ML17300B213

LER 88-002-00:on 880118,ASME Section XI Surveillance Test Interval Exceeded.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls Established for Tracking of Partially Completed Surveillance Tests.Controls established.W/880216 Ltr

ML17300B213
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	02/16/1988
From:	Haynes J, Shriver T ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
192-00345-JGH-T, 192-345-JGH-T, LER-88-002, LER-88-2, NUDOCS 8802220028
Download: ML17300B213 (5)

Text

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8802220028 DOC.DATE: 88/02/16 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SHRIVER,T.D. Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Serv HAYNES,J.G. Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Serv RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-002-00:on 880118,ASME Section XI surveillance test interval exceeded.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ~ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000529 g RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL A

PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 LICITRA,E 1 1 DAVIS,M 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/NAS 1 1 AEOD/ DS P/ROAB 2 2. AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2

~/'DRI &/P IB 1 1 NRR/PMAS/ILRB 1 1

- BF 02 1 1 RES TELFORD,J 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 1 RES/DRPS DIR 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROH,M 5 5 FORD BLDG HOY i A 1 1 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS,J 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NOTES 1 1 A

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 48 ENCL 47

Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA85072-2034 192-00345-JGH/TDS/DAJ February 16, 1988 NRC Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

'Washington, D.C. 20555,

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)

Licensee Event Report 2-88-002-00 File: 88-020-404 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 88-002-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. D. Shriver, Compliance Manager at

~

(602) 393-2521.

Very trul yours, yG c J. G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/TDS/DAJ/kj Attachment cc: 0. t1. DeNichele (all w/a)

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

J. B. Hartin T. J. Polich R. C. Sorenson E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr INPO Records Center

NRC Perm 3$ $ U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (9031 APPROVED OMS NO,31104101 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) EXPIRES: 3/31/SS FACILITY NAME III DOCKET NUMSER 12) PA 3 TI'TLE Icl Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 529 >oFO 3 ASME Section XI Surveillance Test Interval Exceeded EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILI'TIES INVOLVED ISI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQVCNT/AL Rsvs~ DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMSERISI NVMSER ~mr<

NVMSSR MONTH N/A 0 5 0 0 0 011 68 88 8 0 02 00 02 16 8 8 N/A 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO THIS REpoRT IS SUsMITTED pURsUANT To THE REDUIREMENTs oF 10 cF R (): /chess one or more of the foiiowinp/ (Ill MODE (9) 20.402(N) 20.SOS(c I $ 0.734)(2) I iv) 73.71(III POWER 20.SOS( ~ )(1)IO 50.3$ (cl(1) 50.734)(2(lvl 73.7(lc)

LEYEL 1 0 0 20.SOS (~ ) (I) IN ) 50.3$ (cl(2) $ 0.73(e) (2)(rNI OTHER /Specify in Ahttrett pe/ow end in Test, HIIC Form 20.SOS( ~ ) (I l(o1) 50.73(s)12)(l) $ 0,73(s I (2)(r Nl) IAI 3EEAI 2OAOS(s)(1)llvl 50.73(sl(2HNI $ 0,73(sl(2) (vNI I(S) 20.40$ (~ l(1) lv) 50.734) l2(DIR 50,73 I ~ ) (2) (s I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I NAME TELEPHONE NVMSEA AREA CODE Timothy D. Shriver, Compliance Manager 6 02 39 3 25 21 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCRISED IN THIS AEPOR'T (13)

COMPONENT MANUFAC. MANUFAC. EPOATABLE CAUSE SYSTEM CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONFNT TVRER TVAER TO NPADS SUPPLEMENTAL AEPOR'T EXPEC'TED (1CI MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SU EMISSION DATE I(5)

YES /If yet, comp/etc EXPECTED SVBstISSIOAI DATE/ NO AssTRAGT /(,imit to /coo Ipecet, /e., epprosimeteiy ftfteen sinpie.~ce typewritten /ines/ (1$ )

On January 18, 1988 at approximately 1354 11ST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Hode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent power when it was determined that ASME Section XI surveillance testing had not been conducted within allowable time constraints on two Containment Power Access Isolation Valves (VA)( ISV).

Pursuant to Technical Specification 4.0.2 the valves were required to have been tested by January 16, 1988. The valves were satisfactorily surveillance tested by 0137 HST on January 19, 1988.

The root cause was inadequate administrative controls established for the tracking and completion of partially completed surveillance tests.

As corrective action to prevent recurrence, appropriate guidance will be implemented to require appropriate tracking of partially completed surveillance tests.

There have been no previous LER's submitted involving the identified root cause.

T(VQ ICI 8802220028 8802i6 PDR ADOCK 05000529 8 DCD

NRC Foim 144* U.E. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMM/$$ /ON (94SI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OME NO SI50 0104 EXPIRES: 8/Sl/88 FACILITY NAME 4I> OOCKET NUMEER IS I LER NUMEER IEI ~ AOE IS)

SEOI/ENTIAL /IEVIEION HUMP 4 A NI/MP 4 II Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 52 98 8 002 00 02 oF 0 3 TEXT /// mort aoeee I/ /eeoeed. we eddIP'ooe/ H/IC %%dmI SRL48/ I IT)

On January 18, 1988 at approximately 1354 HST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Hode 1 (POWER OPERATIONS) at approximately 100 percent power when it was determined that ASHE Section XI surveillance testing required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 had not been performed within allowable time constraints on valves ( ISV)

GPA-UV-4A (Containment Power Access Purge Inlet Outboard Isolation) and CPB-UV-5B (Containment, Power Access Purge Outlet Outboard Isolation). In accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.2 the two Containment Power Access Purge (VA) valves were required to be tested no later than January 16, 1988 at approximately 0620 HST. The two valves were satisfactorily tested by approximately 0137 HST on January 19, 1988.

In November 1987, an approved work document was initiated by ANPP personnel (utility, non-licensed) to have required valves surveillance tested in accordance with ASHE Section XI requirements. The valves are scheduled to be tested on a quarterly basis and were due to be completed by December 1, 1987.

ANPP personnel (utility, licensed) completed testing on all the scheduled valves except the two containment (CTHT) purge valves discussed above on December 1, 1987. The Assistant Shift Supervisor (utility, licensed) decided to delay corn/pletion of the surveillance test until the containment needed to be vented in order to minimize the number of stroking evolutions on the containment purge valves. The surveillance test was then inadvertently returned to the surveillance test scheduling personnel prior to work completion. Surveillance personnel received the work package and rescheduled the valve group for the next surveillance interval without realizing the work was incomplete.

During a later review of ASHE Section XI valve trend data, the responsible ASHE test engineer (utility, non-licensed) noted that fourth quarter 1987 trend information was not available for two Containment Power Access Purge Valves. A followup attempt was made to obtain the trending information from the work document that had been initiated to perform ASHE surveillance testing on the two Containment Power Access Purge Valves. During a review of the work document on January 18, 1988, it was identified that the two valves had not been tested as scheduled. An investigation identified that the maximum Technical Specification extension date had elapsed on January 16, 1988 at approximately 0620 HST. As immediate corrective action, Control Room personnel (utility, licensed) were notified and the valves declared inoperable. Also a work document was initiated to have the -two purge valves surveillance tested. The valves were satisfactorily tested by 0137 HST on January 19, 1988 and returned to operable status.

4AC I 0/IM 4444

/98SI

NRC Form 38SA U 8 NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

/9 83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO 3180 0/04 EXPIRES; 8/3l/88 FACILITY NAME OI OOCKET NUMSER Ill LER NUMSER ISl ~ AOE 13)

YEAR SECVENZ/AL .roP rrEV/8/0/r

~ rvMPErr rrv>>eFA Palo Verde Unit 2 o 5 o o o 5 2 8 8 002 0 0 03op0 3 TEXT /// moro o/>>co // ror/rr/rod. //oo odd/oor>>/ /Y/IC Form JEEA 3/ I Ill The root cause of this event has been determined to be a personnel error as a result of inadequate administrative controls established for tracking the performance of partially completed surveillance tests. Administrative controls were not established to ensure that the appropriate documentation was prepared to track the portion of the surveillance test that had not been completed.

As corrective action to prevent recurrence, controls will be established to ensure that operations department personnel responsible for the performance of surveillance tests prepare appropriate documentation for tracking components that are awaiting completion of scheduled surveillance testing. Additionally, the surveillance testing administrative controls procedure will be revised to provide further clarification concerning the requirements for documenting the completion of assigned surveillance tasks. These corrective actions will be implemented for Units 1, 2, and 3.

There viere no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at t: he start of the event, other than as described above, that contributed to the event. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location which contributed to the event. There were no automatic or manually initiated safety system responses and none were necessary. The two containment purge isolation valves were satisfactorily tested prior to and after the period that the valves were administratively not OPERABLE. During the period that the valves were administratively inoperable, the valves were maintained in their deactivated containment isolation position (shut) except that CPB-UV-5B (Containment Power Access Purge Outlet Outboard Isolation) was activated for a period of approximately three hours during a containment vent evolution.

However, an OPERABLE Containment Power Access Purge Outlet Inboard Isolation valve was available at all times to provide containment isolation required. Based upon the above, there were no safety consequences or if implications of this event.

There have been previous Licensee Event Reports submitted due to exceeding surveillance interval time requirements; however, none of the previous events were caused by inadequate administrative controls for tracking partially completed surveillance performance.

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