ML17328A084

LER 89-013-00:on 890617,reactor Trip Breakers Opened When ESF Signal Initiated from Set I,Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel.Caused by Miscommunication. Importance of Complete Turnover stressed.W/890717 Ltr

ML17328A084
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	07/17/1989
From:	Beilman T, Will Smith INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-013, LER-89-13, NUDOCS 8907250330
Download: ML17328A084 (5)

Text

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ACCESSION NBR:8907250330 DOC.DATE: 89/07/17 NOTARIZZD: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-316 Donald'.- Cook Nu'clear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana & 05000316 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BEILMAN T.P.:".: Indiana Michigan:Power Co.",(formerly Indiana':.Michigan Ele SMITH,W.Q. ....= Indiana Michigan Power Co:. (formerly, Indiana-,-&.- Michigan Ele R RECXP.NAME - - RECIPIENT AFFXLIATION I

I

SUBJECT:

LER 89-013-00:on 890617,calibr during startup surveillance testin results in une ected ESF actuation. ltr. D W/8 '

S DISTRIBUTION-CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL TXTLE:. 50.73/50;9 Licensee. Event Report (LER), Incident Q SIZE Rpt, etc; NOTES:

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FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 43 ENCL 42

Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nuclear Plant~

P.O. Box 458 Z

Bridgman, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 July 17, 1989 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating License DPR-74 Docket No. 50-316 Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:

89-013-00 Sincerely, W. G. Smith, Jr.

Plant Manager WGS: clw Attachment cc: D.H. Williams, Jr.

A.B. Davis, Region III M.P. Alexich P.A. Barrett J.E. Borggren R.F. Kroeger NRC Resident Inspector J. Giitter, NRC R.C. Callen G. Charnoff, Esq.

Dottie D. Hahn Sherman, ANI Library pP

\ I, INPO PNSRC A.A. Blind S.J. Brewer/B.P. Lauzau 89072 0330 S907i7 PDF" ADOCI 050003i6 S PDC

NRC Form 355 U.S. NUCLEAR AEOULATORY COMMISSION (443)

APPAOVED OMIL NO. 31500104 EXPIRES: 4/31/44 LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME ul DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT I 2 0 5 0 0 0 OF 0

D.CALIBRATION 1 6 3 1

DURING START-UP SURVEILLANCE TESTING RESULTS IN UNEXPECTED ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION DUE TO INADE UATE SHIFT TURNOVER EVENT DATE (Bl LEA NUMBER (DI REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IDI MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR ~. SDQUDNTrAL NUMBER

'??N rraVraK?N hN: NUMDDR MONTH OAY YEAR I'ACILITYNAMED DOCKET NUMBER(s) 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 7 8 9 8 9 013 00 071 7 8 9 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CF R (I: ICI?ecfr one or more of me folio?flop) ('11 MOOS ID) 20A02(D) 73.7)(DI 20AOS(e) 50.73(a) l2) I(a)

POWER 20AOS(allII (I) EOM(c)(1) 50.734) (2) (a) 73.71(c)

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER T. P . BEILMAN AREA CODE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL DEPARTMENT SUPERINTENDENT 61 64 65- 5901 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13l r ry N. ?r?8 .

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YES Ilfyer, complete EXPECTED SUSMISSIOII DATEI X NO ABSTRACT ILlmit to f400 rpecee, I 5, eppronlmetely fifteen rlnpl~e typewrftten lineal (14)

On June 17, 1989 at 2232 hours0.0258 days <br />0.62 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.49276e-4 months <br />, the Unit Two Reactor Trip breakers opened when an unexpected Engineered Safety Features signal initiated from the Set I, Intermediate Range (IR) Nuclear Instrumentation Channel, High Nuclear Flux.

Prior to the event, the unit was in Mode 4 wi.th preparations being made for startup. First shift Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technicians began performing the startup surveillance procedure and removed the block of the High Nuclear Flux trip signal. Operators ensured that the Reactor Trip Breakers were open prior to the test. During testing, the IR bistable setpoints were found beyond the procedural specifications. While the calibration procedure was being obtained for use, operators closed the reactor trip breakers in preparation for testing of the Main Turbine Stop Valves. When the second shift technicians returned to begin calibration, they incorrectly informed the operators that a trip signal would not occur.

Had the technicians realized that the trip would occur, they would have waited to perform the calibration until after the trip breakers had been reopened.

NRC Form 345 ID 53)

NRC Ann 388A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE E T REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUA APPROVEO OMB NO. 3)EOW)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACI/ITY NAME 11) POCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 181 PAGE 13)

SEOUENTIAL REVISION NUMEEII NUMllER D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6 8 9 0 1 3 00 02 oF 03 TEXT//P/NE/eEPECE/4/EEUE9// UEEaEWana////ICFOIINSEE)43/l)l)

Conditions Prior To Occurrence Unit Two in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) prior to start up.

Descri tion of Event On June 17, 1989 at 1315 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />5.003575e-4 months <br />, Instrumentation and Control (I&C) techni-cians began performing surveillance test procedure STP.180 "Instrument Checks Prior to Start-Up." As part of this test procedure, the High Nuclear Flux Trip Block is defeated, by lifting wires, in order to allow the trip signal through the Solid State Protection System (EIIS-JC) . The procedure informs personnel that the trip signal will occur. Operators ensured that the Reactor Trip Breakers (EIIS-JC/BKR) were open prior to testing. During testing, the Set I, Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumen-tation bistables (EIIS-IG/RIS) were found out of specification. Procedural requirements prompted the technicians to exit STP.180 and return to the shop to obtain a second procedure, "Intermediate Range Calibration,"

IMP.230.

In the meantime, a shift change occurred for operators and technicians.

The second shift of operators began testing of the Main Turbine Stop Valves (EIIS-TA/XCV) and closed the Reactor Trip Breakers for interlock purposes at 1923 hours0.0223 days <br />0.534 hours <br />0.00318 weeks <br />7.317015e-4 months <br />. When the second .shift of technicians arrived in the control room to begin the bistable adjustments, the operators asked if a reactor trip signal would be generated as a result of the bistable ad5ustments.

The second shifg technicians referred to the procedure they intended to perform, IMP.230, which did not defeat the block of the High Nuclear Flux trip signal and, therefore, did not require notification to the control room operators of the trip signal. As a result, the technicians -incorrectly replied that a trip signal would not be generated. Permission was therefore granted to perform IMP.230.

Performing the calibration involved raising the simulated test input signal above the High Nuclear Flux trip setpoint. This signal is normally blocked during the calibration procedure when the level trip mode switch is placed in the BYPASS position. However, since the wires remained lifted due to the in process surveillance procedure, the trip signal was not blocked at the Solid State Protection System. The signal initiated the unexpected reactor trip signal and the opening of the Reactor Trip Breakers at 2232 hours0.0258 days <br />0.62 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.49276e-4 months <br />, according to the logic of 1/2 Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumen-tation channels indicating a High Nuclear Flux (current equivalent of approximately 25 percent of rated thermal power).

NRC I'ORM 300A *U.S.OPO:1988 0 824 538/455 (983)

(((el'ICENSEE NRC Fons 358A E T REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUA N U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME 11l DOCKET NUMBER (21 I.FR NUMBER ISI PAGE (31 YEAR @'j SEOUENTIAL REVISION NUMSER NUMSEA D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 o s o o o 3 16 8 9 013 0 0 0 3 OF 0 3 TEXT /FIIRo>> <<ec>> /o I>>(R>>od, >>os NSEURM/HRC AAII3RS43/ IITI The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified of the event via the Emergency Notification System on June 18, 1989 at 0006 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

There were no inoperative structures, components, or systems that contri-buted to this event.

Cause of the Event Incomplete turnover/research of status when gob was taken over.. Also incomplete research when the operator questioned whether or not a trip signal would occur.

Anal sis of Event This report is being submitted under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) as an event that resulted in an unplanned automatic actuation of an Engineering Safety Feature including the Reactor Protection System.

The automatic reactor protection system responses, including opening of the reactor trip breakers and associated actuations, were verified to have functioned properly. Based on the above, it is concluded that the event did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2) nor did it adversely impact the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action Immediate corrective action involved Operations personnel implementing plant procedures to verify proper response of the automatic protection system and to assess plant conditions for initiation of appropriate recovery actions.

This event and the importance of complete turnover will be stressed during the next scheduled I&C technician training meetings.

Failed Com onent Identification None.

Previous Similar Events None.

NRC FORM SOEA *U.S.GPO:1988.0824 538/455 (9831