ML17300A793

LER 87-011-00:on 870331,while in Mode 1,fire Watch Round Not Performed Per Tech Spec 3.7.12.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Fire Watch Patrolman Counseled on Safety Warnings & Scheduled for Addl training.W/870427 Ltr

ML17300A793
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	04/27/1987
From:	Bradish T, Haynes J ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
192-00197-JGH-T, 192-197-JGH-T, LER-87-011, LER-87-11, NUDOCS 8705050401
Download: ML17300A793 (10)

Text

REGULATO Nr ORi')ATIOI< DISTRIBUTION 'I:Vi (R IDB>

ACCEBSIOI i NBR: 8705050401 DOC. DATE'7/0'i /27 NOTA'< > 7E) i: t'JO DOCKET

.~ FAC Il: STI'I 5D 528 Po) o Verde induc 1 eav'tat i onI object Uni t 1> Av'i zona Pub 1 i 05000528 AUTH. NAI')E AU I HOR hF'F IL1*7 I Ol'~

BRAD I SH> I . R. Av i zona i~)uc J eav PoI'er Pv ( form<. i'> z! Av i. zona Public Serv HAYNES, iJ. G. Av i zona-"Nucler T" Po'acv Pv'object ( form<.< ) <3 Ar i zona Publ ic Berv RECIP NAI'1'. REC I P I F.-NV Ar-F IL IATIO~

SUB JECT: LER 87 011-00 on 870331I <"hi le in Node 1 I iv e iIIabch round not f pev formed pev Tech Spec 3. 7. 12. Caused b g cogzIi tive pev'sonne1 ev v ov'. F'ire iiiatch patv olman counseled on sal-<<tq u>arnings scheduled fov addi tv aining. I~/870')27 ltr.

DISTR IBVT IDN CDDE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event F?eport IEEED CDRIES RECEIVED: LTR (LFR) I J

Incident ElIC';.

1?pt I I SIZE:

<.tc.

NOTES: Btandav'di zed plant. Yi. Davi si I'!RR: 1CLI, 05000528 REC IP I EN'I'D CC!P I EB RECIPIENT COPIES CODE/NAI'IE LTTR Et" CL ID CODE/NANh I TTR E'IICL PD5 LA ) 1 PD5 PD I ICITRA,,- 1 DAVIS N 1 INTERNAL: ACRS I'1I CHELSQN 1 4CRS YIOELLER 1 AEQD/DOA 1 AEOD/DSP/ROA)< 2 2 AFOD/DSP/ I'FIAB ) tiRR/DEBT/ADE 0 NRR/DEBT/ADB 1 0 N<R/DEBT/CEB 1 NRR/DEBT/El,) < .I t!<R/DEBT/ I CB!<

NRR/DEBT/I IF. 1< 1 I'!RR /DEST/ YiTB NRR/DEBT/PS1< NRR/DEBT/RSB 1 1 RR/DEBT/S<G)< I NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAD i~.'RR /DOEA/ EAB 1 NRR/DREP/EP1< ) 1 t!RR/DREP/RAB 1 1 I!RR/DREP/RPB P7

/ ILRz<

NRR/Pli) A~~/PTBI< ) PEC FILE ,1 1 REB SPEIB, T 1 ILE 1 EXTERNAL: EChG GROHI I'I H ST LOBBY W>'-.R)'iRC I PDR PDR NSIC HARA ISp J I' I C I'1AYBI G NOTES:

TOTAL N'J}'!BER OF COPIES REGLIIRED: I TTR 43 ENCL

r.

NRE)Form 355N U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 8 Sll APPAOVED OMB NO, 31504104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) EXPIRES: SISIISS FACILITY NAME HI DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E TITLK lcl 0 s 0 o 052 1 OF 0 3 Fire Watch Patrol Missed Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE IS) LER NUMBER (Sl RKPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILI'TIES INVOLVED IS)

OAY YEAR YEAR SEOUENTIAI. REVS~ DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKFT NUMBER(S)

MONTH NVMSER Sinai..

NMMSER MONTH N/A 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 8 7 87 01 00 04 2 7 87 NA 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIRKMENTS OF 10 CPR (I: ICneck one or more or tne Iollowinol (11)

OPERATINO MODE (Sl 20.40l(SI 20AOS(cl 50.73(el(2)(tel 7$ .71(S)

~ OWER 20.405(eHI) 4) 50.$ 5(c) (I ) 50.7$ (e)(2)lrl 7$ .71(cl LEYEL (till)(BI 1 0 0 20.405 (I)II I (ii ) 50.$ 5 (c) (lI 50.7$ (e I (2) (rS I OTHER Ilpeclry in Aettrect Serow end in FeeL IYRC Form 20.405( ~ I(1) (ill) 50.7 l(e I (2) ( ll 50,73(e) (2) (rill)(A) $ FFAI 20AOS(el(ll(lrl 50.73(e l(2)(4) 50,7$ (e)12) 20A05 I~ ) (1) (r) 50.734) (21(lill 50.7$ ( ~ )(2)(el LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

TELEPHONE NUMBER NAME'homas AREA CODE R. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor (Ext. 6936) 602 932 53 0 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT l13)

.'IL(tr. o rriry!!!Syt!'O MANUFAC. EPORTABLE MANUPAC.

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TO NPROS  !RM)kt'AUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TUREA NPADS g@kl~~

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT KXPECTED (14i MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE H5)

YES IIIym, complete EI(PECTED SUSMISSIOIY DA TEI NO ABETRAcT (Limit to 1400 MMteL ie., epproirimetely Iitteen dnole tpece typewritten lined (15)

At approximately 2354 MST on March 31, 1987 with Palo Verde Unit 1 in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent power, a fire watch round was not performed in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.12, ACTION a. The roving fire watch had been implemented on January 14, 1987 as a compensatory measure due to the potential inoperability of Thermo-Lag Fireproofing installed on the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R-Safe Shutdown cable trays in the Auxiliary Building.

The root cause of this .event was a cognitive personnel error by the fire watch who did not immediately notify the Shift Supervisor that the fire watch round would not be completed within the specified time frame. The fire watch found the entrance to one of the assigned fire watch areas taped off and did not enter.

To prevent recurrence, the fire watch has been counseled on different types of Safety Warnings (i.e. barrier tapes, pennants, ropes, placards, etc.) utilized throughout the jobsite and scheduled for additional fire watch training.

There have been no previous events with the same root cause which have been reported.

8705050401 870427 PDR ADOCK 05000528 PDR NAC feim $ 45

NRC Form 38SA U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ig4ISI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO 3/SGWIGS EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME ITI OOCKET NUMSER (3)

LER NUMSER IS) PAGE ISI SEQUENT/AL,S/'EV/SIOs/

~'~

S/VMISR HVMSSA TEXT Palo Ver illms//P e U it 1 a>>ss is /Pdvnd, vw aAWonV/Y/IC fom/ 38SA'sl (IT) 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8 8 7 0 1 1 0 0 02 OFO At approximately 2354 MST on March 31, 1987, with Palo Verde Unit 1 in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100 percent power, a fire watch round was not performed in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.12, ACTION a. The fire watch (contractor non-licensed) did not patrol the northeast corner of the Auxiliary Building (NF) 70 foot level, thereby exceeding the hourly requirement. The fire watch commenced the next round at 0010 on April 1, 1987 and properly completed the entire fire watch round, complying with the Technical Specification requirement.

The fire watch had been established on January 14, 1987 as a compensatory measure due to the potential inoperability of Thermo-Lag Fireproofing (ISL) installed on the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R-Safe Shutdown cable trays (TY) in the Auxiliary Building. The fireproofing had been declared inoperable pending an evaluation of the criteria utilized for installation of the Thermo-Lag on the intervening support steel (SPT) of the protected Appendix R cable trays.

On March 31, 1987, during the first hourly fire watch round, the fire watch found the entrance to one of the assigned fire watch areas taped off. The watch attempted to contact several departments for assistance but did not reach any of them. The watch then completed the round without entering the area.

During the second fire watch round, the individual contacted the F.re Protection Department who directed the individual to enter the area as assigned. Fire Protection verified with Radiation Protection Department and the Assistant Shift Supervisor (utility licensed) that the tape had not been placed there by them for any known hazards. The fire watch completed her second and third rounds within the requisite time requirements.

The root cause of the event was attributed to a cognitive personnel error by the fire watch who did not immediately notify the Shift Supervisor that the fire watch round would not be completed within the specified time frame. This error is contrary to approved procedural controls. As immediate corrective action, the masking tape was removed from the door since no reason could be established for the tape being placed there.

To prevent recurrence, the fire watch has been counseled by the foreman on the different types of Safety Warnings (i.e. barrier tapes, pennants, ropes, placards, etc.) which are utilized throughout the jobsite. In addition, the individual has been scheduled for additional fire watch training.

Lastly, to ensure that the fire watches will be able to contact their supervision in the event of future problems, each roving fire watch and the on-shift foreman will be equipped with a portable radio. This corrective action was implemented for the Main Steam Support Structure (MSSS) fire watch as a result of Unit 2 LER 87-005-00 regarding a fire watch who had been locked in a room without a means of communication. As a result of this event, the above corrective action has been implemented for all roving fire watches.

4RC I </RSS 34SA ld 83>>

I NRC form 388A 19>31 0

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION U.E. NUCLEAR REOULAYORY COMMISSION AffROVEO OMS NO 3150&IOO EXPIRES: 8131/88 fACILIEYNAME lll OOCKEY NUMSER 121 LER NUMSER (8) fAOE (31 aaauarr YIAL o 8 v la lo rr NUM ao rrvMoao Palo Verde Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8 7 0 1 1 0 003 OF 0 3 ZEXf IIfrrroro Nroco lr oarroora ow Mrrr'rrofHPC forrrr JSEALU 1121 The purpose of the Thermo-Lag Fire Proofing on the cable trays is to protect the Appendix R-Safe Shutdown circuits in the event of a fire. This is necessary to ensure that one train of systems is available to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and cold shutdown as required. Calculations indicate that the existing Thermo-Lag protection conservatively exceeds the negligible fire loading in the affected area. In addition, the smoke detectors in this area were operable and the Fire Brigade would respond to the alarms. Therefore, this event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

There were no structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event, other than those described above, that contributed to the event. There were no manual or automatic safety system responses. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location or procedural deficiencies which contributed to the event. There were no operator actions which contributed to this event.

There have b..en no previous similar events with the same root cause which have been reported. However, PVNGS has experienced an increase in the number of fire watches which have not been completed as required. Although the root cause in each event has been different, PVNGS has initiated an Interdepartmental Event Investigation (IEI) to evaluate and determine can be identified. If if a common element or deficiency the evaluation identifies a different root cause than that contained in this report or identifies the need to implement significantly different corrective actions a supplement will be submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.

4IIC I OIIM aaao 19 83r

Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.o. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00197-JGH/TRB/TJB April 27, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-528 Licensee Event Report 87-011-00 File: 87-020-404

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 87-011-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50 '3. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor at (602) 932-5300 Ext. 6936.

Very trul yours, J. G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/TJB/cld Attachment ceo 0. M. DeMichele (all w/a)

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

J. B. Martin R. P. Zimmerman R. C. Sorensen E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr INPO Records" Center

~ ~

o

]I l