ML17304B078

LER 89-003-00:on 890217,preplanned Alternate Sampling Sys for Fuel Bldg Discovered Inoperable.Caused by Temporary & Permanent Electrical Loads in Excess of Circuit Capacity. Circuit Breaker Supplying Power opened.W/890320 Ltr

ML17304B078
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	03/20/1989
From:	Haynes J, Shriver T ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-00460-JGH-T, 192-460-JGH-T, LER-89-003-01, LER-89-3-1, NUDOCS 8903280260
Download: ML17304B078 (14)

Text

AC CK1KRATED Dl STKBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATO INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO YSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8903280260 DOC.DATE: 89/03/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SHRIVER,T.D. Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Serv HAYNES,J.G. Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Serv RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATXON

SUBJECT:

LER 89-003-00:on 890217,loss of power to alternate fuel bldg effluent monitor.Due to excessive electrical loads.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, J ENCL Letc.SIZE:

NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000528 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 CHAN,T 1 1 DAVIS I M 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1, 1 IRM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RPB 10 ll 1 1

2 1

1 2

NRR/DLPQ/QAB NRR/DREP/RAB NR 10 10 9A 1

1 1

1 1

1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RES/DSR/PRAB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMSPS 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYSiG 1 1 NSIC MURPHYPG.A 1 1 NOTES: 1 1 NOXK 'ZO ALL 'KIDS" EKCIPIENIS:

PIZASE HELP US I0 REXUCE RESTE CONIACI XHE DOQMERZ CGNIROL DESKS RXN Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) m ELIKBQTB ARK NAME PBCN DZGTRZBVZZGN LIPIS FOR DOCUMENI'8 YOU DOHPT NEZDt TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 47 ENCL 46

NRC Form 344 U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (9 53)

APPROVED OMS NO. $ 150010(

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) EXPIAES: S($ 1/44 FACILITY NAME III POCKET NUMSER (2) PA Palo Verde Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8 1 QF 0 5 TITLE (aI Loss of Power to Alternate Fuel Buildin Effluent Radiation Monitor EVENT DATE (5) LEA NVMSER (5) REPORT DATE (7) O'THEA FACILI'TIES INVOLVED (4)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQVENTIAI. REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR SACILITYNAMES DOCKET NVMSER(SI NVM4ER  : c.: NVM4ER N/A 0 5 0 0 0 021 7 8989 003 0 0 0 3 2 0 8 9 N/A 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO THIS AEPOAT IS SUSMITTED PUASUANT T 0 THE REQVIREMENTS OF 10 CFA I): (Checa one or more of the foffowinf) ill)

MODE (Sl 20A02I4) 20A05(cl 50.7$ (a) (2) (Iv) 7$ .71(SI tOWER 20.405( ~ l(IHI) 50.34(c)(1) 50.7$ ( ~ ) (2)(vl 7$ .71(cl LEYEL 1 0 0 20A05 (a) I I I (5 I 50.34(cH2) 50.7$ (IH2HrEI OTHER ISoecffy in AONreCI Oerow enrf fn Tear, HRC Form

"~"4:g>~S" 20A05( ~ I(1) (5 II 50.7$ (a) (2) I 0 50.7$ (aH2Hr)IIIIAI $SSAI

@gf @ 20A05(a) I I I(iv) 50.7$ (a) (2) IS) 50.7$ (a) (2 Hr)4 I (5 I 20A05( ~ I (I) (v) 50.7$ (aH2)(ii)l 50.7$ (IH2Hal LICENSEE CONTACT FOA THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMSER AREA CODE Timothy D. Shriver, Compliance Manager 60 23 93 -2 521 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCAISED IN THIS REPORT (1$ )

COMPONENT MANVFAC. COMPONENT MANUFAC CAUSE SYSTEM TURER TO NFROS @Iyng)hY:(()<,. '.s( CAUSE SYSTEM TURER TO NPllor,! )r)a(4!$%()!-

EJ) j:"'(i~(,",.'~h(I!'UPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXI'ECTEO (14I MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUSMISSION DATE (I SI YES fff yN. comprece EXPECTED SVSMISSIOff OATEI X NO On'FePPruarLyEA'fI,i'i%SF, at appronximaNteiy 1415 MST, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at approximately 100 percent power when a Chemistry Effluent Technician (utility, non-licensed) discovered that the Preplanned Alternate Sampling System ( IL) for the Fuel Building was inoperable. The circuit breaker, which supplies the electrical power (EC), had opened and deenergized the alternate system. With the alternate sampling inoperable, Unit 1 operated in a condition contrary to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.8. At approximately 1425 MST, the power to the Preplanned Alternate Sampling System power was restored. No safety system responses occurred and none were necessary.

The root cause of the event was temporary and permanent electrical loads in excess of circuit capacity. In response, the circuit breaker supplying the electrical power opened and caused the loss of electrical power (EC)(BKR) to the alternate sampling system.

A Plant Change Request has been issued to perform a conceptual study of supplying dedicated power to these loads.

Similar events were reported in LER 529/87-14, 529/88- 13, and 530/88-07.

8903280260 8'7)0320 PDR ADDCK 05000528 S PNU NRC Sorm 345

0 NRC Fee~ SSSA

<4ASI U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE VENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AFFROVEO OME NO SISOW104 EXFIRES: EISI/%

FACILITY NAME I'l OOCKET NUMIER Ql LEIS NUSSEER lEI ~ AOE <a

,v~. SEQUENTIAL 44I SYISION NVM Sh .'CM HVV Sh Palo Verde Unit TEXT IP hhre ShtCR N ~ 1 vM FAHAASF HIIC fenh ~'Sl 1lTI o s o o o 52 889 0 03 00 02oF 0 5 DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED:

A. Initial Conditions:

On February 17, 1989, at approximately 1415 MST, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at .approximately 100 percent power.

B. Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):

Event Classification: Condition Prohibited by the Plant's "Technical Specifications (TS)

On February 17, 1989, at approximately 1415 MST, a Chemistry Effluent Technician (utility, non-licensed) discovered that the Preplanned Alternate Sampling System ( IL) for the Fuel Building (VL) was inoperable. The circuit breaker, which supplies the electrical power (EC), had opened and deenergized the alternate system. With the'lternate sampling system inoperable, Unit 1 operated in a condition contrary to TS 3.3.3.8.

Prior to the event, on February 16, 1989 at approximately 0540 MST, the normal Fuel Building low and high range effluent monitors (RU-145 and RU-146)(IL) were declared inoperable due to failure of the detector to satisfactorily source check. Appropriate actions were initiated in accordance with approved procedures. These actions included the installation of the Preplanned Alternate Sampling. System on a portable cart within one hour in accordance with TS 3.3.3.8 ACTION 37 and 40. The alternate sampling system taps into the Fuel Building vent and utilizes a particulate and charcoal cartridge for sample collection with an in-line flow gauge and sampling pump. The alternate sampling system is electrically powered from a local outlet.

Following the installation of the alternate sampling system, the process and sample flow rates were verified every four hours pursuant to TS 3.3.3.8 ACTION 36. On February 17, 1989, at approximately 1130 MST, a process and alternate sampling system flow check was performed. At this time, the alternate sampl'ing system was energized and operable.

At approximately 1410 MST, the "Radiation Monitoring System, Daily Surveillance Test", 75ST-9ll07, was successfully completed. Prior to returning RU-145 to service, at approximately 1415 MST, the Chemistry Effluent Technician decided to perform one last flow check prior to completing activities to make RU-145 and RU-146 operable and discovered that the alternate sampling system was deenergized. The alternate sampling system was made operable at approximately 1425 MST. At approximately 1500 MST, the new NAC FOAM SSSA IS SSi

'I ll l

1i lt

I NRC Se<~ SSSA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

'94SI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ARSROVEO OM4 NO 4150WIOS EXRIRES: SISIla FACILITY NAME III OOCXET NVM4ER IEI LEII NIJNOEII ISI ~ AOE ISI SSQUSNYIAL REVISION NUM SR ?4. NUUSSR Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 5 2 8 8 9 0 0 3 00 03 oF0 5 TEXT IR'RVS Meee N ISSMNd, USS RRWaenel HRC /One ~'ll I ITI particulate and iodine filter were installed and RU-145 and- RU-146 were returned to service.

C. Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event:

As stated in Section I.B, the Fuel Building Radiation Monitors, RU-145 and RU-146 were inoperable for corrective maintenance. No other structures, systems, or components were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.

D. Cause of each component or system failure, if known:

Not applicable - no component or system failures were involved.

However, as stated in Section I.B, electrical power to the alternate sampling system was interrupted when the circuit breaker opened.

Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known:

Not applicable - no failures were involved.

F. For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected:

Not applicable - no comp'onent failures were involved.

G. For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service:

Not applicable - no failures were involved. However, the alternate sampling system was discovered inoperable on February 17, 1989 at approximately 1415 MST. The alternate sampling system was made operable at approximately 1425 MST. RU-145 and RU-146 were restored to service at approximately 1500 MT. The total elapsed time was approximately ten minutes, H. Method of discovery of each component or system failure or

-procedural error:

Not applicable - no component or system failures or procedural errors'ere involved.

I. Cause of Event:

The root cause of the event was temporary and permanent electrical loads in excess of the circuit capacity. In response, the circuit VRC IORM SSSA IS SSi

l

//RC form 255A U.S. //UCLEAR RECULA'tORT COMM/55/4//

(9 82/

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AP/'ROMEO OMS //0 2IEO~ICO EXPIRES.'/Sl/88 OOCKET I/UMSER IEI LER RUMSER I8) PACE ISI r~i 554UERTIAL RUM 5R r>/rl ll5'rrl5IQrr 5ÃC RUMOTR Palo Verde Unit 1 o 5 o o o 52 889 0 0 3 0 0, 04oF 0 5

'TEXT ///rrroro 5/rooo /5 orRroorE rr>> tewoonelHRC /rovm 8/NA5/ Ill) breaker opened and caused a loss of electrical power to the alternate sampling system. Without electrical power, the sampling pump can not draw a sample from the fuel building vent.

An informal review of the local outlets available to power the alternate sampling system has determined that the circuits are near capacity loading.

J. Safety System Response:

Not applicable - no safety-system responses occurred or were necessary.

K. Failed Component Information:

Not applicable - no component failures were involved.

II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSE(UENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:

No adverse safety consequences or implications resulted from this event. The alternate system was determined to be operable two hours and 45 minutes prior to the discovery of the loss of power, Upon discovery of the loss of power, the alternate sampling system power was restored within approximately ten minutes and RU-145 and RU-146 were returned to service within approximately 45 minutes. The TS 3,3,3,8 ACTION 40 permits 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to install the alternate sampling system. No significant levels of radiation were measured before or after the event.

III'ORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

A. Immediate: .

Power was restored to the alternate sampling system. Additionally, the normal Fuel Building Radiation Monitors RU-145 and RU-146 were restored to service. Therefore, the ACTION statements for the alternate sampling system operability were exited.

B. Action to Prevent Recurrence:

A Plant Change Request has been issued to supply dedicated power to the sample earth The design change is expected to be ready for implementation in the three units by December 1989. Implementation in the units is expected by February 1990. If additional information is identified that would significantly affect the reader's perception of the appropriate corrective actions, a supplement to this report will be issued.

vAC /OAM )55A IQ Slr

lI NRC PoN<<)CCA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

<94)I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPAOVEO OMS NO )150WIOC EXPIRES: 4/)I/44 OOCKET NUMSER Ql LE/I NUMSEII /bi PAOE I)I SCOUCNT<AL REVISION NUM CR NUMCCR Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 0 0 3 00 05 oF 05 TEXT /// <R<NP soecc /I PCUn<S Uw a<bcC<cvc////IC /cpm )ICSA9/ ll))

IV. PREVIOUS SIHILAR EVENTS:

Three previous events have occurred which are similar to the event described in this LER. A description of each is described below:

LER 529/87-014 described an event where the alternate sampling system for the Fuel Building Ventilation Radiation Honitor (RU-145) had been turned off and rendered inoperable. As corrective action to prevent recurrence, a placard was installed on the cart which identifies the cart as a Technical Specification piece of equipment. Since the event described in this LER involves the overloading and subsequent tripping of the power supply breaker, the corrective action described in LER 87-014 would not have prevented the event described in this LER.

2) LER 529/88-013 described an event where the alternate sampling system for Normal Plant Ventilation Radiation Honitor (RU-143) had been rendered inoperable when the circuit breaker opened. As corrective action to prevent recurrence, an Engineering Evaluation Request was issued to evaluate the feasibility of supplying alternate power to the loads. This evaluation had progressed to the point of a conceptual study when this event occurred and thus, did not prevent the event.

3) LER 530/88-007 described an event where the alternate sampling system for the Condenser Vacuum Pump/Gland Seal Exhaust Radiation Honitor (RU-141) became electrically disconnected from a nearby electrical outlet and thus, rendered inoperable. As action to prevent recurrence, the involved individual was counseled, additional training was performed, and enhanced labeling for the sample cart was developed. Additionally, an evaluation was initiated to upgrade the installation of the sample cart. The evaluation discussed is part of the conceptual study discussed as corrective action in Section III.B of this LER. Installation of these upgrades would not have prevented the event described in this LER. Also, counseling, training, and labeling would not have prevented the event discussed in this LER.

VRC IORM )CIA

<9 4)<

II I

Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00460-JGH/TDS/RJR March 20, 1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Palo. Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-528 (License No. NPF-41)

Licensee Event Report 89-003-00 File: 89-020-404 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No, 89-003-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50,73. In accordance with 10CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. D. Shriver, Compliance Manager at

.(602) 393-2521.

Very tr y yours, J. G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/TDS/RJR/kj Attachment cc: D. B. Karner (all w/a)

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

J. B. Hartin T. J. Polich H. J. Davis A. C. Gehr INPO Records Center

l(

1i 1