Text

LER 90-001-00:on 900225,pyralarm Fire Detection Zone for Elevation of Auxiliary Bldg Declared Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fire Watch Dispatch Notified & Continuous Fire Watch posted.W/900323 Ltr
	ML17328A620
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	03/22/1990
From:	Blind A, Sampson J; INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	; NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
	LER-90-001-01, LER-90-1-1, NUDOCS 9004040035
	Download: ML17328A620 (7)
	v • d • e

ACCELERATED DI UTION DEMON TION SYSIHM

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REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9004040035 DOC.DATE: 90/03/22 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana & 05000315 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SAMPSON,J.R. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele. 'LIND,A.A.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 90-001-00:on 900225,pyralarm fire detection zone inoperable, roving FW on inoperable fire rated assemblies.

W/9 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES '

ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD3-1 LA 1 1 PD3-1 PD 1 1

,GIITTER,J. 1 1 E INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 5 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1 1 NRR/DET/ESGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 NRR DS RG FIL RG LBSD1 FILE 01 0

1 1

NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB 1, 1, 1 1

EXTERNAL EG&G STUART I V A 1 1 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 I NS C MURPHY I G ~ A 1 1 1 1 A

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FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED'TTR 32 ENCL 32

Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 458 Bridgman, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 INDIANA NICHIGAM POWER March 23, 1990 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating License .DPR-58 Docket No. 50-315 Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the followinq report. is being submitted:

90-001-00 Sincerely, A.A. Blind

~ ~

Plant Manager AAB:clw Attachment cc: D.H. Williams, Jr.

A.B. Davis, Region III M.P. Alexich P.A. Barrett J.E. Borggren R.F. Kroeger NRC Resident Inspector J.G. Giitter, NRC R.C. Callen G. Charnoff, Esq.

Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D. Hahn INPO S.J. Brewer/B.P. Lauzau 90040400"'00=-:2-1='DR ADOC}: 050Ci0= S 5 PLrC

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPAOVED OMB NO. 31500104 (SSB)

EXPIRES; 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION AEQUESTt 60.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PAO/ECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME l1) DOCKET NUMBER l2) PA E 3 D. C. Cook Nuclear Plane, Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 5 1 OF 0 5 Pyralarm Fire Detection Zone Inoperable, Roving FW on Inoperable Fire Rated Assemblies Not Upgraded eo Continuous Fire Watch Due to Personnel Error.

EVENT DATE (5) LFR NUMBER (5) REPORT DATE (71 OTHER FACILI'TIES INVOLVED (Sl YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVS~ DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(5)

MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH D. C. Cook -Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 ]

0 2 25 90 90 0 0 1 00 03 2 290 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T0 THE RLOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFA ()1 /Check one Or more Ol the Iellowlng/ (11 OPERATING MODE (0) ] 20. 402 (11 ) 20.405(c) 50,73( ~ l(2)(iv) 73.7103)

POWER 20.405 (o) (1) li) 5025(c) ll) 50.73(o) (2) (r) 73.71(cl LE v E L 20.405 (I l(Q ) 50.35(c)(2) 60.73(o) (2)(viil OTHER ISpeclfy In Ahttrect 1 0 0 (x )

trerorvenr/ln Text, HRC Form 20,406 I ~ ) (I ) (iii) 60.73( ~ l(2) (I) 60.73(o)l2)(riil)IA) 366A/

20.406(o l(1) (Iv) 50.73(ol(2)lii) 50.73( ~ ) l2) lvlii)IS) 20.405(ol(1) lv) 60.73(ol(2) liii) 50.73 I~ I (2) I x )

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE J. R. Sam son, 0 erations De artment Su erintendent COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) 616465-5901

~NSr62y x n CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE TO NPADS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TVRER i@Q c >0 'PORTABLE TURER TO NPADS Pjg>>

IFpPrI9i'~@j L~X<N~<

SUPPLEMENTAL AEPOAT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES /II yeL complete EXPECFEI/ St/8MISSIOH DA TE/ NO ABSTRACT /Llmlt to Ictx) tpecet, /.e., epproxlmetely Ilfteen tlnpre tpece typerrr/tten linn/ (15)

On 02-25-90 at 1015 the pyralarm fire detection zone 2 for the of the Auxiliary (Aux.) Building (Bldg.) (EFR ZN 2) was declared 587'levation inoperable. The Unit Supervisor (US) notified the Fire Watch (FW) Dispatch and a roving FW was established to patrol the 587'levation of ehe Aux.

Bldg. to satisfy Technical Specification (TS). The US did not note that the TS action statement previously in affect for inoperable Coolant Charging Pump room wall fire rated assemblies located within the fire detection zone changed when EFR ZN 2 became inoperable and therefore, failed to upgrade a roving FW to a continuous FW. A continuous FW was noe established for the inoperable assemblies until 02-26-90 ae 1620. Also, while EFR ZN 2 was inoperable, Fire Door 368 was inoperable from 0635 to 1532 on 02-26-90, and Fire Door 364 was inoperable from 0740 eo 1517 on 02-26-90. The US eseablished a roving FW paerol on the inoperable fire doors. With EFR ZN 2 inoperable, a continuous FW should have been established to satisfy the TS action statement.

A reference to the fire rated assembly TS has been added to the surveillance procedure for a standing fire detection alarm. In addition, this event was reviewed with Operations personnel by a training memo and discussed with the involved personnel.

NRC Form 356 (54)B)

NRC FORM 366A (649) ~

LICENSEE EVENT. REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAYCOMMISSION t APPROVEO 0MB NO. 3150010<<

EXPIRES: <</30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFOAMATION COLLECTION AEOUESTI 50A) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BUADEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150OI0<<I. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LFA NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION

!@j NUMBER 9 NUMBER D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 3 ] 5 9 0 0 0 100 02 OF 0 5 TEXT /// more <<P<<o<< /t r<<rruind, Ir<<<<<<ddrdoo<</ HRC Form 366A'<</ l)7)

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Unit 1 (U-1) in Mode 1 operating at 100X.

Unit 2 (U-2) in Mode 1 operating at 100X.

Descri tion of Event On 02-25-90 at 1015, the pyralarm fire detection (EIIS/ID-DEC) zone for the 587'levation (elev.) of the Auxiliary (Aux.) Building (Bldg.) (EFR ZN 2) was declared inoperable. This fire detection zone encompasses areas in both U-1 and U-2. A roving fire watch (FW) patrol was established to patrol the 587'evel elev. of the Aux. Bldg. as required by Technical Specifications (TS) 3.3.3.7 (U-1) and 3.3.3.8 (U-2) Fire Detection Instrumentation. Prior to the fire detection for the 587'lev. of the Aux. Bldg. becoming inoperable, a roving FW was established on the inoperable U-1 and U-2 Coolant Charging Pump (CCP) (EIIS/BQ-P) room removable walls per TS 3.7.10 (Fire Rated Assemblies). When the fire detection for the'87'lev. of the Aux. Bldg. became inoperable, the Unit Supervisor failed to recognize that the requirements to satisfy the TS 3.7.10 action statement changed. With the fire detection on the 587'lev.

of the Aux. Bldg. inoperable, the US should have upgraded the roving FW on the U-1 and U-2 CCP Room removable walls to a continuous FW to satisfy the TS 3.7.10 action statement.

In addition, while the 587'lev. Aux. Bldg. fire detection was inoperable, two fire doors within the fire detection zone became inoperable. Fire Door 368 (Nuclear Sampling Room) was inoperable from 0635 to 1532 on 02-26-90, and Fire Door 364 (U-1 CCP Room) was inoperable from 0740 to 1517 on 02-26-90. When the fire doors became inoperable, the US notified the FW Dispatch to establish a roving FW on the inoperable doors. With the Aux. Bldg. fire detection inoperable, a continuous FW should have 587'lev.

been established to satisfy the TS 3.7.10 action statement.

On 02-26-90 at 1620, the US recognized that the TS 3.7.10 action statement was not met for the inoperable fire rated assemblies. The US notified the FW Dispatch to upgrade the roving FW on the U-1 and U-2 CCP Room removable walls to a continuous FW Since Fire Door 368 and 364 were operable at the

~

time the finding was identified, no FW was required to be posted on Fire Doors 368 and 364.

NRC Form 366A (6J)9)

NRC FOAM 368A (689) ~

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t APPROVEO 0MB NO. 31500104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS COLLECTION REOUESTI 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PJ)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)104), OFFICE

'NFOAMATION OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LEA NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)

YEAR /r(SE SEOUENTIAL REVISION NUMSER NUMBER

'D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 3 I 5 9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 OF 0 5 TEXT /// mort 4/root /4 rtr/Ir/rtr/ oso tdChrr'ont/ HRC /oem 36649/ (17)

A similar event occurred in December 1989 when an operator did not recognize the TS 3.7.10 requirement to upgrade the roving FW on an inoperable fire rated assembly to a continuous FW when the fire detection on one side of the fire rated assembly became inoperable. Although this event was similar, the event was not reportable since a continuous FW had been established on a fortuitous basis. The preventive action for the December event included referencing TS 3.7.10 on the U-1 and U-2 Event Initiated Surveillance procedures for Standing Fire Detection Alarms. In addition, a commitment was made to train Operations personnel on the addition of the TS 3.7.10 reference to the procedure and the need to check for inoperable fire barriers when a fire zone becomes inoperable. The procedures were revised and placed into effect on 02-27-90. The training "was also completed on 02-27-90. It is believed that these preventive.

actions would have prevented this event 02-25-90.

if they had been in place on Cause of Event The cause of this event was personnel error. The involved operators failed to review TS Open Items when the fire detection for the 587'lev. of the Aux. Bldg. became inoperable. This review would have identified inoperable fire rated assemblies which required upgrading from a roving FW to a continuous FW.

In addition, when the fire doors became inoperable during the inoperability of the 587'lev. of the Aux. Bldg. fire detection, the involved personnel failed to adequately review TS 3.7.10 to determine that a continuous FW was required.

Anal sis of Event The TS 3.7.10 action statement for an inoperable fire rates assembly requires that "...within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly, or verify the OPERABILITY of the fire detectors per specification 4.3.3.7 on at least one side of the inoperable assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol...". Failure to establish the required FW patrol within one hour was a violation of TS 3.7.10 and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

The U-1 and U-2 CCP room removable walls were inoperable without a continuous FW for 29 hours3.356481e-4 days 0.00806 hours 4.794974e-5 weeks 1.10345e-5 months 2 minutes. Fire door-364 was inoperable without a continuous FW for 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 37 minutes, and Fire door 368 was inoperable without a continuous FW for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months 57 minutes.

NRC Form 366A (6419)

NRC FORM 366A (649) ~

t LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)

TEXT CONTINUATION US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l APPROVEO OMB NO. 3)500104 E XPIR ESI 6/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: SOA) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150010E), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

'K6< SEQUENTIAL Warp~'EVISION YEAR O'UMBER ;md NUMBER D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 3 15 90 0 0 1 0 0 04 oFo TEXT /I/ more Specs /E rer/Ir/red, e>> eddicene/1Y/IC %%drm 36643/ (IT)

The analysis of this event concludes that in the unlikely event of a fire, personnel would have been promptly aware of its presence and would have extinguished the fire without significant spreading of the fire or equipment damage. This conclusion is based on the following:

1. The 587'levation of the Aux. Bldg. is provided with a Preaction Dry Pilot Sprinkler System. This system has a compressed air pilot line with sealed sprinkler heads rated at 175oF, and water piping with sprinklers rated at 250oF or at 220oF for side wall'sprinklers. Had a fire occurred on the 587'lev. of the Aux. Bldg., Control Room annunciators in U-1 and U-2 would have alarmed upon actuation of the sprinkler system to alert the Control Room. The operators would then investigate the cause of the alarm and take corrective action to extinguish the fire.

2. Although a continuous FW was not assigned to the inoperable fire rated assemblies, a roving FW was established to patrol the inoperable fire rated assemblies and the 587'lev. of the Aux. Bldg. each half hour.

Had a fire occurred which affected the fire rated assembly, the fire would have been noted by the roving FW within 30 minutes and corrective actions would have been taken.

Although a continuous FW was not posted at the inoperable fire rated assemblies, it is concluded that the alarms associated with the 587'ire Protection Syst: em and the roving FW, touring the 587'lev. of the Aux.

Bldg. each 30 minutes, would have allowed timely identification of a fire.

Therefore, this event is not considered to have created a significant safety concern, nor did it create a significant hazard to the health and safety of the general public.

Corrective Action

1. When the US recognized that a continuous FW was required for the U-1 and U-2 CCP Room removable walls with the fire detection for the of the Aux. Bldg. inoperable, the FW Dispatch was notified and 587'lev.

a continuous FW was posted.

2. Since Fire Door 364 and 368 were operable when the FW posting error was noted, the TS 3.7.10 action statement had been exited and no corrective action was required.

3. This event was discussed with the involved personnel. The personnel are fully aware of the TS '3.7.10 requirements for an inoperable fire rated assembly.

NRC Form 366A (649)

NRC FORM 366A (6$ 9)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR RFGULATORY COMMISSION t APPROVEO OMB NO 3(50d)06 EXPIRES 6/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO

')HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(50d(06). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER 12) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR @+:rk SEOUENTIAL re i%%

REVISION NUMBER NUMBER D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 o so 00 31 5 9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 QF 0 5 TEXT /I/ mero Arroeo /e ootu/rod, ueo odd/I/erro/ NRC Form 366AS/ (17)

4. A reference to TS 3.7.10 has been added to the Event Initiated Surveillance procedures. Training has been completed on the procedure change and the need to check for inoperable fire barriers when a fire zone becomes inoperable.

5. A training memo was sent to operations personnel to review this event.

Failed Com 'onent Identification None Previous Similar Events A review of previous similar Licensee Event Reports did not reveal a similar LER where an operator failed to upgrade a roving FW on an inoperable fire rated assembly to a continuous FW when the fire detection zone being used to satisfy the Technical Specification became inoperable.

Although a similar LER was not identified, the plant condition report system did identify a similar event were an operator failed to recognize the TS requirement to upgrade a roving FW on an inoperable fire rated assembly to a continuous FW. Since the TS requirement for a continuous FW was met by a continuous FW posted on one side of the inoperable fire rated assembly, this finding was not reportable.

NRC Form 366A (649)

ML17328A620

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