ML17300A987

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LER 87-012-00:on 870716,discovered That Time Interval for Performance of Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.b.1 Exceeded on 870102.Caused by Error in Approved Procedure.Procedure to Be revised.W/870812 Ltr
ML17300A987
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/1987
From: Bradish T, Haynes J
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
192-00255-JGH-T, 192-255-JGH-T, LER-87-012-01, LER-87-12-1, NUDOCS 8708190151
Download: ML17300A987 (7)


Text

REGULA INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO 'YSTEM (BIDS>

ACCESSION NBR: 8708190151 DOC. DATE: 87/08/12 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station. Unit 2. Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH. NAME BRADISHi T.

HAYNES'. G.

R.. AUTHOR AFFILIATION Arizona Nuclear Poeer Prospect (formeri'g Arizona Public Serv Arizona Nuclear Poeer Prospect (formerly Arizona Public Serv RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-012-00: on 870716'ime interval for performance of Tech Spec 4. 6. 1. 3. b. 1 exceeded. Caused bg error in approved procedure. Procedure revised. W/870812 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER) i Incident Rpti etc.

NOTES: Standardized plant. M. Davis> NRR: 1Cg. 05000529 REC I P IENT COP I ES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5" PD 1 1 LICITRAiE 1 1 DAVIS> M 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MI CHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1

'AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1. 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 N /RPB 2 2 NRR/PMAS/ILRB 1 1 IL 02 1- 1 RES DEPY GI 1 1 ELFORDi J 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 EXTERNAL: EG8cG GROQ> M 5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS' 1 1 NS I C MAYS> G 1 1 NOTES:

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 44

NAC Form 344 U.S. NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION (9 831 APPROVED OMB NO. 3150010l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI EXPIRES! 4/31/44 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (21 PA E Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 1 OF TITLE lel Late Containment Airlock Leaka e Surveillance Test Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE 15) LEA NUMBER LS) REPOA1'ATE It) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Sl YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)

MONTH DAY NVMSE/I I IIUM44R MONTH Palo Verde Unit 1 0 50 0 0528 0 1 .287 87 012 0 0 0 8 1 2 8 7 /I'A 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINC THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (): /Chntr one or more o/ the /ollowlnpl (11 MODE (4) 20.402(h) 20.405(cl 50,73(el(2)llr) 73 71(4)

POWER 20.405( ~ ) (I l(l) 50.34(c) (I ) 50.73(sl(2) lrl 73.71(c)

LEVEL 1 p p 20.405 (e l(1 I (4) 50.34(cl(2) 50.73(e) (2) (rB) DTHER /Spec/ty /n Aotrrect perow cert ln Tert, /YRC Fohn 20.405(el(II(!Ill 50.73( ~ l(2)(ll 50.734)(21(r)B) IAI 34SA/

20.405 (e)(t l(lrl 50.73(el(2) (III 50.73(el 12)(rl4 I (5) 20.405(e)(1)(r) 50.73(el(2)(ill) 50.73( ~ ) l2) (r I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Thomas R. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor 602 393 -3531 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMI'ONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13I CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANVFAC MANUFAC. EPOATABL TURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TVRER TO NPADS e(1!Skk~:

fjf~!3r,; p!"'j4'/IS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 051 YES /I/ yn, complete EXPECTED SVSM/SS/ON DATE/ NO ASSTAACT /4/mlt to te00 tpecn, Ie., epprorimerely /i/Inn tlnpre specs typewntren Anni (141 On July 16, 1987 it was discovered that on January 2, 1987 at 1816 MST, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) operating at 100 percent power, the time interval for the performance of Technical Specification (T.S.) Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.b.l (Containment Airlock Leakage Test) was exceeded.

The root cause of the event has been identified as an error in an approved procedure (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE. REQUIREMENTS CROSS REFERENCE).

This procedure did not include a reference to the fact that T.S. 4.0.2 was not applicable to T.S. 4.6.1.3.b.l.

As corrective action to prevent recurrence, the procedure will be revised to identify that no time extension will be allowed for the surveillance

,requirement. Additionally, a review of the T.S. will be conducted to determine if there are any other examples of T.S. surveillance requirements which do not allow the use of T.S. 4.0.2. Any examples identified will be compared to the approved surveillance test intervals to ensure that the time extensions are not being used incorrectly.

No similar events involving a late surveillance test resulting from the inappropriate use oi T.S. 4.0.2 have been previously reported.

8708'0151 870812 ~l PDR S

ADQCK 05000529 PDR

(

NRC Form 344

NRC Form 444A (945) U4. )IUCLEAR REOULATORY COMM)55)OH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OM4 )IO 51EP P)P4 EXPIRESl 4/4)/44 FACILITY NAME )1) OOCKET NUMEER IT)

LER FIUMEER )4) PACE )5)

YEAII joe 55OUCNTIAL Ijo II4 V re IO N Xrg IIUM eo MUM TA Palo Verde Unit TEXT lllmore Ieeee il roe>wed, 2

oee aRPo'encl Pll)C fonrr 494l1) I)7) o s o o o 2 9 8 7 012 0 0.0 2 OF 0 On July 16, 1987 it was discovered that on January 2, 1987 at 1816 MST, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) operating at 100 percent power, the time interval for the performance of Technical Specification (T.S.) Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.b.l (100 foot elevation Containment Airlock (NH)(AL)

Leakage Test) was exceeded.

The airlock leakage test is conducted in accordance with surveillance test (ST) procedure 73ST-9CL04, CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK OVERALL LEAK TEST, and is required by T.S. to be performed at least once per 6 months. This surveillance requirement is applicable during operational Modes 1-4 (POWER OPERATION thru HOT SHUTDOWN) and T.S. 4.0.2 is identified as not applicable for this specification. This means that the normally allowed extensions (1.25 times the surveillance interval or 3.25 times the surveillance interval for three consecutive intervals) cannot be utilized for this ST.

An engineer (contractor non-licensed) in the group which normally conducts 73ST-9CL04 was checking the performance intervals in preparation for an upcoming performance of the ST and identified a concern regarding surveillance interval extensions. Based on further investigation, had been performed for the 100 foot elevation it- was determined that 73ST-9CL04 containment airlock on July 2, 1986 at 1816 and was required to be compl'eted by January 2, 1987 at 1816. Unit 2 was in Mode 1 from January 2, 1987 until a shutdown was initiated for a planned ST Outage,and Mode 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) was subsequently entered on January ll, 1987 at 0500 at which time T.S. Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.b.l was no longer applicable. 73ST-9CL04 was successfully performed on January 28, 1987 at 1330 while Unit 2 was still in Mode 5 for the Outage. Therefore, the T.S.

Surveillance Requirement was exceeded by approximately 8 days ll hours.

The root cause of the event has been identified as an error in an approved procedure (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CROSS REFERENCE).

The procedure did not include a reference to the fact that T.S. 4.0.2 was not applicable to T.S. 4.6.1.3.b.1. This resulted in 73ST-9CL04 being scheduled with an allowable 25 percent time extension. Had time extension, the ST scheduling group would have been tracking the actual it been scheduled without a performance of the ST and would have notified the performance group as the ST late date was approached.

Upon discovery of the problem, the past performance intervals for the 100 and 140 foot elevation containment. airlocks for all three operating units were reviewed to determine if they had exceeded the 6 month requirement. Two additional instances were identified in Unit 1. 73ST-9CL04 had been performed on April 4, 1985 at 1630 for both the 100 and 140 foot elevation Containment airlocks. The 100 foot elevation airlock was successfully tested on October 8, 1985 at 1715 (approximately 3 days late) and the 140 foot elevation airlock was successfully tested on October 9, 1985 at 1320 (approximately 3 days-21 hours late).'oth of these events occurred while Unit 1 was in Mode 3 (HOT STAILTDBY).

The root cause previously described is applicable to both of these events (the procedure in use for these events was titled SURVEILLANCE TESTING).

IAC IOIIM 544A

)94)I

NRC FoNA 3SSA IS43I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOR Y COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO 3(50M(Cd EXPIRES: 4/31/84 FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMSER (21 LER NUMSER (Sl ~ AQE (31 YEAR,cd@

O i'UM SEQUENT/AL ER jPI AEVISION NUM EA

'TEXT Palo Verde Unit

/// /oo/o aoodo /I /ooked, 2

odo oeWo'on@ /YRC Fo/III ~ 4/ (I TI 0 5 0 0 0 $ 2 9 87 0 12 0 0. 0 30F 0 3 As corrective action to prevent recurrence, the following actions will be taken for all three operating units:

Administrative Control Procedure TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CROSS REFERENCE will be revised to identify that no time SURVEILLANCE'EQUIREMENTS extension will be allowed for the 6 month surveillance interval for the performance of 73ST-9CL04. Concurrently, the ST scheduling program will be revised to reflect the fact that 73ST-9CL04 will not be allowed to utilize the T.S. 4.0.2 time extensions;

2) A review of the T.S.

examples will be conducted to determine if of surveillance requirements which do not allow the use of T.S.

there are other 4.0.2. Any examples identified will be compared to the approved surveillance test intervals to ensure that the time extensions are not being used incorrectly.

73ST-9CL04 is performed to verify that the overall airlock leakage rate is within its limit to ensure that the airlock will perform its function during a design basis accident with peak containment internal pressure.. In all three events, the late surveillance test was completed successfully when performed and would have been able to meet its safety function in the event of an accident.

Additionally, there has never been a failure of 73ST-9CL04 when performed in Units 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, these events did not affect the safe operation of the units or the health and safety of the public.

There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location which contributed to the event. There were no automatic or manually initiated safety system responses. Should other concerns or information pertinent to this event be discovered, a supplement to this report will be issued.

No similar events involving a late surveillance test= resulting from the inappropriate use of T.S. 4.0.2 have been previously reported.

NRC I QRM 3ddo 14 43 I

Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. SOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARI2ONA 85072-2034 192-00255-JGH/TRB/TJB August 12, 1987 Do'cument Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 2 Docket No. 50-529 Licensee Event Report 87-012-00 File: 87-020-404

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 87-012-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office..

If you have any questions, please contact T. 'R. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor at (602) 393-3531.

Very trul yours, J. G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/TJB/cld Attachment cc: 0. M. DeMichele (all w/a)

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

J. B. Martin R. P. Zimmerman R. C. Sorenson E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr INPO Records Center

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