ML17333A360

LER 96-001-00:on 960216,determined Alarm Setpoint of Radiation Monitor Set Incorrectly.Caused by Failure to Fully Integrate Regulatory Requirements of 10CFR70.24 Into Plant Design.Setpoint adjusted.W/960318 Ltr

ML17333A360
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	03/18/1996
From:	Blind A, Noble D AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-001, LER-96-1, NUDOCS 9603210239
Download: ML17333A360 (5)

Text

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REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9603210239 DOC.DATE: 96/03/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION NOBLE,D. American Electric Power Co., Inc.

BLIND,A.A. American Electric Power Co., Inc.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 96-001-00:on 960216,determined alarm setpoint of radiation monitor set incorrectly. Caused by failure to fully integrate regulatory requirements of 10CFR70.24 into plant design.Setpoint adjusted.W/960318 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: ZE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD3-1 PD 1 1 HICKMANgJ 1 1 INTERNAL: AEOD SP ~B 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 FILE CENT R+ 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1

/DE/EEL 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HZCB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EZB 1 1 RGN3 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POOREgW. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEI CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEEDI FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25

P American Electric r Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place Bndgman, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 AMER!CAN ELECTRIC POWER March 18, 1996 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating Licenses DPR-58 Docket No. 50-315 Document Control Manager.

96-001-00 Sincerely, ba4 A. A. Blind Site Vice President Iclc Attachment H. J. Miller, Region III E. E. Fitzpatrick P. A. Barrett R. F. Kroeger M. A. Bailey - Ft. Wayne S. J. Brewer J. R. Padgett G. Chamoff, Esq.

D. Hahn Records Center, INPO NRC Resident Inspector 9g.s i'('q /pZ

'316032i0239 9603i8 PDR ADQCK 050003ib 8 PDR

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS, FORIIAR LXCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO TH INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION HASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERNOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE 0 HANAGEMENT AND BUDGET HASHINGTOH DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) Page 1 of 3 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 05000 315 TITLE (4)

Radiation Monitorln for New Fuel Vault Store e Area Found Not to Meet the Re ulrements of 10CFR70.24 SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY HAME DOCKET NUHBER DAY YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH Cook Unit 2 05000 316 FACILITY NAHE 02 16 96 96 -- 001 00 03 18 96 DOCKET HUNGER OPERATING MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(I) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71(b)

PONER LEVEL (10) 100 20.2203(a)(2) (I ) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(v) OTHER (Specify in 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) Abstract belou 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(I) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) and in Text, HRC Form 366A) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Doug Noble, Radiation Protection Superintendent 616 465-5901, x2527 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS TO NPRDS EXPECTED SUBMISSION YES X NO DATE 15 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typeuritten lines) (16)

This ls a follow-up report pursuant to the one-hour telephone notification made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(ii)(B) on February 16, 1996. It was determined that due to the relative locations of monitor and stored assemblies, the requirements for detection of a postulated criticality accident in the New Fuel Storage Vault as stated in 10CFR70.24 were not met, and a condition outside the design bases therefore existed. It was later determined that the alarm setpoint of the radiation monitor was set incorrectly. The setpolnt was adjusted per 10CFR 70.24(a)(2), and a follow-up call to the original notification was made.

Upon discovery of the condition, a fuel bundle was relocated to a position In the New Fuel Storage Vault (NFSV) where the monitor would detect a criticality accident. Subsequently, the monitor was relocated inside the NFSV and procedures were developed for calibration and response to the monitor.

This event is attributable to failure to fully Integrate the regulatory requirements of 10CFR70.24 into the plant design bases via an accepted process. This resulted in the installation of monitoring that was not captured in either the modification process or on plant drawings.

This condition was determined to have little safety significance due the design of the NFSV. The Westinghouse criticality analysis for this storage facility shows that the acceptance criteria for criticality Is met for the storage of the Westinghouse fuel assemblies used in the cores of both Units 1 and 2. Based on this, it has been concluded that at no time was the health and safety of the public in jeopardy.

NRC FORH 366A . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH APPROVED BY OHB HO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THI IHFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION COKHEHTS REGARDIHG BURDEN FORWAR ESTIMATE TO TH IHFORHATIOH AND RECORDS HAHAGEHENT BRANCH (HNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE 0 HANAGENEHT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 0500 315 96 001 00 2 OF 3 TEXT {ilmore space is required, use additional NRC Form 366h'sl (17)

Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 fn Mode 1, at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power On February 16, 1996, a preliminary calculation was performed that determined that In the event of a criticality accident in the New Fuel Storage Vault (NFSV) with a source term as described ln 10CFR70.24, the dose rates at the installed criticality monitor would not exceed the low setpolnt of the monitor, due to the location of the monitor relative to the stored assemblies. This constituted a non-compliance with 10CFR70.24, as this section of the Code requires that the monitor be located In such a manner so as to detect a criticality accident.

Upon discovery of this non-compliance, a fuel bundle was relocated to a position tn the NFSV where the monitor would detect a criticality accident.

Subsequently, on February 20, 1996, the criticality monitor was found have an alarm setpolnt of 1000 mR/hour, which is outside the range of 5 mR/hour to 20 mR/hour specified in 10 CFR 70.24(a)(2). The alarm setpolnt was adjusted to 5 mR/hour to restore the monitor to operable status.

This event Is attributable to failure to fully integrate the regulatory requirements of 10CFR70.24 into the plant design bases via an accepted process, such as the design change process, when the requirements were originally recognized to be applicable in the 1970s. Subsequent decisions regarding the need for the monitor and Its placement were also made without adequate investigations of the design basIs for the monitor. This resulted in the installation of a monitoring system that did not achieve compliance with the regulatory basis, was not captured via the modification process or on plant drawings, and lacked a procedure for response to monitor alarms.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), for a condition outside the design basis.

The design of the New Fuel Vault diminishes the probability for an accidental criticality within the New Fuel Vault.

The New Fuel Vault as described ln the plant's Technical Specifications (5.6.2.1) state:

"The new fuel pit storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with a nominal 21 inch center-to-center distance between new fuel assemblies such that Q will not exceed 0.98 when fuel assemblies are placed in the pit and aqueous foam moderation is assumed.'he Westinghouse criticality analysis for this storage facility shows that the acceptance criteria for criticality Is met for the New Fuel Storage Vault (NFSV) for the storage of Westinghouse 15x15 assemblies, the 17x17 standard and optimized fuel assemblies, and VANTAGE 5 fuel assemblies, with the nominal enrichment limit of s 4.55 w/o U .

All fuel assemblies stored in the NFSV have met the requirements, and based on this, it has been concluded that at no time was the health and safety of the public in jeopardy.

NRC FORH 366A . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150.0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY NITH THI INFORHATION COLLECTION REGUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORllAR LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION COHHEHTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIHATE TO TH IHFORHATIOH AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRAHCH (HNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIONg IIASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE 0 HANAGEHEHT AND BUDGET 'NASHIHGTON DC 20503.

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 0500 315 96 001 00 3 OP 3 TEXT IIr more space Is required, use additional NRC Form 366A'sI {17)

On March1, 1996 administrative controls on placing fuel in the New Fuel Storage Vault were put in place. No fuel will be stored in the NFSV until all criticality monitoring issues are resolved.

A Temporary Modification was completed to install a radiation detector inside the New Fuel Vault. Instructions for the Radiation Protection technicians were developed to ensure that the radiation monitor is functional and that the alarm setpolnt is In compliance with 70.24(a)(2), and compensatory actions have been prescribed if the monitor is not operable.

The Emergency Plan was modified to Include actions for a confirmed criticality accident. This event will be considered when developing Emergency Plan drill scenarios.

A procedure was developed that provides guidance for Radiation Protection (RP) personnel when responding to an alarm from the accidental criticality radiation monitor. All RP personnel have been trained on the procedure and made familiar with its requirements.

Configuration control and design control practices are now proceduralized In the AEPSC General Procedures. The lessons learned from this event have already been formalized, therefore no new preventive actions are planned at this time.

New computer-aided mechanisms are available to check the license basis for the plant and the NRC regulation guidelines. These text search engines are available to the Nuclear Safety, Ucensing and Fuels staff for this purpose.

One is capable of searchIng AEP correspondence with the NRC, as well as the UFSAR, based on key words.

Similarly, the other can be used to search the regulations In Title 10 of the Code'of Federal Regulations, NRC Regulatory Guides, NRC Information Notices, and related documents for requirements based on key words. These systems are being used to assist In the determination of regulatory positions on issues as they emerge.

N/A 315/9240140