ML17332A587

LER 95-001-00:on 950106,Unit 2 Fire Detection Sys Was Made Inoperable W/O Compensated Action Due to Personnel Error. Restored Switch to on Position & Completed Test

ML17332A587
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	02/20/1995
From:	Beilman T, Blind A INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-95-001, LER-95-1, NUDOCS 9503010362
Download: ML17332A587 (5)

Text

'

H.j.MME' ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING I

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9503010362 DOC.DATE: 95/02/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BEILMAN,T.P. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele F BLIND,A.A. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 95-001-00:on 950106,Unit 2 fir detection sys was made inoperable w/o compensated action due to personnel error.

Restored switch to "on" position & completed test.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report 2 2 SIZE:

ENCL (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

C F

NOTES RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD3-1 PD 1 1 HICKMAN,J 1 1 INTERNAL: AEOD/ESRD/RAB 1 1 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1

~FILE CENTERS 02 1 1 1'

NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB 1

1 1

1 NRR/DE/EELB 1 NRR/DISP/PIPB 1 NRR/DOPS/OECB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRSS/PRPB 2 2 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN3 FILE 1 1 01'ITCO EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACTTHE DOCUMENTCONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2083 ) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NA'ME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place Bridgrnan, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 INDIANA NICHIGAN POWER February 20, 1995 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating Licenses DPR-74 Docket No. 50-316 Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ort S stem the following report is being submitted:

95-001-00 Sincerely, A. A. Blind Plant Manager

/mr Attachment lj c: J. B. Martin, Region E. E. Fitzpatrick III P. A. Barrett R. F. Kroeger M. A. Bailey Ft. Wayne NRC Resident Inspector J. B. Hickman NRC J. R. Padgett G. Charnoff, Esq.

D. Hahn INPO S. J. Brewer 9503010362 950220 PDR ADOCK 05000316 S PDR

NRC FORM 366 . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PROVED BY OMB NO. 315~104 IS 92i EXP (RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE O COMPLY VENT THIS INFQRMAtlON COLLECTCN 4EOUEST: '".0 "PS FO~~

LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARtXNG BUIIEN ESTIMATE TQ THE INFORMADQN ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB TT I eL U.S. NUCLEA REGULATORY CQMMISSCN WASHINGTON OC 20666~I. MO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROrECT Oidooicek OFFCE OF (See reverSe fOr required number Of digitS/CharaCterS far eaCh blOCk) MANAGEMENTANO BUDGET. WASHINGTON. CC 20600.

FACIUTY NAME lil DOCKET NUMBER IT) PAGE ITI DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 2 0S000 316 10F 3 UNIT 2 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM MADE 'INOPERABLE WITHOUT COMPENSATORY ACTION DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR.

EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6 I REPORT NUMBER 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8 FACIUTY NAME OQCKET NUMBER SEOUENtiAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER OAY 05000 FACIlflvNAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 06 95 95 001 00 02 20 95 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR i: ICheck one or morel 11 MODE (9) 20A02(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a) (2) (iv) 73.71(bl POWER 20 405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a) (2) (v) 73.71(cl LEVEL (10) 100K 20A05(a)(1) (ii) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii) OTHER iseeeeY ul AeeINCI 20.405(a) (1) (iii) 50.73(a) (2) (i) 50.73(a) (2l(viii)(A) de~ end ~ TeII, NRC 20.405(a) (1) (iv) 50.73(a) (2) (ii) 50.73(al(2) (viii)(B) Form 066AI 20.405(a) (1l(vl 50.73(a) (2)(iii) 50.73(a) (2) (x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 TELEPHONE NUMBER iincwoe Alee Coeel

'"T. P B INTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT 616 466-2601 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER To Npres TO NPROS DAY YEAR SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 ~ECTED YES SUBMISSION FI Yee. camreeie EXPECTED SUBL0SSION DATE) DATE (15)

ABsTRAOT (Limit to 1400 spaces. i.e. approximately 15 single-spaced typewntten knes) (16)

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On January 6, 1995 at 1112 hours0.0129 days <br />0.309 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.23116e-4 months <br /> it was discovered that the Unit 2 fire detection monitor panel switch (EZIS/ZC-HS) had been placed in the "off" position during the performance of a surveillance. Zn the "off" position, visual and audible alarms associated with the Unit 2 fire detection zones will not alarm in the Control Room. Zt was determined that the switch had been in the "off" position for approximately three hours, during which time all Unit 2 fire detection was inoperable without the appropriate compensatory measures being taken.

On January 26, 1995 it was determined that this event was 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), as operation prohibited by Technical reportable under Specifications.

The event is attributed to personnel error. The switch was left in the "off" position in violation of the procedure being used to perform the surveillance.

If a fire had occurred during the period when the fixe detection system was inoperable, a "Fire System Actuation" or "C02 Header Pressurized" alarm would still have annunciated in the Control Room for the areas provided with fire suppression capabilities, alerting the Control Room to a fire in the monitored areas. Routine security patrols and operator tours were also ongoing for areas without a fire suppression system. Zn addition, multiple Unit 2 fire detection zones were being toured as a result of other fire protection concerns. Based on this, the event did not represent a significant safety hazard and at no time was the health of safety of the public placed in jeopardy.

S4C FC4M $66 I6 921

HAC fORM SSSA U.S. NUCLEAR AEGULATOAYCOMMISSION

[64(SI APPROVEO OM6 HO. 21600104 ESTIMArEO SVAOEH ~ EA RESPONSE tO COMPLY WTN 'S LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) IHPOAMATION COI.LECTION REQVESt. SOO HAS POR<<RO COMMENTS REGAAOING SVAOEH ESTIMATE 'tO THE RECOROS TEXT CONTINUATION AHO AEPOATS MANAGEMENT SRAHCH IP 6201. V.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHING'tON OC 206$ 5. AHO TO THE PAPERWORK AEOUCTION PRO(SOT 121S001041 OPPICE OP MANAGEMENTAHO SUOGE't, WASHINGTON, OC 20SOS PACILII'V NAME 111 I COCKET HVMSEA 11I PAGE ISI LEA NUMSEA ISI I ISSGVEHPIA I AEVI$10HI

( 4UM44A I i'4UMPPA DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT I ONIT Io (5 (o Io! o 3(l 6I9 5I OIOI OIO )0 I -Io" 0 l 3 TEXT III ~ PPPCP N nOuree. PW 444PPPAer HIIC Avm 2064'411121 I ) I 1 I Conditions Prior to the Occurrence Unit One was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.

Descri tion of Event On January 6, 1995 at approximately 0815 hours0.00943 days <br />0.226 hours <br />0.00135 weeks <br />3.101075e-4 months <br />, the Unit 2 fire detection monitor panel switch (EZZS)/IC-HS) was taken to the "off" position by a technician performing a routine surveillance. The technician then left the Control Room without restoring the panel alarm function.

The panel switch was in the HoffA position for approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> was discovered at 1112 hours0.0129 days <br />0.309 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.23116e-4 months <br /> and restored to the "on" position.

before it The fire detection monitor panel switch (EZIS/ZC-HS) is a cut-out switch for the Pyrotronics fire detection system installed throughout the unit and in various site office buildings. Zn the "off" position, visual and audible alarms associated .with the fire detection zones will not alarm in the Control Room.

During the 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> that the switch was in the Aoff position no visual or audible A alarms could be received in the Control Room, causing the fire detection system to be inoperable without proper compensatory measures being taken.

Cause of Event This event is attributed to personnel error. The procedure for the surveillance being performed, **12 THP 6030. IMP.153, allows the monitor panel switch (EIZS/IC-HS) to be taken to the HoffA position momentarily to reset alarms at the panel. However, the procedure also specifically states that the technician at the panel is responsible for ensuring that the Control Room alarm functions are restored prior to leaving the test panel unattended. The technician placed the switch in the AoffA position and then exitect the Control Room.

A lack of understanding of the function of the switch contributed to this event.

It was not understood until after the event, while reviewing the applicable print, that placing the switch to AoffA would defeat all Unit 2 fire detection.

al sis of Event This event was determined to be reportable on January 26, 1995 pursuant to aOCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification. Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 requires that within one hour, an hourly fire watch patrol be established if detectors in any fire detection zones are inoperable. With the fire detection more than one half. of the fire monitor alarm switch in the "off" position, all Unit 2 fire detection was inoperable.

HAC Pone SSSA ISSSI

NRC SORM ESSA U.5. NUCLEAR RKQULATORY COMMISSION losel ArrROVEO OMS HO. 2150410$

ESTIM EO 4VROEH rER RESrONSE TO COMrLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) IHSORMATION COLL'ECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. fORWARO COMMENTS REQAROING SVROEN ESTIMATE TO TNE RKCORO5 TEXT CONTINuATION AHO RKrORT5 MAHAQEMEHT SRANCH Ir 520I. V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI551ON. WASHIHQTOH. OC 20555. ANO TO THE rArERWORK REOUCTION rROJECT 1215041041. Of f ICE Of MANAGEMENTAHO KUOQET.WASHINGTON. OC 20502.

fACILITYHAMS 111 COCKET NUMKER (2I LER NUMK~ R I ~ I rAQK ISI YEAR aaA

~ SSQUSNTIAL AtVrtlON rrVM ta DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NUMB A UNIT 2 o 5 o o o 3Il 69 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 " 0 3 TEXT N mare aaaaa e eeffaeerr. rraa aaeaaanar HlIC farrrr 2SISA'tl I Ill Anal sis of Event continued In the event of a fire, a "Fire System Actuation " or .RC02 Header Pressurized" alarm would still have annunciated in the Control Room for those areas provided with fire suppression capabilities. Routine security patrols and operator tours were ongoing in the areas'onitored by the fire detection system but not having fire suppression capabilities. In addition, multiple Un't 2 fire detection zones were being toured in support of other fire protection concerns. Based on this, the event did not represent a significant safety concern. At no time was the health or safety of the public jeopardized.

Corrective Action Upon discovery, the switch was restored to the "on" position and testing was completed.

To prevent recurrence, labels have been placed on the control panel for each unit at the monitor switch. The label cautions personnel against leaving the switch in the "off" position and states the results of leaving including the Technical Specification which must be entered.

it in. that configuration, Similar Events

'315/93-003-01 Failed Com onent 1dentification None H RC farra 254A 10451