ML18031A266

Notifies of Potential Deficiency in Amphenol Connectors & Cutler-Hammer E-30 Switches.Ge Requested to Evaluate Extent of Problem & Provide Corrective Action Plan,If Required. NRC Will Be Advised of Reportability by 791011

ML18031A266
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	09/11/1979
From:	Curtis N PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
References
840-4, NUDOCS 7909170425
Download: ML18031A266 (3)

Text

TWO NORTH HIHTH STREET, ALLENTOWH, PA. 18101 PHOHEt (215) 821-5151 NORMAN W. CURTIS Vice President-Engineering IL Construction 821-5381 September ll, 1979 Mr. Boyce H. Grier.

Director, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissioTL 621 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 18406 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION NOTIFICATION OF A POTENTIAL DEFICIENCY ZN AMPHENOL CONNECTORS AND CUTLER HAMMER E-30 SNITCHES ERs 100450/100508'ILE, 840-4 PLA-399

Dear Mr.,

Grier=

This serves to confirm, information provided to NRC Resident Inspector R. Gallo on. 9/11/79 and. relates to: the subject: deficiency which is under evaluation for repoztability in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

'The anomalies summarized below have been noted during routine Quality Control surveillance and/or inspections of PGCC/ACR Panels and documented by Bechtel.

QA on MCAR-1-37:

l. Amphenol female connector pins are. not seating properly in the dielectric.

The relative position of the pins varies after. mating and. unmating of the connectors. Zt has. been observed that some pins retract merely from turning the connector. This is especially the case after pins have been removed and an attempt is made to reinsert them into the connector dielectric. Further, it has been noted that the conductor and pin pull out of the connector. dielectric during pull tests using a hemostat to avoid removing the pins. An example is documented on NCR 4309 for the pull test fozces necessary to extract the conductor and pins from the connector of cable 4208/C51B-019. For number 18 AWG wire, the pull test maximum is ten pounds. The test range of the 27 conductors tested was from. three to ten pounds. These observations are documented on NCR 4309.

Additional examples may be found through a review of cable inspection d ta sheets for non-safety related cables (cablest 1510/C12A-002; 1301/C12B-001; 9115/C12A-019; 9115/C12A-0201 9115/C12A-0211 9115/C12A<<022 and 8860/E012-009).

Zt should be noted that, the method of performing the pull testing of con-ductor pin crimps has been changed, at General Electric's re~est, to include the use of hemostats. This change was made to avoid complete removal of all pins from connectors for pull testing. The hemostat pull PENNSYLVANIA POWER 8 LIGHT COMPANY Pe (0 "CEOSI.TO y<~

Mr. Boyce H. Grier September 11, 1979 test method tended to amplify or further substantiate the Amphenol con-nector problem. As the pull test was in process, the connector female pins were extracted in many instances, before the maximum pull test force was achieved. Also, FDI WJGO, for PGCC cable inspection, makes provision for connector replacement, thereby> eliminating the necessity for identifying connector deficiencies via nonconformance reports in accordance with FIM G-3.

Finally, discussions with cognizant field engineering,. Quality Control and, craft personnel lead to a determination that an apparent generic problem exists with the Amphenol female connectors Samples of the defective connectors are being provided GE-site personnel for GE's use in evaluating the extent of, this problem.

2.. Cutler-Hammer push button switches installed in ACR benchboards, are stickingg of 189 switches: inspected, ten switches, do not retract when manual 'depression is relieved.. These switches bear GE P/N 851E341P2GXGXXX and are purchased fzom Cutler-Hanmer under P/N CHE30AC. These nonconforman-ces are documented on NCR, 4313.

A second condition, as described on. Sheet 20 of NCR, 3403 (documented in BLG>>2147 dated July 24, 1979) involves switch (HV-1112D) CHE30AB, which became dislodged due to failure of the mechanical locking device between push button to contact blocks. While this particular switch and the second switch of the same type which have- failed. were installed in non-safety related, equipment, the concern is for similar switches used in safety related'~ipment..

GE has been recpxested to investigate the extent of the problems cited,, provide corrective action plan, if recpxired, and to advise whether in G.E.'s a

technical opinion, the deficiency, were it to have gone uncorrected, could have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant.

Following the evaluations of the above conditions, the Commission will be advised as to each item's, xeportability by Octobex'l> 1979.

Very truly yours, N. W. Cuztis Vice President;Engineering & Construction CIM:mcb cc: Mr. Robert M. Gallo Mz. Victor Stello (15)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Directox'O Box 52 Office of Inspection a Enforcement Shickshinny< Pennsylvania 18655 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. G. McDonald Office of Management Information 6 Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 IIEmLATORY DOCKET FILE COPY