ML17328A505

LER 89-008-01:on 890311,reactor Cable Tunnel CO2 for Quadrants 1,3 & 4 Declared Inoperable Due to False Indication of status.W/901017 Ltr

ML17328A505
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	09/28/1990
From:	Blind A, Sampson J INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-008, LER-89-8, NUDOCS 9010250377
Download: ML17328A505 (8)

Text

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9010250377 DOC.DATE: 90/09/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana & 05000316 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SAMPSON,J.R. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele BLIND,A.A.'Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECXPIENT AFFILIATION R

SUBJECT:

LER 89-008-01:on 890311,reactor cable tunnel C02 for Quadrants 1,3 & 4 inoperable due to false indication. D DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T'OPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE-TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES A ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD3-1 LA 1 1 PD3-1 PD 1 1 D COLBURN,T. 1 1 D

INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DS P 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E . 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/L'HFB1 1 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 N W SPLB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 EG 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EXB 1 1 RGN3 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSXC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D

D D

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P 1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF 'COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 30 ENCL 30

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'ook Nuclear PO, Sox 458

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Indiana Michigan~.

Power Company Plant Bridgrnan, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 INDIANA MfCHIGiAN POWER October 17, 1990 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating Licenses DPR-75 Docket No. 50-316 Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:

89-008-01 Sincerely, 8 d8 A.A. Blind Plant Manager AAB:clj Attachment cc: D.H. Williams, Jr.

A.B. Davis, Region III M.P. Alexich P.A. Barrett J.E. Borggren .

R.F. Kroeger B. Walters Ft. Wayne NRC Resident Inspector T. Colburn NRC J.G. Keppler M.R. Padgett G. Charnoff, Esq.

Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D. Hahn INPO S.J. Brewer/B.P. Lauzau B.A. Svensson

@010250;,77 90092'~

PDh ADOCK 05000-'16 PDC

NRC FORM 366 US,NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (64)9) APPAOVED OMB NO.31504104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT tLER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS ANO REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430), V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3'I500104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503, FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKFT NUMBER (2) PA 5 3 D. C. C ok Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 1 OFO 3

""'"'eactor Cable Tunnel CO for quadrants 1, 3 and 4 Inoperable Without Required Firewatch Due to False indication of Status Caused b Worn Isolation Switch Ke EVENT DATE IS) LEA NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IS)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR ~5 BFOUENTIAL orfr 14'UMBER Xr~P REVOIR MONTH NUMBER DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 89 8 9 0 0 8 0 1 0 9 2 8 9 0 0 5 0 0 0 THIS RFPOAT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE RLGUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (): /Choco onr or morr of the Iollowinp/ (11 OPERATING MODE (1) 4 20.402(B) 20.405(c l 60,73(o) (2) (iv) 73.71(B)

POWER 20.405(o)(1)(l) 5026(c)(I) 50.73( ~ I (2) (vl 73.71(c)

LEYEL 0 0 0 20.405(o) (I )(N) 50.36(c)(2) 60.73(o)(2)(vN) OTHER ISprcify in ABrtrrct trrlow mr/ ln yrxL HRC Form 20.4054) (1)(IN) 50.73(o) (2)( I) 50.73(o)(2)(vNII(A) 3ESA/

r 20AOS(o I (1)(iv) = 50.'73(o)(2)(N) 50.73(o) (2) (vlNI (6)

>84PI:, r'R, ~A> 20.405(s) (11(vl 50.73(o) (2) (Nl) 50.73(s) (2)(xl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NVMBEA AREA CODE J. R. Sam son, 0 erations De'rtment Su erintendent COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILVAE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) 6164655901 I "IIV"".5'xRIEr~c'.

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURER REPORTABLE @<'M TO NPRDS

@'r r.. '

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONEN'T MANUFAC TUAER EPOR TAB LE TO NPRDS xc~%

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14I MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE ('ISI YES IIIyrr, complrtr EXPECTED S(/Ehf/SS/DN DATE/

AssTRAcT ILlmlt to lroo rprcrr, I r., rpproolmr roly fi from tlnplr rpres typrwri t ton linrr/ (16)

This revision reflects changes in the corrective action.

On .Harch ll, 1989, at 0821 hours0.0095 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.123905e-4 months <br />, dioxide (C02) actuation system for the reactor cable tunnel quadrants one, it was identified that the automatic carbon three and four; had been isolated since 0403 hours0.00466 days <br />0.112 hours <br />6.66336e-4 weeks <br />1.533415e-4 months <br /> without the required firewatch. The C02 automatic actuation was isolated via the local key lock isolation switch at 0357 to allow personnel entry. After personnel exited the area, the key lock switch was restored to what was thought to be the normal position. This was verified by the local indicating light extinguishing when the key lock switch was turned. A second person verified by visual observation that the switch had been restored to the normal position.

At 0831, permission was requested to isolate the reactor cable tunnel C02 system. The Control Room operator identified that the associated AC02 isolated" annunciator. alarm was already in. It was then identified that the key lock switch was not fully in the normal position.

The root cause of this was an excessively worn key which allowed the key to be removed prior to the switch being fully in the normal position and with only one of the two switch contacts made up (one set of contacts is for the local indicating light, the other set is for the C02 isolation and Control Room annunciator). The worn key was replaced and a policy has been instituted to replace the affected keys on a periodic basis.

NRC Form 356 (64)9)

NAC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR AEGULATORYCOMMISSION (64)9) APPAOVED OMB NO. 31500104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOADS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3)

BEOVENTIAI. 6?II: REVISION

...?I NVMBER ...? NUMBER D. C. Cook Nucl ear Pl ant Uni t TEXT /I/II>>m <<>>co /4 meked, uoo odd/doI>>l /Y/IC Fom? 36543/ (17) 2 0 5 0 0 0 8 9 0 08 0 1 0 QF Conditions Prior to Occur'rence Unit Two in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown).

Descri tion of Event This revision reflects changes in the corrective action. ,

On March ll, 1989, at 0831 hours0.00962 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.161955e-4 months <br />, it was identified that the automatic carbon dioxide (C02) actuation system (EIIS/LW) for the reactor cable tunnel quadrants one, three and four; had been isolated since 0403 without the required firewatches.

The C02 automatic actuation was isolated via the key lock switch (EIIS/LW-HS) at 0357 to allow personnel entry. After personnel exited the area, the key lock operated switch was restored to what was thought to be the normal position. This was verified by the local indicating light extinguishing when the key lock switch was turned. 'A second person verified by visual observation that the switch had been restored to the normal position.

At 0831, permission was requested to isolate the reactor cable tunnel CO2 system. The Control Room operator identified that the associated "C02 isolated" annunciator alarm was already in. It was then identified that the key lock switch was not fully in the normal position.

Cause of Event The key lock switch has two sets of contacts which are arranged in a gang fashion. The key switch operates the first set of contacts and the first set of contacts then operate the second set of contacts. The first set of contacts are for the local indicating light; the second set is for the automatic actuation circuitry and the Control Room alarm annunciators. The switch is also designed such that the key can -only be removed is fully in the normal or isolate position.

if the switch Investigation of this event determined that the key could be removed from the switch, prior to being in the full normal or isolate position, key was excessively worn. It was also determined that the first set of if the contacts could be made up without the second set being made up.

This event was caused by a worn key as described above and is considered the root cause of this event. Contributing to this event was the failure of the Control Room operators to recognize that the annunciator alarm remained in after the local key lock switch was returned to normal. At the time of this event, a cooldown from Node 4 to Mode 5 was in progress. The level of activity in the Control Room contributed to the operators not identifying the problem.

NAC Fom? 366A (64)9)

l.

NAC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED 0MB NO. 31500104 (669) 6 XP I R E6 I 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOAOS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLtAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1'HE PAPERWOAK REDUCTION PROJtCT (31504)104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR gM SEGUENTIAI. +J)( REVISION NUMSER i@ NUMSER D. C. C k N P TEXT /ffmar <<>>Ce /4//V/kfSI/, u44 Ed//I/tV>>/HRC RNIII36643/ (12) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 8 9 008 .01 0 3 OF 0 3 Anal sis of Event The isolation of the C02 system without compensatory fire watch coverage, was in violation of Technical specification 3.7.9.3 action a, and is reportable un'der 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).

It has been concluded that in the unlikely event of a fire, personnel would have been promptly aware of its presence and been able to control and extinguish the fire without significant propagation or equipment damage.

This conclusion is based on the following: 1) the relatively low fixed combustible load within the area involved; 2) the physical and administrative limits on the introduction of transient combustibles; 3)

Operable early warning fire detection systems (consisting of both ionization and infrared detectors), and 4) the existence of a trained on-shift fire brigade.

Based on the above, this event is not considered to have created any significant safety concern and did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined by 10 CFR 50.59,. nor did it create a significant hazard to the health and safety of the general public.

Corrective Action

1. The worn key,was. replaced and the Safety and Assessment Department has instituted a policy of replacing all of their C02 key lock switch keys on a periodic basis.

2. This event was discussed with several Operations Department personnel.

It was determined that the knowledge. level in regard to responsibilities 'o associated with the C02 system annunciator alarms is adequate.

further corrective action in this area is warranted.

Failed Com onent Identification None Previous Similar Events None NAC Form 366A (64)9)

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