ML17332A972

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LER 95-009-00:on 950913,fire Protection Compensatory Actions Incorrectly Established.Caused by Personnel Error.Continuous Fire Watch Patrol Established & Personnel Counselled.W/ 951013 Ltr
ML17332A972
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 10/13/1995
From: Blind A
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-95-009-01, LER-95-9-1, NUDOCS 9510170401
Download: ML17332A972 (5)


Text

0 PRIORITY (ACCELERATED RZDS PROCESSZNS)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9510170401 DOC.DATE: 95/10/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BLIND,A.A. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele BLIND,A.A. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 95-009-00:on 950913,fire protection compensatory actions incorrectly established. Caused by personnel error. Continuous fire watch patrol established & personnel counselled.W/

951013 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Inciden Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD3-1 PD 1 1 HICKMAN,J 1 1 INTERNAL-I~E TE@ D RAB Rm 2

1 1

2 1

1 AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB 1

1 1

1 1

1 NRR/DISP/PIPB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DS SA/SPS B/B 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN3 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHYiG.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECZPIENTS PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEI CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESKS ROOM OWFN 5DS (415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

Indiana Michiga Power Company Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place

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Bridgrnan, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 Z

IND)ANA MICHIGAN POWER October 13, 1995 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating Licenses DPR-58 Docket No. 50-315 Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled the following report is being submitted:

95-009-00 Sincerely, A. A. Blind Plant Manager

/clc Attachment c: H. J. Miller, Region E. E. Fitzpatrick III P. A. Barrett R. F. Kroeger M. A. Bailey Ft. Wayne S. J. Brewer J. R. Padgett G. Charnoff, Esq.

D. Hahn Records Center, INPO NRC Resident Inspector 95iOi7040i 95iOi3 PDR ADOCK 050003i5 8 PDP .

NRC FORM 366 '.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 315~104 (5-02)

EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECIlON REOUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMEJrrs REGARDING BURDEN ESRMAJE TO THE INFORMATION FORWARD AND RECORDS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (MNBB 77IC), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGl'ON. DC 20555400I ~ ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PAQJECT (51500104), OFFCE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20500.

FACILITYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMBEA (2) PAGE 0)

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 05000 315 10F 3 TITLE (C)

Fire Protection Compensatory Actions Incorrectly Established Due To'ersonnel Error EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6 REPORT NUMBER OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 6 SEOUEMlAL REVISON FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER DAY YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Cook - Unit 2 05000 FACIIJIY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 09 13 95 95 009 00 10 13 95 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUAN T TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR %2 Check one or m ore 11 MODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a) (2) (iv) 73.71(b)

POWER 20.405(a)(1) (i) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a) (2) (v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 20.405(a)(1) Oi) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a) (1) (iii) X 5073(a)(2)(t) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Speory in lurctract below and In Text. NRC 20>405(a) (I) (iv) 50.73(a) (2) (ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Form st>5A) 20.405(a) (1)(v) 50.73(a) (2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

W. Hodge, Plant Protection Superintendent 616/J(65-5901 x3370 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13 Ax'J~x'tet> ta TC SYSTEM REPORTABLE j))".~':,">g:I>x'~<"'x REPCRTABLE MANUFACTURER TO NPROS TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION rd yee. complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 13, 1995, with Unit 2 at 100 percent power the fire detection system for the Unit 2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room and Diesel Generator Ramp/Corridor Areas, Detecfion Zone ¹31, was declared inoperable. An hourly fire watch patrol was established to patrol these areas at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> as required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.8.

Prior to Detecfion Zone ¹31 being declared inoperable, fire watch patrols had been establhhed in Unit 2 for the planned removal of Unit 1 shutdown support capabilmes for the Reactivity Control System/Charging Pump and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems, TS 3.1.2.3 and 3.7.1.2, respecfively. The acfion statements require equivalent shutdown capability be established in the form of fire watch patrols. The patrol frequency h dependent on the operability of the fire detection systems in the affected areas. The Unit 2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room was an affected area. With the loss of detecfion in the area, a confinuous patrol was required in this area. A continuous post was not establhhed until sixteen hours after Detecfion Zone

¹31 was declared inoperable.

The event was caused by Fire Protecfion Secfion personnel error.

During thh sixteen hour period the affected area was toured approximately every half h'our. During that time Unit 2 continued to operate at 100 percent power with its shutdown equipment operable. Based on this, the event did not constitute a significant safety hazard and at no time was the health and safety of the public ln jeopardy.

NAC FORM 09J (5 02)

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NRC FORM SSSA US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO 0MB NO. 31500)0i I5$ 01 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE To COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERl INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: SOB HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE To THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH IP430). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 131500)IMI, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND 8 UDG ET, WASHINGTON. OC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 11) LER NUMBER IS) PAGE IS)

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NVM Sll g't t tt ASydQN NVMSSII Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant TEXT IJP warP <<eCP ir nqu)Ptf. VPP ~ - Unit HRC FCtdt 35SASI I)7) 1 o s o o o 3 l 5 9 5 0 0 9 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3 Unit 1 was in Mode 6 Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power On September 13, 1995, the fire detection system for the Unit 2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room and Diesel Generator Ramp/Corridor Areas, Detection Zone ¹31, was declared inoperable. An hourly, roving fire watch tour was established to patrol these areas at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> as required by Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.8. Prior to Detection Zone ¹31 being declared inoperable, roving fire watch patrols had been established for the planned removal of Unit 1 shutdown support capabiliUes for the Reactivity Control System/Charging Pumps (CVCS) and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems (AFW), Unit 1 TS 3.1.2.3. and 3.7.12, respectively. The TS Bases for 3.1.2.3 and 3.7.12 state, in part, "Fire watches posted in the affected opposite unit areas...may serve as the equivalent shutdown capability specmed in the action statements of Specificatio 3.1 2.3 (3.7.1.2). In the affected areas, either establish continuous fire watches or verify the OPERABIUTY of the fire detectors per Specificatfon...and establish hourly fire watch patrols.".

One such affected area was the Unit 2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room. Upon the inoperability of the detecfion system in this area, the roving fire watch patrol was required to be upgraded to a continuous post.

At 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> on September 13, 1995, the Unit 2 Control Room Unit Supervisor (US) contacted the Fire Protection Section. The Unit Supervisor Informed a fire protection technician that Detection Zone ¹31 was inoperable. The US also listed the specific areas, i.e., Unit 2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room and Diesel Generator Ramp/Comdor, the zone monitored. The technician, when adding these areas to the tour, noted that the Unit 2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room was already being toured by a roving fire watch patrol. He failed to recognize that this area was being toured for equivalent shutdown capability reasons. Rather than upgrading the tour to a continuous patrol, he documented a second reason, l.e., loss of detection, for the established patrol.

On September 14, 1995, it was recognized by the Rre Watch Supenrisor, while reviewing documentation from the previous night, that the TS 3.1.2.3 and 3.7.1.2. action statements were not being met for the specific area in question. A continuous fire watch post was established on September 14, 1995, at 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />, sixteen hours after the continuous post was required.

NRC Fotw) SSSA ISBS)

NRC FORM SSSA IAS. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.31500104 (589)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE To COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 50J) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE To THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH IP430). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 30555, ANO To THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(50d((HI. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 30503.

FACILITYNAME III DOCKET NUMBER l?) LER NUMBER (SI PAGE (3)

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The cause of this event was personnel error. The fire protecfion technician failed to recognize the significance that the Appendix R related tour had on the overall Plant Fire Protection Program. When the impairment was noted, the technician did not take into consideration the established Appendix R tour and the impact this impairment had on this tour.

Thh event h considered reportable per the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2) I(B) since TS 3.1.2.3 and 3.7.1.2 required a continuous fire watch patrol in the Unit 2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room instead of the roving fire watch patrol established. Upon the inoperability of Detection Zone ¹31, an hourly fire watch patrol was confirmed to have been established on September 13, 1995, at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />. This was upgraded to the required continuous patrol on September 14, 1995, at 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />, for a total of shteen hours of noncompliance.

The roving fire watch patrolled the affected area approximately once every half hour during this shteen hour period. In that time span, Unit 2 continued to operate safely at 100% power with all shutdown equipment available for use. Based on this, it h concluded that this event did not constitute a significant hazard to the health and safety of the public.

A continuous fire watch patrol was established in the Unit 2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room, as required by TS 3.12.3 and 3.7.12, on September 14, 1995, at 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />.

Personnel counselling has been completed for the applicable technician regarding making non-conservative dechlons.

Refresher training has been provkled to all fire protection technicians for 10CFR50 Appendix R Equivalent Shutdown Capability and the associated compensatory acllon requirements.

315/94409-00 316/94402<0 315/9~03-00 315/91-001-00

'V NRC Fons SSSA (SBS)

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