ML18032A427

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Rev 2 to Design Baseline & Verification Program,Program Plan. W/870710 Ltr
ML18032A427
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 07/10/1987
From: Gregory Chapman, Gridley R, Martin R
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
PROC-870710, NUDOCS 8707170207
Download: ML18032A427 (25)


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REGULATORY QRMATIQN DISTRIBUTION SY I (RIDS)

NBR:8707170207 DQC. DATE: 87/07/10 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET 0 r'ACIL:50-259 ACCESSION Browns Ferry 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Stations Unit ii Tennessee Nuclear Power Stations Unit 2> Tennessee 05000259 05000260 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station. Unit 3i Tennessee 0500029'6 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MARTINe R. S. Tennessee Val leg Authoritg CHAPMAN'. Tennessee Valley Authority GRIDLEYi R. Tennessee Valley Authority REC IP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

Rev 2 to "Design Baseline & Verification Programi Program Plan. " W/870710 1tr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: D030D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR l ENCL ~ SIZE:

TITLE: TVA Facilities Routine Correspondence NOTES: Zwolinski 3 cg. 1 cg ea to: Axelradi Ebneteri S. Richardsoni 05000259 Liawi G. Zechi Qli OIA.

Zwolinski 3 cg. icy ea to: Axelradi Ebneteri S. Richardson'iawi 05000260 G. Zechi Qli OIA.

Zwolinski 3 cg. icg ea to: Axelradi Ebneteri S. Richardson. 05000296 Liawi G. Zechi Oli OIA.

REC IP IENT COPIES REC I P I ENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL JAMERSONiC 1 1 PD 1 1 GEARS' 1 STANGi J 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 ADM/LFMB 0 AEOD 1 1 OGC/HDS2 1 0 FI E 1 1 EXTERNAL'PDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 NOTES: 12 12 TOTAL NUMBER OF CQP IES REQUIRED: LTTR 24 ENCL 22

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Revision 2 DESIGN BASELINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM BROMNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT Preparer Approved by:

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'te Dir ctor C-zv- PT Assi tant to t e D e t r of Nucle r Engineering Manager Engineering Assurance irector vision of Nuclear Engineering p> 0>07 870110~~

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DESIGN BASELINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM TABLE OF CONTENTS Section ~Pa e

1.0 INTRODUCTION

.............. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2 2 .0 OBJECTIVE......... 2 3~0 SCOPE ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 3.1 Prerestart Phase (1). ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,3 3.2 Postrestart Phase (2)....................... 3

4.0 DESCRIPTION

OF PROGRAM (PHASE 1)......,...................... 3 4.1 Establish Design Basis Input ~ ~

4.2 Establish Configuration.. 5 4.3 Evaluate Configuration. ~ ~ 6 Issue Outputs.......................,. 8 4.5 Independent Review by Engineering Assurance. 10

5.0 DESCRIPTION

OF PROGRAM (PHASE 2).. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 10 6.0 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION...................

6.1 Organ>.zatxon............. 11 6.2 Control............... 11 6.3 Change E lements............................ ll 7.0 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION............. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 12 7.1 Program Procedures. ~ ~ ~ 12 Attachment A DBVP Scope Phase 1 (Systems)..................... 1 2 Attachment B DBVP Scope Phase 1 (Events)...................... 1 of 1 Attachment C Conceptual Plan for Design Baseline and Verification Program.. ... 1 of 1 Attachment D Browns Ferry Project Organization. 1of1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This program has been developed to reconcile design control issues described in several evaluations and audits as follows:

0 Comprehensive review of the existing program.

0 Studies/evaluations performed by TVA and others.

0 Interviews of key personnel within the TVA organization.

0 The corporate evaluation conducted by INPO.

The implementation of this program has been structured into two phases: prerestart (Phase 1), and postrestart (Phase 2).

2.0 OBJECTIVE The objectives of this program are to reestablish the design basis and evaluate the plant configuration to ensure that it satisfies the design basis by:

Verifying the functional adequacy of the plant configuration.

Ensuring that the configuration of these systems is supported by engineering analysis and documentation.

Providing confidence that plant configuration is in conformance with licensing commitments.

The essential elements of the overall program are as follows:

Verification of plant configuration.

Reconciliation of the configuration to engineering design documents including essential calculations.

Reconciliation of the configuration to the FSAR and licensing commitments.

Performance of system evaluation for the system configuration.

Issuance of revised key plant drawings for the required systems consistent with the plant configuration.

Implementation of improved change control The'se program objectives will be met in two phases. The prerestart phase (1) of this program will include the systems and portions of systems required for safe shutdown. The postrestart phase (2) will include implementation of the remaining modifications to the safety systems not required for restart, completion and revision of the design criteria documentation, completion of system evaluations, and implementation of corrective actions to other systems as required.

An improved change control process will be put into effect to ensure that compliance with the design basis continues.

3.0 SCOPE 3.1 PreRestart Phase 1 The detailed scope of the prerestart phase (1) is as follows:

o The list of systems or portions of systems covered in this phase is given in attachment A. These systems were identified by evaluating the abnormal operational transients, design basis accident and special events from BFN FSAR Chapter 14, and determining the safety actions utilized for mitigating these events. The systems required to support the systems which perform the safety actions are included. This evaluation includes the required unit 2 systems, common systems, and portions of unit 1 and unit 3 systems to support, unxt 2.

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The table of design basis events within the scope is shown in attachment B. The events and safety actions are:

Safety actions required for Chapter 14 Design Basis Accidents RPV integxity Primary ox secondary containment integrity Core Cooling Overpressure Relief (Safety Relief Valves)

Decay heat removal (torus cooling)

A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) has been performed for BFN that identifies the system contx ibution to the risk of core melt. All the systems identified in the PRA as posing the highest risk are included in the scope.

3.2 Postrestaxt Phase 2 The other systems and portions of systems that are utilized in abnormal operational transients and special events not covered

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." by the Phase 1 scope are in the Phase 2 program.

4.0 DESCRIPTION

OF PROGRAM (PHASE 1)

The methodology is: (1) establish the design basis input for the evaluation, (2) establish the plant configuration, (3) evaluate the configuration to the design basis, and (4) issue the outputs.

Attachment C provides the summary logic of the progx.am activities.

4.1 Establish Desi n Basis In ut The design basis input will consist of a commitments/requirements data base, the General and System Design Criteria, System Requirements Calculations to support the Shutdown Analysis, the set of essential calculations within the scope of the Design Baseline and Verification Program (DBVP),

and functional testing requirements.

4.1.1 Commitments/Re uirements Data Base The licensing commitments made throughout the plant life will be documented in a data base. Design requirements necessary to achieve safe shutdown will also be data based. I 4.1.2 Desi n Criteria The Design Criteria Documents (DCD) will be developed from a search of the licensing commitments and design requirements data base and from the review by senior level engineers; The DCD will serve as the basis for engineering requirements and will be used to determine plant modifications required before restart and evaluate system configuration.

4.1.3 S stem Re uirements The Shutdown Analysis (SA) will be based on FSAR Chapter 14 requirements and will identify the accidents, abnormal operational transients, and special events from which the plant must safely shut down.

The System Requirements Calculations (SRC) will be based on the SA and will identify the systems or portions of systems that will perform the shutdown for each event,.

The SRCs will identify the boundaries for the system.

They will provide the system modes and the components for shutdown.

The SRCs will be used to establish the list of essential calculations and establish the scope for the program.

4.1.4 Establish Essential Calculations The DBVP will specify the essential calculations needed to verify the adequacy of the design within the safe shutdown boundary. The BFN Design Calculation Evaluation Program (DCEP) will determine if the calculations exist and are adequate to support the design output. If calculations are not in place or are determined to be inadequate, new calculations will be developed. DBVP will ensure that, the calculations meet the safe shutdown design basis and are in place to support, the design requirements for the DBVP scope.

4.1.5 Establish Testin Re uirements The testing requirements for verification of system capability will be developed using the SRCs and DCDs.

The Test Requirements Documents (TRDs) will establi.sh the testing to support the requirements of the DBVP.

Paragraph 4.2.3 discusses testing and 4.3.6 discusses evaluations of the testing.

4.2 Establish Confi uration The plant configuration will be established by: walkdown of the Flow, Control and Single Line drawings, review of other programs, verification of electrical logic, and testing.

4.2.1 Malkdown The Flow, Control and Single Line drawings define the portion of the plant that will be walked down to document the plant configuration. The walkdowns will verify the functional configuration of the systems within the boundaries identified in 4.1.3. They will address the arrangement of components, the type of components, and nameplate data on the components. The as-constructed (AC) drawings will be marked up to reflect the actual walked down configuration.

The results of the walkdowns will be used in the functional evaluation of drawings to issue revised AC drawings and will be used in the component evaluation in 4.3.5.

4.2.2 Other Pro ram Walkdowns Other programs at BFN have been performing field verification walkdowns. The information gathered during these programs will be assessed and used, if appropriate, in determining the functional plant configuration. Examples of these programs include Environmental Qualification and Appendix R.

4.2.3 Verification of Electrical Lo ic Electrical systems will be verified by one of two methods:

o Schematic/elementary diagrams will be functionally verified by tests and by review of existing documentation.

o Single lines will be verified by physical walkdown and functional testing.

Based on these results, the electrical schematics will be verified as CCDs and issued.

4. 2.4 ~Testin Testing will be performed as part of the Restart Test Program to test specifications based on the Test Requirements Documents (paragraph 4.1.5).

4.3 Evaluate Confi uration System Evaluation Reports (SYSTER) will be prepared for the systems shown in attachment A. A final report will be prepared to demonstrate the plant meets its safe-shutdown design basis.

The final report will be based on the SYSTERs and will account for the interfaces between systems. It will function like an overall plant SYSTER.

A review of change documentation will be performed to determine if the partially implemented and unimplemented changes should be incorporated in the plant to satisfy the design basis. This review will identify any changes required before restart.

4.3. 1 Functional Evaluation of Drawin s Drawings that will be issued as Configuration Control Drawings (CCDs) will be reviewed to ensure they accurately depict system functions. The as-designed (AD) drawings will be compared to the revised AC drawings and differences will be reconciled.

Differences will require an Engineering Change Notice (ECN) to document the configuration. Any deviation from the design basis will be identified on the punch list and resolution identified.

The results of the evaluation and resolution of differences will be used in the preparation of the CCDs.

4.3.2 Si nificant Condition Re ort/Nonconformance Re ort/Condition Adverse to ualit Re ort SCR/NCR/CA R A review will be performed to ensure adequate corrective actions have been identified for all open and closed SCR/NCR/CAQRs within the Phase 1 scope and that the corrective actions satisfy the design basis. The results of the review will be included in the SYSTER.

Corrective action will be generated, as necessary.

4.3.3 Evaluation of Other Pro ram Sco es This part of the evaluation will review other to determine if they can be used to satisfy DBVP programs'copes requirements. The portions of the system evaluations within DBVP which rely upon the other programs will be identified and documented in the SYSTERs.

4.3.4 Evaluate Acce tabilit of Unim lemented or Partiall Im lemented Chan es The change documentation will be reviewed on the systems and portions of systems required for safe shutdown to ensure that the changes required to meet the design basis are implemented in the plant at restart.

Changes that will not. be fully implemented at restart will require that a revised Unreviewed Safety Question Determination (USQD) review be performed based on their status at restart.

Portions of changes not required for restart will be cancelled/voided and closed. ECNs will be written to remove the cancelled/voided changes from the AD drawings. (New ECNs will be written if the changes are to be made after restart.)

4.3.5 Evaluate Com onents Verification will be performed that the components, determined by the Baseline System Engineer to be required for safe shutdown, meet. the design basis.

Data collected by walkdown and records research will be used to determine if the components in those systems or portions of systems required to meet the design basis are adequate for the application. The results of the component evaluation will be documented in the SYSTERs....

4.3.6 Evaluate Confi uration Throu h Testin The Test Specifications prepared in the Restart Test Program will be reviewed in the DBVP to ensure that the tests will verify the required characteristics of the configuration. DBVP will evaluate the configuration against the requirements of the SRCs. If testing, determines the plant configuration does not satisfy the requirements of the SRCs, the configuration will be modified by the change control process.

4.3.7 Identif 0 en Items During the DBVP, some open items will be identified which must be scheduled and tracked through completion, for example, unverified assumptions, test discrepancies and the need for supplemental walkdowns. A punchlist will be maintained for all open items. The punchlist will indicate the action plan and who is responsible for resolution.

4.4 Issue Out uts 4.4.1 Resolve 0 en Items This will include verifying assumptions, reviewing test results, evaluating changes since the walkdowns and tests were performed, and all other prerestart open items. All supporting essential calculations required before restart will be complete and issued before restart.

4.4.2 Issue Drawin s Once evaluations are complete, the boundaries that have been evaluated will be marked on the drawings and the drawings will be modified and issued as CCDs.

CCDs will document the verified adequate plant configuration. For Phase 1 (prerestart) of the program, the portions of the systems within the safe shutdown boundaries will be the verified portions of the CCDs.

(Phase 2 will complete the CCDs.)

4.4.3 Schematic/Elementar Dia rams The schematic and elementary diagrams will be updated to reflect the functional configuration of the plant. The.

configuration will be determined from testing, drawing

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comparison and walkdown data.

System Evaluation Reports (SYSTER) will be prepared to address each system. The SYSTERs will be prepared from the evaluations in paragraph 4.3.

Where it is determined that the actual plant configuration is different than the licensed configuration, a USQD will be written.

The results and conclusions of the program will be documented in a final report for submission to the Director, Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE). The report will consider trending of deficiencies found during the implementation of the program in order to determine if other corrective actions are needed. It will evaluate interfaces between systems to ensure they meet the safe shutdown design basis. It will recommend postrestart tasks that are identified during the prerestart phase. Based upon review of the report, the Director will determine if the stated objectives of the program have been met, or if additional actions are required.

4.5 Inde endent Review b En ineerin Assurance EA DNEs Engineering Assurance will perform an independent review of the DBVP.

An EA oversight review team of experienced technical personnel will independently review, on a sample basis, the DBVP as the project completes its document preparation, document revisions, and/or review. The review objectives are:

Confirm and validate .that engineering activities are being conducted in accordance with the approved program plan and procedures established for the DBVP.

Confirm functional and technical adequacy of system evaluations and completeness/correctness of supporting documentation.

Verify that corrective actions resulting from these evaluations have been documented and properly implemented or scheduled for postrestart.

This review will provide added assurance that the engineering activities associated with the program are conducted in a technically adequate manner and in accordance with the written procedures prepared specifically for this effort..

The results and conclusions of this review will be documented in a final EA report to the Director, DNE.

5.0 DESCRIPTION

OF PROGRAM (PHASE 2)

The postrestart phase (2) will complete engineering documentation and evaluations, describing the final functional configurations as CCDs.

The change control and management review procedures used during the prerestart phase (1) will also be in effect during the postrestart phase.

The postrestart phase (2) will:

Issue design change packages which were not required for pre-restart and complete the related modifications.

Complete the design criteria/design basis.

Complete other corrective actions resulting from the restart final report.

Implement the permanent design change control system Complete system evaluation not required for restart.

6.0 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION Attachment D shows the DBVP organization for the Browns Ferry Project. Consistent with these responsibilities for maintaining a design control program, DNE has taken the lead in order that the design basis and design change control improvements will be implemented.

Within DNE, the project organization onsite will provide the lead for program implementation. The Project Engineer will interface with the Site Director as necessary. Baseline System Engineers within the Civil, Electrical, Mechanical, and Nuclear disciplines shown on attachment D, will be responsible for >

coordinating all system evaluation activities on an appropriate---

system or portion thereof. Senior level'engineers will be assigned for each system to provide technical assistance and guidance to the system engineers.

6.2 Chan e Control Transitional Change Control Procedures will be used to allow for completion of modifications initiated before approval of the Permanent Change Control Program. Transitional Change Control process provides appropriate level of control of changes to the plant configuration until the Permanent Change Control Program is developed and implemented.

A Change Control Board (CCB) has been established to limit and control plant modifications. The first priority of the CCB during the restart phase is to define, review, limit, and control plant modifications required to be implemented before restart of BFN and to stop all other changes to the selected systems. The CCB will also review nonrestart modifications, and ensure they are scheduled for implementation.

6.3'lements A conceptual plan showing the program elements and their interrelationship is presented in attachment C.

7.0 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION 7.1 Pro ram Procedures Procedures required to assign specific responsibilities, define methods, and establish documentation requirements will cover, as a minimum, the following subject areas:

,0 Change Control Board 0 Identification of Licensing Commitments 0 System Walkdowns 0 Design Criteria/Design Basis 0 Drawing Comparison Review 0 Transitional Change Control 0 Performance of System Evaluations 0 Review of ECNs and Other Changes 0 Engineering Assurance Oversight Review 0 Essential Calculation Regeneration 0 Preparation of Configuration Control Drawings 0 Punchlist 0 Schematic/Elementary Diagrams 0 Shutdown Analysis 0 Systems Requirements Calculation 0 Test Requirements Documents

1of2 ATTACHMENT A DBVP PHASE I SCOPE (SYSTEMS)*

System Number S stem Name Notes 1 Main Steam 2 Condensate 6 Demineralized Mater 3 Reactor Feedwater" 10 Boiler Drains 6 Vents and Blowdown SRV Discharge Only 12 Auxiliary Boiler 1 18 Fuel Oil 23 RHR Service Mater 24 Raw Cooling Water 25 Raw Service Mater 26 High-Pressure Fire Protection 1 + EECW interface 29 Potable Water Distribution 1 30 Ventilation 31 Air Conditioning (Heating-6 Cooling) 32 Control Air 33 Service Air 1 34 Vacuum Priming 1 37 Gland Seal Water 1 39 C02 Storage, Fire Protection and Purging HVAC for D-G support 43 Sampling and Mater Quality RPV isolation 6 RHRSW interface 44 Building Heating 1 47 Turbine Generator EHC 50 Sodium Hypochlorite EECW interface only 53 Backwash Air 1 63 Standby Liquid Control 64A Primary Containment and Isolation Logic 64B Reactor Building and Primary Containment Ventilation 64C ~ Secondary Containment Pentrations and Isolation 65 Standby Gas Treatment 66 OFF-GAS 67 Emergency Equipment Cooling 68 Reactor Mater Recirculation 69 Reactor Mater Cleanup 70 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water NOTES

1. These systems are being evaluated only for their primary/secondary containment penetrations.

+The system boundaries were selected using the System Requirements Calculations to determine the systems and portions of systems used to mitigate FSAR Chapter 14 design basis events and provide for safe shutdown.

2 of 2 ATTACHMENT A (Continued)

DBVP PHASE I SCOPE (SYSTEMS)*

System Number S stem Name Notes 71 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RPV isolation 6 core cooling for non-accident events 73 High Pressure Coolant Injection 74 Residual Heat Removal 75 Core Spray 76 Containment Inerting 77 Radwaste 78 Fuel Pool Cooling and Demineralization 79 Fuel Handling and Storage RPV integrity (fuel pool only) 82 Standby Diesel Generator 84 Containment Atmospheric Dilution 85 Control Rod Drive 86 Diesel Starting Air 90 Radiation Monitoring 92 Neutron Monitoring 94 Traversing Incore Probe 99 Reactor Protection 57-1 125-V DC Distribution 57-2 208/120 V AC Distribution 57-3 250-V DC Distribution 57.-4 480-V AC Distribution 57-5 4-KV AC Distribution 57-6 Offsite Power and Other Distribution ATMS 24V DC only NOTES:

1. These systems are being evaluated only for their primary/secondary containment penetrations.
  • The system boundaries were selected using the System Requirements Calculations to determine the systems and portions of systems used to mitigate FSAR Chapter 14 design basis events and provide for safe shutdown.

DBVP Rev 2 Page I of I DBVP ATTACHHENT B PHASE I SCOPE (EVENTS)

I )Primary )Secondary )Other Safety )Core )Overpressure )Reactivity iRPV ]Containment )Containment [Decay Heat )Sa~e~y Actions Coolin Relief Control Inte ri Into ri Inte rit Removal Actions I I I I DBAs: )Included )N)A (except break )Included )Included )Included (except )Included Jlncluded )Included I )outside )(except )break outside) )(except break )(as Ibreak [outside) )applicable)

)inside)

Applicable [-4SIV Closure I-TIG Trips (with ) Include Al I )-Pres Reg None [-Loss Offsite I-All )Not Transients: )-Loss of Vacuum BP failure )Required Scrams fails [ Power Isolation )Included

)-Pres Reg Fails )-HSIV Closure ]Events in Core -Inadvert ( Events [Until

)-Inadvert Open SRV )-Pres Reg fails )cooling and)or [ Open )-Loss of )After i-FW Loss )-Loss of Vacuum )Overpressure [ Turbine ) Shutdown )Restart

)-FW Control Fail )-Loss Offsite )Relief plus ] Bypass ( Cooling

)-Loss Offsite ] Power )-Loss FW Heater i Power )-FW Control Fail [-Shutdown Cool

] Halfunctlon

)-Inadv. Pump [(Passive

( Start Integrity-

)-Rod Withdr. ) AII Events)

J Error

)-Recir Fail-Incr

)-Startup Idle i Loop Special ]-Shutdown Outside )-Overpressure [-Overpressure )-Shutdown None (-Loss Fuel Pool (-Fire iNot Events : I-Fire ) Protection (CH5 ( Protection ) Outside ) Cooling )-Shutdown ]Included

)-Earthquake ) Design Basis )-FIre )-Earthquake [ Outside )Until

) Event) )-Shutdown )-Loss Fuel (-Earthquake ]After

[-Shutdown Outside ) outside i Pool I )Restart

)-Earthquake [-Shutdown t I Cooling I I wio Rods )(Pool Integ) I I

-Earthquake I I I J I

OB(IVP Rev 2 Poge 1 of' CONCEPTUAL PLAN FOR DESIGN BASELINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM ATTACHMENT C TEST TEST RESULTS (4+2 4)

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COMMITMENT/ CHANGE REOUIREMENTS DESIGN CRITERIA DOCUMENT DATA BASE ASSESSMENT (4.1.1) DOCUMENTS (4.1.2) (4.3.4)

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM TEST ANALYSIS REOUIREMENTS REOUIREMENTS (4.1.3) CALCULATION DOCUMENTS (4.1.3) (4.1.5)

(4.2.3)

REQUIRED POST CORRECTIVE RESTART REVIEW NCR/SCR/CAOR ACTIONS (4.3o2) (4+4 F 1)

ESSENTIAL RESTART CALCULATIONS SYSTEM (4.1.4) EVALUATIONS (4.3 ')

(4.3.6)

(4 '.3)

REPORTS OTHER PROGRAM (4.4 ') (4.4.5)

INPUT (4.2.2)

(4.3.3) 'I i ~ t MECHANICAL ISSUE (t

DRAWING CONFIGURATION ELECTRICAL CONTROL WALKDOWNS COMPARISON (4.2.1) (4.3. 1) DRAWINGS (4.3.2)4 (4.2.3) (4.4.2)

(4.4.3)

COMPONENTS EVALUATION ~ r (4.3.5) NOTE: NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS INDICATE APPLICABLE SECTION.

DBVP Rev 2 Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT D BROWNS FERRY PROJECT BFEP DNE ORGANIZATION PROJECT SPONSOR ENGINEER F'P P SPECIAL PROJECTS BVP PROGRAM MANAGER PROJECT ENGINEERING STAFF SERVICES MANAGER ASSISTANTS STAFF CIVIL ELECTRIC L NUCLE R BRANCH BRANCH BRANCH BRANCH SPONSOR SPONSOR SPONSOR SPONSOR L EQ.'CT LEAD LEAD ENGINEERING LEAD LEAD ENGINEER ENGINEER MANAGER ENGINEER ENGINEER

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 5N 157 Lookout Place JUL 10 $ 87 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority 50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) DESIGN BASELINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM, PROGRAM PLAN REVISION 2 The purpose of this letter is to transmit the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant's Design Baseline and Verification Program (DBVP) Program Plan, Revision 2.

Revision 2 supersedes Revision 0 submitted March 13, 1987, (Revision 1 was an internal document which was not distributed to NRC) and upgrades BFN's program to (1) reconcile design control issues, (2) reestablish the design basis, and (3) evaluate the plant configuration.

Should you have any questions on the above, please get in touch with A. C. Alford at extension 2588.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Gridley, Director Nuclear Safety and Licensing Enclosure cc: See page 2 An Equal Opportunity Employer

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JUL 10 (S87 cc (Enclosure):

Mr. G. G. Zech, Assistant Director Regional Inspections Division of TVA Projects Office of Special Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. J. A. Zwolinski, Assistant Director for Projects Division of TVA Projects Office of Special Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East West Highway EWW 322 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Browns Ferry Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 311 Athens, Alabama 35611

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