ML17303A403

LER 87-002-00:on 870317,continuous Fire Watch Not Established within Required Time,Per Tech Spec 3.7.11.2 Action A.Caused by Personnel Error.Fire Protection Personnel Counseled on Importance of Proper performance.W/870413 Ltr

ML17303A403
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	04/13/1987
From:	Bradish T, Haynes J ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
192-00186-JGH-T, 192-186-JGH-T, LER-87-002, LER-87-2, NUDOCS 8704160124
Download: ML17303A403 (9)

Text

REGULATOR FORilATIGN DISTRIBUTION 3 -M (R IDS>

ACCESSIGN NBR: 8704160124 DGC. DATE: 87/04/13 NOTARIZED: NG DOCKET FAG IL: STN-50-528 Palo Verde iNucleav Station> Unit 1I Arizona Pub li 05000528 AUTH. NAMIE AUTHOR AFF ILI AT I QN BRADISH, T. R. Av i zona Nucleav Power Pr o Ject ( formev'1 g Ari zona Public Serv HAYNES> J. Q. Av izona Nucleav'ower Prospect (fovmerlg Arizona Public'evv RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION'UB JEC f: LER 87-002-00: on 870317> failure to estab lish cont jnuous t il e watch within required time of Tech Spec 3. 7. 11 2 ACTIOl'4 k. ~

Caused bil pev sonnel erv or. Fiv e pv otection inriividual counseled on importance of proper pev'formance. W/870413 ltv.

DISTRIBUTION CODE; IEESD COPIES RECEIVED: LTR l ENCL JSIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Repov t (LER) i Incident Rpti etc.

NOTES: Standav'dized plant. M. Davis. NRR: 1Cg. 05000528 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT CO< IES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAMiE LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 LICITRAIE 1 1 DAVIS> M 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 1 ACRS l4YLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TAPB 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/ADT 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ELB } 1 NRR/DEST/ ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/RSB 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 NRR/DQEA/EAB 1 NRR/DREP/EPB 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2 N /ILRB 1 1 NRR/PMAS/PTSB 1 REQ FILE 02 1 RES SPEIS> T 1 1 Wa FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EQ8(Q QRQH> M 5 5 H ST LOBBY L4ARD 1 1 LPDR NRC PDR 1 NSIC HARRISp J 1 1 NSIC MAYST G 1 1 1 1 TOTAL NUiilBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LT1R 46 ENCL 44

NRC Form 245 UA. NUCLEAR REOULATOAY COMMISSION (0.82)

APPAOVEO OMS NO. 21500104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) EXPIRES: 5/21/SS FACILITY NAME (I I DOCKET NUMSER 12) PA Palo Verde Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 1 OF 3 TITLE Iei ontinuous Fire Watch Posted La te Dle to P r EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMSER ISI AEPORT DATE ltl OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (4)

MONTH OAY YEAR YFAA o/Zj 440UNNrIAI SS/ri rleVreKIN OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NVMSER(SI NUM4 ~ II NUM44II MONTH N/A 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 1.78 787 0 0 2 0 0 041 387 N/A 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUSMITTEO PURSUANT T0 THE REOUIREMENTE DF 10 cFR ()I Icnece one or more of tire followinpi (11 OPERATINO MODE (4) ] 20A02(4) 20A05(cl 50.724) l2) lie) 73.7101)

POWER 20.405(e)(II(il SOW(c) Ill 50.724) (21(el 72.71(e)

LEYEL 1 0 0 20.405 (e) I I ) IN) 50.25(c) (2) 50.734 l(2)(rN) OTHER /Specify in Aprtrect Oerow end ln Test, /IRC Form 20A054)(1 l(Nil X 50.72(el(2)lll 50.72(el(2) lriN)(Al 266AI 20A054 1(1)(hl 50.72(el(2)(NI 50.72(e)(2)(rNII(S) 20AOS(el(1) 4) 50.724)(2)(IN) 50.'t24) (2 H4 I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER I'I2)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Thomas R. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor (Ext. 6936) 602 932 -53 00 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILVAE OESCAISEO IN THIS REPORT (12)

CAVSE SYSTEM COMI'ONENT MANUFAC MANUFAC. EPORTASL TVRER TVRER TO NPAOS k>l.+4%>

4>g'C>:"'OMPONENT 4NW+X EUPPLEMENTAL REPDRT ExPEcTED lie) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUSMISSION YES Ilfyer, compl>>e EXPECTED 6(/Elt/SSIOhl DATE/ DATE IISI NO AEETAAct /Limit to leo7 tpecer, I e., epproelmerely fifteen tlnFie Mace typewritten liner/ (15)

At 0750 on March 17, 1987, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent power when a continuous fire watch was not established within the required time of Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 ACTION a.

The continuous fire watch was necessitated when the Train B, Electrical Penetration Room, sprinkler system was declared inoperable with the redundant Train A Electrical Penetration Room sprinkler system already inoperable.

The root, cause of the event was a cognitive personnel error in that the Fire Protection individual did not notify the Building Services Foreman in sufficient time to post the watch. A contributing factor was a fire alarm and subsequent response by the Fire Protection Department during the time the fire watch was required to be established. The error was contrary to an approved procedure.

There were no errors in the procedure which contributed to the event.

As corrective action to prevent recurrence the Fire Protection individual was counseled on the importance of proper performance of his duties.

There were no previous similar events repor'ted.

8704160124 870413 PDR ADOCI/e 05000528 S PDR NAC eorm 244 rI

NAC torm 555A U.t. NUCLEAR AEOULATOIIYCOMMI55ION 1945 I I.ICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION A55ROYEO OMS NO 1I50WI05 EXlrIAES: 9/91/55 FACILITY NAME III OOCIIET NUMEEII I1) LEII NUMEEII Itl ~ AOE Iti YEAII 55095NYIAL 5 5 v rt ro rr g$ < ~r M A rrurretA Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 528 87 002 0 0. 0 2 o" 0 3 TEXT N mrrm 5Arct lI YINriYrE rr55 rNIoond HIIC frrrm 005l'5I I I Tl At 0750 on March 17, 1987, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent power when a continuous fire watch was not established within the required time of Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 ACTION a. The sprinkler (SRNK) system in the Electrical Penetration Room, Train B, Auxiliary Building (NF) 100 foot elevation was declared inoperable due to spurious detector (DET) alarms (AIM) causing the deluge valve (V) to trip. The redundant Train A Electrical Penetration Room sprinkler system was already inoperable due to a malfunctioning detector that did not pass its functional Surveillance Test. A hourly fire watch patrol for the Train A Electrical Penetration Room was in place. Due to the redundant Train A sprinkler system being inoperable, a continuous fire watch was required in the Train B Electrical Penetration Room when the sprinkler system was declared inoperable in Train B at 0650.

The Train B sprinkler system was declared inoperable during shift change in the Fire Protection group. The information was relayed from the night shift fire protection individual to the oncoming day shift individual. The day shift individual attempted to call the Building Services Foreman to notify him that a continuous fire watch was needed however was not able to contact him. The Building Services Department provides the personnel that perform the fire watch d'uties.

The Fire Protection individual continued with his duties when a fire alarm for Unit 1 was received. After the fire alarm had been responded to, the individual realized that the continuous fire watch had not been placed in effect. Building Services personnel were immediately notified to post a continuous fire watch in the Train B Electrical Penetration Room. The fire watch was posted at 0803, 13 minutes beyond the required 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The event lasted 13 minutes.

The root cause of the event was cognitive personnel error in that the Fire Protection individual, (utility non-licensed) did not notify the Building Services Foreman (utility non-licensed) in sufficient time to post the watch. A contributing factor was the fire alarm and the required response by the Fire Protection Department. This event was contrary to an approved procedure. There were no errors in the procedure which contributed to the event.

Troubleshooting, performed in accordance with an approved work control document, did not reveal any problem with the Train B detector circuitry or functional operation. An Engineering Evaluation Request was submitted to evaluate the ventilation in the Train B Electrical Penetration Room. The Train B Electrical Penetration Room sprinkler system was returned to operable status at 1445 on March 19, 1987. The continuous fire watch was terminated at 1454 on March 19, 1987.

Troubleshooting the Train "A" detector is ocntinuing.

As corrective action to prevent recurrence the Fire Protection individual was counseled on the importance of proper performance of his duties.

'rAc III+M 555m I9 51r

NAC Foam 944A U,S. NUCLEAA AEQULATOAYCOMMISSION I94$ 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AFFAOVEO OMS NO 4150&104 EXFIAESl 4/41/44 FACILITY NAME 111 OOCKET NUMSEA IEI LEA NUMSEA 141 ~ AQE ISI YEAS 'tQVCNT/AL FL49 htyltlQN NVM th  :.+'9 NVM th Palo Verde Unit TEXT /// more MMce lt /etoeN/. tee 1

4th/ioht/ ///IC Fo/m 444A'4/ IITI 528 87 002 0 0 03oFO were no structures, components, or systems that were inoperable I'here at the start of the event, other than those described above, that contributed to the event. There were no manual or automatic safety system responses. The response to the fire alarm, as described above, was an unusual characteristic of the work location which contributed to the event. There were no operator actions which contributed to this event. This event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public since in the event of a fire, there was an hourly fire watch patrol in the redundant Electrical Penetration Room.

The event was discovered by the Fire Protection individual after he returned from the fire response to Unit l.

There have been no previous similar events with the same root cause previously reported. However, PVNGS has experienced a noted increase in the number of fire watches which have not been completed as required. Although the root cause in each event has been different, PVNGS has'nitiated an Interdepartmental Event Investigation (IEI) to evaluate and determine if a common element or deficiency can be identified.-

NAC 1 QhM 14th 19 4)/

Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00186-JGH/TRB/JEM April 13, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-528 Licensee Event Report 87-002-00 File: 87-020-404

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 87-002-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor .

at (602) 932-5300 Ext. 6936.

Very truly yours,

,~ 444 J. G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/JEM/cld Attachment Cco 0. M. DeMichele (all w/a)

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

J. B. Martin R. P. Zimmerman R. C. Sorensen E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr INPO Records Center

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