ML17300A775

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LER 87-002-00:on 870320,Class 1E Train B Bank of Pressurizer Backup Heaters Could Not Be Energized from Control Room,Per Tech Spec Requirement.Caused by Malfunction of Heater Breaker & Personnel Error.Breaker replaced.W/870417 Ltr
ML17300A775
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 04/17/1987
From: Bradish T, Haynes J
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
192-00189-JGH-T, 192-189-JGH-T, LER-87-002-01, LER-87-2-1, NUDOCS 8704240352
Download: ML17300A775 (10)
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Text

REGULATORY INFORNATION DISTRIBUTION S EN (R IDS>

)ACCESSION NBR: 8704240352 DOC. DATE: 87/00/17 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Stations Unit 2i Arizona Pub AUTH. NA>lE AUTHOR AFFILIATION li 05000529 BRADISH> T. R. Arizona Nuclear Pouer Prospect (formerly Arizona Public Serv HAYNES> J. Q. Arizona Nuclear Pou:er Prospect (formerly Arizona Public Serv RECIP. NANE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-002-00: on 870320'ontrol room operator discovered that Class 1E train B bank of pressurizer backup heaters could not be energized. Hea+e~ breaker malfunctioned. Caused bg personnel error. Nemo on procedures issued. W/870417 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SI ZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LEH) i Incident Rpt> etc, NOTES: Standardi zed plant. N. Davis'RR: 1Cg. 05000529 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NANE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/MANE LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PDG PD 1 1 LICITRAiE 1 1 DAVIS' 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS NICHELSON 1 1 ACRS NOELLER 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEVI/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 NRR/*DT 1 NRR/DEBT/ADE 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 1 NRR/DEBT/NEB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/NTB 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 NRR/DEST/SQB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 NRR/DREP/EPB 1 NRR/DREP/RAB NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2

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TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 42

NAC Form.344 U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (9 $ 3)

APPROVED OMS NO. 3(504)104 EXPIRES'. 5/31/SS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LERI FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMSER (2) PA 3 Palo Verde Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 1 OF 0 4 TITLE I ~ I Technical S ecification Noncom liance Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER LS) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED ISI MONTH OAY YEAR YfAR $ S~'SQVSNCIAI NVMSSII 4<

RSVISION NVMSSR MONT DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NVMSERIS)

N A 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 8 7 8 7 0 0 2 0 0417 87 N A THIS AEPOAT Is svsMI'TTED pUAsUANT To THE AEDUIREMENTs DF 10 cFR (): /cnecc one or morr o/thr /orrow/np) 111) 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINQ MODE I~ I 20 402(S) 20.405(c) 50.73(e l(2)(N) 73.7((III POWER 20.405( ~ I llI (I) SOM(c)(II 50.73(el(2) lcl 73.7 I(c)

LEVEL (10) 20.405 I~ I llI (III 50.35(c)(2) 50.73(e I (2) (rill OTHER /Sorel/y in AOIVett Oe/Owen</in Test, N/IC Form 20.405( ~ )ill(Ill) 50.73(c I 12) I I) 50.73(el(21(rill)(A) 366AI 20.405 I~ I llI (I>nS?< 2?@v.'AUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. EPORTASLE:~4IQ~4~(? '

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SU 5 MISSION DATE (15)

YE 5 I// yn, compit to Expf cTED svdct/$ $ /DIY DATE/ NO ASSTRACT (Limit to (400 tpecet, /.t.. epprocimetriy /i/Iten Iinpre /pter typrwrHtrn rrnn/ llfl At 1700 MST on March 20, 1987, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 2 (STARTUP) at approximately 1 percent reactor power when a Control Room Operator discovered that the Class lE Train "B" bank of pressurizer backup heaters could not be energized from the control room. The Assistant Shift Supervisor went to the local breaker and energized the heaters. The heaters functioned properly. On March 27, 1987 a NRC resident inspector discussed the event with the Shift Supervisor. Based on this discussion it was determined that the heaters had been inoperable due to not meeting a Technical Specification (T.S.) Surveillance Requirement and that LCO 3.4.3.1 ACTIONS had not been performed within the required time.

Troubleshooting determined that the heater breaker had malfunctioned. The breaker was replaced and the circuit operated properly.

The root cause of the event was cognitive personnel error in that the Shift Supervisor, Day Shift Supervisor and the Shift Technical Advisor did not recognize the Surveillance Requirements and believed that the heaters were operable as required by the LCO. As corrective action the Operations Manager issued a memo reminding licensed personnel that T.S. Surveillance Requirements must be complied with at all times during the applicable Modes.

There were no similar events previously reported.

I7 8704240352 870417 PDR ADOCK 0500052 9 PDR NRC eorm 344

NRC Form 388A 19831 U.8. NUCLEAR AECULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OM8 NO 3150 0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAIA'E Ill OOCKET NUMEER 12l LER NUMEER 18) PACE I31 YEAR,/Pre'EQUENT/AL j'v:

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/Y/IC /rorm 3IRLA8/ llll o s o o o At 1700 MST on March 20, 1987, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 2 (STARTUP) at 529 8 7 00 2 00 02oF0 4 approximately 1 percent reactor (RCT)(AB) power when a Control Room Operator (utility licensed) discovered that the Class 1E (EB) Train "B" bank of pressurizer (PZR)(AB) backup heaters (EHTR)(AB) could not be energized from the control room.

The Assistant Shift Supervisor (utility licensed) went to the local breaker (BRK)(EB) and manually shut the breaker energizing the heaters. The heaters then functioned properly.

The Shift Supervisor (utility licensed), the Day Shift Supervisor (utility licensed) and the on duty Shift Technical Advisor (utility non-licensed) then discussed the applicable Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) (3.4.3.1) and agreed they were in compliance with the 1CO since the heaters were capable of being powered from a Class 1E bus (BU). The applicable Technical Specification is shown on page 4 of this LER.

On March 27, 1987 a NRC resident inspector discussed the event with the Shift Supervisor and stated that the 18 month Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.1.3b requires that the heaters are capable of being reconnected to their respective buses manually from the control room following a loss of power.

Based on this information the Shift Supervisor initiated an investigation to determine if the heaters could have been reenergized from the control room following a loss of power. It was found that the normal circuit for the heater. is the same circuit that is used following a loss of power. Therefore, the heaters could not be reenergized from the control room after a loss of power although the heaters could have been and were energized locally.

Since the surveillance requirement could not be met, the pressurizer heaters were technically inoperable even though the Limiting Condition for Operation was met in that the pressurizer heaters were capable of being powered from Class 1E busses.

The root cause of the event was a cognitive personnel error in that the Shift Supervisor, Day Shift Supervisor and the Shift Technical Advisor did not recognize the Surveillance Requirements and believed that the heaters were operable as required by the KO. A contributing factor to the error, as seen by the Technical Specification on page 4, is that the KO requires that the heaters are capable of being powered from the Class 1E busses and is silent concerning manual reconnection from the control room.

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As corrective action to prevent recurrence the Operations Manager issued a memo to the Unit Superintendents to remind licensed personnel that T.S. Surveillance Requirements must be complied with at all times during the applicable Modes.

Troubleshooting and repair was accomplished under an authorized work control document. It was found that the heater breaker was malfunctioning. A spare breaker was installed in place of the faulty breaker and the heater circuit was restored to operability at 1815 on March 24, 1987. The event lasted approximately 97 hours0.00112 days <br />0.0269 hours <br />1.603836e-4 weeks <br />3.69085e-5 months <br /> and 15 minutes. A Root Cause of Failure has been initiated for the heater breaker and is currently in progress. The breaker was manufactured by the ITE Gould and is type K600S model Ol.

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1 NRC Form SSEA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO/r

/94ISI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OM8 NO SINAI GI'S EXPIRES: 8/S'I/88 FACILITY NAME (II OOCIIET NUM4ER IS I LER NUMEER IEI ~ AGE IS)

YEA/I SEGVENTIAL A4 V IE lo N NVM EA NVM EA TEXT Palo Verde Unit

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/Y/IC Form S/I/IA'4/ I IT I 0500052987 002 00 03 OF 0 4 Although the breaker could not be operated from the control room, the heaters could still be energized by manual operation of the breaker locally. The heaters would then be able to perform their function. This event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public since there is a redundant bank of heaters that was operable and capable of being powered from an alternate Class 1E bus from the control room.

There were no structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event, other than those described above, that contributed to the event.

There were no manual or automatic safety system responses. There were no unusual character.sties of the work location which contributed to the event.

Procedural controls are established through the implementation of the applicable Technical Specifications. This event was contrary to Technical Specifications 3.0.4, 4.0.1 LCO 3.4.3.1 and Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.1.3b. There were no errors in an approved procedure which contributed to the event. Should other information pertinent to this event be discovered, a supplement to this report will be issued.

There were no similar events previously reported.

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PA IRC form 344A

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~ U SNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t& S~I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO 3150 OIO4 EXPIRES'I3I 'ES fACILITYNAME III OOCKET NUM8ER I1I LE'R NUMSER ISI PACE IS)

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RAY%ION a&i IIVM444 NVM4ER TEXT Palo Verde Unit 2 N 4444 N>>44 N I44Viiwf. 444 NR44444f PfiiC AXIRJIPEA3 I nT) 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 8 7 002 00 0 4 OF 0 4 PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3.1 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a minimum steady-state water level of greater than or equal to 27K indicated level (425 cubic feet) and a maximum steady-state water level of less than or equal to 56X indicated level (948 cubic feet) and at least two groups of pressurizer heaters capable of being .'

powered from Class 1E buses each having a nominal capacity of at least 150 kM.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

ao With only one group of the above required pressurizer heaters OPERABLE, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b. With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, restore the pressurizer to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, or be in at least HOT STANDBY with ti:

reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4.3.1;1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

4.4.3.1.2 The capacity of the above required groups of pressurizer heaters shall be verified to be at least 150 kW at least once per 92 days.

4.4.3.1.3 The emergency power supply for the pressurizer heaters shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that on Safety Features Actuation test signal concurrent with a loss-of- an'ngineered offsite power:

a. The pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from the emergency power sources, and
b. The pressurizer heaters can be reconnected to their respective buses manually from the control room.

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~ f Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.o. BOX 52034 ~ PMOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 192-00189-JGH/TRB/JEH April 17, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Mashington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 2 No. STN 50-529

'ocket Licensee Event Report 87-002-00 File: 87-020-404

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event, Report (LER) No. 87-002-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor at (602) 932-5300 Ext. 6936.

Very truly yours, J. G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/JEH/cld Attachment CC: 0. H. DeHichele (all w/a)

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

J. B. Hartin R. P. Zimmerman R. C. Sorensen E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr INFO Records Center

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