2903 It 15053 It

HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT -

SUMMARY

OF OPERATING.S'r~SES System:

FEEDWATER (DB-1-18" & EB-9-18")

CONSUMERS roJER COMPANY PALISADES PIANr

• Sheet 2 of 7 TABLE 7-2 Revision 1 (Completely Revised)

POINT PRESSURE WEIGHT p + w sh (1)

SEISMIC P+W+S l.2S~

2

)

EXPANSION SA (3)

PtW+S+T 0.8(Sh+SA(4)

NO.

STRESS. P STRESS. W STRESS. S STRESS T 18 4822 1500 6322 15000 6730 13052 18000 1624 22500 14676 30000 19 20 21 4735 1500 6235 15000 4085 10320 18000 3420 22500 13740 30000 22 II II II II 6191 12426 II 3335 II 15761 II 23 II II II II 5016 11251 II 8165 II 19416 II 24 II II II II 3401 9636 II 3450 II 13086 II 25 4913 II 6413 II 3728 10141 II 3687 II 13828 II 26 II II II II 4923 ll336 II 3222 II 14558 II 27 4735 II 6235 II 5903 12138 II 3ll6 II 15254 II 28 II II II II 4983 11218 II 2803 II 14021 II 29 II 11*

II II 4653 10888 II 4284 II 15172 II 30 II II II II 3963 10198 II 5174 II 15372 II 31 II II II II 7576 138ll II 5249 II 19o60 II 32 II II II II 8308 14543 II 4127 II 18670 II 33 II II II II 4122 10357 II 3252 II 13609 II 34 II II II II 3554 9789 II 2357 II 12146 II

-...J I,_.

0 HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILUEES OUTsIDE CONTATh1-iEiff -

SUMMARY

OF OPERATING STRESSES System:

FEEDWATER (DB-1-18" &. EB-9-18")

CONSUMERS PaIBR COMPANY PALISADES PIANT

• Sheet 3 of 7 TABLE 7-2 Rev:i.sion l (Completely Revised)

POINT

.PRESSURE WEIGHT p + w sh (l)

SEISMIC P+w+S l.2S~

2

)

EXPANSION SA (3)

P+W+S+T o.8(sh+sA(4)

NO.

STRESS p

STRESS. W STRESS s STRESS, T 35 4735 1500 6235 15000 5087 11322 18000 6109 22500 17431 30000 36 II II II II 2050 8285 II 1923 II 10208 II 37 II II II II 4350 10585 II 3557 II 14142 II 38 II II II II 4134 10369 II 1895 II 12264 II 39 40 4735 1500 6235 150CO 2807 9042 18000 1730 22500 10772 30000 41 II II II II ll209 17444 II 2773 II 20217 II 42 4735 II 6235 II 5470 11705 II 2395 II 14100 II 43 II II II II 5854 12089 II 2104 II 14193 II 44 45 4735 1500 6235 15000 9812 16047 18000 2842 22500 18889 30000 46 II II II II ll03l 17266 II 2940 II 20206 II 47 4440 II 5940 II 9980 15920 II 2134 II 18054 II 48 II II II II 12814 18754 II 1901 II 20655 II 49 II II II II 7022 12962 II 1739 II 14701 II 50 II II II II 4998 10938 II 1205 II l2l43 II 51 II II II II 9814 15754 II 2133 II 17887 II

HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT -

SUMMARY

OF OPERATING STRESSES System:

FEEDWATER (DB-1-18" & EB-9-18")

TABLE 7-2 Revision 1 (Cmpletely Revised)

POilf.r PRESSURE WEIGHT p + w sh (1)

SEISMIC P+W+S 1.2s~

2

)

EXPANSION NO.

STRESS. P STRESS. W STRESS s STRESS, T 52 4440 1500 5940 15000 5915 I

11855 18000 737 53 II II II II 8225 14165 II 1312 54 II II II II 5815 11755 II 725 55 II II II II 7421 13361 II 245 56 II II II II 6549 12489 II 2842 57' II II II II 6614 12554 II 3295 58 II II II II 9465 15405 II 2659 59 II II II II 9719 15659 II 1968 60 II II 11 11 7967 13907 II 3681

-.J I

61 II II II 11 8240 14180 11 4125 62 63 4440 1500 5940 15000 7495 13435 18000 2227 64 II II II 11 7413 13353 II 3574 65

-66 4735 1500 6235 15000 7107 13342 18000 3344 67 II II II 11 89i5 15150 II 3718 CONSUMERS PCWER COMPANY PALISADES PI.AN.r

• Sheet 4 of 7 SA (3)

PtW+S+T o.8(sh+sAC4) 22500 12592 30000 II 15477 II II 12480 II II 136o6 II II 15331 II II 15849 II II 18o64 II II 17627 II II 17588 II II 18305 II 22500 15662 30000 II 16927 II 22500 16686 30000 II 18868 II

-.J I -

N HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAilW!Ei:IT -

SUMMARY

OF OPERATilffi STRESSES System:

FEEDWATER (DB-1-18 11

& EB-9-18 11

)

CONSUMERS P<N1ER COMPANY PALISADES PIANT

• Sheet 5 of7 TABLE 7-2 Revision 1 (Completely Revised)

POINT PRESSuRE WEIGHT p + w sh (l)

SEISMIC P+w+S l.2S~

2

)

EXPANSION SA (3)

P+W+S+T o.8(sh+sA C4)

NO.

STRESS p

STRESS. W STRESS s STRESS, T 68 4735 1500 6235 15000 2161 8396 18000 1971 22500 10367 30000 69 70 4735 1500 6235 15000 3000 9235 18000 3ll2 22500 12347 30000 71 II II II

.3378 9613 II 1941 II 11554 II 72 II II II II 2395 8630 II 1164 II 9794 II 73 II II II II 8359 14594 II 5192 II 19786 II 74 II II II II 8704 14939 II 3883 II 18822 II 75 II II II II 7337 13572 II 3149 II 16721 II 76 II II II II 4581 10816 II 3000 II 13816 II 77 II II II II 3091 9326 II 3195 II 12521 II 78 II II II II 2814 9048 II 3705 II 12754 II 79 II II II II 30't5 9310 II 4352 II 13662 II 80 II II 2473 8708 II 911 II 9619 II II 81 82 4735 1500 6235 15000 4482 10717 18000 2651 22500 13368 30000 83 II II II II 6727 12962 II 2730 II 15692 II 84 I!

II II II 7lll 13346 II 4354 II 17700 II 85 4913 II 6413 II 2873 9286 II 1197 II 10483 II 86 II II II II 3232 9645 II 1212 II 10857 II

-..J I

CONSUMERS PCl-lER COMPANY PALISADES PIANT

• HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAil'ENT -

SUMMARY

OF OPERA')::IIfil STRESSES System:

FEEDWATER (DB-1-18" & EB-9-18")

Sheet 6 of 7 TABLE 7-2 Revision 1 (Completely Revised)

?OINT PRESSURE WEIGHT p + w sh (1)

SEISMIC P+W+S l.2S~

2

)

EXPANSION SA (3)

PtW+S+T 0.8(Sh+SA(4)

NO.

STRESS. P STRESS. W STRESS s STRESS, T 88 4822 1500 6322 15000 2633 8955 18000 2100 22500 ll055 30000 89 II II II II 4654 10976 II 1734 II 12710 II 90 II II II II 4013 10335 II 3359 II 13694 II 91 4735 II 6235 II 5762 11997 II 7092 II 19089 II 92 4735 II 6235 II 7419 13654 II 9003 II 22657 II 93 II II II II 3918 10153 II 4137 II 14290 II 94 II II II II 5744 11979 II 1536 II 13515 II 95 II II ti II 8674 14909 II 6436 II 21345 II 96 II II II II 4654 10889 II 9292 II 20181 II 97 II II II II 3725 9960 II 4337 II 14297 II 98 II II II II 6473 12708 II 3853 II 16561 II 99 II II II II 4265 10500 II 4289 II 14789 II 100 3660 II 5160 II 1424 6584 II 3503 II 10087 II 101 II II II II 3577 8737 II 8529 II 17266 II

CONSUMERS PCNlER COMPANY PALISADES PIANT HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE COI'l"TAINMENT - SUMMA.RY OF OPERATING STRESSES System:

FEEDWATER (DB-1-18" & EB-9-18 11

)

Sheet 7 of 7 TABLE 7..12.

Revision 1 (Coillpletely Revised)

POINT PRESSURE WEIGHT p + w sh (1)

SEISMIC P+W+S 1.2S~

2

)

EXPANSION SA (3)

Pt-W+S+T 0.8(~+SA( 4

)

NO.

STRESS. P STRESS. W STRESS. S STRESS, T

. 102 4735 1500 6235 15000 5459 11694 18000 3239 22500 14933 30000 103 II II II II 4360 10595 II 2299 II 12894 lo4 II II II 3084 9319 2266 II 11585

• II 105 II II II 22o6 8441 II 2187 1o628 II lo6 II II 2517 8752 II 2054 II 108o6 II 107 II II II 4083 10318 10o6 11324 II 108 II II II II 8272 14507 II 2368 II 16875 II 109

• 11 II II II 9792 16027 II 2888 II 18915 II 110 4913 II 6413 II 2677 9090 II 821 II 9911 NOTES:

1.

Sh = Allowable Limit of P + W per Applicable Code

i.

l.2Sh = Allowable Limit of P + W + s per AppLicahle Code

3.

SA = AlLowable Limit of T ~er Applicable Code

4.

0.*8(Sh +SA) =Threshold at Stress for Mandatory Break Location in this Study, AEC

-.J I -

VI HIGH-EN~RGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT -

SUMMARY

OF OPERATING STRESSES System:

MAIN STEAM DUMP (EB-1-8")

TABLE 7-3 POINT PRESSURE WEIGHT (1)

SEISMIC (2)

NO.

STRESS; p STRESS, w p + w sh STRESS, s P+W+S l.2Sh 1

6105 1500 7605 1500.0 5803 13408 18000 2

II II 6216 13821 II 3

II II II II 4907 12512 II 4

II II II II 2894 10499 II 5

II II II II 4694 12299 II 6

II II 4758 12363 7

II II II 2620 10225 II 8

II II II 2893 10498 9

II II II II 1843 9448 II NOTES:

1)

Sh = Allowable limit of P+W per Applicable Code

2) l.2Sh = Allowable limit of P+W+S per Applicable Code

3) SA = Allowable limit of T per Applicable Code CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT Sheet 1 of 1 EXPANSION (3)

(4)

STRESS, T SA P+W+S+T 0.8(Sh+SA) 3483 22500 16891 30000 1009 II 14830 II 553 II 13065 II 3994 II 14493 II 4165 16464 II 4836 II 17199 II 6474 II 16699 7869 II 18367 II 3784 13232

4) 0.8(Sh+SA) =Threshold of Stress for Mandatory Break Location in this Study, AEC Criteria

8.0 DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS Table 8-1 lists and describes the significant high energy line breaks postulated in Section 7.0 for the high energy piping systems described in Section 6.0, and routed in the vicinity of essential structures and components as defined in Section 5.0, Table 5-1.

The following subsections correspond to and present the analysis and consequences of the breaks tabulated in Table 8-1.

8.1 Failure No. 8.1 - Line No. EB-1-36" - Main Steam Penetration Room (MSPR) 8.1.1 Main steam critical crack downstream of the MSIV inside main steam penetration room (see Figure 33 for location of this failure).

a.

Compartment Pressurization and Structural Analysis

b.

c.

A critical crack in either of the main steam lines inside the main steam penetration room will have a flow area of 8.5 square inches. This is not as large as that of either the 6" or 8" line breaks analyzed in Section 8.2, and consequently, a

detailed analysis of compartment pressurization, steam flooding, and water flooding are not provided herein.

Environmental Analysis The critical crack failure may not trip the plant on low steam generator pressure and, consequently, the main steam isolation valves' actuation system may be subjected to adverse environmental conditions for an extended period. Therefore, a third redundant set of solenoid valves described in Section 2.0 (d). will be added outside the main steam penetration room in the turbine building as required for the larger breaks analyzed in Section 8.2.

Jet Reaction and Jet Impingement Pipe reaction from this failure is 6.5 kips which is an insignificant loading for this pipe.

Electrical conduit for the actuation system of the main steam isolation valves is in the immediate vicinity of these sections of the main steam line just before exiting the penetration room which would subject the isolation valve actuation system conduit routed along the ceiling to jet impingement. However, the distance from top of steam line to bottom of conduit is 40" which results in a pressure on the conduit of 14 psi.

This pressure is not sufficient to cause distortion or damage to the extent that the actuation system would be lost; therefore, no modifications are required.

The safety injection and refueling water line and heat exchanger E-57 is in the vicinity of the main steam line and would be subject to significant jet impingement forces requiring the addition of restraints.

8-1

d.

Pipe Whip Analysis - Not applicable

e.

Pipe Stress at Main Steam Isolation Valve Pipe stress at connection to MSIV is within selected criteria.

8.2 Failure No. 8.2 - Line No. EB-1-6" and EB-1-8" in MSPR 8.2.l Main steam dump EB-1-8" or relief EB-1-6" valve lines full circumferential or slot break at connection to main steam lines in main steam penetration room (see Figure 33 for location of this failure).

a.

Compartment Pressurization and Structural Analysis A full circumferential break of the larger 8" steam dump line with a flow area of 50 square inches results in the most severe compartment pressurization for the main steam penetration room, fan room above, and feed water penetration room below. The energy release rate for this break is 682,000 Btu/sec (1195 Btu/lb x 571 lb/sec) and the vent areas associated with the affected compartments are: 215 sq. ft. to the feedwater penetration room, 44 sq. ft. to the turbine hall, 199 sq. ft. to the fan room, 85 sq. ft. from fan room to the atmosphere, and 35 sq.

ft. from the feedwater penetration room to the turbine hall. The results of the pressurization calculations show the following maximum conditions:

Main Steam Penetration Room (MSPR)

Pressure= 0.38 psig@ 0.15 sec Temperature= 279°F@ 2.4 sec Fan Room (FR)

Pressure= 0.36 psig@ 0.16 sec Temperature= 263°F@ 2.4 sec Main Feedwater Penetration Room (MFPR)

Pressure= 0.39 psig@ 0.17 sec Temperature = 212°F @ 2.4 sec The resultant differential pressures which produce structural loads and may cause stress reversal are as follows:

MSPR walls = 0.4 psid MSPR floor= 0.4 psid MSPR ceiling = 0.4 psid 8-2

An evaluation of the structural design shows that the structure can withstand differential pressures of 3 psid for walls and 1.25 psid for floors and ceilings. Consequently, no structural modifications are required for these primary retaining structures.

The plenum leading to the purge exhaust unit in the MSPR is to be structurally reinforced for compartment pressurization and protected by jet impingement baffles at the postulated break point.

Additionally, there are openings, heating and ventilating duct work, and doors from the MSPR to adjacent rooms that will have to be modified as required to mitigate the consequences of the break. Although pressures and temperatures in adjacent rooms would be less than those existing in the MSPR, MFPR, and FR, a detailed environmental analysis was not performed and, for purposes of this design, it is considered necessary to close all existing openings to adjacent rooms.

b.

Environmental Analysis The maximum temperature and pressure to which the components in the MSPR, FR, and MFPR are subjected are assumed to be equivalent to the values stated previously for maximum compartment pressurization.

The MSPR and FR will experience temperatures exceeding the environmental qualification for the solenoid valves serving the main steam isolation valves in the MSPR and the dump valves in the FR. A redundant main steam isolation valve solenoid system has been added outside the MSPR as explained in Subsection 8.1.1 (b). The steam dump valve solenoids will be required to operate to dump steam to the atmosphere as the plant is brought to cold shutdown conditions. These solenoid valves and electro-pneumatic converters have been located outside the FR. The steam dump control valves have been modified to qualify for the postulated environment in the FR.

The MFPR is subjected to conditions exceeding the design values for the CCW pumps. However, these are not essential to safe shutdown because their function will be provided by the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Consequently, no environmental protection or qualification is required as a result of this accident.

c.

Jet Reaction and Impingement The full circumferential break of the 8" steam dump line produces the most adverse reaction force on the main steam line. The corresponding force is 38 kips which does not produce stresses exceeding the allowable stress value for the main steam line, therefore, no modifications are required.

8-3

• 1

d.

There are no components essential to shutdown in the immediate vicinity which can be subjected to jet impingement. The containment wall would be subjected to jet impingement; however, the loading is insignificant relative to containment design loads and no damage will result.

Pipe Whip Pipe whip will not occur for either a 6" or 8" line break at their connection to the main steam line because the lines are de-energized following the break and blowdown continues from the main steam lines only.

e.

Pipe Stress at MSIV - Not applicable 8.2.2 Main steam dump lines full circumferential or slot break at highest intermediate stress points (points 6 and 8 on Figure 30).

a.

Compartment Pressurization and Structural Analysis b.

c.

Compartment pressurization is identical to the analysis presented in Section 8.2.1 (a).

Environmental Analysis Environmental analysis is identical to that presented in Section 8.2.1 (b). Both high intermediate stress points on each dump line are in MSPR.

Jet Impingement and Jet Reaction The steam dump lines from the main steam lines are routed in the vicinity of the steam generator blowdown lines. A full circumferential or slot break at the high intermediate stress points in the steam dump line from steam generator "A" could be directed at the blowdown line for steam generator "B" and vice versa, resulting in uncontrolled blowdown of both steam generators. However, the closest high stress point for either dump line is 10 feet from the nearest blowdown line from either steam generator. Consequently, jet impingement forces are negligible at this distance and modifications are not required.

Jet reaction forces from a break at high stress point 8 are no worse than those stated previously in 8.2.l(c) for a break at the connection to the main steam lines.

d.

Pipe Whip

e.

Pipe whip will occur following a break at point 6; however, there are no structures or components in the vicinity which require protection.

Pipe Stress at MSIV - Not applicable 8-4

8.2.3 Main steam dump line critical crack in main steam penetration room.

The steam dump line critical crack has an area of 0.6 square inches resulting in a reaction force of 490 pounds which is not significant. The environmental effects will be less severe than those previously for the larger lines and, consequently, no further analysis was required.

8.3 Failure No. 8.3 - Lines EB-1-36" and EB-1-26"

8. 3.1 Main steam line full circumferential or slot break at highest intermediate stress points 8, 15 and 37, 38, and branch connections in turbine building, points 6 and 29, and 15 on Figure 28. See Figure 33 for failure location.

a.

Compartment Pressurization and Structural Analysis

b.

c.

The energy release from a full circumferential or slot break of the 36" main steam line at point 6 will cause pressurization of the turbine building. Pressure will not exceed 0.9 psi locally and will be limited to 0.5 psid at which point the siding fails and relieves the pressure.

Environmental Analysis There are no essential structures or systems in the vicinity of any of these break locations and, as stated above, the building will relieve the pressure at 0.5 psid and no long duration adverse environmental condition will occur. The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump which is located in a pit in the turbine building is isolated from the environmental conditions by a gasket-sealed checker plate ceiling.

Jet Reaction and Jet Impingement There are no essential components in the vicinity which could be affected by jet impingement.

d.

Pipe Whip Analysis A full circumferential break of the 36" main steam line at point 6 will result in an axial force of 694 kips. This exceeds the design capability of the existing restraints in the MSPR. Consequently, structural modification and/or additional restraints are required to prevent pipe whip into the MSPR and to mitigate the consequences of this break.

The battery room wall adjacent to the main steam lines has been analyzed for impact due to pipe whip caused by a slot failure at point

6. The pipe will strike the corner of the west battery room wall first and would form a plastic hinge in the pipe. The dynamic loading on the battery room wall comer is a result of the 360 kip force acting though a distance of 6 inches resulting in a 2160 in-kip impact on the corner of the structure.

8-5

e.

The battery room wall has been analyzed for the impact due to the slot failure in accordance with the method outlined in Section 10.6. The capacity of the wall was calculated to exceed the input energy from the whipping pipe with a ductility times yield displacement value of 3 inches. The battery room wall can withstand the pipe whip and restraints for this purpose are not considered necessary.

Pipe Stress at MSIV As described in detail in Section 10. 7, an analysis was made to determine the stresses in the main steam lines, EB-1-36", at*their connections to the MSIVs resulting from any of the postulated guillotine or slot failures in the turbine building as enumerated in Section 7.1. This analysis includes the six new main steam line restraints R1 through R6 as shown in Figures 28 and 33. The worst case was identified as a full circumferential failure of the 26" turbine lead at point 41, which results in an axial (horizontal) force of 363 kips. In the piping at its points of connection to the MSIVs the stresses due to this force are calculated as having a maximum value of 121 7 3 psi. This occurs at the small end of the 36 x 30 reducer at point 27 A. The longitudinal pressure stress at this point is 7386 psi, and the weight stress is negligible (approx. 100 psi). The combined primary stress is thus about 19650 psi. The valve body has an outside diameter of 32.0",

and it is conservatively assumed that the wall thickness is 1.838". The stress in the valve body, at its critical section, is then approximately 8600 psi, which is substantially below the code allowable primary stress value of 15000 psi for normal operating conditions. It is therefore concluded that the operability of the MSIV s will not be impaired under the worst postulated pipe failure condition.

8.3.2 Main steam subheaders full circumferential or slot break at highest intermediate stress points in turbine building, points 18, 22, 41, and 46, and Figure 28 (see Figure 33 for location of this failure).

None of the breaks at the high intermediate stress points will produce conditions more adverse than those analyzed in Section 8.3.1. Additionally, there are no essential structure or components in the vicinity. No further analysis or modification is required.

8.4 Failure No. 8.4 - Line EB-13-4" - MSPR 8.4.1 Main steam supply to auxiliary feedwater pump turbine driver full circumferential or slot break at connection to main steam line in main steam penetration room (see Figure 33 for location of this failure).

Failure of this line, or any other failure which causes both main steam isolation valves to close, causes loss of the turbine-driven auxiliary feed water pump, and application of the single failure criteria to the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump results in loss of the entire auxiliary feedwater system. The fire pumps 8-6

can be used to supply lake water to the steam generators through the auxiliary feedwater system; however, the pressure at which this water can be supplied is not high enough to reach a saturation temperature corresponding to the allowable cooldown rate. Therefore; modification EBD 6-4" and EBD-7-4" is provided to assure steam supply to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps as explained in Section 9.3.

a.

Compartment Pressurization and Structural Analysis The 4" break will not produce effects as adverse as those previously discussed for the larger lines in the MSPR.

b.

Environmental Analysis (Same as above)

c.

Jet Reaction and Jet Impingement (Same as above)

The modified design EBD-6-4" and EBD-7-4" in the MSPR leading to EB-13-4" in the turbine building for this steam supply line is such* that no jet impingement occurs on essential structures or components.

d.

e.

Pipe Whip Analysis The line will normally be de-energized downstream of the new isolation valves, consequently, blowdown occurs only from the main steam lines and no pipe whip can develop.

Pipe Stress at MSIV - Not applicable 8.5 Failure No 8.5 - Line EB-6-12" -Turbine Building 8.5.1 Main steam supply to moisture separator reheater full circumferential or slot break at connection to main steam line in the turbine building and at other pipe fittings in the run to postulated worst pipe whip.

a.

Compartment Pressurization and Structural Analysis The turbine building is of sufficient size to absorb and dissipate the release from this break without adverse effects.

b.

Environmental Analysis (Same as above) 8-7

c.

Jet Reaction and Jet Impingement The jet reaction force on the main steam line for the connection point break is 81 kips. This force will not produce stresses exceeding the allowable stresses and will not damage the 36" main steam line.

Jet impingement from the full circumferential or slot break at the connection point will strike the auxiliary building wall with a pressure of 195 psi over area of 413 square inches. This results in a total force on the wall of 81 kips which will not damage the structure.

d.

Pipe Whip Analysis.

A break at the first 90 degree elbow in the pipe run causes a pipe whip into the auxiliary building wall with a force of 81 kips acting through a distance of 3'-6" producing a dynamic load of 3402 in-kips. This would damage the structure, therefore, a bumper restraint is required to protect the structure. See Figure 33 for location of this restraint.

e.

Pipe Stress at MSIV - Not applicable 8.6 Failure No. 8.6 - Line EB-9-18" - MFPR 8.6.1 Requirement for encapsulation sleeves and restraints has been subsequently waived by Directorate of Licensing for an adopted augmented inservice inspection program (Ref. 17) which was approved as a suitable measure to provide protection from the consequences of postulated pipe ruptures at two elbows in the feedwater lines (see Figure 32).

8.6.2 Main feedwater line critical crack in auxiliary building main feedwater penetration room (see Figure 32 for loaction of this failure).

a.

Compartment Pressurization and Structural Analysis A critical crack in the 18" main feed water line will have an area of 3.1 square inches. The blowdown is not of significance from a crack of this size and no compartment pressurization will occur.

b.

Environmental Analysis The plant would continue to operate until the operator takes action; consequently, components in the vicinity may be subjected to long term abnormal environmental conditions. However, these conditions will not be as adverse as those expected following a larger 6" line break to be analyzed in -the following Section 8. 7. Consequently, no environmental analysis is presented herein.

8-8

1

c.

d.

e.

Jet Reaction and Jet Impingement The main feed water lines are near the ceiling of the MFPR. The control and instrumentation systems associated with the component cooling system are several feet below. Consequently, no jet impingement damage can occur to these components. There are control and power cable conduits routed as close as 18" to the main feedwater lines on the ceiling. These would see a force of 770 pounds from a crack, which is not sufficient to damage the conduit. Additionally, all control valves are fail-open, fail-safe type which further reduces the consequences of any critical crack in the main feedwater lines. Therefore, no modifications are required to mitigate the consequences of this failure.

Pipe Whip Analysis - Not applicable Pipe Stress at MSIV - Not applicable 8.7 Failure No. 8.7 - Line EB-14-6" - MFPR

8. 7.1 Auxiliary feedwater supply to main feed water lines full circumferential or slot break at connection to main feedwater lines in the main feedwater penetration room (see Figure 32 for location of this failure).

a.

Compartment Pressurization and Structural Analysis A full circumferential or slot break of the auxiliary feed water line at its connection to the main feedwater line will release feedwater into the MFPR at a rate of 1510 lb/sec. The energy release corresponding to this break is 624,687 Btu/sec (1510 lb/sec x 413. 7 Btu/lb).

Vent area associated with the MFPR is 215 sq. ft. and the resultant maximum compartment conditions are as follows:

Main Feedwater Penetration Room Maximum pressure= 0.1 psig Maximum temperature = 2 l 2°F Fan Room Maximum pressure= 0.1 psig Maximum temperature = 2 l 2°F The low compartment pressures immediately following the break and until the trip occurs, result as a consequence of only approximately 25% of the feedwater flow flashing to steam as it enters the compartment and venting rapidly up through the MSPR and FR to atmosphere.

In the auxiliary feedwater line operating mode the main feedwater pumps will pick up part of the added flow requirements caused by this 8-9

b.

break and maintain feedwater flow at a high enough pressure to delay a low steam generator low level or low pressure trip for several minutes.

Uncontrolled reverse blowdown from the feedwater line into the MFPR will occur following either automatic or manual trip until the steam generator has emptied. Compartment pressure will rise as the higher energy fluid in the steam generators enters the compartment. However, the conditions cannot exceed those given in Section 8.2.1 for an 8" steam dump line break in the MSPR, which has approximately twice the flow area as a 6" line break and a higher enthalpy.

In the hot standby operating mode the main feedwater pump will be operating and would supply the subject break. There would be no sudden water loss from the steam generator and no consequent reactor trip on low water level or low pressure in the steam generator. The main feedwater pump would continue to supply the break until operator action shuts down the pump followed by reverse blowdown from the feedwater line into the MSPR as described above.

Water flooding will occur rapidly in the MFPR following the break. The floor is sealed to prevent leakage into the west engineered safeguards room below; however, the floor design pressure of 1.25 psig will be exceeded if more than approximately 3 feet of water is allowed to accumulate. Consequently, a flood opening is provided to drain the water from the MFPR into the turbine building. This opening would protect the floor from overstress and mitigate the consequences of the break. Therefore, no other structural modifications are required.

Environmental Analysis The temperature in the MFPR and adjacent compartments will initially be lower than that associated with the 8" steam dump line break analyzed in Section 8.2.1, as shown in the preceeding compartment pressurization analysis. However, the temperature will begin to rise rapidly as the higher energy fluid from the steam generator begins to blowdown into the room. The temperature in the MFPR will rise above the I 23°F temperature associated with the 8" steam dump line break analyzed in Section 8.2.1 because the air cushion which prevented steam flow from the MSPR into the MFPR will have been expelled. The environmental conditions cannot exceed those stated previously for the 8" break, however, and it is assumed that the MFPR will be subjected to conditions equivalent to those experienced in the MSPR for the 8" steam dump line break. This temperature, approximately 320°F and the compartment flooding will incapacitate the component cooling system components in the MFPR.

The plant can, however, be shut down to and maintained in the cold shutdown conditions by use of the auxiliary feedwater system, steam dump valves, and the unaffected steam generator. The modification previously described in Section 8.4 will assure steam to the 8-10

turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and provide sufficient flow to bring the plant to the cold shutdown condition. Cooling water to the safety injection system pumps seals, if required, can be supplied from the service water system through an existing tie-in.

Consequently, no environmental qualification is required for the equipment in the MFPR following a break of the 6" auxiliary feed water J.tne.

c.

Jet Reaction and Jet Impingement

d.

The reaction force on the 18" main feed water line from a break of the 6" feedwater line is 26 kips. This force does not produce significant stress and therefore no further consideration is required.

There are no components in the immediate vicinity of the break location that can be damaged by jet impingement.

The containment wall is approximately 60" from the break and will see a pressure of 31 psi over an area of 840 square inches. This loading does not exceed the containment wall capacity and no modifications are required.

The MFPR ceiling is open immediately above the break point and the steam jet will pass through to the MSPR without any jet impingement effects.

Pipe Whip Analysis The auxiliary feedwater line is normally not a high energy line and only blowdown from the main feedwater line can occur. Consequently, pipe whip will not occur.

e.

Pipe Stress at MSIV - Not applicable 8-11

TABLE 8-1 SIGNIFICANT HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAKS FAILURE NUMBER LINE NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION 8.1 EB-1-36" Main Steam line critical crack inside main steam penetration room, worst case.

8.2 EB-1-6" and

1.

Main steam dump or relief valve line full EB-1-8" circumferential or slot break at connection to main steam lines in main steam penetra-tion room.

2.

Main steam dump lines full circumferential or slot break at highest intermediate stress points.

3.

Main steam dump lines critical crack in main steam penetration room.

8.3 EB-1-36" and

1.

Main steam line full circumferential or EB-1-26" slot break at highest intermediate stress points and branch connections in turbine building.

2.

Main steam subheaders full circumferential or slot break at branch connection to 36" line and at highest intermediate stress points in turbine building.

8.4 EB-13-4" Main steam supply to auxiliary feedwater EBD-7-4" pump turbine driver full circumferential EBD-6-4" or slot break at connection to main steam line in main steam penetration room.

8.5 EB-6-12" Main steam supply to moisture separator reheater full circumferential or slot break at connection to main steam line in turbine building and at other pipe fittings in run to postulate worst pipe whip.

8.6 EB-9-18"

1.

Main feedwater line full circumferential or slot break at high intermediate stress point in auxiliary building main feedwater penetration room.

2.

Main feedwater line critical crack in auxiliary building main feedwater penetration room.

8-12

FAILURE NUMBER 8.7 TABLE 8~1 (Continued)

LINE NUMBER EB-14-6" 8-13 DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION Auxiliary feedwater supply to main feedwater lines full circumferential or slot failure at connection to main feedwater lines in auxiliary building main feedwater penetration room.

9.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATIONS Modifications described herein are based upon an engineering analysis of pipe breaks and system availability criteria in accordance with Section 1.4. They are final designs that have been or will be constructed at the Palisades Plant.

9.1 Main Feedwater Encapsulation Elbows and Restraints Requirement for encapsulation sleeves has been subsequently waived by Directorate of Licensing for an adopted augmented inservice inspection program (Ref. 17).

9.2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation In the event of a postulated pipe break within either the main steam or feedwater penetration rooms, steam could migrate through the ventilation ducting into areas containing safe shutdown equipment, and the environmental conditions (pressure, temperature, and humidity) could render this equipment inoperable. Steam would enter the ventilation exhaust plenum located in the main steam penetration room and travel through the ducts to other parts of the auxiliary building. In addition, steam could enter the inlet and exhaust ducts in the feedwater penetration room and migrate throughout the auxiliary building.

These ducts will be separated to prevent steam migration and pressurization in the auxiliary building areas other than main steam and feedwater penetration rooms and the fan room where a self contained system will be installed.

9.2.1 The first alternate considered was the installation of isolation valves whicn would have been located in the ventilation ducting. The isolation valves and their actuation. systems would have required qualification to meet the most severe environmental conditions for the postulated pipe breaks. This first alternate was subsequently dropped in favor of the second alternate Section 9.2.2 below.

9.2.2 The means of separation being installed requires structural reinforcement of the exhaust plenum to ensure that it would withstand the maximum pressure in the penetration rooms and installation of a jet impingement baffle to protect the exhaust plenum. This would prevent steam migration to other areas through the ducts. The ventilating system in the feedwater penetration room will be modified to be a new self-contained system within the main steam and feedwater penetration and fan rooms. See Figures 37 & 38. The ducts leading to or from these areas will be removed and wall openings will be structurally sealed. See Figures 39 & 40.

9.3 Main Steam Supply for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine The single failure criterion requires a redundant auxiliary feedwater pump for all accidents which require shutdown to a cold condition as discussed in Section 8.4. To qualify the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump as the redundant backup to the motor-driven pump, it will be necessary to connect EB-13-4" to a steam dump line 9-1

EB-1-8" to each main steam line upstream of the main steam isolation valves.

Connections to each main steam dump line EB-1-8" will be provided by installing new lines EBD-6-4" & EBD-7-4" in the MSPR, each with two normally closed, remotely operated valves in parallel, leading to existing EB-13-4" in the turbine building (as shown on Figures 5 & 33).

The lines EBD-6-4" & EBD-7-4" from the main steam dump lines EB-1-8" to EB-13-4" are Seismic Category I and designed to ASME Section III, Class 2 requirements.

The EB-13-4" line will normally be de-energized and will not be considered a high energy pipe as discussed in Section 7.3.

9.4 Protection for Essential Controls and Instruments The following instrumentation and controls are considered essential for emergency shutdown and will be qualified for initial and/or continuous operation in the most severe environmental conditions resulting from various line breaks as described in Section 8.0, will be relocated or modified, or a redundant system will be added in a safe location.

9.4.1 Main steam isolating valves CV0510 and 0501 are closed pneumatically by means of solenoid-operated air supply valves SV0502, SV0506, SV05 l 2, and SV0513, and solenoid-operated vent valves SV0508, SV0510, SV0514, and SV0524. These solenoids located in the MSPR do not assure initial closure after one hour of subjection to a postulated steam environment of 320°F dry ambient or 220°F 100% saturated ambient. Therefore a redundant set of solenoid valves for air supply SV0505A, SV0505B, and for vents SV0507 A and SV0507B will be located outside the MSPR in the turbine building as shown in Figure 5.

9.4.2 Main steam dump valves CV0779, CV0780, CV0781, and CV0782 are operated electro-pneumatically for proportioning control by means of air-operated diaphragm valves and electro-pneumatic converters E/P0779, E/P0780, E/P0781 and E/P0782, as shown on Figure 6. The solenoids and electro-pneumatic converters could not be qualified in a steam environment of 320°F dry or 220°F saturated and therefore are relocated outside the fan room in a weathertight cabinet with tornado protection as shown in Figures 34 and 41B.

The main steam dump control valves CV0779 through CV0782 were modified to qualify for the postulated steam environment.

9.4.3 Standby service water control valves CV0879 and CV0880 and solenoid valves SV0879 and SV0880 are not essential to safe shutdown for purposes of this study and therefore will not be environmentally qualified for steam of 220° saturated.

9-2

9.5 9.6 New Concrete Wall and Slab at Hatchway Above MSPR The concrete block wall has been strengthened to withstand the differential pressure discussed in Section 8.2 and a portion of the hatchway through the MSPR ceiling has been sealed by a concrete slab as shown on Figure 34.

Control Room Ventilation The control room ventilation exhaust duct, which was previously routed to the area of the exhaust plenum, has been rerouted to a separate location as shown on Figure 34.

The wall area where the duct was previously routed has been structurally sealed. This modification precludes any possibility of adverse environmental conditions migrating to the control room.

9.7 Close Openings at the Northeast Corner of the MFPR 9.8 The existing doorway and wall openings leading from the feedwater penetration room to the auxiliary building will be provided with closures to prevent steam flooding, pressurization, and water flooding of the auxiliary building due to pipe breaks in the main steam or feedwater penetration rooms. An opening in the east wall (3'-4" by 7'-6") will be sealed with reinforced concrete. The doorway in the north wall (6'4" by 7'-6") will be closed with a steel bulkhead door. The closures will be designed for the maximum differential pressure caused by the peak compartment pressure in the main feedwater room for the accidents considered in Section 8.0. See Figure 32 for location of these modifications.

Pipe Restraint for Main Steam Supply to Reheater A pipe bumper restraint will be provided on the west wall of main steam penetration room between the wall and line EB-6-12", to reduce the pipe whip travel distance from 3'-6 to less than 1 inch. This addition is required so that the west wall can withstand the kinetic energy generated by the break of EB-6-12" at the restrained elbow. See Figures 33 and 41A for location of this modification.

9.9 Additional Vent Area and Egress Provisions An egress opening 3'-0" by 7'-0" with tornado protection will be provided in the southwest wall of the fan room at elevation 625. A normally locked door will provide.

control of access. (See Figure 34.)

An opening 7'-0" wide by 9'-0" high will be provided in the west wall of the feedwater penetration room. The lower portion of the opening, 2'-0" high by 7'-0" at elevation 590, will maintain the floor drainage capacity for flooding from postulated auxiliary feed water pipe breaks. This part of the opening will be provided with fixed panels and a flapper gate check valve hinged at the top 2'-0" x 3'-6" and opening into the turbine building to prevent flooding from Lake Michigan as described in Reference 15. The middle portion 3'-0" high by 7'-0" wide will be of fixed panels. The upper portion 4'-0" high by 7'-0" wide will have a wire mesh partition that allows venting and controls access (See Figures 3 2 and 4 lA.)

9-3

9.10 Main Steam Line Pipe Restraints The full circumferential or slot failure of the main steam pipe at any postulated break points (Figure 28) must be restrained from forming a plastic hinge at the containment penetration and prevent overstress of the main steam line at the connection to the main steam isolation valve.

One independent restraint is provided for each of the two main steam lines EB-1-36" at the penetration through the west wall of the MSPR (Figure 33). These restraints R 1 and R2 are anchored to the auxiliary building walls on column rows J and 22. The restraint structure for each pipe has been designed for a maximum axial dynamic force of 694 kps postulated by a full circumferential break of the main steam line, acting towards the west or east. The axial deformation of the pipe will be restrained by the interaction between lugs attached to the main steam line and the restraint. The design ensures that no plastic hinge will form at the pipe-lug interface. Final design of this restraint provides for 1 /8 +/- 1/16" gap plus full thermal movement of the main steam lines in the east-west horizontal directions (Figure 41B).

In addition to the above restraints, two structural steel framed restraints for each of the two main steam lines EB-1-36", R3 & R4, and EB-1-26", Rs & R6, have been provided in the turbine building to restrain the pipes against transverse deformations

, (Figure 33). The restraint structures are designed for a maximum of 694 kips of dynamic load acting towards the north-south direction or in the vertically up or down direction (Figures 33 and 41B).

9.11 SIRW Pipe Restraints Pipe restraints will be provided to the safety injection and refueling water (SIRW) line and heat exchanger T-57 in the MSPR for protection against postulated jet impingement as shown in Figure 41A.

9-4

10.0 ANALYTICAL METHODS OF BREAK EVALUATION 10.1 Piping Stress Analysis 10.2 Pipe break locations selected on the basis of total stress were determined by summing the longitudinal stresses due to pressure and weight and the combined stresses due to thermal expansion and seismic effects. The conservative assumption was made that these stresses are additive absolutely (without regard to sign).

The longitudinal stresses due to pressure were determined in accordance with ANSI B31.l.O, paraagraph 102.3.3(d).

Thermal expansion and weight stresses were determined from a flexibility analysis using Bechtel program ME553, which combines stresses in accordance with ANSI B3 l. l.O, paragraph 119.6.4.

The combined stresses due to seismic effects were obtained from dynamic analyses using the response spectra method. Analyses were made in the XY-and XZ-planes, and the highest of the two values thus obtained was then selected.

Stress intensification factors calculated in accordance with ANSI B3 l. l.0 were applied in the thermal expansion and seismic analyses wherever appropriate.

The resultant stress values for the main steam, main feedwater, and main steam dump lines are tabulated in Tables 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3 for each point on the applicable piping isometric (Figures 28, 19, and 30 respectively). These tables also include the comparable total stress limits per the criteria applicable to this study and the code- -

allowable stress values for each point evaluated.

Piping Blowdown Models

a.

A blowdown analysis was made for a single-ended break in the 18" feedwater line upstream of the check valves to determine resultant compartment pressurization. The blowdown analysis from the feed water pumps and use of a Bechtel FLASH computer program to determine the initiation of flashing flow in the line and resultant effects on pressure, velocity, and specific volume at pipe discharge.

b.

Blowdown analysis for the 8" main steam dump line break and a 6" auxiliary feedwater line break at the connection to the main feedwater line is based on full Moody flow rates. This data was used to determine room pressurization.

c.

Blowdown analysis for various area breaks to determine reactor trip conditions is based on full Moody flow rates.

d.

Environmental effects from blowdown are based on enthalpy with no credit for heat losses in the compartment.

10-1

10.3 10.4 10.5 Pipe Whip Model Pipe whip is assumed to act on components in the vicinity of postulated full circumferential breaks of high energy piping systems as identified in Section 7.0 herein.

The analysis of the pipe whip is based on Bechtel topical report BN-TOP-2, Rev. 1, dated September, 1973.

In brief, the reaction forces acting on the pipe caused by the momentum change of the discharge from the break is a function of the upstream fluid conditions, i.e., fluid enthalpy, pressure, pipe frictional characteristics, and break area. The relationship used is as follows:

where Fj =Jet reaction force &lb)

Ab = area of break (in. )

Kj, P2, and PA as defined in the above BN-TOP-2, Rev. 1, September 1973.

The pipe and restraint motion were then calculated using the above force and the methods presented in the above-mentioned report, BN-TOP-2.

Jet Impingement Model Jet impingement forces are assumed to act on components adjacent to postulated cracks or slot or full circumferential breaks of high energy piping systems as identified in Section 7.0 herein.

The analysis of the jet impingement is based on Bechtel topical report BN-TOP-2, Rev. 1, as revised to reflect AEC task force comments on the original submittal.

In brief, the forces acting on components, targets, in the jet stream is calculated as follows:

where Pj =pressure on a target at distance X from the pipe (psi)

At= target area (in2)

O_ = angle of incidence between jet axis and target surface Compartment Pressure Analysis Model Compartment pressurization is assumed to occur following the full circumferential break, worst case, of high energy piping systems as identified in Section 7.0 herein. A pipe break of this type results in the release of high energy steam or steam and water mixture to the compartment or building in which the break occurs. As the pressure builds up within the compartment, the steam-air-water mixture flows through openings to relieve the resultant pressure. The maximum differential pressure achieved between compartments determines the differential loads between the compartments and the 10-2

forces exerted on enclosed compartments. The maximum pressure differential developed is a function of the number and shape of the openings between compartments, the volume of each compartment, and the blowdown rate from the broken pipe.

Differential pressure analyses were made to calculate transient pressure response of the affected compartments. The calculations include a mass and energy balance of the two-phase, two-component, steam-air-water mixture as the high energy fluid enters the compartments during the accident and exits through vents and openings. There is no consideration in the calculation for heat transfer between the fluid and compartment surfaces which would generally have a negligible effect or compartment pressures for the short time following the rupture within which peak differential pressure occurs.

Two models for vent areas and volumes used to calculate compartment pressurization are shown in Figure 36. The difference between the models is the addition of two openings, a door from the fan room (21 square feet) and an opening plus flood gate from the feedwater penetration room (56 square feet) and the deletion of the main steam line blackout through the auxiliary building wall (due to the proposed main steam line restraint).

The final design is a door from the fan room (21 square feet), an opening plus fl.ood gate from the feedwater penetration room (35 square feet), and main steam line penetration restraint at the auxiliary wall ( 44 square feet). There is no significant change to the calculated compartment pressurization.

10.6 Structural Analysis of Battery Room Wall The following general steps were used to determine the adequacy of the structural system in resisting the applied loading.

10.6.1 The magnitude and location of the peak dynamic force was determined as follows:

where CD = the fluid dynamic factor downstream of the flow restrictor (0.85) p

= the fluid pressure Ar= the cross-sectional flow area of the fluid jet (internal area of 36" pipe) 10.6.2 The resistance versus displacement curve to the maximum allowable displacement was evaluated. This is given by the expression µxy for all resisting elements where

µ

= ductility factor (reinforced concrete = 30) xy

= yield displacement 10-3

10.6.3 The maximum displacement was calculated assuming fully plastic impact, elasto-plastic displacement, and the conservation of energy method.

10.6.4 The displacement as calculated under Section 10.6.3 was compared to the maximum allowable displacement under Section 10.6.2 and was shown to be a lesser value.

10.7 Stresses at MSIV Pipe Connections Due to Failure No. 8.3.

The worst consequences of the postulated main steam line failures identified in Section 7.1 (Failure No. 8.3) would be the result of full circumferential or slot failures, in which blowdown forces calculated by the methods described in Section 10.3, Pipe Whip Model, are assumed to be acting on the piping system at the break location. To identify the location of the pipe failure which would result in the highest stresses in the MSIVs, a series of flexibility analyses were made in which the appropriate blowdown force was applied statically at each of the postulated pipe break locations in turn, in both the axial direction (guillotine failure) and in the direction perpendicular to the pipe centerline (slot failure) which was considered to give rise to the highest deflections and stresses in the vicinity of the MSIVs. Bechtel program ME632 was used for these analyses.

Several factors believed to be important to the investigation were considered, and generally conservative means were introduced in the analyses to account for them.

These were, (1) the operational clearances at the failure restraints to allow for thermal expansion and contraction of the piping; (2) the anticipated deflections of the failure restraints in the event that contact should be made with them by fhe piping; and, (3) the potential occurence of "plastic hinges" in the piping as a consequence of the high blowdown forces, which would place an upper-bound value upon the latter.

Because ME632 is a linear-elastic computer code, the simultaneous consideration of both a gap at a restraint and a spring constant representing the inherent stiffness of the restraint is not possible. Therefore, a compromise was made whereby these two factors were combined as a pseudo-spring constant, k', calculated from where k' = a + 0, in/lb F

a= operational clearance, or gap, at restraint o = calculated deflection of failure restraint structure in direction of blowdown force (i.e., horizontal or vertical, as appropriate)

F = blowdown force.

The effect of the failure restraints upon the distribution of forces in the piping system was thus accounted for by introducing the restraints in the flexibility analyses as a spring having the appropriate constant, k'.

10-4

10.8 In some cases (e.g., postulated failure at point 37), a first analysis showed that the resulting elastic stress at some other point (e.g., point 33) was excessively high, suggesting that the latter may be the location of a "plastic hinge".

Accordingly, the collapse-load moment, Mc, was compared with the actual (elastic) moment, Ma determined by the analysis. When Mc was greater than Ma, a second analysis was made in which the blowdown force, Fa at the break location. under investigation was reduced to a lower value, F C' calculated from, By the means described above, the worst case was identified as a full circumferentail failure at point 41. Because this break results in an axial force of 363 kips acting horizontally towards the north, and because the pipe will be bearing on the failure restraints in the hot (fully expanded) condition, a final analysis was then made in which the pseudo-spring constant, k', described above, was substituted by the actual spring constant for the restraints,o/F. The results of this final analysis and the conclusions drawn therefrom are reported in Section 8.3.l(e).

Structural Design of Main Steam Line Restraints The design criteria are in accordance with Document-B of Structural Engineering Branch, Directorate of Licensing's document "Structural Design Criteria for Evaluating the Effects of High Energy Pipe Breaks on Category I Structure Outside the Containment," and the FSAR appendix A-2(d). The design methods are based on BN-TOP-2 Revision 2, dated May 1974 and BC-TOP-9 Revision 2, ductility ratios.

Maximum deflection of any restraint structure was limited to ensure that the stresses in the main steam line at the connection to the main steam isolation valves do not exceed selected criteria as described in Sections 8.3.1 and 10. 7.

10-5

11.0 CONCLUSIONS An engineering study was made of all the Palisades Plant piping systems outside containment to identify the high energy pipes and their postulated break locations in accordance with the criteria in Section 1.4. The effects of all the pipe breaks on essential systems and structures were considered, and in several cases, as identified in this report, it was determined that modifications would be required to meet the criteria set forth in Section 1.4 for safe shutdown of the plant. These modifications are summarized in Section 2.0 and described in Section 9.0.

Subsequent to Revision 2 of this report the Directorate of Licensing accepted an augmented inservice inspection program for the main feedwater line at two elbows in the penetration room, Reference 17.

The main steam and feedwater line containment wall penetrations were studied to determine the feasibility of adding encapsulation sleeves. This was done to satisfy a criterion of break postulation at all high energy pipe anchors, regardless of other considerations such as relative stress levels and quality of materials used. It was found that closures could not be attached to the containment wall without degrading the strength of the reinforced concrete wall surrounding the penetration sleeve. The anchorages to the wall are not designed to sustain a pipe jet force in combination with line process pressure acting on the projected area of the forging and cone anchorage to the wall.

The annular space surrounding the pipe insulation is cooled by air which is circulated through the annular space around the pipes in order to maintain the concrete temperature within the design limit of 1 S0°F. An encapsulation would prohibit this method of cooling the concrete.

For these reasons, it was concluded that encapsulation of the existing main steam and feedwater containment penetration is not practicable.

This study also reconfirmed that there is not sufficient space around the steam lines outside of containment wall penetrations to add restraints which would limit the movement of steam pipe.

The thickened pipe sections, complete ultrasonic testing, radiography, and supplementary tests were provided during initial construction to ensure that a pipe break would not occur in locations where restraints could not be provided. Reference 14 stated questions as to the effect of the main steam line breaks on the suction line to the safety injection pumps and the structural integrity of the rooms containing plant batteries. Section 8.3 discusses additional restraints against full circumferential and slot breaks of the 36" and 26" main steam lines to ensure function of the main steam isolation check valves. Protection for the high-pressure safety injection pump suction pipe is provided by sufficient clearance from the main steam line and by the addition of restraints.

The battery room wall was analyzed, as discussed in Section 8.3, for impact due to a whipping pipe caused by a slot failure of the 26" branch connection, at point 6 (the worst case), and it is concluded that the battery room wall corner could withstand the impact load. The auxiliary building wall was analyzed, as discussed in Section 8.5, for pipe whip impact of the 12" main steam line to the reheater and a bumper restraint is added at one elbow.

Certain control valve solenoids and electro-pneumatic converters for the main steam line isolation and dump valves could not be environmentally qualified in the postulated penetration room steam environments. Therefore a redundant set of isolation valve solenoids is installed in the turbine building and the dump valve solenoids and electro-pneumatic converters relocated outside the fan room in a weathertight cabinet tornado protected.

11-1

Certain modifications are adopted for the heating and ventilating system and openings to prevent steam from entering rooms containing other essential systems and the control room.

The conclusion is reached that the modifications described herein allow the plant to be safely brought to a cold shutdown for any of the postulated high energy pipe breaks outside of the containment.

11-2

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ATMOSPHERE ATMOSPHERE LOUVER 50SQ. FT.

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13.0 REFERENCES

No.

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Reference FSAR, Vol. III, Appendix A FSAR, Vol. II, Section 8.4 FSAR, Vol. II, Section 7.2 FSAR, Vol. I, Section 6.1 FSAR, Vol. II, Section 9.10 FSAR, Vol. II, Section 9.7 FSAR, Vol. II, Section 10.2 FSAR, Vol. II, Section 9.3 FSAR, Vol. II, Section 9.1 FSAR, Vol. II, Section 7.5 FSAR, Vol. II, Section 9.8 FSAR, Amendment 19, Question 5.2 FSAR, Amendment 16, Question 14.3 AEC Letter to Consumers Power Company, December 15, 1972 FSAR, Amendment 15, Question 2.4 AEC Letter to Consumers Power Company, August 7, 1973 AEC Letter to Consumers Power Company, October 9, 1973 13-1