ML17326B342

LER 87-022-01:on 871007,as Found Data of Two Pressurizer Level Channels Exceeded Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation.Caused by Transmitter Calibr Shift.Calibr Checks for New Transmitter Installations planned.W/880211 Ltr

ML17326B342
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	02/11/1988
From:	Beilman T, Will Smith INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-022, LER-87-22, NUDOCS 8802170409
Download: ML17326B342 (5)

Text

REGUL*TOR4 .NFQRMATION DISTRIBUTION S l El < RIDS)

ACCESSION NBA 8802170409 DQC. DATE: 88/02/11 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-315 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Poeer Planti Unit ii, Indiana h 05000315 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BEILMAN> T. P. Indiana Michigan Power Co. <formerly Indiana h Michigan Ele SMITHS'. G. Indiana Michigan Power Co. < formev lg Indiana 8< Michigan Ele RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFF ILIAT ION SUB JECT: LER 87-022-01: on 871007. as found data of two pv essuri zer level channels exceeded Tech Spec limiting condition fov opevation. Caused bg transmittev calibv shift. Calibv checks fov nee transmitter installations pinned. W/880211 ltv.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ~ ENCL ~ SIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report <LER) Incident Rpti etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT CQP IES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD3-3 LA 1 1 PD3-3 PD 1 WIGGINGTON~ D 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSQN 1 1 ACRS MOELLER AEQD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS AEQD/DSP/RQAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ I CSB NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEST/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB NRR/DEST/SGB 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RAB 1 NRR/DREP/RPB SIB 1 1 NRR/PMAS/ ILRB 02 1 RES TELFQRD> J RES/DE/EIB 1 RES/DRPS DIR RGN3 F ILE 01 1 EXTERNAL: EG >'.G GRQHz l l 5 5 FORD BLDG HOYLE A 1 1 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR NSIC HARRIS' 1 NS IC t lAYS> G 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45

Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nucfear Plant PO Box "58

~ Br.dqrnan MI 49106 616 465 5901 Z

INDIANA NICHIGiAN POMfER February ll, 1988 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Operating License DPR-58 Docket No. 50-315 Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:

87-022-01 Sincerely, W. G. Smith, Jr.

Plant Manager WGS:a h Attachment cc: D. H. Williams, Jr.

A. B. Davis, Region III M. P. Alexich R. F. Kroeger H. B. Brugger R. W. Jurgensen NRC Resident Inspector J. F. Stang, NRC R. C. Callen G. Charnoff, Esq.

Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D. Hahn INPO PNSRC A. A. Blind P. A. Barrett/P. Lauzau

NRC Form 344 UA. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COABAISSION (9413)

APPIIOVED OMIL NO. 3)400)04 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) EXPIRES: 4/31/44 FACILITY NAME Ill DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 o s o o o31 510F 03 OU VIOLATION OF ESF INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION TOLERANCES DUE TO TRANSMITTERS CALIBRATION SHIFT EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (4) REPORT DATE (7I OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (4)

MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR Cpv'e SEQUENTIAL OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI (c'.Pl NUM SEA c,.;'NUMSER MONTH D.C. COOK PLANT-UNIT 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 10 0787 87 022 01 0211 88 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (I( ICneck one or more ot ttte Ioiiorytnd) (11)

OPERATINO MODE IBI 20.402 (4 I 20A05(c) 50.73(el(2) IN) 73.71(s)

POWER 20,405(all) l(5 50.34(c) III 50,73(a) (2) (rl 73.71(cl LEYEL 0 0 0 20.405(e l(1 I I 4 I 50.34(c) (2) 50.73(e) (2)(ea) DTHER Ispeciry In Aottrect Oeiow end In Teat, HRC Form 20.40a(al(1)(IIII X 50.73(a I (2)D I 50.73(el(2) Ir)B)(Al SSSAI 20A05(a l(l) (Ial 50.73(el(2) (EI a0.73(el (2)(t)a) (BI 20.405(el (I) (al 50,73(el(2)(BII 50.73(sl(2)(s)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

T. P. BE ILMAN TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL DEPARTMENT SUPERINTENDENT COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13) 616 465 -59 01 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. MANUFAC. EPORTABL TURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TO NPROS 0ÃN: '.. 4 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED l14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE Ua)

YEs IlfyN, complete ExPEcTED $ USMIssIDH DA Tdl X NO AasTRAcT ILImit to te00 tpecet, I.A. epproaimeteiy lirtten tinoie apace typewrltNn IinNI (14)

During the past Unit One Refueling Outage performed between June and October 1987, the as found data of two pressurizer level channels exceeded the Tech-nical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) values, although they remained within the Safety Analysis. The as found data was obtained during routine calibration evolutions, and the associated components (Foxboro transmitters) were adjusted and restored to acceptable as left conditions.

The cause of the drift is considered attributable to two factors. First, the two transmitters had been installed during the previous refueling outage as part of an Environmental Oualification upgrade. It is not considered unusual for new force balance transmitters to exhibit slightly higher drift during their first calibration cycle following installation. Secondly, the elapsed time between installation and first recalibration was longer than normal due to an extension of the refueling outage start date. This may have contributed to the observed magnitude of the drift.

Corrective action to prevent recurrence will be to perform calibration checks for new transmitter installations between outages as plant conditions allow. The "wear. in" period has elapsed for transmitters installed since the previous outage, and further drifting is not expected.

8802170409 8802ii gfk2.

PDR ADOCK 050003i5 I((

S PDR NRC Form 344

~ n ena r

NRC Form 300A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$ 831 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OM8 NO 3159~104 EXPIRES: 8/3ll88 FACILITYNAME (ll DOCKET NUMSER (21 LER NUMSER 101 PAGE 131 YEAR SEOUENTIAL @CO REVISION NU>>04R ~ 4 NUMSER D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT

~

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Conditions Prior to Occurrence Unit One was in Mode 6 (Refueling).

Unit Two was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).

Descri tion of Event While Unit One was in a refueling outage between June and October 1987, routine calibrations were performed on various Technical Specification transmitters (EIIS/XRIR). Initial evaluation of the "as found" data indicated that 16 transmitters had exceeded our internal accuracy require-ments (i.e., 0.5% accuracy). During the same time period, Unit Two was shut down for a maintenance outage. Calibrations were performed on Unit Two transmitt'ers, 20 of which exhibited calibration shifts similar to those found on Unit One. All transmitters were recalibrated within specifications at the time they were found in error. Note that while the units were operating, there had been no indications of significant transmitter drift based on the results of Technical Specification required Channel Checks.

An investigation was initiated to determine if a problem existed with trans-mitters manufactured by Foxboro Corporation. As-found data from the most recent calibrations, the maintenance histories of the transmitters, and the past calibration records were reviewed. Engineering review determined that there were 24 instances of calibration shift on Unit One with four of those most likely due to a data collection error. Also, there were 25 instances of calibration shift on Unit Two. It was concluded that this characteristic could be considered a normal occurrence for force balance transmitters during their initial installation period.

The conclusion of the analysis showed that two of the three channels for the Unit One pressurizer levels (EIIS/JB-LT) had exceeded the Technical Specification LCO limit. Other channels had exceeded the LCO values, however, the redundancy criteria was not compromised.

Other than the transmitters described, there were no other inoperable components, systems, or structures which contributed to this event.

Cause of the Event We believe that the majority of the'transmitters affected were not defective and are, in retrospect, exhibiting normal characteristics. New Foxboro force balance transmitters were installed during the previous. outages for both units. Because the transmitters are primarily mechanical devices with moving parts, the transmitters are expected to exhibit a certain "wear in" NRC FORM 3004 ~ U S GPD:,1980 0 024 538I455 re OA 1

NRC Form 368A V.S. NUC( EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT EPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO 3(58~(84 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (I I DOCKET NUMBER (31 I ER NUMBER (6) I'AGE (31 yEAR ',.x SSOVENTIAL ? 4(V>>ION NVMSSR NVMSS4 D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 0 s o 0 o 315 87 02 20 1 0 3 OF 0 3 TEXT /Z rr>>ro N>>co 8 oorrlor/, ow aI/oo>>/ NRC /rorm 3//SA3/ (IT(

time before they fully stabilize. Further, the elapsed time between the initial installation and the first calibration of the Unit One transmitters due to an extension of the refueling outage start date may have contributed to the overall magnitude of the drift factor.

In general, the Unit 1 transmitters were in service 9 months longer than those in Unit 2 and exhibited drifts of greater magnitude. This is attributed to the greater time interval between initial calibrations and the subsequent calibration checks.

Anal sis of Event The condition of having less than the minimum number of pressurizer level channels operable is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.73, Section (a)(2)(i)(B) ~

The impact of the transmi,tter calibration drifts was evaluated. The calculated Channel Statistical Allowance (CSA) was compared to the Total Allowance which represents the allowance between the setpoint and the safety analysis value. The evaluation showed none of the observed transmitter calibration drifts exceeded the safety analysis bounds.

Therefore, it is concluded that the event did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2), nor did it adversely impact health and safety.

Corrective Action Corrective action to prevent recurrence will be to perform calibration checks for new transmitter installations between outages as plant conditions allow.

We believe that the transmitters have had a reasonable period to "wear in,"

and therefore excessive future drift would not be expected or considered acceptable performance.

Failed Com onent Identification None.

Previous Similar Events None.

NRC FORM 388A oU.S GPO"I 986 0.83A 538'A55

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