ML17328A189

LER 89-012-00:on 890913,solid State Protection Sys Surveillance Testing Performed on Train B While Train a Safety Injection Pump Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error. Breaker Surveillance Test Procedures revised.W/891005 Ltr

ML17328A189
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	10/05/1989
From:	Baker K, Blind A INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-012-01, LER-89-12-1, NUDOCS 8910160148
Download: ML17328A189 (7)

Text

AC CELE RATED DlBUTI ON DE M ONSTRIQlON SYSTEM REGULATORY. INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8910160148 DOC.DATE: .89/10/05 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET I FACIL:50-315 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana & 05000315 AUTH.,NAME ,AUTHOR AFFILIATION BAKER,K.R. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele BLIND,A.A. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-012-00:on 890913,SSPS surveillance testing performed on Train while Train safety injection pump inoperable.

B A W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL I 'IZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD3-1 LA 1' PD3-1 PD 1 1 GIITTER,J. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 . AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1

1 1

1 1

1 AEOD/ROAB/DS P NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1, '1 2

1 2

1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 .1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB NRR/DLPQ/PEB NRR DRE 8D 10 PB 10 1

1 2

1 1

2 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT ll 1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G WILLIAMSi S 4 4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 'NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 ~ 1 NCTE TO ALL '%IKS" RIKIPIHGS'LEASE HELP US TO REDUCE PRSTE! ~C1'HE DCX:XMEM7 COHIBOL DESK RXH Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) %0 EZiQGNATE KX3R NQQ FR% DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DXXIMENIS KÃJ DONiT NEEDI'ULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED

'OTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 39 ENCL 39

Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nuclear Plant PO. Box 458 Bridgn)an, I)II 49106

, 6164655901 INQMNA N ICHIGAIV POWER October 5, 1989 United States -Nuclear Regul'atory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating License DPR-58 Docket No. 50-315 Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:

89-012-00 Sa:ncerely,

,k R.~

A.A. Blind Plant Manager AAB:clw Attachment.

CC D.H. Nilliams, Jr.

A.B. Davis, Region M.P. Alexich III P.A. Barrett, J.E. Borggren R.F. Kroeger NRC Resident Inspector J.G. Giitter, NRC R.C. Callen G. Charnoff, Esq.

Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D. Hahn INPO PNSRC S,J ~ B1.ewer/B.P. Lau7au ~wg Pl

NRC Form 300 U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATOAY COMMISSION (0.03) APPROVED OMB NO. 31500104 I

EXPIRES'I 0/31/00 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)

DOCKS'7 NUMBER (2) A FACILITY NAME HI D., C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 OF 0 4

"'"'" Solid State Protection System Surveillance Testing Performed on The B3 Train5 While 1 1 The A Train Safety Injection Pump Was Inoperable Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER (0) REPORT DATE (7) O'THER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR yQi" SEQUENTIAL NUMBER PP:

THB NUMNNR MONTH DAY YEAR 0 5 0 0 0 0 9 1 3 89 89 0 1 2 0010 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (I: (Check One or mori Of the follovvfnfl (ll 0 5 0 0 0 OPEAATINO MODE (0) 73.71(II)

] 20.402(0) 20.405( ~ I 00.73(el(2)(lv)

POWER 20.400 (~ HI I B) 50.30(e) (I ) 50.73(eH2Hv) 73.7 1(c)

LEYEL OTHER ISuecrfy In Auttrect 00.73(e)12HYN) 1 0 0 20.400( ~ l(1)(0) 50.30(cH2) uelow enrf ln Tent, NRC Eorm 20A05( ~ I (1)(NI I 50.73(e) (2)(ll 00.73(eHEHvillHA) 34EAI 20.405(e l(1 I Bv) 00.73(eH2) IN) 50,73(e) (2) (vNIH 0 )

20,405(eHIHvl 50.73(eH2)(Ni) 50,73(e)(2Hel LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE K. R. Baker, Operations Superintendent 6 1 6 4 6 5 5 9 0 1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS AEPOAT I13I MANUFAC- EPOATABLE .:>jj:.tIr@Rgen)mmg~tm MANUFACi EPORTABL 9('fga()PALS(FABv)fEy CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TO NPRDS TURER

(~(evcm> .,&13(mli4I~e:::I(:

'Ii)IEIIIjII(IP'0:: j)I(7'jiN>~i@),jij%~,;

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14l MONTH DAY YEAR EXPFCTEO SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES Ilf yet, comulete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE/ NO ABSTRACT ILImlr to f400 tuecet, I e., euurovlmerely frltein tlnoli.tutti ryuevvntren llnnl 110)

At 0852 on September 13, 1989, the B Train of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) was ma'de inoperable Eor SSPS and reactor trip breaker surveillance testing aEter receiving permission Erom the Shift Supervisor and Unit Supervisor. Due to the design of the circuitx'y, the B Train of safety injection is also made inoperable during the testing. The A Train safety injection pump was also inoperable during the testing due to being isolated for leak repairs. Therefore, both safety injection pumps were inoperable Erom 0852 until the B Train of SSPS was returned to operabilit'y at 1000 on September 13, 1989. This violation of T.S. 3.5.2 was recognized by a second Unit Supervisor when reviewing plant status in preparation for the A Train SSPS and reactor trip breaker testing.

The primary cause of this event was failure oE the Shift Supervisor and Unit Supervisor to recognize that the SSPS testing should not be done with the opposite train saEety injection pump inoperable. Also contributing to the event was the job planning process which did not consider the surveillance schedule and the lack of guidance in the surveillance procedure to ensure that opposite train equipment was operable. Preventive actions taken to prevent recurrence include revision of the surveillance procedure and inclusion of the surveillance schedule in the job planning process.'RC Form 300 (0 03 I

NRC Form 388A U.S~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3150&(04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1> DOCKET NUMSER (3( LER NUMSER (8) ~ AGE (3I YEAR .C: SEGMENT/AL .'(". 4(ve/ON SdP. NUM 84 %iK HUMP(4 D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 .3 1 5 8 9 0 1 2 0 0 02oF 0 4 TEXT /limo/4 N/pcd ir /494ir4E 4/4 odd/dd44/PIRC Fd/m 388AS/ (1TI Conditions Prior to Occurrence Unit One in Mode 1 at 100 percent reactor thermal power'.

Descri tion of Event At 0852 on September 13, 1989, the B Train of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) (EIIS/JC) was made inoperable for SSPS and reactor trip breaker (EIIS/AA-BKR) surveillance testing after receiving permission from the Shift Supervisor (Senior Licensed Operator) and the Unit Supervisor (Senior Licensed Operator).'ue to the design of the circuitry, the B Train of safety injection (EIIS/BQ) is also made inoperable during the testing.

Concurent with the B Train testing, the A Train safety injection pump was also inoperable due to it being isolated for leak repairs at 0450 on September 13, 1989. Therefore, both safety injection pumps were inoperable for one hour and eight minutes. One safety injection pump was isolated and the other would not have auto started in the event of an SI signal, from 0852 when the B Train was 'placed in test, until the B Train of SSPS was returned to operability at 1000 on September 13, 1989. This violation of Technical Specifi.cation 3.5.2 was. recognized by a second Unit Supervisor '(Senior Licensed Operator) when reviewing plant status prior to granting approval for the A Train SSPS and reactor trip breaker testing.

Cause of Event The primary cause of this event was that the Shift Supervisor and the Unit Supervisor failed to recognize that the B Train SSPS testing should not have been done while the A Train safety injection pump was inoperable. Both supervisors knew that the A Train safety injection pump was inoperable, but they did not make the connection when authorizing performance of the B Train SSPS testing.

Job planning inadequacy also contributed to this event. The Operations Department and Instrumentation & Control Department representatives, involved in planning of the work for the day, did not consider the surveillance test schedule when arranging for the A Train safety injection pump work.

Also contributing to this event was a procedural weakness. The Unit One SSPS and reactor trip breaker surveillance test procedure did not contain direction to ensure the opposite train equipment was operable prior to commencing the test.

44C FOAM 3(dA (9831

NRC Form 388A U.S. NUCLEAR RECULATCRY COMMISSION (943(

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3150WIOI EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (II DOCKET NUMSER (1I LER NUMSER LSI PACE (31 YEAR SEOVENTIAL P<rr REVISION NVModrl NVMOTA D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 e ~ 0 o o 3 1 5 8 9 0 1 2 0 0 03<<0 4 TEXT llfmoro sosco ir oso/rwsrL o>> a /Tioiono///RC Form 36SA's/ (IT(

Anal sis of the Event This event is considered reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii).

During this event, all.of the A Train equipment was operable except for the North safety injection pump. If a safety injection signal had occurred during this event the B Train equipment would not have automatically started, but would have started upon manual action. The emergency operating procedure for a safety injection requires the operators to verify the safety injection .

pumps running and to manually start pumps as needed. It is conservatively estimated that the operators would have manually started the South safety injection pump within five minutes of the event initiation. The limiting accident when considering loss of high head safety injection is the small break loss of coolant accident. For the circumstances in question the A Train'centrifugal charging pump would have began injection upon event initiation, but when a conservative approach of no high hea'd safety injection is consi.dered, significant increases in core fluid temperature are not expected until well after the five minute point.

Since operator training and procedural guidance existed to ensure that'he B Train safety injection pump and charging pump would have been promptly started in the event of a safety injection, it is concluded that adequate safety injection flow would have been initiated far in advance of reaching an inadequate core cooli.ng situation.

Based on the above it is concluded that this event did not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.

Corrective Actions A memorandum was issued to Operations Department personnel to reinforce the necessity of maintaining opposite train equipment operable during SSPS'esting on the other train.

This event was discussed with the job planners to stress the need to consider the surveillance test schedules during the daily job planning meetings. The surveillance schedules are now being used during the job planning process.

I The Unit One SSPS and reactor trip breaker surveillance test procedures were revised with'change sheets on September 21, 1989, to add a requirement for the Shift Supervisor to ensure that the opposite train equipment is operable. The Unit Two procedures did not require revision as they had been previously revised to include the requirement.

NaC so/IM 3ddA (9 831

NRC Form 3ddA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATCRY COMMISSION 1943)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3'Is)WIOI EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILI'TY NAME III DOC)hET NUMSER 13) LER NIIMSER (8) PACE )3) yd*R ~u'SEQUENT/AL 5'rUM d4

@AN 4d V rdlQ rr r/v M 9 d 4 D. C. Cook Nuclear TEXT /// moro d/roco /I roduwo/L Plant -

uoo or)r/rohorho//VRC Form 3SSAS)

Unit

)IT) 1 0 5 0 0 0 3 I 5 8 9 0 l 20 0 0 4 oF 0 4 The procedure weakness was reviewed for generic implications. It was determined that the current practice for the writing of procedures is to provide the Shift Supervisor with sufficient information to allow determining the affect of performing the procedure on plant equipment, and systems. This practice is 'also specified in the Plant Manager Instruction (PMI-2010) for procedures. Since adequate guidance in this area is provided by PMI-2010, no new initiatives are warranted at this time.

Failed Com onent Identification None Previous Similar Events There were no previous similar events identified which involved SSPS surveillance testing on one train, while equipment was inoperable on the opposite train.

44C Foohr dddo 19 83)