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Report 16C4437-RPT-002, Revision 0, 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station
	ML17244A272
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Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	07/07/2017
From:	Masiunas A; Stevenson & Associates
To:	; Duke Energy Carolinas, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Stevenson & Associates Lngmeermg Soh111ous fv,. \\'uclear [nergr Document No: 16C4437-RPT-002 Revision 0 July 7, 2017 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Prepared for:

Duke Energy 550 South Tryon Street Charlotte, NC 28202 Stevenson & Associates 1626 North Litchfield Road, Suite 170 Goodyear, AZ 85395

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Freqtiency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station REVISION RECORD Initial Issue (Rev. 0)

Prepared by:

Reviewed by:

Jwan Abdalraheem Approved by:

Revision History 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 2 of94 7/7/2017 7/7/2017 717120 l 7 Rev. Prepared by/

Reviewed by/

Approved by/

Description of Revision No.

Date Date Date

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station TABLE OF CONTENTS:

16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 3 of94 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 7 I.1 Purpose............................................................................................................................. 7 I.2 Background...................................................................................................................... 7 1.3 Approach.......................................................................................................................... 8 1.4 Plant Screening................................................................................................................. 8

2.

Selection of Components for High Frequency Screening....................................................... 9 2.1 Reactor Trip/Scran1.......................................................................................................... 9 2.2 RCS/Reactor Vessel Inventory Control........................................................................... 9 2.2. I Reactor Coolant Loop............................................................................................. 10 2.2.2 Chemical and Volume Control............................................................................... I 0 2.2.3 Residual Heat Removal........................................................................................... I I 2.2.4 Process Sampling.................................... ~............................................................... 11 2.3 RCS/Reactor Pressure Control....................................................................................... 11 2.4 Core Cooling.................................................................................................................. 12 2.4.1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Valves.................................... 12 2.4.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Supply Valves....................................................................... 13 2.4.3 Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge Flow Control and Isolation Valves...................... 13 2.5 AC/DC Power Support Systems.................................................................................... 13 2.5.1 Emergency Diesel Generators................................................................................. I 4 2.5.2 Battery Chargers..................................................................................................... 17 2.5.3 Inverters.................................................................................................................. 17 2.5.4 EOG Ancillary Systems.......................................................................................... 18 2.5.5 Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs.................................................................... 20

3.

Seismic Evaluation................................................................................................................ 22

3. I Horizontal Seismic Demand........................................................................................... 22 3.2 Vertical Seismic Dernand............................................................................................... 22 3.3 Component Horizontal Seismic Demand....................................................................... 25 3.4 Component Vertical Seismic Demand........................................................................... 26

4.

Contact Device Evaluations.................................................................................................. 27

5.

Conclusions........................................................................................................................... 28 5.1 General Conclusions...................................................................................................... 28 5.2 Identification of Follow-Up Actions.............................................................................. 28

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0

6.

References............................................................................................................................. 29 A.

Representative Sample Component Evaluations.................................................................. 49 A. I High Frequency Seismic Demand.................................................................................. 49 A. I. I Horizontal Seismic Demand................................................................................... 49 A.1.2 Vertical Seis1nic Demand....................................................................................... 51 A.2 High Frequency Capacity............................................................................................... 52 A.2.1 Seismic Test Capacity............................................................................................. 52 A.2.2 Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor..................................................................... 53 A.2.3 Seismic Testing Single-Axis Correction Factor..................................................... 53 A.2.4 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration...................................... 53 A.2.5 Co1nponent Margin................................................................................................. 54

8.

Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation................................................... 55 TABLE OF TABLES:

Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity vs. Depth Profile..................................................... 23 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra...................................... 24 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation........................................ 55 Table 8-2: Rugged Solid-State Components Screened from High Frequency Confirmation...... 83 Table B-3: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confinnation..... 85 Table 8-4: Core Cooling Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation.................... 91 Table B-5: Electrical Power Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation................ 92 TABLE OF FIGURES:

Figure 3-1: Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V/H Ratios.......................................................................................................................... 25

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page S of94 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [ l]. ln particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4),

Enclosure I, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, ofthe March 12, 2012 letter [I].

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Eai1hquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena [2).

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(t) letter on March 12, 2012 [ 1 ], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(t) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under I 0 CFR Patt 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(t) letter was a request that licensees perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their/unctions important to safety."

EPRI I 025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic" [3] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [4] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [5].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perfonn a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by the NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [6].

'This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for Catawba Nuclear Station. The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confinnation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

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50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Page 6 of94 EPRI 3002004396 [ 4] is used for the Catawba Nuclear Station engineering evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference [4], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation Estimation of a vertical ground motion response spectrum (GMRS)

Estimation of in-cabinet seismic demand for subject components Estimation of in-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 1

INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 7 of94 The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the NRC in its March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [ 1]. In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item ( 4 ), Enclosure l, Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [I].

1.2 Background

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Tem1 Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review ofNRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clal"ify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena [2].

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1 ], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(1) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under I 0 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(t) letter was a request that licensees perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be qffected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their/unctions important to safety."

EPRI I 025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic" [3) provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(£) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [ 4] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [5].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perfonn a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [6].

On March 31, 2014, Catawba Nuclear Station submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [7]. By letter dated October 27, 2015

[6], the NRC transmitted the results of the.screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 8 of94 This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for Catawba Nuclear Station using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September I 7, 2015 [ 5].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

1.3 Approach EPRI 3002004396 [4] is used for the Catawba Nuclear Station engineering evaluations described in this repo11. Section 4.1 of Reference [4] provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation. Accordingly, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

Catawba Nuclear Station's SSE and GMRS Information Selection of components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation Estimation of seismic demand for subject components Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations Summary of Results 1.4 Plant Screening Catawba Nuclear Station submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GMRS and seismic hazard infonnation to the NRC on March 31, 20 I 4 [7]. In a letter dated April 27, 2015, the NRC staff concluded that the submitted GMRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the Catawba Nuclear Station site [8].

The NRC revised screening determination letter [9] concluded that the Catawba Nuclear Station GMRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria in the SPID [3].

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 9 of94

2. SELECTION OF COMPONENTS FOR HIGH FREQUENCY SCREENING The fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited equipment to fail to perform as necessary.

An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference [4], this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (AC/DC power suppot1 systems).

Within the applicable functions, the components that would need a high frequency confirmation are contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal-in or lockout (SILO) circuits.

Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2. J of Reference [ 4] is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions.'

2.1 Reactor Trip/Scram The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference [4] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that, "the design requiremenls preclude the application of seal-in or lockout circuits that prevent reactor trip/SCRAM.functions" and that "No [high-frequency] review [of the reactor trip/SCRAM

!iystems is] necesswy. "

2.2 RCS/Reactor Vessel Inventory Control The reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout (SILO) circuits that would create a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The focus of the review was contact control devices that could lead to a significant leak path. Check valves in series with active valves would prevent significant leaks due to misoperation of the active valve; therefore, SILO circuit reviews were not required for those active valves.

Reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control system reviews were performed for valves associated with the following functions:

Pressurizer Pressure Relief, Pressurizer Spray, Reactor Vessel Head Vent, Chemical and Volume Control, Residual Heat Removal,

' The selection of components for high frequency screening is described in Stevenson & Associates report I 6C443 7-RPT-00 I [220] and is summarized herein.

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station I 6C443 7-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Process Sampling A table listing the valves selected for analysis and their associated flow diagrams is included as Table B-3 of this report.

2.2. l Reactor Coolant Loop Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORV) l/2NC32B, l/2NC34A, l/2NC36B, PORV Isolation Valves J/2NC3JB, J/2NC33A, l/2NC35B Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via relays which are energized from process control signals. There are no devices which could seal-in and cause a sustained undesirable opening of the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves [IO, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].

For this reason, these PORY controls can be credited in a high frequency event, and analysis of the Isolation Valve controls is unnecessary.

Pressurizer Safety Valves 1/2NC1, 1 /2NC2, 1 /2NC3 1/2NC I, l/2NC2 and J/2NC3 are passive components with no external or integral electrical devices with lhe exception of position indication switches and are therefore 1101 subject lo spurious opening due to a high frequency seismic event [ 16, 17].

Reactor Head Vent Block Valves 112NC250A, J/2NC251 B Both Reactor Head Vent Block Valves 1/2NC250A and I/2NC251B could be subject to undesirable opening due to chatter of the motor-operated valve (MOY) opening contactor. The opening contactor can seal-in resulting in cycling the valve open. In addition, the 1/2NC250A control circuit contains an additional contact associated with the output from digital optical isolator (DOI) FM3 which electrically isolates the SSF Open control switch (NC41/0PEN).

Chatter at this contact could initiate actuation of the associated MOY opening contactor [I 0, 18, 19, 20].

Pressurizer Spray Valves J/2NC027 and 112NC029 1/2NC027 and l/2NC029 are fail-closed air-operated valves (AOYs) that utilize a dedicated solenoid pilot valve and rugged hand switch, directly venting the AOV to override the pneumatic control signal and ensure closure. There are no vulnerable devices in this circuitry subject to SILO [21, 22].

2.2.2 Chemical and Volume Control Regenerative Heat Exchanger Letdown Inlet Isolation Valves l/2NVJA, J/2NV2A Both Regenerative Heat Exchanger Letdown Inlet Isolation Valves are controlled by a rugged hand switch. There are no devices in the control circuit subject to chatter [23, 24, 25, 26].

Excess Letdown Isolation Valves l/2NVJ 22B, l/2NVJ 23B Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via a rugged hand control switch.

There are no chatter sensitive contact devices involved in the control of these valves [27, 28].

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 11 of94 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leak-off Isolation Valves l/2NV052A, l/2NV063B, J/2NV07.:/A, and J/2NV085B These valves fail open on loss of air or loss of control power [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36].

Their associated solenoids, l/2NVS0520, l/2NVS0630, l/2NVS0740, and l/2NVS0850, are energized by rugged control switches. A normally closed contact on interposing relays GE (ED, EF) transfers control to panel l/2ASPA (1/2ASPB) when energized by a rugged transfer control switch. When the valves are closed, chatter on the interposing relay contacts could only lead to momentary opening of the valve. The solenoid valves would re-energize and close their associated main valve once shaking subsided. There are no vulnerable devices in this circuitry subject to SILO.

2.2.3 Residual Heat Removal Residual Heat Removal NC Loop Supply Isolation Valves J/2NDOOJ B, l/2ND002A, J/2ND036B and J/2ND037A During Mode I power is removed from l/2NDIB, l/2ND2A, and 1/2ND37A in the closed position (until the ND System is placed into operation) in order to preclude fire induced inlera<.:tion which could lead Lo outside Containment LOCAs. During Mode I, power is not removed from l/2ND368 to prevent the loss of the interlock between this valve and l/2Nll36B and 1/2NS388 [37, p. 26]. Therefore, only 1/2ND36B could be vulnerable to spurious opening due to contact chatter during a seismic event. Valve l/2ND36B is manually operated via Open/Close pushbuttons (rugged devices). Valve position interlocks are provided such that valves FW558, NI 1848, NI 1368, and NS38B must be closed before 1/2ND36B can be opened

[38, 39]. Valve l/2FW558 is open during normal operations and the associated limit switch interlock (rugged device) blocks the open circuit for 1/2ND368 [40, 41]. Therefore, no devices meet the selection criteria.

2.2.4 Process Sampling NC Hot Leg A Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve l/2Nlvf022A, NC Hot Leg C Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve l/2Nlvf025A, PZR Liquid Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve J/2NM003A, Pressurizer Steam Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve l/2NM006A All the control circuits for the Process Sampling Valves listed above are vulnerable to chatter of the MOY opening contactor, which can seal-in and cycle the affected valve open. Additionally, these circuits contain a parallel, interposing contact on the open circuit from the output of a DOI (FW I, FX2, FY3, or FAA) used to isolate the Control Room and Sample Room control switches.

Chatter of this contact can initiate actuation of the MOY opening contactor [42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49] (Ul) [50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57] (U2).

2.3 RCS/Reactor Pressure Control The reactor vessel pressure control function is identified as a key function in Reference [4] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "required post event pressure control is typically provided by passive devices" and that "no specific high fi*equency component chatter review is required for this function." [4, pp. 4-6]

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 2.4 Core Cooling 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 12 of94 Core cooling is also a key function in Reference [4]. The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning.

For PWR plants, the decay heat removal mechanism involves the transfer of mass and energy from the steam generators to the atmosphere. This requires replacement of that mass to the steam generators via some feedwater system, e.g. turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump. Therefore, for this evaluation the following functions were checked:

Steam from the steam generators to the TDAFW turbine and exhausted to atmosphere Coolant from the upper surge tanks to the steam generators via the TDAFW pump The selection of contact devices for the TDAFW pump was based on the premise that pump operation is desired, thus any SILO which would lead to pump operation is desirable and for this reason does not meet the selection criteria. Only contact devices which could render the TDAFW system inoperative were considered. The power-operated valves in the flow paths above are listed in Table 8-4.

2.4.1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Valves Steam Generator to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Isolation Valves 1/2SA2 and 1/2SA5 These valves are connected upstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MS IVs) and therefore not subject to isolation by MSIV closure [58, 59]. Control for these valves consists of air-to-close actuators supplied by energize to close solenoid valves configured to fail open on loss of control air or loss of DC power and vent off the actuator allowing the spring force to open the valve [60, p. 13]. The associated solenoid valves are normally maintained energized by contacts from relay AB [ 61, 62, 63, 64]. Relay AB is maintained energized via multiple series contacts associated with the Aux FWPT auto-start circuits. Upon initiation of a LOOP signal, relay DC is energized causing relay AB to de-energize interrupting power to solenoids I /2SASV0020 and l/2SASV0050 opening l/2SA2 and J/2SA5. Chatter analysis indicates no SILO devices in the circuitry that could cause the valves to isolate or remain isolated due to contact chatter.

Steam Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve 1/2SAJ-15 Any relay chatter that could cause the momentary energization of the Trip and Throttle (T&T)

Valve MOY Close Contactor (ISAl45MC) could seal in and drive the T&T valve closed requiring operator action to reset and re-open the valve to establish Auxiliary Feedwater flow.

Chatter of MOY 1SA145 Closing Contactor (1SAI45MC) could seal in resulting in valve closure. Either Mechanical Overspeed Trip Relay (CR4) or Electrical Overspeed Trip Aux Relay (CON I) can actuate I SA 145 Closing Contactor. Electrical Overs peed Trip Relay (CR3) can actuate Overs peed Trip Aux Relay (CON I). Overs peed Trip Switch TM I ( 1 CAST5762) may cause actuation of Electrical Overspeed Trip Relay (CR3) [65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70].

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 2.4.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Supply Valves Upper Surge Tank Isolation Valves J/2CA4 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 13 of94 Contact chatter of the closing contactor of CA4 Upper Surge Tank Suction Isolation could seal in and result in the valve cycling fully closed [71, 72).

Hotwell Suction Isolation Valves J/2CA2, and TDAFW Pump Suction IsolaOon Valves l/2CA7A The Hotwell Suction Isolation and TDAFW Pump Suction Isolation Valves are maintained open and de-energized to ensure a suction flow path for the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps [73).

2.4.3 Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge Flow Control and Isolation Valves Auxilimy Feedwater Flow Control Valves 1/2CA36, J/2CA48, l/2CA52, and l/2CA64 These pneumatically-operated valves are configured to fail open on loss of air. Upon a TDAFWP automatic start signal they fully open on to insure flow path availability [74, pp. 38, 44, 46, 52). To accomplish this, a solenoid valve (l/2CASV0360, 0480, 0520, 0640) in the main valve's airline de-energizes to vent the valve operator. opening the valve. These solenoid valves will permit venting of the actuator independent of positioner signal [74, pp. I I 8, I 52). The solenoids are de-energized via normally closed contacts when relays DF and DE from the TDAFWP automatic start circuit are energized by a sta1t signal. Chatter analysis indicates no SILO devices in the circuitry that could cause the valves to close or remain closed due to contact chatter [75, 76, 77, 78].

Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Generator Isolation Valves J/2CA50A, l/2CA38A, J/2CA66B and J/2CA54B Contact chatter at the MOY Close Contactor for any of the four (4) Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Generator Isolation Valves could seal in and result in closure of the valve [79, 80, 81, 82] (Ul)

[83, 84, 85, 86] (U2).

2.5 AC/DC Power Support Systems The AC and DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that prevent the availability of DC and AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

Emergency Diesel Generators, Battery Chargers and Inve1ters, EDG Ancillary Systems, and Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs.

Electrical power, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability of AC power to recharge the batteries. The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) and their ancillary support systems. EPRI 3002004396 [4] requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power is not challenged by a SILO device. The

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 14 of94 tripping of lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine if the trip was spurious due to contact chatter or in response to an actual system fault.

The actions taken to diagnose the fault condition could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power.

In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary to distribute power from the EDGs to the Battery Chargers and EOG Ancillary Systems. General information on the arrangement of safety-related AC and DC systems, as well as operation of the ED Gs, was obtained from Catawba's UFSAR [87]. Catawba has four (4) EDGs which provide emergency power for their two (2) units. Each unit has two (2) divisions of Class IE loads with one EDG for each division.

Table B-5 contains the complete list of components included in the analysis for this category, along with the primary reference drawing used to determine its inclusion.

The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event. The Emergency Diesel Generators are not operating but are available.

The seismic evenl is presumed Lo cause a Loss of Offsile Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM.

In response to bus under-voltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class IE control systems must automatically shed loads, start the EDGs, and sequentially load the diesel generators as designed. Ancillary systems required for EDG operation as well as Class 1 E battery chargers and inverters must function as necessary. The goal of this analysis is to identify any vulnerable contact devices that could chatter during the seismic event, seal-in or lock-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP.

The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to all divisions.

2.5. I Emergency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generators is divided into three functional areas, generator circuit breaker control and protective relaying, diesel engine control, and generator load sequencing. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear in the Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR [87, pp. 8.3-11] as well as design basis specifications [88, 89]. The control and protective circuits for the diesel generator function differently depending on whether the diesel is stopped (immediately prior to starting), starting automatically in response to a loss of bus voltage (emergency start), or manually started (with offsite power available). Only two of these states is considered possible during the period of strong shaking, stopped prior to starting 1i and automatically starting. It is expected that under degraded voltage conditions the normal power

" Due to uncertainties in predicting seismic events, this analysis does not assume a strict time correlation between loss of offsite power (LOOP) and start of strong shaking at the site. Loss of offsite power could occur at any point immediately prior to or during the period of strong shaking.

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50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency WM Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 15 of94 feeder breakers would be tripped manually or automatically via the Degraded Voltage Relaying (analyzed herein), and the diesel generator would start automatically on the loss of voltage on the bus. Manual starting during strong shaking (as only a precaution in cases where offsite power has not been effected) is not considered in this analysis.

2. 5.1.1 Generator Protective Relaying The control circuit for the DG I A Output Circuit Breaker includes interlocking contacts in the breaker closing and trip logic. Actuation of the Diesel Generator Lockout Relay l ETA! 9 LOR will prevent automatic or manual closure of the Output Breaker if tripped. This relay would have to be manually reset. Diesel Generator Lockout Relay I ETA 19 LOR may be tripped by chatter in Generator Differential Relay 87G or Voltage Controlled Overcurrent Aux Relays 51 VX I, 51 VX2, 51 VX3 (2 of 3). Relays 51 VX I, 51 VX2, 51 VX3 may be actuated by chatter in their respective Voltage Controlled Overcurrent Protective Relays, PA (51 V), PB (51 V), or PC (51 V). If any of the 4 I 60V Essential Bus I ETA Lockout Relays 86N (Normal Feed), 86S (Standby Feed) or 86B (Breaker Failure) are tripped, DG l A Output Circuit Breaker closure will be blocked and the affecting relay will require manual resetting. These breaker closure interlocks are bypassed by Sequencer Safeguards Actuation Relny I ESGA X l in the event of a Safety Injection Signal but not on a Bus Undervoltage. Normal Feed Breaker IETA3 Lockout Relay 86N may be tripped by contact chatter in PB (51) Overcurrent or PA (51 G) Ground Overcurrent relays. Standby Feed Breaker I ETA4 Lockout Relay 86S may be tripped by PB (51) Overcurrent or PA (51 G) Ground Overcurrent relays. Breaker Failure Lockout Relay 86B may be actuated by contact output from Breaker Failure Timer 62B [90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95] (Ul)

[96, 97, 98, 99, 100, I 01] (U2). The control circuits forthe other three EOG circuit breakers are identical in design and sensitive to chatter in their equivalent devices:

DGIB 1ETBl9 (SB-1): 87G, 51VX1, 51VX2, 51VX3, PA (51V), PB (51V), PC (SlV);

1ETB3 86N: PB (51), PA (SIG); 1ETB4 86S: PB (51), PA (SIG); 86B: 62B DG2A 2ETAl9 (SB-I): 870, SIVXI, 51VX2, SIVX3, PA (51V), PB (SIV), PC (51V);

2ETA3 86N: PB (51), PA (SIG); 2ETA4 86S: PB (51), PA (SIG); 86B: 62B DG2B 2ETBl9 (SB-1): 870, 51VXI, 51VX2, 51YX3, PA (51V), PB (51V), PC (51V);

2ETB3 86N: PB (51 ), PA (51 G); 2ETB4 86S: PB (51 ), PA (51 G); 86B: 62B 2.5.1.2 Diesel Engine Control Chatter analysis for the diesel engine control was perfonned on the start and shutdown circuits of each EOG. Only emergency start in response to a LOOP is considered in this analysis as manual start and non-emergency DG engine trips are disabled in the presence of a sequencer start signal (SI or UV) [I 02, I 03, I 04, I OS]. Due to the initial conditions and event progression described above, as well as the analysis of RCS leak path valves, generator starting via a safety injection signal is also not considered. Generator droop mode and output breaker non-emergency trips are disabled by breaker auxiliary contacts within the Breaker and Governor Control circuitry from the Normal and Standby 4160V Essential Bus Feeder Breakers when both bus feeder breakers are open as would occur during a LOOP [91, 93, 97, 98]

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 16 of94 SILO devices that can block EOG Emergency Start in response to LOOP are the LO-LO Lube Oil Pressure Trip Relay (JB), the DG I A Breaker lockout relay (860) and (2 of 2) Overspeed relays DA (SST 1) R 1, DB (SST2) R 1 (trip Combustion Air Damper Solenoid I SLND0004) and (2 of2) Overspeed relays DA (SSTI) R3, DB (SST2) R3 (trip the Fuel Rack Solenoid I EQSV5 I 30) [ 106, 107]. Each of the above trips would seal-in an EOG trip signal and require manual resetting to permit EOG automatic starting. Non-Emergency Trip Relay (HB) is included as a selected device but the impact on closure of the Fuel Rack would only be momentary for the duration of contact closure as the seal in (Relay JC) is defeated during an emergency start signal by the Shutdown De-Activation Relays (R9/R I 0) and the Fuel Rack Solenoid returns to run position in the absence of a stop signal [I 06] (Note 6). In the automatic starting circuit for the EDGs, contact chatter in the Shutdown De-Activation Relays R9A (RI OA) could seal-in and result in a complete automatic start sequence even in the absence of an SIS or Undervoltage signal [ 102, I 03, 104, I 05]. This would result in the DG running unloaded in Emergency Mode with the output breaker open. Contact chatter at Fail-to-Start Aux Relays TD4/TD5 (2 of 2) [I 06, 107] would result in unlatching the DG Auxiliary Run Relays RI, RI A, R 1 B, RIC and R2 if the DG is already running [ 108, 109]. The Auxiliary Run Relays are mechanically latching relays. Auxiliary Run Relay RIB (4, 4a) provides a trip signal to the DG Output breaker anytime the Diesel Generator is not running as indicated by the status of RIB.

This trip is not inhibited by any other interlock. With an active automatic close signal present, the DG Output breaker would be prevented from re-closing by the breaker anti-pump feature [91, 93, 108, 110] (UI) [97, 99, 109, 111] (U2). Speed Switch ET-1214 (DA) and associated Aux Relay (FA) may permit an inadvertent (premature) Accelerated Sequence permissive to the Sequencer loading relays in advance of the correct speed parameter [112, 113]. Chatter of EQMT5200 (Tach Transmitter Relay) Auxiliary Relays SS 1-K 1 /2 may result in inadvertent (premature) field flash of the diesel Generator [102, 104, 103, 105]. Auxiliary Relay SSl-K4 may allow inadvertent (premature) closure of the DG Output Breaker in advance of the correct speed parameter. [91, 110, 112, 97, 11 I, 113). The control circuits for the other three EOG engine control circuits are identical in design and sensitive to chatter in their equivalent devices.

Engine control diagrams and component designations are typical for all 4 EDGs.

2.5.1.3 Diesel Engine Load Sequencing Analysis of the Diesel Generator Sequencing Cabinets 1/2DGLSA-I and l/2DGLSA-2 was perfonned to determine any contact chatter that could result in spurious operation of DG loads or components. Concerns included premature (premature speed or voltage permissive) or concurrent loading that could overload the DG during the scheduled loading sequence. An additional concern was spurious contact operation that would interrupt, delay or re-initiate loading sequence. Contact chatter of any of the Sequencer Loading Relays (RAJ through RAl3)

[I 14, 115] or Sequence Timer Relays (ST 1 A through ST I 3A) [ 116, 117) can seal in the relay and result in out-of-sequence overloading of the DG. Chatter of the DG Restart Relay (RGA)

[118, 119] could seal-in, actuating Load Shed Timer and Auxiliary Relay (LSATT/LSAT), re-initiating Load Shed via LSA 1,2,3. Chatter of the Load Shed Timer (LSA TT/LSA T) could also allow premature closure of the DG Output Breaker [90, 91, 96, 97]. Chatter of the Blackout Relay (BOA) could seal-in and cause actuation of Sequencer Actuation Relays (SAA 1 through SAAS) [118, 119]. Contact chatter at Engineered Safeguards Aux Relay (1 ESGAX I) could seal-in resulting in actuation of 1 ESGAX I through 1 ESGAX4 [ 120, 121 ]. Contact chatter at 2/3 of

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 17 of94 the Phase Undervoltage Relays (127XAX, 127YAX and 127ZAX) [122, 123] could actuate the Blackout Relay (BOA) resulting in seal-in of BOA and actuation of SAA I through SAAS.

Chatter ofUndervoltage Relay/Special (!27XAX/SPL) may result in a premature Accelerated Sequence Permissive allowing DG loading with less than scheduled voltage only if DIG speed is greater than 43 0 rpm [ 122, 123]. Contact chatter of Logic Timer (L T2A) cou Id actuate Blackout Relay (BOA) and seal-in a subsequent Blackout Sequence [ 122, 123]. Contact chatter of Sequencer Actuation Relays SAAi (AA) or SAAS (BE) would initiate a spurious start of the DG via Shutdown De-Activation Relay R9A or RI OA [ 120, l 02, l 03, 121, I 04, I 05]. The control circuits for the other three EDG Sequencer cabinets are identical in design and sensitive to chatter in their equivalent devices. The equivalent devices for all trains are listed in Table B-1.

2.5.1. Degraded Voltage Relaying Catawba Nuclear Station 4 l 60Y Degraded Voltage protection is arranged in a 2 of 3 relays scheme (27ZY, 27YX and 27ZX) to actuate a trip signal to the Normal and Standby Incoming Bus Feeder Breakers when sustained 4kV bus voltage is detected below the Degraded Voltage set-point [94, 95, I 00, I 0 I]. Inherent time delays ensure the condition is not actuated on intermittent conditions. Once the bus is de-energized, first level bus undervoltage protection is actuated resulting in diesel generator start. There is no seal-in to the Degraded Voltage scheme.

The signal is reset when bus voltage is restored above the Degraded Voltage set-point. Contact chatter could only momentarily delay or prematurely trip the feeder breakers. There are no devices within the Degraded Voltage scheme that could establish a SILO due to contact chatter that would prevent actuation of the circuit.

2.5.2 Battery Chargers 12 5 VDC Vital Bat1e1J1 Bank Chargers 1 ECA, 1 ECB, 1 ECC, and 1 ECD Analysis of 125 VDC Vital Battery Chargers 1 ECA, I ECB, I ECC, and I ECO was performed using information from the UFSAR [87, pp. 8.3-30], as well as vendor schematic diagrams [124].

Each battery charger has a high-voltage shutdown (HYSD) feature, and alarms for charger supply undervoltage and 125 VDC bus high/low voltage conditions. The high voltage shutdown circuit has an output relay K30 I, which shunt-trips the DC output circuit breaker. Chatter in the contacts of these output relays may disconnect the output of the battery chargers from the batteries and therefore meet the selection criteria.

12 5 VDC Diesel Generator Battery Bank Batte1y Chargers 1 DGCA and 1 DGCB Dedicated EDG Battery Bank Battery Chargers I DGCA and I DGCB are also equipped with a high-voltage shutdown (HVSD) feature actuated by internal relay K307 which shunt-trips the DC output circuit breaker. Upstream Timer TD301 may also actuate downstream relay K307

[125, 126].

2.5.3 Inverters l 20VAC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Inverters l/2EIA, 112EIB, !/2EIC, 112EID The inverters are powered from l 25VDC Yitai Instrumentation and Control Power distribution centers via rugged molded case circuit breakers [127, 128]. Review of the design basis specification [ 129], as well as vendor schematic diagrams [ 130, 131] revealed no SILO contact

Page 18 of94

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50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 devices are present in the inve1ter control circuits, and thus no devices associated with the inverters meet the selection criteria.

2.5.4 EOG Ancillary Systems The Emergency Diesel Generators require many components and systems to start and operate.

For identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed.

2. 5. 4.1 Starting Air The Catawba Diesel Generator Starting Air storage capacity for each redundant diesel engine is sufficient for a minimum of five successful engine starts without the use of the air compressors

[132]. Based on Diesel Generator availability as an initial condition, the passive air reservoirs are presumed pressurized and the only active components in this system required to operate are the air start solenoids [133, p. 14] which are covered under the EOG engine control analysis in Section 2.5.1.2 above.

2.5.4.2 Comb11stio11 Air Intake and Ethaust The combustion air intake is a passive system taking outside air from outside the building through two air intake lines. The exhaust from the engine is discharged through an exhaust silencer, then routed outside the building at a point separated and removed from the air intake.

Both are passive systems, do not rely on electrical control and not subject to high frequency*

failures [134, p. 12].

2.5.4.3 Lube Oil The Diesel Generators utilize a "dry" sump lube oil system with engine-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps [ J 35, p. 2] which do not rely on electrical control.

2.5.-1.-1 Fuel Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical pumps to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks. The mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control [136, p. 24]. Fuel oil is transferred by gravity from the storage tanks to the day tanks. A set of level switches located within the day tank control the position of the fuel oil transfer valve; opening the valve to allow fuel to flow to the day tank at low level and closing the valve to shut off the supply at high level. Chatter analysis of the control circuits for the electrically-powered solenoid-actuated fuel oil transfer valves concluded they do not include SILO devices [137, 138, 139, 140].

2.5.-1.5 Cooling Water The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System is described in its Design Basis Document (DBD)

[141, p. 20]. The Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System for each diesel includes a jacket water-intercooler water heat exchanger which is supplied with cooling water from the Nuclear Service Water System (RN). Engine driven pumps are credited for jacket water circulation when the engine is operating. These mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical

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50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

¥M. Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 19 of94 control. The electric jacket water pump is only used during shutdown periods and is thus not included in this analysis.

2.5.4.6 Nuclear Service Water Nuclear Service Water Pumps Four (4) Nuclear Service Water (NSW) pumps, IA, I B, 2A, and 28, provide cooling water to the heat exchangers associated with the four EOGs [ 142]. In automatic mode, these pumps are started via a sequencing signal from either Unit I or Unit 2 (SIS or UV) following EOG start.

Chatter analysis of the EOG start signal is included in Section 2.5.1.2 above. A chatter analysis of the NSW pump circuit breaker control circuits [143, 144, 145, 146] indicates the Phase Overcurrent Relay I ETA 14 PB (50/51) and Ground Overcurrent Relay I ETA 14 PA (50G) could prevent automatic (sequential) breaker closure following the seismic event. Additionally, chatter of LSA I (LSB I) Sequencer Load Shed Relay contacts 4/4a may result in an inadvertent trip of the respective RN pump in the event of seismic activity following a successful automatic start.

With an active automatic stm1 signal still present, the breaker would be prevented from reclosing by the breaker anti-pump feature [147].

RN Pump Discharge Isolation Valves J/2RN28A and l/2RN38B, RN Pump Motor Cooler Isolation Valves l/2RNJ IA and J/2RN20B These valves are part of the flow path for NSW cooling to the EOGs [ 148, 149]. The valves are controlled by the position of an auxiliary contact (52S) from the associated NSW pump motor breaker. When the NSW pump motor breaker is closed, the auxiliary contact energizes an interposing relay (AA/AC) that simultaneously blocks the valve closing contactor while energizing the opening contactor. There is no SILO associated with the individual circuits.

Contact chatter could only momentarily cause undesired valve movement. Valve position would return to the position demanded by the NSW pump breaker once shaking subsided [ 150, 151, 152, 153] (UI) [154, 155, 156, 157] (U2).

Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water Cooler RN Supply Isolation Valves l/2RN232A and l/2RN292B These valves are controlled by the associated Diesel Generator Auxiliary Run Relay (RIC). The Auxiliary Run Relays are controlled by the DG Start/Stop Circuitry. RIC is a latching relay that will maintain set or reset position mechanically. With an active DG run signal, RIC will maintain the set position thus commanding interposing relay AA to block the valve closing contactor and energize the opening contactor. Contact chatter of the interposing relay could only momentarily cause undesired valve movement. Valve position would return to the position demanded by RIC once shaking subsided [ 15 8, 159] (U I) [ 160, 161] (U2).

RN Pumphouse Pit Isolation Valves JRNJA, JRN2B, JRN5A, and JRN6B Chatter analysis for these valves indicates they may be susceptible to SILO conditions that have the potential to obstruct the overall RN flow path to or from the UHS that sustains the EOG coolers. These valves are all susceptible to spurious closure signals from contact chatter of their respective MOY Close Contactor. Additionally, each of these valves have control switches at both Unit Main Control boards (IMC! I and 2MCI 1). Chatter of the interposing auxiliary relays

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 20 of 94 for the control switches (CD, AA, AE, and DD) can initiate actuation of the respective MOY Close Contactor [162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169).

Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Return to Lake Valves 112RN847A, and 112RN849B These valves are susceptible to spurious closure due to contact chatter of their MOY Close Contactor [ 170, 171, 172, 173).

2.5.4. 7 Ventilation The Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System (VD) is described in its Design Basis Specification [174). The VD System Emergency Fans (DSF-1/2, A I, A2 and DSF-1/2, Bl, B2) start any time the diesel receives a start signal. The fans are automatically stopped by a signal from the fire detection system. The fans will also start on a Blackout or LOCA signal, which overrides any fire protection system signal that may be present. [ 1 74, p. 21]. Chatter analysis of the control circuits for the Emergency Fans [ 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182) concluded that they do not include SILO devices.

Each set of DG Emergency Ventilation Outside Air Supply (DSF D-1. 3, 7. 9) and Return Air Dampers (DSF D-2, 4, 8, 10) are paired on the same circuit and propo1tional temperature controller. The circuit is configured such that the Outside Air Supply and Return Air Dampers are connected with polarities reversed so that the dampers will move converse to each other in response to the demanded signal from the propo1tional temperature controller. The damper controller circuit is enabled by the associated Emergency Fan Run Contactor (M). Emergency Fan operation is described above. Following an emergency start signal, manual purge function is locked-out and any fire protection signal is bypassed. There are no contact devices within the damper controller circuits subject to SILO that are capable of inhibiting damper operation prior to or in the presence of an active Safeguards Signal (SI or UV).

2.5.4.8 Crankcase Vacuum The crankcase vacuum system is passive and does not require electrical controls to function

[ 183, 184, 185). No components in this system are sensitive to high frequency motion.

2.5.5 Switchgear. Load Centers. and MCCs Power distribution from the EDGs to the necessary electrical loads (Battery Chargers, Inverters, Fuel Oil Valves, Nuclear Service Water Components, and EDG Ventilation Fans) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a circuit breaker trip and interruption in power.

This effort excluded control circuits for the EDG circuit breakers, which are covered in Section 2.5.1.1 above, and the NSW Pump breakers which are covered in Section 2.5.4.6 above, as well as component-specific contactors and their control devices, which are covered in the analysis of each component above.

Due to their high frequency sensitivity, the medium-and low-voltage circuit breakers in the 4 I 60V switchgear and 600V load centers which are supplying power to loads identified in this section must be included in the High Frequency Program. Circuit breakers in the following

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S0.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 21 of94 cubicles have been identified for evaluation because they have the potential to trip during strong shaking 111 :

!ETAS

IET8S

2ETAS

2ET8S IETAl6 IET816

2ETAl6

2ET8-16 I ELXA-048 IELX8-048

2ELXA-048

2ELX8-048 1ELXA-06C

1ELX8-06C

2ELXA-06C

2ELX8-06C

IELXA-04C 0

IELXB-04C

2ELXA-04C

2ELXB-04C

I ELXC-048

lELXD-048

2ELXC-048

2ELXD-048 1 ELXC-04C

IELXD-04C

2ELXC-04C

2ELXD-04C.

Per the Design Basis Specification for the 125 VDC Vital I&C Power System (EPL) [ 129, p. 21]

DC Distribution uses Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (MCCBs) which are seismically rugged [4, pp. 2-11]. MCC8s are used in low voltage Motor Control Center Buckets [ 186] and are considered rugged as well.

The only circuit breakers affected by external contact devices not already mentioned were those that distribute power from the 4160\\1 ESf Busscs to the 4 l 60/600V step-down transformers

( 1 ET AS, 1ETA16, I ETB5, I ET8 I 6, 2ETA5, 2ET A 16, 2ET85, 2ET816) and from the 4 I 60/600V step-down transformers to the 600V Load Centers (1 ELXA-48, I ELXC-48 1 ELXB-4C, 1ELXD-48,2ELXA-4B, 2ELXC-48 2ELXB-4C, 2ELXD-4B). A chatter analysis of the control circuits for the 4 l 60V circuit breakers [187, 188, 189, 190, 191, I 92, 193, 194] indicates their respective phase overcurrent relays (50/51) and ground fault relays (SOG) could trip the transformer feed breakers. With an active automatic close signal still present (SI or UV), the breaker would be prevented from rec losing by the breaker anti-pump feature [ 14 7]. A chatter analysis of the control circuits for the 600V Load Center Incoming Feed Circuit Breakers [195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204] (U I) [205, 44, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 2 I I, 212, 213] (U2) indicates contacts from the Sequencer Load Shed Relays LSA3 and LSB3 could trip the Incoming Feed Circuit Breakers. With an active automatic close signal still present (SI or UV), the breaker would be prevented from reclosing by the breaker anti-pump feature [214].

'" In the case of 4160 switchgear breakers, which are automatically tripped during load shed and then closed again by the sequencer, strong shaking may be sustained after reclosure depending upon the duration of the event and the timing between the event and loss of offsite power. If the breakers are not sufficiently rugged to high frequency motions, they may trip after rec!osure.

Page 22 of94

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0

3. SEISMIC EVALUATION 3.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand Per Reference [ 4], Section 4.3, the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the horizontal direction is the Catawba Nuclear Station horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS), which was generated as pa11 of the Catawba Nuclear Station Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [7] submitted to the NRC on March 31, 2014, and accepted by the NRC on April 27, 2015 [8].

It is noted in Reference [4] that a Foundation Input Response Spectrum (FIRS) may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. However, for sites founded on rock, per Reference [4], "The Control Point GMRS developed for these rock sites are typical(v appropriate for all rock7founded structures and additional FIRS estimates are not deemed necessmyfor the highfi*equency confirmation effort."

All major Category I structures are founded on sound rock per Catawba Nuclear Station Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report [7]. Therefore, the Control Point GMRS is representative of the input at the building foundation.

The horizontal GMRS values are provided in Table 3-2.

3.2 Vertical Seismic Demand As described in Section 3.2 of Reference [ 4], the horizontal GMRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GMRS (VGMRS), which is the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

The site's soil mean shear wave velocity vs. depth profile is provided in Reference [7] Table 2.3.2-2 (profile I), and reproduced below in Table 3-1.

50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 23 of94 Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity vs. Depth Profile Layer Depth Thickness, di Vsi di/Vsi I [di/ Vsi)

Vs30 (ft)

(ft)

(ft/s)

(s)

(ftis) l 0.0 0

6800 0.000000 0.000000 2

4.0 4.0 6800 0.000588 0.000588 3

8.0 4.0 6800 0.000588 0.001176 4

12.0 4.0 6800 0.000588 0.001765 5

13.5 1.5 5723 0.000262 0.002027 6

17.5 4.0 6955 0.000575 0.002602 7

21.5 4.0 6955 0.000575 0.003177 8

25.5 4.0 6955 0.000575 0.003752 9

29.2 3.7 7783 0.000475 0.004228 10 32.9 3.7 7783 0.000475 0.004703 8077 11 36.5 3.6 7783 0.000463 0.005166 12 40.0 3.5 8552 0.000409 0.005575 13 43.5 3.5 8552 0.000409 0.005984 14 46.9 3.4 8854 0.000384 0.006368 15 50.2 3.3 8854 0.000373 0.006741 16 53.5 3.3 8854 0.0003 73 0.007113 17 57.0 3.5 8854 0.000395 0.007509 18 60.5 3.5 8854 0.000395 0.007904 19"'

98.4 37.9 8859 0.004278 0.012182 20 3365.7 3267.3 9285 0.351890 0.364072 Using the shear wave velocity vs. depth profile, the velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m (98.4ft) to the surface of the site (V sJo) is calculated per the methodology of Reference [4], Section 3.2.

The time for a shear wave to travel through each soil layer is calculated by dividing the layer depth (d1) by the shear wave velocity of the layer (Ys1).

The total time for a wave to travel from a depth of 30m to the surface is calculated by adding the travel time through each layer from depths of Om to 30m (l:[di/Vs1]).

The velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface is therefore the total distance (30m) divided by the total time; i.e., Vs30 = (30m)/l:[d/Ys1].

The site's soil class is determined by using the site's shear wave velocity (Vs30) and the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the GMRS and comparing them to the values within Reference

[4], Table 3-1. Based on the PGA of 0.329g and the shear wave velocity of 8077ft/s, the site soil class is C-Hard.

Once a site soil class is determined, the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V /H) at each frequency are determined by using the site soil class and its associated V/H values in Reference

[4], Table 3-2.

'"The shear wave velocity in Layer l 9 is calculated by interpolating shear wave velocities from Layer 18 and 20.

ea 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

¥M. Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 24 of94 The vertical GMRS is then calculated by multiplying the mean V/H ratio at each frequency by the horizontal GMRS acceleration at the corresponding frequency. It is noted that Reference [4],

Table 3-2 values are constant between 0.1 Hz and I 5Hz. The Y/H ratios and VG MRS values are provided in Table 3-2 of this report. Figure 3-1 below provides a plot of the horizontal GMRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GMRS for Catawba Nuclear Station.

Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra Frequency HG MRS V/H VG MRS (Hz)

(g)

Ratio (g) 100 0.329 0.81 0.266 90 0.334 0.84 0.281 80 0.345 0.88 0.304 70 0.37 0.93 0.344 60 0.433 0.94 0.407 50 0.563 0.92 0.518 40 0.698 0.87 0.607 35 0.735 0.82 0.603 30 0.748 0.77 0.576 25 0.731 0.71 0.519 20 0.699 0.7 0.489 15 0.633 0.7 0.443 12.5 0.589 0.7 0.412 10 0.535 0.7 0.375 9

0.498 0.7 0.349 8

0.461 0.7 0.323 7

0.421 0.7 0.295 6

0.377 0.7 0.264 5

0.328 0.7 0.23 4

0.265 0.7 0.186 3.5 0.231 0.7 0.162 3

0.198 0.7 0.139 2.5 0.158 0.7 0.111 2

0.145 0.7 0.102 1.5 0.114 0.7 0.08 1.25 0.096 0.7 0.067 I

0.084 0.7 0.058 0.9 0.081 0.7 0.057 0.8 0.079 0.7 0.055 0.7 0.074 0.7 0.052 0.6 0.067 0.7 0.047 0.5 0.057 0.7 0.04 0.4 0.046 0.7 0.032 0.35 0.04 0.7 0.028 0.3 0.034 0.7 0.024 0.25 0.029 0.7 0.02 0.2 0.023 0.7 0.016 0.15 0.017 0.7 0.012 0.125 0.014 0.7 0.01 0.1 0.012 0.7 0.008

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Page 25 of94 0.8

--HGMRS 0.7

--VGMRS 0.6

-V/H Ratio {C-Hard) c 0

0.5

~ 0.4

(!J (ij u

u er 0.3 0.1 0

0.1

./

10 Frequency (Hz)

I I

100 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 Figure 3-1: Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V /H Ratios 3.3 Component Horizontal Seismic Demand 0

ro er:

r:

Per Reference [ 4] the peak horizontal acceleration is amplified using the following two factors to determine the horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum:

Horizontal in-structure amplification factor AFsH to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the control point elevation Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsH is derived from Figure 4-3 in Reference [4]. The in-cabinet amplification factor, AFc is associated with a given type of cabinet construction. The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference [ 4] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148

[215] assuming 5% in-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRJ NP-7148 [215] classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 26 of94 flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room benchboard panels and low amplification structures such as motor control centers.

All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table B-1 in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in-cabinet amplification categories in Reference [4] as follows:

a Motor Control Centers are typical multi-cubicle cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections. Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height-

to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the front-to-back direction. This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response. In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications. These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

Switchgear cabinets are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category. Each section is a wide box-type structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less clamping which increases the enclosure response. Components can be mounted on the wide panels, which results in the higher in-cabinet amplification factors.

e1 Control cabinets are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width.

Each section consists of structures with height-to-depth ratios of about 3 which result in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

3.4 Component Vertical Seismic Demand The component vertical demand is determined using the peak acceleration of the VG MRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz and amplifying it using the following two factors:

Vertical in-structure amplification factor AFsv to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the control point elevation Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsv is derived from Figure 4-4 in Reference [ 4). The in-cabinet amplification factor, Afc is derived in Reference [4] and is 4.7 for all cabinet types.

Page 27 of94

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4. CONTACT DEVICE EVALUATIONS Solid-state devices were identified using vendor technical data and screened as rugged based on test results from the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [216, pp. 6-3]. These screened solid-state relays appear in Table B-2 along with a reference to the vendor document used to make this determination.

Per Reference [4], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(I) If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [216],

then the component seismic capacity from this program is used.

(2) If a contact device was not tested as part of [216], then one or more of the following means to determine the component capacity were used:

(a) Device-specific seismic test repo1ts (either from the station, manufacturer/vendor, or from the SQURTS testing program).

(b) Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per f2 I 7] and [2181.

(c) Assembly (e.g. electrical cabinet) tests where the component functional performance was monitored.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated with the component mounting point demand from Section 2.5.1 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Reference [ 4]. The high-frequency evaluations as described above were performed in Reference [219].

A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provided in Table B-1 in Appendix B.

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station

5. CONCLUSIONS 5.1 General Conclusions 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 28 of94 Catawba Nuclear Station has performed a High Frequency Confirmation evaluation in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] using the methods in EPRI report 3002004396 [4].

The evaluation identified a total of 374 components that required evaluation. As summarized in Table B-1 in Appendix B, 302 of the devices have adequate seismic capacity, and 72 components required resolution following the criteria in Section 4.6 of Reference [ 4].

To improve plant safety, Catawba Nuclear Station intends to address equipment sensitive to high frequency ground motion for the reevaluated seismic hazard information through mitigation strategies in lieu of a separate resolution of the 72 components identified under the letter [ 1]

which do not impact the credited path for mitigation strategies.

5.2 Identification of Follow-Up Actions Based on the general conclusions above, no follow-up actions are necessary.

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50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency VM. Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 29 of94

6. REFERENCES

[1]

NRC (E. Leeds and M. Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title I 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2. I, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML I 2053A340, March 12, 2012.

[2]

NRC Repott, "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century,"

ADAMS Accession Number MLI 11861807, July 12, 2011.

[3]

EPRI Report I 025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization, and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," Final Report, February 2013.

r4l EPRJ Report 3002004396, "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," Final Report, July 2015.

[5]

NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute (A. Mauer), "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, 'High Frequency Program:

Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility.'," ADAMS Accession Number ML15218A569, September 17, 2015.

[6]

NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List, "Final Detem1ination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title I 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 'Seismic' of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML I 5J94AO15, October 27, 2015.

[7]

Catawba Nuclear Station (K. Henderson) Letter (CNS-I 4-038) to NRC, "Seismic Hazard and Screening Repott (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC I 0 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Additional Information Pursuant to Title l 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(t) regarding Recommendations 2.1,*2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML I 4099A 184, March 3 I, 20 I 4.

[8]

NRC (F. Vega) Letter to Catawba Nuclear Station (K. Henderson), "Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2 - Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations relating to Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (TAC nos. MF3965 and MF3966)," ADAMS Accession Number MLI5096A513, April 27, 2015.

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 30 of94

[9]

NRC (M. Franovich) Letter to Duke Energy Carolina, LLC (E. Kapopoulos), "Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2, and McGuire Nuclear Station, Units l and 2, Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML! 6344A3 I 3, December 22, 2016.

[IO] Catawba Document CNEE-0150-01.25 Rev. 9, ElemenfrnJ1 Diagram Reactor Coolant System (NC) Reactor Vessel Head Vent Block Valve JNC250A.

[ 11] Catawba Document CNEE-0150-01.17 Rev. 5, Elementwy Diagram Reactor Coolant System (NC) Interlocks for Controlling N2 Supply to JNC32B and JNC34A.

[ 12] Catawba Document CN EE-0150-01.15 Rev. 19, Element my Diagram Reactor Coolant System (NC) Solenoid Valves 1 NCSV0320 and 1 NCSV0360.

[13] Catawba Document CNEE-0250-01.09 Rev. 12, Reactor Coolant System (NC)

Press11ri::er Power Operated Relief lso!otion Valve 2NC035B.

[ 14] Catawba Document CNEE-0250-01.10 Rev. 9, Element my Diagram Reactor Coolant System (NC) Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve 2NC03 l B.

[ 15] Catawba Document CNEE-0250-01.14 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System (NC) Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isola/ion Valve 2NC033A.

[16] Catawba Document CN-1553-01.01 Rev. 21, Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System (NC).

[ 17] Catawba Document CN-2553-01.0 I Rev. 19, Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System (NC).

[!8] Catawba Document CNEE-0150-01.35 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System (NC) Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve JNC251B.

[ 19] Catawba Document CNEE-0250-01.25 Rev. 7, Elemenlary Diagram Reactor Coolant System (NC) Reactor Vessel Head Vent Block Valve 2NC250A.

[20] Catawba Document CNEE-0250-01.35 Rev. 5, Elementmy Diagram Reactor Coolant System (NC) Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve 2NC251B.

[21] Catawba Document CNEE-0150-01.36 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System (NC) Pressurizer Spray Control Valves JNC027 & JNC029.

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 31 of94

[22] Catawba Document CNEE-0250-01.36 Rev. 6, Element my Diagram Reactor Coolant System (NC) Pressurizer Spray Control Valves 2NC027 & 2NC029.

[23] Catawba Document CNEE-0157-03.01 Rev. 11, ElementmJ; Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) Solenoid Valves - Reactor Building 1 NVOOJA.

[24] Catawba Document CNEE-0157-03.02 Rev. 7, Elementm)I Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) Solenoid Valves - Reactor Building 1 NV002A.

[25] Catawba Document CNEE-0257-03.01 Rev. 5, Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) Solenoid Valves Reactor Building 2NVOOJA.

[26] Catawba Document CNEE-0257-03.02 Rev. 5, Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) Solenoid Valves Reactor Building 2NV002A.

[27] Catawba Document CNEE-0157-03.1 ! Rev. 9, ElementmJ; Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) Solenoid Valves - Reactor Building JNVI22B, JNV!23B.

[28] Catawba Document CNEE-0257-03.11 Rev. 7, Elementm~v Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) Solenoid Valves - Reactor Building 2NVJ 22B, 2NVJ 23B.

[29] Catawba Document CNEE-0157-03.07 Rev. 7, Elementc11y Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) Solenoid Valves - Reactor Building JNV052A, JNV074A.

[30] Catawba Document CNEE-0157-03.09 Rev. 12, ElementmJ1 Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) Solenoid Valves - Reactor Building JNV32B, JNV63B, JNV85B.

[31] Catawba Document CNEE-0147-07.01-07 Rev. 19, ElemenlmJ1 Diagram AuxilimJ1 Feedwater System (CA) JASPA Transfer Switches.

[32] Catawba Document CNEE-0147-07.02-05 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Auxilimy Feedwater System (CA) JASPB Tram.fer Switches.

[33] Catawba Document CNEE-0257-03.07 Rev. 5, Elementmy Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) Solenoid Valves - Reactor Building 2NV052A, 2NV074A.

[34] Catawba Document CNEE-0257-03.09 Rev. 10, Elementm:v Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) Solenoid Valves - Reactor Building 2NV032B, 2NV063B, 2NV085B.

[35] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-07.01-07 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA) 2ASPA Transfer Switches.

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 32 of94

[36] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-07.02-05 Rev. 4, ElemenlmJ1 Diagram AuxiUmJ1 Feedwater System (CA) 2ASPB Transfer Switches.

[3 7] Catawba Document CNS-1561.ND-00-000 I Rev. 3 8, Design Basis Speciflcat ion for the Residual Heat Removal (ND) System.

[3 8] Catawba Document CN EE-0141-01.07 Rev. 16, Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System (ND) NC Loop 3 Supply to ND Train i B isolation Valve IND036B.

[39] Catawba Document CNEE-0241-01.07 Rev. 12, ElementmyDiagram Residual Heal Removal System (ND) NC Loop 3 Supply to ND Train 2B Isolation Valve 2ND036B.

[40] Catawba Document CN-1571-01.00 Rev. 33, Flow Diagram of Refueling Water System.

[41] Catawba Document CN-2571-01.00 Rev. 27, Flow Diagram o,f Refueling Water System.

[ 42] Calawba Document CNEE-0161-01.0 I Rev. 9, Elementary Diagrnm Nuclear Sampling System (NM) Pressurizer Liquid Sample Line inside Containment Isolation Valve JNM003A.

[ 43] Catawba Document CNEE-0161-01.01-0 I Rev. 2, Element01J1 Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (Nlvl) Pressurizer Liquid Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve I NM003A.

[ 44] Catawba Document CNEE-0161-01.02 Rev. 8, Elementmy Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NM) Pressurizer Steam Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve INM006A.

[45] Catawba Document CNEE-0161-01.02-01 Rev. I, Elementa1y Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (Nlvl) Pressurizer Steam Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve INM006A.

[ 46] Catawba Document CNEE-0161-01.04 Rev. 8, Elementmy Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NM) NC Hot Leg A Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve INM022A.

[47] Catawba Document CNEE-0161-01.04-01 Rev. 1, Elementmy Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NM) NC Hot Leg A Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve JNIY!022A.

[ 48] Catawba Document CNEE-0161-01.05 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NM) NC Hot Leg C Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve JNM025A.

Page 33 of94

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[ 49] Catawba Document CNEE-0161-01.05-01 Rev. 0, Element my Diagram Nuclear Sampf ing System (NM) NC Hot Leg C Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve JNM025A.

[50] Catawba Document CN EE-0261-01.01 Rev. 2, Elementm:v Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NM) Pressurizer Liquid Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve 2NM003A.

[51 J Catawba Document CNEE-0261-01.01-01 Rev. I, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NM) Pressurizer Liquid Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve 2NM003A.

[52] Catawba Document CNEE-0261-01.02 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (Nlvf) Pressurizer Steam Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve 2NM006A.

[53] Catawba Document CNEE-0261-01.02-01 Rev. 2, E!eme11tm:1* Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NM) Pressurizer Steam Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve 2NM006A.

[54] Catawba Document CNEE-0261-01.04 Rev. 2, Elementmy Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NM) NC Hot Leg A Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve 2NM022A.

[55] Catawba Document CNEE-0261-01.04-0 I Rev. 1, Element my Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NM) NC Hot Leg A Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve 2NM022A.

[56] Catawba Document CN EE-0261-01.05 Rev. 2, Element my Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NJvf) NC Hot Leg C Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve 2NM025A.

[57] Catawba Document CN EE-0261-01.05-01 Rev. 0, ElementmJ' Diagram Nuclear Sampling System (NM) NC Hot Leg C Sample Line Inside Containment Isolation Valve 2NM025A SSF Controls.

[58] Catawba Document CN-1593-01.00 Rev. 22, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SM)

Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere (SV).

[59] Catawba Document CN-2593-01.00 Rev. 24, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SM)

Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere (SV).

(60] Catawba Document CNS-1593.SA-00-0001 Rev. 33, Design Basis Specification/or the Main Steam to AuxilicllJ' Equipment System (SA) and Feedwater Pump Turbine Exhaust System (TE).

Page 34 of94

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 (61] Catawba Document CNEE-0141-01.01-0 I Rev. 0, ElemenfmJ1 Diagram Reshlual Heat Removal System (ND) Status Indication Valves JNDOOJ B & JND036B.

(62] Catawba Document CNEE-0147-02.04 Rev. 5, Elementmy Diagram AuxilimJ1 Feedwater System (CA) Motor Driven Pump A Safety Injection and 4kV Blackout Turbine Driven Pump 1 & Motor Driven Pump A.

[ 63] Catawba Document CN EE-024 7-0 I.00-01 Rev. 3, ElemenfmJ1 Diagram Steam to AuxiliwJ1 Equipment System (SA) Steam Generator 214 Leve/for Valve 2SA005.

[64] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-02.04 Rev. 6, ElementmJ1 Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA) Motor Driven Pump A Safety Injection and 4kV Blackout Turbine Driven Pump I & A1otor Driven Pump A.

[65] Catawba Document CNEE-014 7-04.23 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Auxilim)' Feedwater System (CA) Trip & Thro/Ile Valve Controls Transfer.

[66] Catawba Document CNEE-0147-04.23-01 Rev. 14, ElemenfmJ1 Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA) Trip & Thro/tie Valve Controls Transfer.

[67] Catawba Document CNEE-0147-04.23-02 Rev. 2, Element my Diagram AuxilimJ1 Feedwater System (CA) Trip & Throttle Valve Controls Transfer.

[68] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-04.23 Rev. 12, Elementmy Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA) Trip & Thro/tie Valve Controls Transfer.

[69] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-04.23-01 Rev. 15, Elementm)1 Diagram Auxilimy Feedwater System (CA) Trip & Throttle Valve Controls Tran:.fers.

[70] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-04.23-02 Rev. 3, Elementmy Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA) Trip & Throttle Valve Controls Transfer.

[71] Catawba Document CNEE-0147-04.02 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Auxilimy Feedwater System (CA) CA Pumps Suction From UST Header Isolation Valve JCA004.

[72] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-04.02 Rev. 4, Elementmy Diagram Auxilim)' Feedwater System (CA) CA Pumps Suction From UST Header Isolation Valve 2CA004.

[73] Catawba Document CN-1592-01.01 Rev. 26, Flow Diagram of Auxilia1J1 Feedwater System (CA).

[74] Catawba Document CNS-I 592.CA-00-000 I Rev. 46, Design Basis Spec(fication for the Auxilimy Feedwater System (CA).

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station I 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 35 of94

[75] Catawba Document CNEE-014 7-05.03 Rev. 15, Elementary Diagram Auxilia1y Feedwater System (CA) Steam Generator Main CF Bypass to CA Nozzle Valves.

[76] Catawba Document CNEE-014 7-05.04 Rev. 15, ElemenfaJ)J Diagram AuxiliaJJi Feedwater System (CA) Steam Generator Main CF Bypass to CA Nozzle Valves.

[77] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-05.03 Rev. 9, Elementa1y Diagram Auxilia1y Feedwater System (CA) Steam Generator Main CF Bypass to CA Nozzle Valves.

[78] Catawba Document CNEE-024 7-05.04 Rev. I 0, ElementaJJJ Diagram AuxiliwJ1 Feedwater System (CA) Steam Generator Main CF Bypass to CA Nozzle Valves.

[79] Catawba Document CNEE-014 7-04.09 Rev. 8, ElemenlaJJJ Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA) CA Pump No. I Discharge to Steam Generator D Isolation Valve ICA038A.

[80] Catawba Document CNEE-0147-04.12 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram AuxilimJ; Feedwater System (CA) CA Pump No. J Discharge to Steam Generator C Isolation Valve JCA050A.

[81] Catawba Document CNEE-014 7-04.13 Rev. 11, Element my Diagram A uxiliaJJi Feedwater System (CA) CA Pump No. 1 Discharge to Steam Generator B Isolation Valve JCA054B.

[82] Catawba Document CNEE-0147-04.16 Rev. 11, ElemenlmJ1DiagramAuxilim:v Feedwater System (CA) CA Pump No. 1 Discharge to Steam Generator A Isolation Valve JCA066B.

[83] Catawba Document CNEE-024 7-04.09 Rev. 4, ElemenlmJ; Diagram AuxilimJ1 Feedwater System (CA) CA Pump No. 2 Discharge to Steam Generator 2D Isolation Valve 2CA038A.

[84] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-04.12 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Auxilimy Feedwater System (CA) CA Pump No. 2 Discharge to Steam Generator 2C Isolation Valve 2CA050A.

[85] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-04.13 Rev. 6, Elementmy Diagram Auxilimy Feedwater System (CA) CA Pump No. 2 Discharge to Steam Generator 2B Isolation Valve 2CA05-IB.

[86] Catawba Document CNEE-0247-04.16 Rev. 5, Elementmy Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA) CA Pump No. 2 Dish to Steam Generator 2A Isolation Valve 2CA066B.

[87] Catawba Nuclear Station, "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report," April 5, 2015.

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 36 of94

[88] Catawba Document CNS-115.01-EPC-OOOI Rev. 14, 4.16KV Essential A11xilic11y Power System (EPC) and Class 1 E Diesel Generator Protective Relaying and Metering System (ERN) Design Basis Specification.

[89] Catawba Document CNS-114.00-EQB-OOO 1 Rev. 16, Design Basis Specification for the EQB System.

[90] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-01.18 Rev. 20, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETA Unit 18 Diesel Generator lA (JGEN0004).

[91] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-01.18-0 I Rev. 13, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETA Unit 18 Diesel Generalor lA (JGENR0004).

[92] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-01.3 8 Rev. 21, Element my Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 1 ETB Unit 18 Diesel Generator 1 B (1 GENR0005).

[93] Catawba Document CNEE-01 15-01.38-01 Rev. 13, Element my Diagram -1160 V Switchgear 1 ETB Unit 18 Diesel Generator 1 B (1 GENR0005).

[94] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-01.20 Rev. 18, Elemenlcny Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1 ETA Breaker Failure, Mode Selector and Degraded Bus Voltage Circuits.

[95] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-01.40 Rev. 17, Elementmy Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1 ETA Breaker Failure, Mode Selector and Degraded Bus Voltage Circuits.

[96] Catawba Document CNEE-0215-01.18 Rev. 17, Elemen!GIJ' Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETA Unit 18 Diesel Generator 2A (2GENROOO-I).

[97] Catawba Document CN EE-0215-01.18-01 Rev. 8, Elementmy Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETA Unit 18 Diesel Generator 2A (2GENR0004).

[98] Catawba Document CNEE-0215-01.38 Rev. 17, Element my Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETB Unit 18 Diesel Generator 2B (2GENR0005).

[99] Catawba Document CNEE-0215-01.38-0 I Rev. 6, Elementmy Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETB Unit 18 Diesel Generator 2B (2GENR0005).

(100] Catawba Document CNEE-0215-01.20 Rev. JO, Elementmy Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETA Breaker Failure, Mode Selector and Degraded Bus Voltage Circuits.

[I 0 I] Catawba Document CNEE-0215-01.40 Rev. 14, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETA Breaker Failure, Mode Selector and Degraded Bus Voltage Circuits.

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[ l 02} Catawba Document CNEE-0120-01.0 I Rev. I 6, ElementmJ1 Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel JA & 1 B (Typical Part 1) Engine Panel Electrical Schematic.

[I 03] Catawba Document CNEE-0120-01.01-01 Rev. 24, ElementmJ1 Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel lA & 1 B (Typical Part 1) Engine Panel Electrical Schematic.

[I 04] Catawba Document CNEE-0220-01.0 I Rev. 19, ElementmJ' Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel 2A & 2B (Typical Part 1) Engine Panel Electrical Schematic.

[I 05] Catawba Document CNEE-0220-01.01-0 I Rev. 25, Element my Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel 2A & 2B (Typical Part 1) Engine Panel Electrical Schematic.

[ 106] Catawba Document CNEE-0120-0 I.0 I -09 Rev. 12, Element my Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel 1 A & 1 B (1)pical Part 2) Engine Panel Electrical Schematic.

[I 07] Catawba Document CNEE-0220-01.01-09 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel 2A & ]B (Typical Part 2) Engine I'anc/ Electrical Schematic.

[I 08] Catawba Document CNEE-0I20-01.01-10 Rev. 6, Element my Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel.

[I 09] Catawba Document CNEE-0220-01.01-10 Rev. 5, ElementmJ' Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel.

[ 110) Catawba Document CNEE-0120-01.01-02 Rev. 26, Elementmy Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel IA & JB (Typical Part 3) Engine Panel Electrical Schematic.

[ 111] Catawba Document CNEE-0220-01.01-02 Rev. 21, ElementmJ' Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel 2A & 2B (Typical Part 3) Engine Panel Electrical Schematic.

[ 1 12] Catawba Document CNEE-0120-01.01-05 Rev. 13, Elementwy Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel IA & I B (Typical) Engine Panel Electrical Schematic (EQC System).

[ 113] Catawba Document CN EE-0220-01.01-05 Rev. 14, Element my Diagram Diesel Engine Control Panel 2A & 2B (Typical) Engine Panel Electrical Schematic (EQC System).

[114] Catawba Document CNEE-0114-00.10 Rev. 2, ElementmJ' Diagram Diesel Generator No. 1 A Load Sequencer (Part 10) Loading Relays.

[ 115) Catawba Document CNEE-0214-00.10 Rev. 2, Element my Diagram Diesel Generator No. 2A Load Sequencer (Part JO) Loading Relays.

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[I 16] Catawba Document CNEE-0114-00.08 Rev. 11, Element my Diagram Diesel Generator No. IA Load Sequencer (Part 8) Committed & Accelerated Sequence Circuits.

[117] Catawba Document CNEE-0214-00.08 Rev. 7, Elementmy Diagram Diesel Generator No. 2A Load Sequencer (Part 8) Committed & Accelerated Sequence Circuits.

[ 118] Catawba Document CNEE-0114-00.06 Rev. 12, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator No. IA Load Sequencer (Part 6) Reset Circuits.

[119] Catawba Document CNEE-0214-00.06 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator No. 2A Load Sequencer (Part 6) Reset Circuits.

[120] Catawba Document CNEE-0114-00.02 Rev. 6, Elementc11J1 Diagram Diesel Generator No. I A Load Sequencer (Part 2) Actuation Circuit.

[ 12 l] Catawba Document CNEE-0214-00.02 Rev. 5, ElementmJ' Diagram Diesel Generator No. 2A Load Sequencer (Part 2) Actuation Circuit.

[ 122] Catawba Document CNEE-0114-00.04 Rev. 6, ElementmJ1 Diagram Diesel Generator No. IA Load Sequencer (Part 4) Load Logic Voltage Sensing, Reset & Load Shed Circuits.

[ 123] Catawba Document CNEE-0214-00.04 Rev. 2, Element my Diagram Diesel Generator No. 2A Load Sequencer (Part 4) Load Logic, Voltage Sending, Reset & Load Shed Circuits.

[124] Catawba Document CNM-1356.05-0023.001 Rev. DF, Schematic 300AMP Batte1y Charger 600VAC 3PH 60HZ I 25-I60VDC.

[l 25] Catawba Document CNM-1356.08-0002.002 Rev. DE, Schemalic 75A Battery Charger 125VDC, 575VAC, 3PH, 60HZ.

[126] Catawba Document CNS-106.03-EPQ-0001 Rev. 14, Design Basis Specification/or the EPQSystem.

[127] Catawba Document CN-1705-01.01 Rev. 14, One Line Diagram I25VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System (EP L).

[128] Catawba Document CN-2705-01.01Rev.14, One Line Diagram I25VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System (EPL).

[ 129] Catawba Document CNS-I 06.01-EPL-0001 Rev. 12, Design Basis Specification for the I25 VDC Vital I&C Power System (EPL).

Page 39 of94

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[ 130] Catawba Document CNM-1358.03-0043.00 I Rev. E, Schematic 15 KVA Vital Inverter 125VDC 120VAC JPH 60HZ.

[I 31] Catawba Document CNM-1358.03-0043.002 Rev. E, Schematic 15 KVA Vital Inverter 125VDC 120VAC JPH60HZ.

[132] Catawba Document CNS-1609.VG-04-0001 Rev. 16, Design Basis Specification for the Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System (VG).

[133] Catawba Document CNS-120.0 I-EQC-0001 Rev. 19, Design Basis Specification for the EQC System.

[134] Catawba Document CNS-1609.VN-05-0001 Rev. 3, Design Basis Specification/or the Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System (VN).

[ 135] Catawba Document CNS-I 609.LD-00-000 I Rev. 29, Design Basis Specification for the Diesel Genemtor Engine Lube Oil System (LD).

[ 136] Catawba Document CNS-l 609.FD-03-0001 Rev. 19, Design Basis Specification for the Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System (FD).

[ 137] Catawba Document CNEE-0120-02.01-0 I Rev. 16, Elementary Diagram Diesel Engine JA Fuel Oil System (FD) Solenoid Valves (Part 2).

[I 38] Catawba Document CNEE-0120-02.02-0 I Rev. 17, Elementmy Diagram Diesel Engine 1 B Fuel Oil System (FD) Solenoid Valves (Part 2).

[ 139] Catawba Document CNEE-0220-02.01-0 I Rev. 15, ElemenlaJJ' Diagram Diesel Engine 2A Fuel Oil System (FD) Solenoid Valves (Par/ 2).

(140] Catawba Document CNEE-0220-02.02-01 Rev. 14, Elementwy Diagram Diesel Engine 2B Fuel Oil System (FD) Solenoid Valves (Part 2).

[ 141] Catawba Document CNS-1609.KD-O 1-000 I Rev. I 6, Design Basis Specification for the Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System (KD).

[ 142] Catawba Document CNS-1574.RN-00-0001 Rev. 63, Design Basis Specification for the Nuclear Service Water System (RN).

(143] Catawba Document CNEE-0 I 15-01.14 Rev. 8, Elementmy Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1 ETA Unit 14 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor JA (1PA1TROJ55).

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[144] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-01.34 Rev. 9, ElemenlmJ' Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1 ETB Unit 14 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor 1 B (1Plvfl'RO15 6).

[ 145] Catawba Document CNEE-0215-0 I.14 Rev. 5, Elementmy Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETA Unit 14 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor 2A (2PMTROJ 55).

[146] Catawba Document CNEE-02I5-01.34 Rev. 6, ElemenlmJ' Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETB Unit 14 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor 2B (2PMTROJ 56).

[147] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-0 I.41 Rev. 0, Elementwy Diagram 4KV Switchgear 1 ETA and 1 ETB Breaker Internal Controls.

[ 148] Catawba Document CN-I 574-01.00 Rev. 56, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN).

[149] Catawba Document CN-1574-01.02 Rev. 56, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN).

[I 50] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.07 Rev. 12, Element my Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) RN Pump A Motor Cooler Inlet lmlation Valve IRNJ JA.

[ 151] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.08 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Service

water System (RN) RN Pump B Motor Cooler Supply Isolation Valve I RN20B.

[ 152] Catawba Document CNEE-0I38-01.09 Rev. 12, Element my Diagram Nuclear Service Waler System (RN) RN Pump A Discharge Isolation Valve JRN28A.

[ 153] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.13 Rev. I I, Element my Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) RN Pump B Discharge Isolation Valve JRN38B.

[ 154] Catawba Document CNEE-0238-0 I.07 Rev. 5, ElemenfmJ' Diagram Nuclear Service T'Vater System (RN) RN Pump 2A Motor Cooler Inlet Isolation Valve 2RNOJ IA.

[155] Catawba Document CNEE-0238-01.08 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) RN Pump 2B Motor Cooler Supply Isolation Valve 2RN020B.

[ 156] Catawba Document CNEE-0238-01.09 Rev. 4, Element my Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) RN Pump 2A Discharge Isolation Valve 2RN028A.

[I 57] Catawba Document CNEE-0238-0 I.13 Rev. 4, Elementmy Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) RN Pump 2B Discharge Isolation Valve 2RN38B.

i I*

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station l6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 41 of94

[ 158] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.36 Rev. 12, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) Diesel Generator A Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve JRN232A.

[ 159] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.38 Rev. 13, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) Diesel Generator B Heal E>:changer Inlet Valve JRN292B.

[ 160] Catawba Document CNEE-0238-01.36 Rev. 8, Element my Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) Diesel Generator 2A Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve 2RN232A.

[ 161] Catawba Document CNEE-0238-01.38 Rev. 7, ElementOIJJ Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) Diesel Generator B Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve 2RN292B.

[ 162] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.01 Rev. 9, ElementOIJ' Diagram Nuclear Service rVater System (RN) RN Pumphouse Pit A Isolationfi'om Lake Valve 1 RNIA.

[ 163] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.02 Rev. 9, ElementOIJ' Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (Rf\\~ RN l'wnpho11se !'it A lso!atiu11.fro111 Lake Valve 1 RN2B.

[ 164] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.05 Rev. 9, Element my Diagram Nuclear Service Watei* System (RN) RN Pwnphouse Pit B Isolationji*om Lake Valve lRN5A.

[ 165] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.06 Rev. 8, Element my Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) RN Pumphouse Pit B J.rnlationji*om Lake Valve I RN6B.

[ 166] Catawba Document CN EE-0138-01.01-0 I Rev. 8, Elementmy Diagram Nuclear Service Water Sys/em (RN) RN Pwnphouse Pit A Isolationfi'om Lake Valve I RN I A lvliscellaneous Controls.

[ 167] Catawba Document CN EE-0138-01.02-01 Rev. 7, Ele111ent01y Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) RN Pumphouse Pit A Isolationji*om Lake Valve 1 RN2B Miscellaneous Controls.

[ 168] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.05-01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) RN Pumphouse Pit B lrnlationfrom Lake Valve 1 RN5A Miscellaneous Controls.

[ 169] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.06-01 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) RN Pwnphouse Pit B Isolation.from Lake Valve 1 RN6B Miscellaneous Controls.

[ 170] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.50 Rev. 14, Elementmy Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (RN) Diesel Generator A Heat Exchanger Return to Lake Valve I RN847A.

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 42 of94

[ 171] Catawba Document CNEE-0138-01.52 Rev. 15, Elementary Diagra111 Nuclear Service Water System (RN) Diesel Generator B Heal Exchanger Return to Lake Valve I RN849B.

[ 172] Catawba Document CNEE-0238-01.50 Rev. 12, Element my Diagram Nuclear Service Water System (R.l\\9 Diesel Generator 2A Heat Ei;changer Return to Lake Valve 2RN8-17A.

[ 173] Catawba Document CNEE-0238-01.52 Rev. 14, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Service

water System (RN) Diesel Generator B Heat Exchanger Return to Lake Valve 2RN8./9B.

[ 174] Catawba Document CNS-I 579.VD-00-000 I Rev. 21, Design Basis Specification.for the Diesel Building Ventilation Syste111 (VD).

[ 175] Catawba Document CNEE-0120-05.01-02 Rev. 18, Elementary Diagram Diesel Building Genera/or Ventilation Fan JAJ (VD) (Part 3).

[ 176] Catawba Document CNEE-0120-05.01-03 Rev. 13, Ele111entary Diagram Diesel Building Genera/or Ventilation Fan JA2 (VD) (Part 4).

[ 177] Catawba Document CNEE-0120-05.02-02 Rev.17, Elemenlm~v Diagram Diesel Building Generator Ventilation Fan /Bl (VD) (Part 3).

[178] Catawba Document CNEE-0120-05.02-03 Rev. 13, Ele111entary Diagram Diesel Building Generator Ventilation Fan 1 B2 (VD) (Par/ 4).

[I 79] Catawba Document CN EE-0220-05.01-02 Rev. 16, Ele111enlary Diagram Diesel Building Generator Ven/ Fan 2A I (VD) (Part 3).

[ 180] Catawba Document CNEE-0220-05.02-03 Rev. 11, Elementmy Diagram Diesel Building Generator Ventilation Fan 2B2 (VD) (Part -1).

[ 181] Catawba Document CNEE-0220-05.01-03 Rev. 12, Elementary Diagram Diesel Building Generator Ventilation Fan 2A2 (VD) (Part-/).

[ 182] Catawba Document CNEE-0220-05.02-02 Rev. 16, Elementaiy Diagram Diesel Building Generator Ventilation Fan 2Bl (VD) (Part 3).

[ 183] Catawba Document CNS-I 609.ZD-06-000 I Rev. 4, Design Basis Specification.for the Diesel Generator Engine Crankcase Vacuum System (ZD).

[184] Catawba Document CN-1609-06.00 Rev. 7, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Crankcase Vacuum System (ZD).

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[ 185] Catawba Document CN-2609-06.00 Rev. 7, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Crankcase Vacuum System (ZD).

[ 186] Catawba Document CNS-I 12.0 l-EPE-000 I Rev. 7, Design Basis Specification.for the EPE System.

[l 87] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-01.05 Rev. 8, ElementO/y Diagram 4160V Switchgear

!ETA Unit 5 4160/600VTransformer IETXA.

[ 188] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-0 l. l 6 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Switchgear

!ETA Uni/ 16 4160/600VTransformer JETXC.

[ 189] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-0 l.25 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Swilchgeor I ETB Unit 5 4160/600 V Tron.~former 1 ETXB.

[ 190] Catawba Document CNEE-0115-01.36 Rev. 6, ElementO/y Diagrnm 4 I 60V Switchgear JETB Uni/ 16 4160/600VTmmformer lE7XD.

[ 19 l] Catawba Document CNEE-0215-0 l.05 Rev. 2, ElementO/Ji Diagrnm 4J 60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit 5 4160/600V Transformer 2ET.XA.

[ 192] Catawba Document CNEE-0215-0 l.16 Rev. 4, ElemenfO/y Diagrnm 4160 V Switchgear 2ETA Unit 16 4160/600VTransformer 2ETXC.

[ 193] Catawba Document CNEE-0215-0 l.25 Rev. 2, Elementmy Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETB Unit 5 4160/600V Transformer 2ETXB.

[ 194] Catawba Document CNEE-0215-01.36 Rev. 3, ElementOly Diagram 4 I 60V Swirchgear 2ETB Unit 16 4160/600V Tramformer 2ETXD.

[I 95] Catawba Document CNEE-0 l I 2-01.01 Rev. 5, Elementa1y Diagram 600V load Center I ElXA Normal Incoming Breaker Compartment 4B Undervoltage Circuit Comparlment

./A.

[ 196] Catawba Document CNEE-0 l 12-01.02 Rev. I, Elementary Diagram 600 V load Center I ELXA Compartment./C MCC 1 E!v!XA Feeder Breaker.

[ 197] Catawba Document CNEE-0112-0 l.09 Rev. I, Elementa1y Diagram 600V load Center 1 ELXA MCC 1 EMXE Feeder Breaker 6C.

[I 98] Catawba Document CNEE-0112-01.11 Rev. 6, Elementa1y Diagram 600V Load Center 1 ELXB Normal Incoming Breaker Compartment.:/B Undervoltage Circuit Compartment

-IA.

Page 44 of94

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[ 199] Catawba Document CNEE-0112-01.12 Rev. I, Elementary Diagram 600 V Load Center 1 ELYB MCC 1 EMXB Feeder Breaker 4C.

[200] Catawba Document CNEE-0112-01.19 Rev. I, ElementmJ' Diagram 600V Load Center 1 ELXB MCC 1 EMXF Feeder Breaker 6C.

[201] Catawba Document CNEE-0112-01.21 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram 600V Load Center 1 ELXC Normal Incoming Breaker Compartment 4B Undervoltage Circuit Compartment 4A.

[202] Catawba Document CNEE-0112-01.22 Rev. 1, Elemental)' Diagram 600V Load Center 1 ELXC MCC 1 E!v!XI Feeder Breaker 4C.

[203] Catawba Document CNEE-0112-01.27 Rev. 8, Elementmy Diagram 600V Load Center 1 ELXD Normal Incoming Breaker Compartment 4B Undervoltage Circuit Compartment 4A.

[204] Catawba Document CNEE-0112-01.28 Rev. I, Element my Diagram 600 V Load Center 1 ELXD MCC 1 Ell1X.J Feeder Breaker -IC.

[205] Catawba Document CNEE-0212-01.01 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram 600 V Load Center 2ELXA Normal Incoming Breaker Compartment -IE Undervoltage Circuit Compartment 4A.

[206] Catawba Document CNEE-0212-01.09 Rev. 0, Elementa1J' Diagram 600 V Load Center 2EL'G4 MCC 2EMXA Feeder Breaker 6C.

[207] Catawba Document CNEE-0212-0 I. I I Rev. 2, Elementmy Diagram 600V Load Center 2ELYB Normal Incoming Breaker Compartment 4B Undervoltage Circuit Compartment 4A.

[208] Catawba Document CNEE-0212-01.12 Rev. 0, ElementmJ' Diagram 600V Load Center 2ELXB MCC 2EMXB Feeder Breaker 4C.

[209] Catawba Document CNEE-0212-01.19 Rev. 1, Elementmy Diagram 600V Load Center 2ELXB MCC 2E!v!XF Feeder Breaker 6C.

[21 O] Catawba Document CNEE-0212-01.21 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram 600 V Load Center 2ELXC Normal Incoming Breaker Compartment 4B Undervoltage Circuit Compartment 4A.

[211] Catawba Document CNEE-0212-01.22 Rev. 0, Elementa1y Diagram 600V Load Center 2ELXC MCC 2EMXI Feeder Breaker 4C.

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 45 of94

[212] Catawba Document CNEE-0212-01.27 Rev. 2, ElementmJ1 Diagram 600V Load Center 2ELXD Normal Incoming Breaker Compartment./B Undervoltage Circuit Compartment 4A.

[213] Catawba Document CNEE-0212-01.28 Rev. 0, ElemenlmJ1 Diagram 600V Load Center 2ELXD MCC 2Elv!XJ Feeder Breaker 4C.

[214] Catawba Document CNEE-0112-01.34 Rev. 0, ElementmJ1 Diagram 600V Essential Load Center Internal Breaker Controls.

[215] EPRI Report NP-7148-SL, "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality," Final Report December 1990.

[216] EPRI Report 3002002997, "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary," Final Report, September 2014.

(217] EPRI Report NP-7147-SL, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays," Final Report August 1991.

[218] SQUG Advisory 2004-02, "Relay GERS Corrections," September 7, 2004.

[219] Stevenson & Associates Calculation l 6C4437-CAL-OO 1 Rev. 0, "High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Components," July 5, 2017.

[220] Stevenson & Associates Repo1t I 6C4437-RPT-OO 1 Rev. 0, "Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation at Catawba Nuclear Station," June 30, 2017.

[221] EPRI Report TR-105988, "GERS Formulated Using Data from the SQURTS Program,"

Final Report, April 1996.

[222] Catawba Document CNM-l 338.00-0019.00 I, Operation and Maintenance Manual for AC Optical Isolation Device PIN J 75CJ 45, August 16, 1982.

[223] Catawba Document CNM-1338.00-0058.00 I, Operation and Maintenance Manual for AC Optical Isolation Device PIN 175CJ80, August 10, 1995.

[224] ABB Descriptive Bulletin 4 l-1 l 3S, "Time-Overcurrent Relays Type 51," October, 1993.

[225] ABB Instruction Booklet IB 7.1.1.7-2 Issue A, "Ground Fault Protection Systems Type GR-5".

[226] ABB Instruction Leaflet 41-348.11 C, "Generator Differential Relay Type SA-1,"

November, 1999.

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Paae 46 of 94

[227] Catawba Document CN-1553-01.00 Rev. 29, Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System (NC).

[228] Catawba Document CN-1554-01.00 Rev. 33, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control Sys/em (NV).

[229] Catawba Document CN-1554-01.05 Rev. I 0, Flow Diagra111 of Chemical and Volu111e Control Syste111 (NV).

[230] Catawba Document CN-1561-01.00 Rev. 33, Flow Diagra111 of Residual Heal Removal System (ND).

[23 I] Catawba Document CN-1561-01.0 I Rev. 26, Flow Diagram of Residual Heal Removal System (ND).

[232] Catawba Document CN-1562-01.00 Rev. 12, Flow Diagram of Safety Injection System (NI).

[233] Catawba Document CN-1562-01.0 l Rev. 22, Flow Diagra111 of Safety Injection Sys/em (NI).

[234] Catawba Document CN-1562-01.02 Rev. 32, Flow Diagram of Safety Injection System (NJ).

[235] Catawba Document CN-1572-01.00 Rev. 32, Flow Diagra111 of Nuclear Sampling System (NM).

[23 6] Catawba Document CN-2553-0 l.00 Rev. 26, Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System (NC).

[237] Catawba Document CN-2554-01.00 Rev. 27, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV).

[238] Catawba Document CN-2554-0 l.05 Rev. 13, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV).

[239] Catawba Document CN-2561-01.00 Rev. 3 7, Flow Diagram of Residual Heat Removal System (ND).

[240] Catawba Document CN-2561-01.0 l Rev. 24, Flow Diagram of Residual Heat Removal System (ND).

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Page 47 of94

[241] Catawba Document CN-2562-01.00 Rev. 10, Flow Diagram of Safety lnjeclion System (NI).

[242] Catawba Document CN-2562-01.01 Rev. 22, Flow Diagram o/Sqfety Injection System (NJ).

[243] Catawba Document CN-2562-01.02 Rev. 32, Flow Diagram of Safety Injection System (NJ).

[244] Catawba Document CN-2572-01.00 Rev. 24, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Sampling System (NM).

[245] Catawba Document CN-1592-01.00 Rev. 32, Flow Diagram of Auxilimy Feedwater System (CA).

[246] Catawba Document CN-1593-01.01 Rev. 25, Flow Diagram of Main Steam to Auxiliary Equ1jJ111e11/ (SA) Main Steam Bypass lo Co11dc11scr (SB).

[24 7] Catawba Document CN-2592-01.00 Rev. 31, Flow Diagram of AuxilialJ' Feedwater Sys/em (CA).

[248] Catawba Document CN-2592-01.01 Rev. 32, Flow Diagram of AuxilialJ' Feedwater System (CA).

[249] Catawba Document CN-2593-01.0 I Rev. 20, Flow Diagram of Main Steam to Auxilimy Equipment (SA) Main Steam Bypass to Condenser (SB).

[250] Catawba Document CN-1702-02.0 l Rev. 18, One Line Diagram -f.160 Volt Essential A icdlialJ' Power System (EPC) 4160 V Switchgear No. 1 ETA.

[251] Catawba Document CN-1702-02.02 Rev. 18, One Line Diagram 4160 Volt Essential AuxiliaJJ' Power System (EPC) 4160V Switchgear No. 1 ETB.

[252] Catawba Document CN-1703-01.0 I Rev. 4, One Line Diagram 600V Essential Auxiliaty Power System (EP E) 600 V Load Centers 1 ELXA, 1 ELXC.

[253] Catawba Document CN-1703-01.02 Rev. 3, One Line Diagram 600V Essential Auxiliary Power System (EPE) 600 V Load Centers 1 ELXB, 1 ELXD.

[254] Catawba Document CN-1705-01.02 Rev. 7, One Line Diagram 120VAC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System (EPG).

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Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Page 48 of94

[255] Catawba Document CN-1705-04.01Rev.23, One Line Diagram 125VDC Diesel Essential AuxilimJ1 Power System (EPQ).

[256] Catawba Document CN-I 574-02.0 I Rev. 58, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN).

[257] Catawba Document CN-1574-02.05 Rev. 58, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN).

[258] Catawba Document CN-2702-02.01 Rev. 13, One Line Diagram 4160 Volt Essential AuxilimJ1 Power System (EPC) 4160V Switchgear No. 2ETA.

[259] Catawba Document CN-2702-02.02 Rev. 16, One Line Diagram 4160 Volt Essential Auxilia1J1 Power System (EPC) 4160V Switchgear No. 2ETB.

[260] Catawba Document CN-2703-01.0 I Rev. 5, One Line Diagram 600V Essential Auxilia1J1 I'o111cr System (El' E) 600 V Load Centers 2ELXA, 2ELXC.

[261] Catawba Document CN-2703-01.02 Rev. 4, One Line Diagram 600V Essential Auxiliary Power System (EPE) 600V load Centers 2ELXB, 2ELXD.

[262] Catawba Document CN-2705-01.02 Rev. 6, One Line Diagram 120VAC Vital Instrnmentation and Control Power System (EPG).

[263] Catawba Document CN-2705-04.0 I Rev. 19, One Line Diagram 125 V DC Diesel Essential AuxiliaiJ; Power System (EPQ).

[264] Catawba Document CN-2574-02.01 Rev. 47, Flow Diagram a,( Nuclear Service Water System (RN).

[265] Catawba Document CN-2574-02.05 Rev. 52, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN).

[266] Catawba Document AP-2-A-5500-008 Rev. 17, Procedure Malfunction of Reactor Coolant Pump.

[267] Catawba Document AP-l-A-5500-008 Rev. 18, Procedure Malfunction of Reactor Coolant Pump.

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 49 of94 A. REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE COMPONENT EVALUATIONS A detailed example analysis of two components is provided within this section. This example is intended to illustrate each step of the high frequency analysis methodology given in Section 4 of Reference [ 4].

A.I High Frequency Seismic Demand Calculate the high-frequency seismic demand on the components per the methodology from Reference [4].

These sample calculations are performed for the high-frequency seismic demand of components DA(STI A), contained in control cabinet I DGLSA-2, which is in the Diesel Generator Building at elevation 556', and CR3, contained in control cabinet I ELCP0245, which is in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 543'. Reference [220] contains the list of subject components and their host cabinets, including the components chosen for this example. Reference [219] calculates the high-frequency seismic demand for all the subject components. Note that, per Attachment D of Reference [219], control cabinet 1 ELCP0245 is mounted on the wall above the floor at elevation 543' in the Auxiliary Building. Therefore, the floor above that wall (i.e. the next floor at elevation 554' -0") is conservatively used to calculate the demand for this control cabinet.

A. I. I Horizontal Seismic Demand The horizontal site-specific GMRS for Catawba Nuclear Station can be found in Section 3, Table 3-2.

Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz:

Peak Acceleration of Horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (see Section 3, Table 3-2):

SAHGMRS = 0. 748g (at 30 Hz)

Compute the distance between the subject floor elevation and the building foundation elevation.

Per Attachment F of Reference [219], the foundation elevation for the Diesel Generator Building is 548', and 539' for the Auxiliary Building. Per Table 9-1 of Reference [220], components DA(STl A) and CR3 are mounted on panel 1 DGLSA-2 and I ELCP0245, respectively. Per Attachment D of Reference [219], the building and elevation for I DGLSA-2 and I ELCP0245 is the Diesel Generator Building at 556', and the Auxiliary Building at 554', respectively.

Foundation Elevation (Attachment F of Reference [219]):

Component Floor Elevation:

ELround = 548 ft ELround = 539 ft ELcomp = 556 ft ELcomp = 554 ft Diesel Generator Building Auxiliary Building DA(STJA)

CR3

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station l 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 50 of94 Distance Between Component Floor and Foundation Elevation:

hcomp = ELcomp - ELround = 8 ft DA(STJA) hcomp = ELcomp - ELround = I 5 ft CR3 Per Reference [4], Figure 4-3, calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation:

Slope of Amplification Factor Line, Oft < hcomp < 40ft:

Intercept of Amplification Factor Line with Amplification Factor Axis:

Horizontal In-Structure Amplification Factor [4, pp. 4-11]:

m1 -

z.i-i.z -

0.0225 ~

1 40[t-O[t -

ft AFs1-1(hco111p) = (111h

hcomp+ bh) ifhcomp <= 40ft 2.1 otherwise AFs1-1(hcamp) = 1.38 DA(STJA)

AFs1-1(hca111p) = 1.54 CR3 Calculate the horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor based on the type of cabinet that contains the subject component. The panel types for I DGLSA-2 and I ELCP0245 are provided in Attachment D of Reference [219]; both are control cabinets. Per Reference [4], Section 4.4, the effective horizontal amplification of 4.5 (AFc) is applicable to Control Cabinets/Panels:

Type of Cabinet:

(enter "MCC", "Switchgear",

"Control Cabinet", or "Rigid")

Horizontal In-Cabinet Amplification Factor [4, pp. 4-13]:

cab!= "Control Cabinet for DA(STIA)"

cab2 = "Control Cabinet for CR3

AFc11(cab) =

3.6 if cab= "MCC" 7.2 if cab= "Switchgear" 4.5 if cab= "Control Cabinet" 1.0 if cab= "Rigid" AFch(cabl) = 4.5 AFc 11(cab2) = 4.5

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 51 of94 Multiply the peak horizontal GMRS acceleration by the horizontal in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the components:

Horizontal In-Cabinet Response Spectrum:

ICRSc.h = AFs11

A Fe h

SAGMRS ICRSc.11 =1.38*4.5*0.748=4.65g DA(STJA)

ICRSc.h =1.54*4.5*0.748=5. I Sg CR3 A.1.2 Vertical Seismic Demand The vertical site-specific GMRS for Catawba Nuclear Station can be found in Section 3, Table 3-2.

Determine the peak acceleration of the vertical GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz:

Peak Acceleration of Vertical GMRS between 15 I Iz and 40 Hz (sec Section 3, Table 3-2):

SAvGMRs.,..., 0.607g (at 40 I Iz)

Use the distance between the component floor and foundation calculated in Section A. I. I above to calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor:

Distance Between Component Floor and Foundation Elevation (from Section A. I. I):

hcomp = 8 ft DA(STJA) hcomp = I 5 ft CR3 Calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation:

Slope of Amplification Factor Line:

Intercept of Amplification Factor Line with Amplification Factor Axis:

m =

2*7-1*0

= 0.017 2..

v 100/t-Oft ft bv = 1.0 Vertical In-Structure Amplification Factor: AFsv(hcomp) = mv

hcomp + bv AFsv(hcomp) = 1.14 DA(STIA)

AFsv(hcomp) =0 l.26 CR3 Per Reference [ 4] the vertical in-cabinet amplification factor is 4. 7 regardless of cabinet type:

Vertical In-Cabinet Amplification Factor:

AFc.v =4.7

~A 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

~

Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 52 of 94 Multiply the peak vertical GMRS acceleration by the vertical in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the component:

Vertical In-Cabinet Response Spectrum (Ref. [4, pp. 4-12], Eq. 4-1 b): ICRSc.v = AFsv

AFc.v

SAvoMRS A.2 High Frequency Capacity ICRSc.v =1.14*4.7*0.607=3.24g ICRSc.v =1.26*4.7*0.607=3.58g DA(STJA)

CR3 A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic capacity of components DA(STI A)

(contained in 1 DGLSA-2) and CR3 (contained in I ELCP0245) is presented here.

A.2.1 Seismic Test Capacity The high frequency seismic capacity of a component can be determined from the EPRI High Frequency Testing Program or other broad banded low frequency capacity data such as the Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) or other qualification reports.

A.2.1.l DA(STJA) Capacity The make and model for component DA(ST 1 A) is A gas tat SSC 12 per Table 9.1 of Reference

[220] and was not tested as part of the high-frequency testing program. The seismic capacity is 7.0g for 5% damping, based on low frequency GERS qualification data [221, pp. 3-4].

A.2.1.2 CR3 Capacity The make and model for component CR3 is Agastat EGPD003 per Table 9.1 of Reference [220]

and was tested as part of the high-frequency testing program. The seismic capacity is 14.1 g for 5% damping, based on EPRI high frequency test data [216, pp. 5-18]. For conservatism, the lowest capacity level of any coil state or contact configuration was chosen.

GERS spectral acceleration is used as the seismic test capacity for component DA(ST I A);

therefore, there is no spectral acceleration increase and the effective spectral test capacity is equal to the seismic test capacity. High frequency test spectral acceleration is used as the seismic test capacity for component CR3, and a spectral acceleration increase equal to half the test level increment ( l.25g/2) is appropriate [ 4, pp. 4-16].

Effective Spectral Test Capacity (Ref. [ 4, pp. 4-16]):

SAT= 7.OOg DA(STJA)

SAT= 14.1 + 1.25/2

= 14.73g CR3

~A 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

~

Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station l 6C443 7-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 53 of94 A.2.2 Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor The seismic capacity for component DA(ST! A) was obtained from GERS programs [221].

There is no clear indication provided in those programs as to whether a specific relay was tested to test table limits or the lowest level without chatter. Therefore, it is reasonable (conservative) that a 1.5 knockdown factor is considered for all components under GERS testing, including DA(STIA). The seismic capacity for component CR3 was obtained from the High Frequency Test Program [216], and corresponds to the lowest testing level without chatter. Therefore, a knockdown factor of 1.56 is appropriate for CR3. Knockdown factors were chosen using Table 4-2 of Reference [4]:

Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor:

FK = 1.50 GERS, Lowest Level without Chatter DA(ST!A)

FK = 1.56 High Frequency Test Program, CR3 Lowest Level without Chatter A.2.3 Seismic Testing Single-Axis Correction Factor Determine the seismic testing single-axis correction factor of the subject relay, which is based on whether the equipment housing to which the relay is mounted has well-separated horizontal and vertical motion or not. Per Reference [ 4, pp. 4-1 7 18], relays mounted within cabinets that are braced, bolted together in a row, mounted to both floor and wall, etc. will have a correction factor of 1.0. Relays mounted within cabinets that are bolted only to the floor or otherwise not well-braced will have a correction factor of 1.2 per Reference [4, pp. 4-18].

Per Attachment D of reference [219], panels I DGLSA-2 and 1 ELCP0245 are floor mounted and wall mounted control panels, respectively. Without further information regarding structural configuration of these panels, it cannot be determined whether these panels have a dominant single-axis response motion. Therefore, it is recommended by the EPRI guidance [4) that the FMS factor of 1.0 is used.

Single-Axis Correction Factor (Ref. [ 4, pp. 4 4-18]

and Attachment A of Ref. [219]):

FMs = 1.0 DA(.'STI A)

FMs = 1.0 CR3 A.2.4 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Calculate the effective wide-band component capacity acceleration per Reference [4], Eq. 4-5:

Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration (Ref. [4], Eq. 4-5):

SAy TRS =-* FMs FK

50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 54 of94 TRS = 4.67g DA(STJA)

TRS = 9.44g CR3 A.2.5 Component Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for relays per Reference [4], Eq. 4-6:

(A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components DA(STl A) and CR3 is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all the subject relays is contained in Attachment A of Reference [219].)

Horizontal Seismic Margin TRS 1.005 > 1.0, OK DA(STJA)

(Ref. [4], Eq. 4-6):

=

ICRSc.h 1.824 > 1.0, OK CR3 Vertical Seismic Margin TRS 1.439 > 1.0, OK DA(STJA)

(Ref. [4], Eq. 4-6):

=

ICRSC.1' 2.635 > 1.0, OK CR3 J

50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station B. COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED FOR HIGH FREQUENCY CONFIRMATION Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosur<

No. =

System Building

)

De\\*ice ID Type Manufnrturcr Model ID Typ<

Function I

I M-1/C Ctmtactor MOV Closing Crnuactor Allen-Bradley 205-NXI ICMTS0028 Control Auxiliary Cabinet Building Process Rochester Control Diesel 2

I DA Switch Speed Switch 98%

lnstniment ET-1214 IDECPA Cabinet Generator Svstems Building Control Speed Switch 98%

Control Diesel 3

I FA Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70A IDECPA Generator Relay Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Build in!!

Control Shutdown De-Actuation Control Diesel 4

I RIOA Relay Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD40AI IDECPA Cab met Generator Building Control Shutdown De-Actuation Control Diesel 5

I R9A Rday Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD40AI IDECPA Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Diesel 6

I SS I-Kl Swuch 200 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalco SST-2400A lDECPA Cabinet Generator Build mg Process Control Diesel 7

I SSJ-K2 Switch 200 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalco SST-2400A IDECPA Cab met Generator Buildmg Process Control Diesel 8

I SS2-K3 Switch 440 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalcn SST-2400A IDECPA Cabinet Generator Bll11dmg Process Control Diesel 9

I SS2-K4 Switch 440 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalco SST-2400A IDECPA Cabinet Generator Building Control Fail-to-Stan Auxiliary D87XEL30/

Control Diesel JO I

TD4 Relay Relays Cutler-Hammer D26MRD40AI IDECPA Cabinet General or Bll11dmg Control Fnil-to-Stan Auxilial)'

087XEL30/

Control Diesel II I

TDS Cutler-Hammer IDECPA Generator Relay Relays D26MRD40AI Cabinet Buildme Process Rochester Control Diesel 12 I

DA Switch Speed Switch 98%

Instrument ET-1214 IDECPB Cab met Generator Systems Build mg Control Speed Switch 98%

Control Diesel 13 I

FA Relay Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70A IDECPB Cab met Generator Building 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 55 of94 Floor Component Evaluation Ele\\'.

B:isis for E\\'alualioo (ft)

Cap3cily Result 543 GERS Mitigation Strategics Catawba 556 Repon Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dern Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dern Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Rcpon Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dern 556 GERS Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Rep on Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem

No.

Device ID 14 I

RIOA 15 I

R9A 16 I

SSJ-KI 17 I

SSl-K2 18 I

SS2-K3 19 I

SS2-K4 20 I

TD4 21 I

TD5 22 I

K307 23 I

TD301 24 I

K307 25 I

TD301 26 1

GD( BOA) 27 I

GE(l27ZAX)

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Conirol Shutdown Dc-Acluauon Control Diesel Relay Relay Cu!lcr-1-lammcr D26MRD40AI IDECPB Cabinet Generator Build in£ Conlrol Shutdown De-Actuation Control Diesel Relay Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD40AI IDECPB Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Diesel Switch 200 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalco SST-2400A IDECPB Cabinet Gencrntor Building Process Control Diesel Sw11ch 200 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalco SST-2400A lDECPB Cubine!

Genera Lor Build in I!

Process Contml Diesel Switch 440 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynako SST-2400A IDECPB Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Diesel Switch 440 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalco SST-2400A IDECPB Cabinet Gcnernlor Building Control Fail-10-S!art Auxiliary D87XEUO/

Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer IDECPB Generator Relay Relays D26MRD40AI Cabinel Brnldml!

Control Fa1l-to-Starl Auxiliary D87XEL30/

Control Diesel Cu1lcr-lfammcr IDECPB Gencralor Relay Relays D26MRD40Al Cabmel Bu1ldmg Conlrnl Tyco (Potter-Control D1c~el High DC Shunt Trip Relay CNS 35-96 IDGCA Generator Relay Brumfield)

Cab met Building Control Ametek Control Diesel Relay High DC Shunt Trip Timer (Solidstalc 07-740110-00 lDGCA Cabinet Generator Conlrols)

Building Conlrol Tyco (Poller-Control Diesel High DC Shunt Trip Relay CNS 35-96 lDGCB General or Rcby Brumfield)

Cabinet Brnldmg Control Amclck Control Diesel Relay High DC Shun! Trip Timer (Solidstale 07-740110-00 IDGCB Cabinet Generator Controls)

B111ldmg Control Control Diesel Relay Blackout Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGLSA-1 Cabmel Generator Build ml!

Control Undcrvoltage Relay Z-Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI JDGLSA-1 Gt:ncrator Relay Phase Cabmel Build mg

!6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 56 of94 Floor Component Evaluation Ele\\'.

Basis for Evaluution (rt)

Capacity Resull 556 GERS Cap>Dcm 556 GERS Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Reporl Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Rcpor!

Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem Cmuwba 556 Report Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cup> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem

I l

No.

28 29 30 JI 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 I

I I

I 1

I l

I 1

I I

I l

I Devict ID GF( 127Y AX)

GG(l27XAX)

Gl-1( I 27XAX/SPL)

HG(RGA)

AA!SAAI)

AEtLT2A) 8E(SAA8)

CD(LSAT)

DA{STIA)

DB[ST2A)

DC(ST3A)

DD{ST4A)

DE(ST5A)

DF(ST6A)

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Systtm Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Control Undervoltagc Relay Y-Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGLSA-1 Generator Relay Phase Cabinet Building Control Undcrvoltagc Relay X-Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGLSA-1 Generator Relay Phase Cabinet Building Control Undervollagc Relay Control Diesel Cutkr-Hammcr D26MRD30AI lDGLSA-1 Generator Relay

/Spec ml Cabinet Buildim!

Control Diesel Generator Rcsrnrt Control Diesel Relay Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD'10Al IDGLSA-1 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Sequencer Actuation Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I IDGLSA-2 Cnbinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Logic Timer Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Rmlding Control Control Diesel Relay Sequencer Acnmtmn Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA-2 Cab met Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Timer Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al JDGLSA-2 Cub met Generator Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Comm med Sequence Timer Agastnt SSCl2PAA IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Comm med Sequence Timer Agastat SSC12PAA IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Build nm Con1rol Control Diesel Relay Comm1lted Sequence Tuner Agastat SSC12PBA IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Butldmg Control Control Diesel Relay Comm1t1ctl Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PBA IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Commilled Sequence Timer Agastnt SSC12PCA IDGLSA-2 Cab met Generator Buildinu Control Control Diesel Comm1t1cd Sequence Tuner Agastnt SSCl2PCA IDGLSA-2 Generator Relay Cabinet Hui Id mg JGC4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 57 of94 Floor Component Evnlunlion Elev.

Bnsis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Resull 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cnp>Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dem 556 GERS Cup> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem

No.

c Device ID 42 I

DG(ST7A) 43 I

Dl!(ST8A) 44 I

DJ(ST9A) 45 I

DK(STIOA) 46 I

DL(STI IA) 47 I

DM(STl2A) 48 I

DN(STl3Al 49 I

FA(RAI) 50 I

FB(RAIA) 51 I

FC(RA2) 52 I

FD(RA3) 53 I

FE(RA4) 54 I

FF( RAS) 55 I

FG(RA6)

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2. I Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Ty IR Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Control Control Diesel Relay Commi!lcd Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PDA IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Com milted Sequence Timer Agastm SSCl2PDA I DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastt:lt SSCl2PDA IDGL~A-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Comm1t1ed Sequence Tuner Agasrnt SSCl2PEA IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PMA IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PEA IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Comm med Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PFA IDGLSA-2 Cab met Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRDJOAI IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Build mu Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loadmg Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al JDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Gcncrntor Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGLSA-2 Cab met Gener.llor Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Build mg 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 58 of94 Floor Component Evulualion Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (rt)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cup> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dem

No.

l>evice ID 56 l

FH(RA7) 57 I

F.l(RA8) 58 I

FK(RA9) 59 I

GA(Rt\\ 10) 60 I

GH{RAll) 61 l

GC(RA12) 62 l

GD(RA13) 63 I

HA(IESGAXl) 64 I

LSA l-4/4a(CAJ 65 1

LSA3-l!la(CC) 66 I

LSA3-4/4a(CC) 67 I

GD( BOB) 68 l

GE(l27ZBX) 69 I

GF(l27YBX)

SA 50.54(t) NTIF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Endosnre System Building Typr Manufacturer Model II>

Ty pr Function Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-l*lammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI lDGLSA-2 Cabinet Gcncrntor Building Control Control Di.:sel Relay Loadmg Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI

!DGLSA-2 Cab met Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loaumg Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI lDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al lDGLSA-2 Cab met Generator Buildmg Control Engmccrcd Snfeguards Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA-2 Generator Relay Auxiliary Relay Cab met Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al lDGLSA-2 Cabinet Gcncrntor Building Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSA-2 Cab met Generator Building

Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI lDGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Buildmg Control Control Diesel Relay Blackout Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI l DGLSB-l Cahmet Generator Bwldmg Control Undervoltage Rday Z-Control Diesel Relay Phase Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al lDGLSB-1 Cab met Generator Bu1ldml!

Cl)ntrol Undervoltage Relay Y-Control Diesel Cutlcr-Hilmmcr D26MRD70Al IDGLSB-1 Generator Relay Phase Cab met Build mg l6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 59 of94 Floor Component Evalnation Elev.

Basis for Evnluntion (rt)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap>Dcm 556 GERS Cap>Dcm 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dern 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem

No.

=

Devitt ID 70 I

GG(J27XBX}

71 I

GH{ 127XBXJSPL) 72 I

HG{RGB) 73 I

AA(SABI) 74 I

AE(LT2B) 75 l

BE(SAB8) 76 I

CD(LSBT) 77 I

DA(STlB) 78 I

DB(ST2B) 79 I

DC{STJB) 80 I

DDIST4B) 8 J I

DEIST5B) 82 I

DF(ST6BJ 83 l

DG(ST7B)

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-I: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Ty pt Manufacturer Model ID Ty pt Function Control Undervoltage Relay X-Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSB-1 Generator Relay Phase Cabinet Bt1ilding Control Undervoltage Relay Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRDJOAI IDGLSB-1 Genera.tor Reluy

/Sriecial Cabinet Build in!!

Control Diesel Generator Restart Control Diesel Relay Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD40AI IDGLSB-1 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Sequencer Actual ion Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Gencmtor Build inn Control Control Diesel Relay Logic Timer Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Sequencer Actuation Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Timer Relay Cmler-Hammer D26MRD70AJ l DGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Bwldmg Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agustat SSCl2PAA IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Comm rued Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PAA IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastat SSCJ2PBA JDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer A gas tat SSCl2PBA I DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Commrlled Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PCA IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastat SSCJ2PCA I DGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Buildm" Control Control Diesel Relay Comm med Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PDA IDGLSB-2 Cab met Gcnerutor Building 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 60 of94 Floor Component *Evaluation Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cup> Dem

No.

=

Device ID 84 I

DI-l(ST8B) 85 I

DJ(ST9BJ 86 I

DK(STIOB) 87 I

DL(STI IB) 88 I

DM(STJ28) 89 I

DN(STlJB) 90 I

FA(RBI) 91 I

FB(RBIA) 92 I

FC(RB2) 93 I

FD(RB3) 94 I

FE(RB4) 95 I

FF(RB5) 96 l

FG(RB6) 97 I

FH(RB7)

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2. I Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Control Control Diesel Relay Com mated Sequence Timer Agastat SSC12PDA IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Buildino Control Control Diesel Relay Com milled Sequence Timer Agastal SSCl2PDA IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Buildino Control Control Diesel Co1111mttcd Sequence Timer Agnstat SSCl2PEA IDGL'iB-2 Generator Relay Cabinet Buildino Control Comrol Diesel Relay Comm11ted Sequence Timer Agastat SSCJ2PMA IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Build in!!

Control Control Diesel Relay Commttled Sequence T1111cr A gas mt SSCl2PEA IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Buildin~

Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastat SSC12PFA IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Build in*'

Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI I DGLSB-2 Cabinet Gcnerntor Btuldm*

Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30AI IDGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Buildm~

Control Control Diesel Loading Reby Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSB-2 Generator Relay Cabinet Build inn Cnntrol Control Diesel Relay Loadrng Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al lDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Build in**

Control Control Diesel Relay Load mg Relay Cutler-Hummer D26MRD70Al IDGLSB-2 Cahinet Generator Buildin" Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Buildino Control Cnntrol Diesel Rcluy Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Bu1ld1no Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Build mo 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Paoe 61 of94 Floor Component Evaluation Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (fl)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dcm 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure No.

c; System Building Devire ID Typ<

Manufaclurer Model ID Type Function Control Control Diesel 98 l

FJ(RB8)

Relay Loadmg Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD704AI JDGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Buildine.

Control Control Diesel 99 l

FK(RA9)

Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel 100

)

GA(RBJO)

Relay Loadmg Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI lDGLSB-2 Cabinet Genernlor Buildine.

Control Control Diesel IOI I

GB(RBllJ Relay Loadmg Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI I DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel 102 I

GC(RBl2)

Rcluy Load mg Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI JDGLSB-2 Cab met Generator 13u!ldme.

Control Control Diesel 103 l

GD(RBIJ)

Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I iDGLSB-2 Cabinet Gcnernlor Building Control Engineered Safeguards Control Diesel 104 I

HA(I ESGBX I)

Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGL<;B-2 Generator Relay Aux1hary Relay Cabinet Building Con1rol Con1rol Diesel 105 I

LSB l-4/4a(CAl Relay Load Shed Culler-Hammer D26MRD704A I lDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel 106 I

LSB3-l/la{CC)

Rday Load Shed Culler-Hammer D26MRD704A I IDGLSB-2 Cabinet Gencrnlor Building Control Control Diesel 107 I

LSB3-4/4a(CC)

Relay Load Shed Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A l lDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Buildine.

Control Voltage Controlled Terminul Diesel 108 I

GB(51VX3)

Relay Ovcrcurrenl Auxilial}'

Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30AI lEATCl4 Cabinet Gcneralor Relay Building Control Volrnge Controlled Terminal Diesel 109 I

GC(51VXI)

Relay Overcurrcnt Auxilial}"

Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30AI IEATCl4 Cabinet Generator Relav Building Control Vollagc Controlled Terminal Diesel 110 I

JA(51VX2)

Relay Ovcrcurrcnt Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I IEATCl4 Cabmel Generator Rday Bmldmg Control Voltage Controlled Term ma!

Diesel 111 I

GB!51VX3J Relay Ovcrcurrl!nt Auxiliaf)'

Culler-Hammer D26MRDJOAI IEATC15 Cab met Generator Rd av Build me.

l 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 62 of94 Floor Componenl Evaluation Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Cupacily Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dcm 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cnp>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dcm 556 GERS

.Cap>Dcm 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem

No.

c; Device ID 112 I

GC(51VXIJ 113 I

JA(51VX2) 114 l

AA 115 I

AE 116 I

CD 117 1

DD 118 I

l'-30 I 119 I

K301 120 I

K301 121 I

K301 122 I

CONJ 123 I

CRJ 124 I

CR4 125 I

HB SA 50.54(1) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type Mauufaclurcr Model ID Type Fune lion Control Voltage Controlled Tcnnmal Diesel Relay Overcurrent Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30Al IEATCl5 Cabinet Generator Relay Building Control Voltage Controlled Terminal Diesel Relay Ovcrcurrcnt Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I IEATCJ5 Cabinet Gencrntor Relay Building Control Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D23MR40A IEATC9 Terminal Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Control Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D23MR40A IEATC9 Terminal Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Control Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D23MR40A IEATC9 Terminal Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Control Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D23MR40A IEATC9 Tcnninal Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Control Ametek Control Auxiliary High DC Shunt Trip Reluy (Sol 1dstatc 07-740131-00 IECA Relay Controls)

Cabinet Building Control Ametek Control Auxiliary High DC Shunt Tnp Relay (Solidstatc 07-740131-00 IECB Relay Controls)

Cabinet Building Control Ametek Control Auxiliary High DC Shunt Trip Relay (Solidstate 07-740131-00 lECC Relay Controls)

Cahinct Building Control Ametek Control Auxiliary 1-ligh DC Shunt Trip Relay (SohJstate 07-740131-00 IECD Relay Controls)

Cabinet Building Contactor Ovcrspced Tnp Auxiliary Allen-Bradley 202-NXI 1 I ELCP0245 Control Auxiliarv Relay Cabinet Building Control Overspecd Tnp Relay Agastat (or Tyco) EGPD-003 or -004 IELCP0245 Control Auxiliary Relay (1423176-6)

Cabinet Building Control Mechanical Ovcrspeed Trip Agastat (or Tyco) EGPD-003 or -004 lELCJ>0245 Control Auxiliary Relay Relay (1423176-6)

Cabinet Building Control Control Diesel Relay Non-Emergency Trip Relay Cutler-Hummer D26MRD30AI I ELCP0328 Cabinet General or Build me 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 63 of94 Floor Component Evaluation Elev.

Bnsis for Evaluation (fl)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 594 GERS Mitigation Strategics 594 GERS M1t1gat10n Strategics 594 GERS Mltigauon Strategics 594 GERS M1t1gatton Strategies Catawba Mitigation 554 Rcpon Strategies Catawba Mit1gal1on 554 Report Strategics Catawba M1t1gatton 554 Report Strategics Catawba Mit1gat1on 554 Report Strategics 543 GERS M1tiga11on Strategies 543 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Test 543 El'RIHF Cap> Dem Test 556 GERS Cup>Dcm

No.

i Device ID 126 l

JB 127 l

JC 128 l

Rl(DNSSTl) 129 I

Rl(DB/SST2) 130 l

R3(DA/SSTI) 131 I

R3(DB/SST2) 132 l

HB 133 I

JB 134 I

JC 135 I

Rl(DNSSTIJ 136 I

Rl!DB/SST2) 137 I

R3(DNSSTI) 138 I

RJ(DB/SST2) 139 I

TM J( I CAST5762)

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building.

Type Manufucturer Model JO Type Function Control Control Diesel Relay Lo-Lo Lube Oil Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30A I ELCP032S Cabinet General or Buildinl!

Control Shutdown Cycle Seal-In Control Diesel Agaslal E70 I 2PELL004 I ELCP0328 Generator Relay Timer Cabinet Building Process Control Diesel Switch Ovcrspccd Relay Dynalco SST-2400 I ELCP0328 Cabinet Generator Buildinu Process Control Diesel Sw11ch Ovcrspccd Relay Dynalco SST-2400 I ELCP0328 Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Diesel Swttch Overspced Relay Dynalco SST-2400 I ELCP0328 Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Diesel Switch Ovcrspecd Relay Dynalco SST-2400 I ELCP0328 Cabinet Generator BuilJing Control Control Diesel Relay Non-Emergency Trip Relay Cutler-Hummer D26MRD30AI IELCPOJ29 Cab me!

Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Lo-Lo Lube Oil Trip Rday Culler-Hammer D26MRD30A I ELCP0329 Cabmel Generator Build mg Control Shutdo\\\\11 Cycle Seal-In Control Diesel Agastal E70 I 2PELL004 lELCP0329 Generator Relay Timer Cabinet Build in" Process Control Diesel Switch Ovcrspccd Relay Dynalco SST-2400 I ELCP0329 Cabinet General or Building Process Control Diesel Switch Overspecd Relay Dynalco SST-2400 I ELCP0329 Cabinet Gt.:ncrator Building Process Control Diesel Switch Ovcrspced Relay Dynalco SST-2400 I ELCP0329 Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Diesel Switch Overspccd Relay Dyna I co SST-2400 JELCPOJ29 Cabinet Generator Building Process Overspccd Tnp Switch Dynalco SST-2400AN-I73 I ELCP0334 Control Auxiliary Switch Cab me!

Building l 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Paoe 64 of94 Floor Component Evaluolion Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Cutnwbu 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem 543 Carnwba Cap> Dem Report

No.

a

i Device ID 140 I

52(iil I ELXA-04B 141 l

52(ci) l ELXA-04C 142 l

52@1 ELXA-06C 143 I

52@1 ELXB-04 B 144 l

52@ I ELXB-04C 145 I

52@1 ELXB-06C 146 I

52@1ELXC-04B 147 1

52@1 ELXC-04C 148 I

52@1 ELXD-043 149 I

52@1ELXD-04C 150 I

M/C@I EMXB-R03C 151 J

M/O@IEMXC-F03C 152 I

M/O@l EMXD-F02C 50.54(1) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Endosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function LV Circuit Normal lncom ing Feeder ABB K2000-S lELXA Load Center Am<lliary Breaker Breaker Buiiding LV Circuit I EMXA Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S

!ELXA Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Building LY Circuit I EMXE Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S

!ELXA Loud Center Auxiliary Breaker Building LY Circt11t Normal Incoming Feeder ABB K2000-S

!ELXB Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Breaker Building LV Circull I EMXB Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S JELXB Load Center Au::<iliary Br~akcr Building LV Circuit I EMXF Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S IELXB Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Build mg LV Circuit Normal lncommg Feeder ABll K2000-S IELXC Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Breaker Building LV Circuit I EMXI F ceder Breaker ABB Kl600-S IELXC Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Building LV Circuit Normal Incoming Feeder ABl.l K2000-S IELXD Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Breaker Building LVC1rclllt J EMXJ Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S IELXD Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Building Tl3U031-76 Cnntactor MOV Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXB MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-1 Building Auxiliary Contacts Tl3U03 l-76 Contactor Opening Contact or Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXC MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-1 Building Auxiliary Contacts Tl3U03 l-76 Contactor Opening Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXD MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-l Build mg Auxiliary Contacts 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 65 of94

'-Floor Component,Evalunlion Elev.

Basis for E\\*aluation (fl)

Capacity Result 577 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 577 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 577 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 560 c.. 1.. wba Cap> Dem Report 560 Catawba Cap> Dem Repon 560 Catawba Cap> Dem Rcpon 577 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 577 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 560 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 560 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 556 GERS M1llgation Strategies 577 GERS Mitigation Strategics 556 GERS Mitigation Strategics

No.

Device ID 153 I

M/0@1 EMXD-FOSA 154 I

M/C@IEMXE-FOIC 155 I

M/C@I EMXF-FOIC 156 I

M/C@I EMXK-F08B 157 1

M/C@I EM XL-FORA 158 I

MIO@I EMXL-FOl B 159 I

M/Cl@I EMXO-FO I B 160 I

M/C@l EMXO-FO ID 161 I

M/C@l EMXS-F04A 162 l

M/O@IEMXS-FOID SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Componenl Enclosur<

System Building Type Maoufnclurer Model m

Type Funclion Tl3U031-76 Con tac tor Opening Cuntactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXD MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-I Building Auxiliary Contacts T13U03 l-76 Diesel Contactor Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXE MCC Generator or A77-463967A-l Building Auxiliary Contacts Tl3U031-76 Diesel Contactor Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXF MCC Generator or A 77-463967A-I Auxiliarv Contacts Building Tl 3U03 l-76 Contactor Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXK MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-I BU1ldmg Auxiliary Contacts Tl3U03l-76 Contaclor MOV Closing Conlactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXL MCC Auxiliary or A 77-463967 A-I l:lutlding Auxiliary Contacts Tl3U031-76 Conlactor Opening Contactor Clark Contuctor/KTM-10

!EMXL MCC Auxiliary or A 77-463967!\\-I Bu tiding Auxiliary Contacts Tl3U031-76 Nuclear Conlaclor Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/K TM-I 0 IEMXO MCC Service or A77-463967A-I Waler Pump Auxiliary Contacts House Tl3U031-76 Nuclear Contact or Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXO MCC Service or A77-463967A*I Water Pump Auxiliary Contacts House Tl3U031-76 Contact or Closmg Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXS MCC Aw<Jhary or A77-463967A-I Build mg Auxiliary Contacts TIJUOJI-76 Comactor Open mg Contact or Clark Contaclor/KTM-10 IEMXS MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-1 Building Auxihurv Contacts 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Pa"e 66 of 94 Floor.

Component Evaluation Elev.

Basis for Evalunlion (ft)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Mitigation Strategics 556 GERS Mitigation Strategics 556 GERS M1l1gatio11 Strategics 577 GERS Mitigation Stratcg1cs 556 GERS Mitigation Strategics 556 GERS Mitigation Strategics 600 GERS Mitigation Strategics 600 GERS M1t1gation Strategics 577 GERS Mitigatton Strategics 577 GERS M111gation Strategics

No.

a

i Devire ID 163 I

M/O@I EM XS-F02B 164 I

M/O@l EMXS-F06A 165 I

M/0@1 EMXS-F06B 166 I

M/0@1 EMXS-F06C 167 I I 52@1ETA05 168 l

52@1ETAl4 169 t

52@1ETAl6 170 1

52@1ETAI8 171 I

52S(AFJ@I ETA03 172 I

52S(AF)@IETA04 173 l

PA(51V)@IETAl8 174 I

PB(51 V)@IETAl8 175 l

PC(5 l V)@l ETA! 8 SA 50.54(-f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Componcnl Enclosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Tl3U031-76 Contactor Opening Contaclor Clark Conlaclor/KTM-10 IEMXS MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-I Building Auxiliary Contacts Tl3U03 l-76 Cnntactor Opening Contaclor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 IEMXS MCC Auxiliary or A 77-463967A-l Building Auxiliary Contacts Tl3U03 l-76 Contaclor Open mg Conlactor Clark Conlaclor/KTM-10 IEMXS MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-l Building Auxiliary Contacts T13U031-76 Contaclllr Opcnmg Contactor Clark Contactor/K TM-I 0 JEMXS MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-l Building Auxiliary Contacts MY Circuit Feed to IETXA ABB 51-!K-250, l 200A

!ETA Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Building MY Circuit RN I PA Breaker ABB 51-!K-250, 1200A

!ETA Switchgear At1.<iliary Breaker Building MY Circuit Feed to I ETXC ABB SHK-250. 1200A

!ETA Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Building MY Circuit Diesel Generator I A Output ABB SHK-250, l200A

!ETA Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Breaker Building MY Circuit Nornml Feeder Breaker ABB 700038-KO I or

!ETA Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker 700038-K5 I Building MY Circuit Standby Feeder Breaker ABB 700038-KO I or

!ETA Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker 700038-K5 I Building Protective Voltage Controlled Auxiliary Ovcrcurrcnt Protection Westinghouse COY-8 ( 1876244)

!ETA Switchgear Relay Relay Building Protcclivc Voltage Controlled Auxiliary Ovcrcurrcnt Protection Westinghouse COV-8!1876244)

!ETA Switchgear Relay Relay Building Protccuve Voltage Controlled Auxiliary Ovcrcurrent Protection Westinghouse COY-8 (1876244)

!ETA Switchgear Relay Rel av Building 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 67 cif94 Floor Component Evaluation Elev.

Basis-for Evaluation (ft)

Ca pacify Result 577 GERS Mitigation Strategics 577 GERS Mitigation Strategics 577 GERS Mitigation Strategics 577 GERS Mitigation Strategies 577 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Test 577 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Test 577 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Test 577 EPRIHF Cap>Dem Test 577 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Test 577 EPR!HF Cap> Dem Test Mitigation 577 SQURTS Strategics Mitigation 577 SQURTS Strat\\!gics Mitigation 577 SQURTS Strategies

No.

a

J Devier ID 176 I

PD(62B)@IETA03 177 J

52@1ETB05 178 I

52@1ETBl4 179 I

52@1ETBl6 180 1

52@1ETBl8 181 I

52S( AF)@ I ETBOJ 182 1

52S{AF)@I ETB04 183 I

PA {51 V)r,lj]I ETBl8 184 l

PB (51V)@lETBl8 185 1

PC {51V)@IETB18 186 I

PD(62Bl@IETB03 187 I

M/C@I MXW-FU4D 188 2

M-1/C 189 2

DA SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Ty pr Mannfncturer Model ID Typr Fune lion Control SAM Auxiliary Relay Breaker Failure Timer General Electric

{ 12SAMI 1A21A-IETA Swuchgear Building SI MY Circuit Feed to I ETXB ABB 51-!K-250. I 200A IETB Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Building MY Circuit RN J PB Breaker ABB SHK-250. I 200A lETB Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Building MY Circuit Feed to IETXD ABB SHK-250, 1200A IETB Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Building MY Circuit Diesel Generator I B Output ABB SHK-250, I 200A IETB Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Breaker Building MY Circuit Normal Feeder Breaker ABB 700038-KO I or IETB Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker 700038-KS I Building MY Circuit Standby Feeder Breaker ABB 700038-KO I or IETB Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker 700038-KS I Building Protective Voltage Controlled Auxiliary Relay Overcurrent Protection Westinghouse COV-8 ( 1876244)

IE'ffi Switchgear Building Relay Protective Voltage Controlled Auxiliary Relay Ovcrcurrent Protection Westinghouse COV-8 (1876244)

IETB Switchgear Building Rclav Prolcct1ve Voltage Controlled Aux!linry Relay Ovcrcurrent Proteclmn Westinghouse COV-8 { 1876244)

IETB Switchgear Building Rel av Control SAM Auxiliary Breaker failure Timer General Elcctnc (12SAM11A21A-IETB Switchgear Relay S)

Building Tl3U031-76 Contactor Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10

!MXW MCC Turbine or A 77-463967 A-I Building Auxiliary Contacts Contact or MOY Closing Contactor Allen-Bradley 205-NXI 2CMTS0028 Control Auxiliary Cabinet Building Process Rochester Control Diesel Switch Speed Switch 98%

!nstrumcnt ET-1214 2DECPA Cabinet Generator Svstcms Buildin11:

16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 68 of94 Floor Component Evaluation Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result MJ1igat10n 577 GERS Strategics 560 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Test 560 EPRI IIF Cap> Dem Test 560 EPRlHF Cnp>Dcm Tesl 560 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Test 560 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Test 560 EPR!Hl' Cap> Dem Test Mitigation 560 SQURTS Strntcgics Mitigation 560 SQURTS Strategies Mitigation 560 SQURTS Strategics Mitigation 560 GERS Strategics 568 GERS Mitigation Strategics 543 GERS Mitigation Strategies Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem

~

No.

Device ID 190 2

FA 191 2

RIOA 192 2

R9A 193 2

SS!-Kl 194 2

SS1-K2 195 2

SS2-K3 196 2

SS2-K4 197 2

TD4 198 2

TD5 199 2

DA 200 2

FA 201 2

RIOA 202 2

R9A 203 2

SS I-Kl SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component

. Endosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Control Speed Switch 98%

Control Diesel Culler-Hammer D26MRD70A 2DECPA Generator Relay Auxiliary Relay Cnbinel Building Control Shutdown De-Actuation Control Diesel Relay Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD40Al 2DECPA Cabinet Generator Building Control Shutdown De-Actua(mn Control Diesel Relay Relay Cutler-Hmnmer D26MRD40AI 2DECPA Cabinet Gencrntor Build in!!

Process Control Diesel Switch 200 RPM Auxilmry Relay Dynalco SST-2400A 2DECPA Cabinet Generator Buildinu Proc\\!ss Control Diesel Swuch 200 RPM Auxilmry Relay Dyna I co SST-2400A 2DECPA Cabinet General or Buildi1w Process Control Diesel Switch 440 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalco SST-2400A 2DECPA Cabinet Generator Build in!!

Proct:ss Control Dresel Switch 440 RPM Auxllmry Relay Dynalco SST-2400A 2DECPA Cabmel Generator Build mg Cnntrol Fail-to-Siart Auxiliary DS7XEL30/D26M Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer 2DECPA Generator Relay Relays RD40AJ Cabinet Build mg Control Fatl-lo-Start Auxrhary D87XEL30/D26M Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer 2DECPA Generator Rday Relays RD40AI Cabinet Build mg Process Rochester Control Diesel Switch Speed Swrlch 98%

Instrument ET-1214 2DECPB Cabinet Generator Svstems Building Control Speed Switch 98%

Control Diesel Relay Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70A 2DECPB Cab met Gcncrntor Build mg Control Shutdo\\\\n De-Actuation Control Dresel Relay Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD40Al 2DECPB Cab met Generator Bmlding Control Shutdown Dc-Actuat1on Control Diesel Relay Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD40Al 2DECl'l:l Cabmet Generator Building Process Control Diesel Switch 200 RPM Auxiliary Rday Dynalco SST-2400A 2DECPB Cabmcl Generator Bu1ldm"

!6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 69 of94 Floor Component Evnlnation Eln*.

Basis for Evaluation (rt)

Capodty Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap>Dcm Catawba 556 Report Cap>Dcm Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem Cntawba 556 Report Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem

No.

=

i Device ID 204 2

SSl-K2 20j 2

SS2-K3 206 2

SS2-K4 207 2

TD4 208 2

TD5 209 2

1\\.307 210 2

TD301 211 2

K307 212 2

TD301 213 2

GD( BOA) 214 2

GE(l27ZAX) 2Jj 2

GFll27YAX) 216 2

GG(l27XAXl 217 2

GI-I( I 27XAXISPL)

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type Manufaclurer Mod ti ID Ty pt Function Process Control Diesel Switch 200 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalrn SST-2400A 2DECPB Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Diesel Swnch 440 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalco SST-2400A 2DECPB Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Diesel Switch 440 RPM Auxiliary Relay Dynalco SST-2400A 2DECPB Cab met Generator Building Control Fad-to-Start Auxiliary D87XEL301D26M Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer 2DECPB Generator Relay Relays RD40AI Cahinct Building Control

!'ail-to-Start Auxiliary D87XEL30/D26M Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer 2DECPB Generator Relay Relays RD40AI Cabinet Building Control Tyco (Potter-Control Diesel High DC Shunt Trip Relay CNS 35-%

2DGCA Generator Relay Brumfield)

Cabinet Bu!ldmg Control Ametek Control Diesel Relay High DC Shunt Trip Timer (Sohdstate 07-740110-00 2DGCA Cab111et Generator Controls)

Bt11lding Control Tyco (Potter-Control Diesel High DC Shunt Trip Relay CNS 35-96 2DGCB Generator Relay Brumlicld)

Cabinet Building Control Ametek Control Diesel Relay High DC Shunt Trip Timer (Solidstate 07-740110-00 2DGCB Cabinet Generator Controls)

Building Control Control Diesel

!May Blackout Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-l Cabinet Generator Building Control Undervollage Relay Z-Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-I Generator Rday Phase Cabinet Build mg Control Undervoltage Relay Y-Control Diesel Relay Phase Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-I Cabinet Generator Building Control Undcrvoltnge Relay X-Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-I Generator Relay Phase Cabmcl Build mg Control Undcrvoltagc Rcluy Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30AI

!DGLSA-1 Generator Relay

/Spec IOI Cnbmct Build me.

I6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 70 of94 Floor Component Evohrnlion Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result Catawba j56 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 560 GERS Cap> Dem Catawba 560 Report Cap> Dem 560 GERS Cap> Dem Catawba 560 Report Cap> Dem 556 GERS Car> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cup> Dem

No.

=

i Device ID 218 2

HG(RGAJ 219 2

AA(SAAI) 220 2

AE(LT2A) 221 2

BE(SAA8) 222 2

CD(l..SAT) 223 2

DA(STIA) 224 2

DB(ST2A) 225 2

DC(ST3A) 226 2

DD(ST4A) 227 2

DE(ST5AJ 228 2

DF(ST6A) 229 2

DG(ST7A) 230 2

DH(ST8A) 231 2

DJ(ST9A)

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type M:inufocturcr Model ID Type Fune lion Control Diesel Generator Restart Conrrol Diesel Relay Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD40Al 2DGLSA-I Cabinet Generator Build in~

Control Control Diesel Relay Sequencer Actuation Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I

DGLSA-2 Cnbinet Generator Buildino Control Control Diesel Relay Logic Tuner Cutlcr-Hmnmcr D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Buildim' Control Control Diesel Relay Sequencer Actuation Reby Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Buildino Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Timer Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Build in~

Control Control Diesel Relay Commuted Sequence Timer Agastat SSCI2PAA 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Comm11tcd Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PAA 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Brnldino Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Tuner Agastat SSC! 2PBA 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Buildino Control Control Diesel Relay Commmed Sequence Timer Agastat SSC!2PBA 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Buildm~

Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer A gas tat SSCl21'CA 2DGLSA-2 Cab met Gencriltor Build in£ Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PCA 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Butld1no Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl21'DA 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Buildino Control Control Diesel Relay Comm!lled Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PDA 2DGL5A-2 Cab met Generator Build in*

Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence T1m~r Agustal SSCl2PDA 2DGLSA-2 Cab met Generator Bu1ldino:

I 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 71 of94 l'loor Component Evaluolioo Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Cnpncily Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Car> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem

No.

c:

i Device ID 232 2

DK(ST!OA) 233 2

DL(STI IA) 234 2

DM(STl2A) 235 2

DN(STl3A) 236 2

FA(RAI) 237 2

FA(RAIA) 238 2

FC(RA2) 139 2

FD(RA3) 240 2

FE(RA4l 241 2

FF(RA5) 242 2

FG(RA6) 243 2

FH(RA7) 244 2

FJ(RA8) 245 2

FK(RA9)

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Systrm Building Typ<

Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Control Control Diesel Re!Jy Commmed Sequence Timer Agaslal SSCl2PEA 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastal SSCI2PMA 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Commiued Sequence Timer Agastat SSC!2PEA 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Gcncr::itor Building Control Control Diesel Relay Comm1t1ed Sequence Timer Agaslat SSCl2PFA 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Build in!!

Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD704A I 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD30Al 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-I-lammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Build in!!

Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Build in!!

Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Building I 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Paue 72 of94 Floor Component Evaluation Elev.

Bnsis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cnp>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dcm 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem

No.

i Device ID 246 2

GA( RAIO) 247 2

GB(RAll) 248 2

GC(RAl2) 249 2

GD(RAl3) 250 2

HA(2ESGAXI) 251 2

LSAl-4/4a(CA) 252 2

LSA3-l/la(CC) 253 2

LSA3-4/4a(CC) 254 2

GD( BOB) 255 2

GE(l27ZBX) 256 2

GF(l27YBX) 257 2

GG(127XBX) 258 2

GH( 127XBX/SPL) 259 2

HG(RGB)

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2. l Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Con1rol Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSA-2 Cab met Generator Buildino Comrol Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGL~A-2 Cab met Generator Buildim' Control Control Dk~cl Relay Loading Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD70AI

~DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator BuildinP Control Control Diesel Relay Loadmg Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator BuildinQ Control Engineered Safeguards Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA-2 Generator Relay Auxilinry Relay Cabinel Build in" Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Gcncrntor Buildino Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA-2 Cab met Generator Buildme Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I 2DGLSA-2 Cabinet Generator Build in~

Control Control Diesel Relay Blackout Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB-1 Cabinet Generator Buildino Conlrnl Undervoltage Relay Z-Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB-1 Generator Relay Phase Cabinet BuildinP Control Undervoltage Relay Y-Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB-I Generator Refoy Phase Cabinet Buildin*

Control Undcrvoltage Relay X-Control Diesel Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGLSB-I Generator Re lily Phase Cabinet Buildin2 Control Undcrvoltage Relay Control Diesel Relay

/Special Cutler-l*lnmmcr D26MRD30AI 2DGLSB-1 Cabinet Generator Buildin*

Conlrol Diesel Gcncrntor Restart Control Diesel Relay Relay Cutkr-Hnm111cr D26MRD40AI 2DGLSB-I Cab met Generator Buildinu l 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Parre 73 of94 Floor Component Evalunlion Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dern 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cnp>Dcm 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cnp>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem

No.

=

Device ID 260 2

AA{SABI) 261 2

AE{LTIR) 262 2

BE(SABR) 263 2

CD( LS BT) 264 2

DA(STIR) 265 2

DB(ST2B) 266 2

DC(ST3B) 267 2

DD{ST4B) 268 2

DE(ST5B) 269 2

DF(ST6B) 270 2

DG(ST7B) 271 2

DH(ST8B) 272 2

DJ(ST9B) 273 2

DK!STJOB)

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Systtm Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Control Control Diesel Relay Sequencer Actuation Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I 2DGLSB-2 Cab met Generntor Building Control Control Diesel Relay Logic Timer Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I 2DGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Sequencer Actuation Reloy Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI

'.DGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Timer Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Tuner Agastat SSCl2PAA 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Gencrntor Building Control Control Diesel Relay Comm1Ucd Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PAA ZDGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastat SSC12PBA

DGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Commilled Sequence Timer Agastat SSC12PBA 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Commllled Sequence Timer Agastm SSCl2PCA 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Comm med Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PCA 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agnstat SSCl2PDA 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PDA 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Commlllcd Sequence Timer Agastat SSCl2PDA 2DGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Build mi<

Control Control Diesel Relay Comm 1ttcd Sequence T1111~r Agastal SSCl2PEA

~DGLSB-2 Cab met Gcncrntor Building 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 74 of94 Floor Component Evaluation Ele\\*,

Basis for Evaluation (rt)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cnp>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem

No.

=

i Device ID 274 2

DL(STI IR) 275 2

DM(STl2B) 276 2

DN(STl3B) 277 2

FA(RBI) 278 2

FB(RBIA) 279 2

FC(RB2) 280 2

FD(RB3l 281 2

FE(RB4) 282 2

FF!RB5) 283 2

FG(RB6) 284 2

FH(R87) 285 2

FJ(RB8) 286 2

FK(RB9) 287 2

GA(RBIO)

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Control Control Diesel Rcl"Y Cornmined Sequence Timer Agaslat SSC12PMA 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Iluilding Control Control Diesel Relay Committed Sequence Timer Agastnt SSCl21'EA 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Commilled Sequence Timer Agastat SSC12PFA 2DGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Rday Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Rclny Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30Al 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Build in!!

Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Buildinu Control Cont1ol Diesel Relay Loading Rday Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al WGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Bmldmg Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI

'.DGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Load mg Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Gcncrnlor Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Load mg Relay Culler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Build mg Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI

'.DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Build mg l 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 75 of94 Floor Component Evaluation El""

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dein 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>D.:m

No.

=

Device ID 288 2

GB{RBll) 289 2

GC(RBl2) 290 2

GD(RBl3) 291 2

HA(2ESGBX I) 292 2

LSBl-4/4a(CA) 293 2

LSB3-l/la(CC) 294 2

LSB3-4/4a(CC) 295 2

GB(5!VX3) 296 2

GC(51VXI) 297 2

JA(51VX2) 298 2

GB(51VX3) 299 2

GC(51VXI) 300 2

JA(51VX2) 301 2

AA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Componenl Endosnrc Sys I cm Building Type Manufncturei*

l\\lodcl ID Ty pt Function Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Buildi1w Control Control Diesel Relay Lond ing Relay Cutlcr~J-fommcr D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Buildino Control Control Diesel Relay Loading Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Buildino Control Engineered Safeguards Contml Diesel Culler-Hammer D26MRD704A I 2DGLSB-2 Generator Relay Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Build in" Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Cutler-I-lammer D26MRD704A I 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Buildinl!

Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSB-2 Cabinet Generator Budd mo Control Control Diesel Relay Load Shed Cutler-1-lommcr D26MRD704A I 2DGLSB-2 Cab met Generator Buildino Contrul Voltage Controlled Terminal Diesel Relay Ovcrcurrent Auxilimy Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30AI 2EATCl4 Cabinet Generator Rclav Buildinll.

Control Voltage Controlled Terminal Diesel Relay Ovcrcurrent Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30AI 2EATCl4 Cabinet Generator Rel av Buildinll.

Control Voltage Controlled Terminal Diesel Relay Overcurrent Aux1h'1J}'

Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A 1 2EATCl4 Cabinet Generator Relav Building Control Voltage Controlled Terminal Diesel Relay Overcurrcnt Auxiliary Cutler-I-lammer D26MRD30Al 2EATCJ5 Cabinet Generator Relav Buildino Control Voltage Controlled Terminal Diesel Relay Overcurrent Auxil IOI)'

Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30Al 2EATCl5 Cabinet Generator Relay Buildino Control Voltage Controlled Terminal Diesel Relay Ovcrcurrenl Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A I 2EATCl5 Cab met Generator Relav Huildmr' Control Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D23MR40A 2EATC9 Tcm1mal Auxiliary Relay Cab met Building 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 76 of94 Floor Component Evaluation Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result 556 GERS Cap>Dcm 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap>Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dern 556 GERS Cap>Dcm 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 594 GERS Mitigation Strategies

No.

a Device ID 302 2

AE 303 2

CD 304 2

DD 305 2

K301 306 2

K301 307 2

K301 308 2

K301 309 2

CONJ 310 2

CR3 311 2

CR4 312 2

HB 313 2

JB 314 2

JC 315 2

Rt(DNSSTI)

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function Control Aux1hary Relay Cutler-Hammer D23MR40A 2EATC9 Terminal Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Control Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D23MR40A 2EATC9 Tcnnmal Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Control Auxilinry Relay Cutler-Hammer 023MR40A 2EATC9 Terminal J\\ux*11iary Relay Cabinet Building Control Ametek Control Auxiliary High DC Shunt Trip Relay (Solidslillc 07-740131-00 2ECA Relay Controls)

Cabinet Building Control Ametek Control Auxiliary High DC Shunt Trip Relay (Solidstalc 07-74013!-00 2ECB Relay Controls)

Cabinet Building Control Amc!ek Control Auxiliary High DC Shunt Trip Relay (Solidstate 07-740131-00 2ECC Relay Controls)

Cab met Building Control Ametek Control Auxiliary High DC Shunt Trip Relay (Soltdstatc 07-740131-00 2ECD Relay Controls)

Cnbmct Building Contactor Overspecd Trip Auxiliary Allen-Bradley 202-NXI I 2ELCP0245 Control Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building Control Ovcrspeed Trip Relay Agosta! (or Tyco) EGPD-003 or -004 2ELCP0245 Control Auxiliary Relay

{!423!76-6)

Cabinet Building Control Mechanical Overspcd Trip Agast'at (or Tyco) EGPD-003 or -004 2ELCP0245 Control Auxiliary Relay Relay

( 1423176-6)

Cabinet Building Control Control Diesel Relay Non-Emergency Tnp Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30AI 2ELCP0328 Cabinet Generator Building Control Control Diesel Relay Lo-La Lube Oil Trip Relay Cutlcr-liammcr D26MRD30A 2ELCP0328 Cabinet Generator Building Control Shutdown Cycle Seal-In Control Diesel Agastat E70 l 2PELL004 2ELCP0328 Generator Relay Timer Cabinet Building Process Conlrol Diesel Switch Overspced Relay Dynako SST-2400 2ELCP0328 Cabinet Generator Build mg 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 77 of94 Floor Component Evnhmtion Elev.

Basis for Evaluotion (ft)

Capacity Result 594 GERS Mitigation Strategics 594 GERS Mitigation Strategics 594 GERS Mitigation Strategies Catawba Mitigation 554 Report Strategies Catawba M1tigat1on 554 Report Strategies Catawba Mitigation 554 Report Strategies Catawba Mitigation 554 Report S!rateg1cs 543 GERS Mitigation Strategics 543 El'RI HF Cap> Dem Test 543 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Test 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem Caluwba 556 Report Cap> Dem

No.

a Device ID 316 2

R I( D B/SST2) 317 2

R3(DNSSTI) 318 2

R3(DB/SST2) 319 2

HB 320 2

JB 321 2

JC 322 2

Rl(DNSSTI) 323 2

Rl(DR/SST2) 324 2

R3(DNSST1) 325 2

R3(DB/SST2) 326 2

TM 1(2CAST5762) 327 2

52@2ELXA-04B 328 2

52(,1)2ELXA-04 C 329 2

52@2ELXA-06C SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Ty pr Manufacturer Modrl ID Ty pr Function Process Control Diesel Switch Overspccd Relay Dynalco SST-2400 2ELCP0328 Cabinet Generator Buildimr Process Control Diesel Switch Overspecd Relay Dynalco SST-2400 2ELCP0328 Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Dic-sel Switch Overspccd Rclny Dynalco SST-2400 2ELCP0328 Cabinet Gencrntor Building Control Control Diesel Relay Non-Emergency Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30Al 2ELCP0329 Cabinet Generator Buildine.

Control Control Diesel Relay Lo-Lo Lube 011 Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30A 2ELCP0329 Cabinet Generator Build mg Control Shutdown Cycle Seal-In Control Diesel Relay Timer Agastat E7012PELL004 2ELCPOJ29 Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Diesel Switch Overspecd Relay Dynalco SST-2400 2ELCP0329 Cabinet Generator Brnldme Process Control Diesel Switch Ovcrspccd Relay Dynalco SST-2400 2ELCP0329 Cabinet Generator Building Process Control Diesel Switch Ovcrspced Relay Dynalco SST-2400 2ELCP0329 Cabinet Generator Building Pro..:l!ss Control Diesel Switch Ovcrspccd Relay Dynako SST-2400 2ELCP0329 Cabinet Generator Building Process Ovcrspecd Trip Switch Dynalcu SST-2400AN-17 3 2ELCP0334 Control Auxiliary Switch Cabinet Build mg LV Circuit Normal Incoming Feeder ABB K2000-S 2ELXA Load Center Auxilinrv Breaker Breaker Building LVCircuit 2EMXA Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S 2ELXA Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Building LVCtrcun 2EMXE Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S 2ELXA Load Center Auxilrnry Breaker Build mg l6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 78 of94 Floor Componrnt Evaluation Eln'.

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result Catawba 556 Report Cap>Dcm Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem 556 GERS Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem Catawba 556 Report Cap>Dem Catawba 556 Report Cttp>Dcm Catawba 556 Report Cap> Dem 543 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 577 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 577 Catawba Cap>Dem Report 577 Catawba Cap> Dem Report

No.

Device ID 330 2

52@2ELXB-04B 331 2

52@2ELXB-04C 332 2

52@2ELXB-06C 333 2

52(£il2ELXC-04B 334 2

52@2ELXC-04C 335 2

52@2ELXD-04B 336 2

52@2ELXD-04C 337 2

M/C@2EMXB-R03C 338 2

M/0@2EMXC-F03C 339 2

M/0@2EMXD-F02C 340 2

M/0@2EMXD-F05A 341 2

M/C@2EMXE-FOIC SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function LY Circuit Normal Incoming Feeder ABB K2000-S 2ELXB Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Breaker Building LY Circuit 2EMXB Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S 2ELXB Load Center Auxiliary Brc:Jkcr Building LV Circuit 2EMXF Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S 2ELXB Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Building LV Circuit Normal Incoming Feeder ABB K1000-S 2ELXC Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Breaker Building LVCircuit 2EMXI Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S 2ELXC Loud Center Auxiliary Breaker Building LV Circuit Nonna! Incoming Feeder ABB K2000-S 2ELXD Land Center Auxiliary Breaker Breaker Building LV Circuit 2EMXJ Feeder Breaker ABB Kl600-S 2ELXD Load Center Auxiliary Breaker Building Tl3U03 l-76 Contact or Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXB MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-I Building Auxiliarv Contacts T13U03 l-76 Contactor Opcnmg Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXC MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-1 Building Auxiliarv Contacts T13U031-76 Contnctor Opening Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXD MCC Auxiliary or A 77-46396 7 A-I Building Auxiliarv Contacts Tl3U031-76 Contactor Opening Contactor Clark Contaetor/KTM-10 2EMXD MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-I Building Auxiliarv Contacts Tl3U031-76 Diesel Contaetor Closing Comactor Clark Contaetor/KTM-10 2EMXE MCC GcncrJtor or A77-463967A-1 Building Auxiliary Contacts 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 79 of94 Floor Component Evaluation Elev.

Basis.for E\\*alualion (ft)

Capacity Result 560 Catawba Cup> Dem Report 560 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 560 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 577 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 577 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 560 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 560 Catawba Cap> Dem Report 560 GERS Mitigation Strategics 577 GERS Mitigation Strategies 560 GERS Mitigation Strategics 560 GERS Mnigation Strategics 556 GERS Mitigation Strategics

No.. *c

i Drvicc ID 342 2

M/C@2EMXF-FO IC 343 2

M/C@2EMXK-F08B 344 2

M/C@2EMXL-F08A 345 2

M/0@2EMXL-FO I B 346 2

M/C@2EMXP-FOI B 347 2

M/Cri.~2EMXP-FOI D 348 2

M/C@2EMXS-F04A 349 2

M/Or~'2EMXS-FO ID 350 2

M/0@2EMXS-F02B 351 2

M/0@2EMXS-F06A 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function TIJUOJl-76 Diesel Contactor Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXF MCC Generator or A77-463967A-I Building Aux1lmrv Contacts TIJUOJl-76 Contactor Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-I 0 2EMXK MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-I Building Auxiliary Contacts Tl3U031-76 Contact or Closing Con tac tor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXL MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-1 Building Auxiliarv Contacts Tl3U03 l-76 Contact or Open mg Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXL MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-I Brnldmg Auxiliarv Contacts Tl 3U03 l-76 Nuclear Contaclor Clos mg Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXP MCC Service or A77-463967A-I Water Pump Auxiliary Contacts House Tl3U031-76 Nuclear Contactor Closing Contactur Clark C ontactor/K TM-I 0 2EMXP MCC Service or A77-463967A-I Water Pump Auxiliarv Contacts House Tl3U03 l-76 Comactor Closing Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXS MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-I Build mg Auxiliarv Contacts Tl3U03l-76 Cont actor Opening Contnctor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXS MCC Auxilrnry or A77-463967A-1 Build mg Auxiliarv Contacts TIJUOJ!-76 Contactor Opening Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXS MCC Auxiliary or A77-463967A-1 Butldmg Auxiliarv Contacts Tl3U031-76 Contact or Opening Conlactor Clork Contactor/KTM-1 U 2EMXS MCC Aux1hary or A77-463967A-1 Build mg Auxil1arv Contacts 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 80 of94 Floor Component Evalnution Elev.

Basis*for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity RcsuH 556 GERS Mitigation Strategics 577 GERS M1tigat1on Strategics 556 GERS Mitigation Strategics 556 GERS M1tigat1on Strategics 600 GERS M1t1gatmn Strategies 600 GERS M1t1gat1on Strategics 577 >

GERS Mitigation Strategics 577 GERS M1t1gat1on Strategics 577 GERS M1t1gallon Strategics 577 GERS Mmgation Strategics

No.

i Device ID 352 2

M/0@2EMXS-F06B 353 2

M/0@2EMXS-F06C 354 2

52@2ETA05 355 2

52@2ETAt4 356 2

52@2ETAt6 357 1

S2@1ETA18 358 2

52S(AF)rg/2ETA03 359 2

52S(AFJ@2ETA04 360 2

PA (51 V)@2ETAI &

361 2

PB(51V)@2ETAI&

362 2

PC (5tV}@2ETAl8 363 2

PD(62B)@2ETA03 364 2

52@2ETB05 365 2

52@2ETB14 SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Endosure System Building Type Manufnclnr<r Model ID Type Function TlJU03l-76 Contactor Opening Contactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2EMXS MCC Auxiliary or A 77-463967 A-1 Building Auxiliarv Contacts Tl3U03 l-76 Conlactor Opening Contaclllr Clark Contactor/KTM-l 0 2EMXS MCC Auxiliary or A 77-463967A-I Building Auxiliarv Contocts MV Circuit Feed to 2ETXA ABB SHK-250, 1200A 2ETA Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Building MVCircuit RN2PA Breaker ABB SHK-250, 1200A 2ETA Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Building MY Circuit Feed to 2ETXC ABB SHK-250, 1200A 2ETA Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Building MV CJTcuit Diesel Generator 2A Output ABB 51-IK-250, I 200A 2ETA Switchgear Auxiliarv Breaker Breaker Building MV Circuit Normal Feeder Breaker ABB 700038-KO l or 2ETA Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker 700038-KS I Building MVCircuit Standby Feeder Breaker ABB 700038-KO I or 2ETA Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker 700038-KSI Building Prolcctil'c Voltage Ccmtrollcd Auxiliary Overcurrcnt Protection V..1cstinghouse COV-8 ( 1876244) 2ETA Switchgear Relay Relay Building Protective Voltage Controlled Auxiliary Overcurrent Protection Westmghouse COV-8 ( 1876244) 2ETA Switchgear Relay Rcluv Building Protective Voltage Controlled Auxiliary Overcurrent Protection Westinghouse COV-8 (1876244)

ZETA Switchgear Relay Rel av Building Control SAM Auxiliary Breaker Failure Timer Gencrnl Electric (12SAMllA21A-2ETA Switchgear Relay Sl Building MV Circuit Feed to 2ETXB ABB SHK-250, 1200A 2ETB Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Building MVCircuit RN2PB Breaker ABB 51-IK-250, 1200A 2ETB Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker Building

-1 I

16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 81 of94 Floor Component Evaluation Elev.

Basis for Evaluulion (ft)

Capncily Resull 577 GERS Mitigation Strategies 577 GERS Mitigation Strategics 577 EPRI HF Cap> Dem Test 577 EPRJHF Cap> Dem Test 577 EPRJHF Cap>Dcm Test 577 EPRJHF Cap> Dem Test 577 EPRIHF Cap>Dem Test 577 EPRI HF Cap> Dem Test Mitigation 577 SQURTS Strategics Mitigation 577 SQURTS Stralegics fVJitigation 577 SQURTS Strategies Mitigation 577 GERS Strntegics 560 EPRJHF Cap>Dcm T~st 560 EPRJ HF Cap>Dem Test

=

No.

c Device ID 366 2

52@2ETBl6 367 2

52@2ETBl8 368 2

52S( AF)@2ETB03 369 2

52S(AF)@2ETB04 370 2

l'A(5!V)@~ETBl8 371 2

PB(51V)@2ETBl8 372 2

PC(51V)@2ETBl8 373 2

PDl628)@2ETB03 374 2

M/C@2MXW-F04D SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure System Building Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Fundion MVCircmt Feed to 2ETXD ABB SHK-250. l200A 2EIB Switchgear Auxiliary Brcukcr Building MV Circuit Diesel Generator I B Output ABB SHK-250, 1200A 2ETB Switchgear Auxiliary Arl!'Jkcr Breaker Building MY Circuit Normal Feeder Breaker ABB 700038-KO l or 2ETB Switchgear Auxdmry Breaker 700038-K51 Building MVCircuit Standby Feeder Breaker ABB 700038-KO 1 or 2ETB Switchgear Auxiliary Breaker 700038-KS!

Building Prolect1vc V ollage Controlled Auxiliary Ovcrcurrcnl Protection Westinghouse COV-8 ( 1876244) 2ETB Switchgear Relay Rel av Build mg Prolcctivc Voltage Controlled Auxiliary Ovcrcurrcnt Prolcction Westinghouse COV-8 ( 1876244) 2ETB Switchgear Relay Relay Butlding Prolectivc Voltage Controlled Auxiliary Overcurrcnl Protection Wes1inghousc COV-8 ( 1876244) 2ETB Switchgear Relay Rclav Building Control SAM Auxiliary Breaker Failure Timer Gcncml Electric (12SAM! IA21A-2ETB Swnchgcar Relay Sl Build mg T!3U031-76 Contact or Closing Cuntactor Clark Contactor/KTM-10 2MXW MCC Turbine or A77-463967A-I Build mg Auxiharv Contacts l6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 82 of94 Floor Component Evaluntion Elev.

Basis for Evaluation (ft)

Capacity Result 560 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Tcs1 560 EPRIHF Cap> Dem Test 560 EPRI I-IF Cap> Dem Test 560 EPR!HF Cap> Dem Test M1t1gat1on 560 SQURTS Strntcgics M1ligat10n 560 SQURTS Strntcgics Mitigation 560 SQURTS S1rn1cg1cs Mitigation 560 GERS Strategics 568 GERS Mit1gat1on Stralcgics

~-

50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

~

Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station l 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 83 of94 Table B-2: Rugged Solid-State Components Screened from High Frequency Confirmation Device ID Enclosure Function Make Model Reference FAA

!ELCC0034 Digital Optical Isolator E-Max DOl-175C!45 or

[222, 223]

D0!-175C!80 FM3 IELCC0034 Digital Optical Isolator E-Max D0l-175C145 or

[222, 223]

D0!-175C180 FWI IELCC0034 Digital Optical Isolator E-Max D0!-175C145 or (222, 223]

DOl-175C180 FX2

!ELCC0034 Digital Optical Isolator E-Max D01-l 75C!45 or

[222, 223]

D01-175Cl80 FY3 I ELCC0034 Digital Optical Isolator E-Max DO!-l 75C145 or (222, 223]

DOI-175C!80 PA(51G)(£il!ETA03 IETA Ground Overcurrent

!TE SID (22356140) 2241 PB(S I )(£il!ETA03 IETA Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 I) 2241 PA(SI G)(£il!ETA04

!ETA Ground Overcurrent

!TE 51 D (22356140) 2241 PB(S l )021 ETA04

!ETA Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 l) 2241 PA(SOG)(a}IETAOS

!ETA Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D6141 UL) 2251 PB(S0/51 )@I ETAOS

!ETA Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 l) 2241 PA(SOG)(a)l ETA 14

!ETA Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D6141UL) 2251 PB(S0/51)(@.l ETA 14 IETA Timed Ovl!rcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 J l 12241 PA(50G)(£ill ETA 16 IETA Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D6 l 4 l UL) 12251 PB(50/5I)(alIETA16

!ETA Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 I l 12241 87G@IETAl9

!ETA Generator Differential Westinghouse SA-1 (290B225A I 0) 12261 PA(S I Q)Uil.! ETB03 IETB Ground Overcurrent ITE SID (223S6140) 12241 PB(S l )(aj I ETB03 IETB Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 I l 12241 PA(S l G)(a}I ETB04 IETB Ground Overcurrent

!TE 510 (22356140) 12241 PB(5 l )(aj I ETB04 IETB Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 l) 2241 PA(50G)(aJ!ETB05 IETB Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D6 l 41 UL) r1251 PB(S0/51 )({ill ETBOS

!ETB Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 I) 12241 PA(SOG)(a} I ETB 14 IETB Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D6141UL) 2251 PB(S0/51 )({ill ETB 14

!ETB Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51Y (223T234l) 2241 PA(50G)(a} I ETB l 6

!ETB Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D6141UL) 2251 PB(S0/51 )@I ETB 16 IETB Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51Y (223T234ll 2241 87G(a)l ETB 19

!ETB Generator Differential Westinghouse 5A-l (290B225A I 0)

[2261 FAA 2ELCC0034 Digital Optical Isolator E-Max D0!-175C155 or

[222, 223]

DOl-17SCl80 FM3 2ELCC0034 Digital Ootical Isolator E-Max DOI-!75Cl80 2231 FWI 2ELCC0034 Digital Optical Isolator E-Max DOI-175Cl45 or

[222, 223]

DOI-175C180 FX2 2ELCC0034 Digital Optical Isolator E-Max

. D0!-175Cl45 or

[222, 223]

DOI-175Cl80 FY3 2ELCC0034 Digital Optical Isolator E-Max DO!-l 75Cl45 or (222, 223]

D0!-175C!80 PA(51G)@2ETA03 2ETA Ground Overcurrent

!TE SID (22356140) 2241 PB(5 l )@2ET A03 2ETA Timed Overcurrent

!TE S l Y (223T234 l) 2241 PA(51 G)@2ETA04 2ETA Ground Overcurrent

!TE SID (22356140) 12241 PB(51 \\@2ET A04 2ETA Timed Overcurrent

!TE SJY (223T2341) 12241 PA(50G)@2ETA05 2ETA Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D614 l UL) r12s1 PB(S0/51 )(aJ.2ETA05 2ETA Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T2341) r1241 PA(50G)@2ETAl4 2ETA Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D6141UL) r12s1 PB(S0/51)@2ETA14 2ETA Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 y (223T234 l)

[2241 PA(50G)@2ETA16 2ETA Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D6141UL) rz2s1

Page 84 of94

~-

50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

~

Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station I 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Table B-2: Rugged Solid-State Components Screened from High Frequency Confirmation Device ID Enclosure Function Make Model Reference PB(50/5I)(@,2ETA16 2ETA Timed Overcurrent ITE 51 Y (223T234 l) 2241 87G(@.2ETA 19 2ETA Generator Differential Westinghouse SA-1 (290B225A I 0) 2261 P A(5 l G )(@,2ETB03 2ETB Ground Overcurrent ITE 510 (223S6140) 2241 PB(5 I )(@,2ETB03 2ETB Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 I) 2241 PA(5 IG)(@,2ETB04 2ETB Ground Overcurrent ITE 510 (223S6140) 2241 PB(S l )@2ETB04 2ETB Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 I) 2241 PA(50G)(@,2ETB05 2ETB Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D6141UL) 2251 PB(50/5 I )@2ETB05 2ETB Timed Overcurrent ITE 51 Y (223T234 I) 2241 PA(50G)@2ETB 14 2ETB Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (202D6141UL) 2251 PB(S0/51)(@,2ETB14 2ETB Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 I) 2241 PA(50G)@2ETB 16 2ETB Ground Overcurrent

!TE GR-5 (2020614 I UL) r22s1 PB(50/5I)(@,2ETB16 2ETB Timed Overcurrent

!TE 51 Y (223T234 l)

[2241 87G(@.2ETB 19 2ETB Generator Differential Westinghouse SA-I (290B225A I 0)

[2261

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station

!6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 85 of94 Table B-3: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Valve ID P&ID Comment Evaluation Needed Unit 1 INC4 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INCS CN-1553-01.00 [227)

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 1NC6 CN-1553-01.00 [227)

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INCJ3 CN-1553-0 l.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 1NCl4 CN-1553-01.00 [227)

Packless Manual Valve Normally Open; No Relays No INCl9 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INC20 CN-1553-01.00 [227)

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INC23 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Open; Both sides of the No Head Gasket would have to Fail and there are no Relays INC24 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed; Both sides of the No Head Gasket would have to Fail and there are no Relays 1NC25A CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Valve Normally Open; Both sides of the Head Gasket would No have lo Fail 1NC26 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INC37 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Open; No Relays No 1NC94 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INC95 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INCI06 CN-1553-0 l.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No JNClll CN-1553-0 l.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No JNCl12 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Open; No Relays No 1NCI13 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INCll5 CN-1553-01.00 [227)

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed; No Relays No INC234 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INC235 CN-1553-01.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INC261 CN-1553-01.00 [227)

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INC298 CN-1553-0 l.00 [227)

Manual Valve Normally Closed No INC311 CN-1553-0 l.00 [227]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INCi CN-1553-01.0 l [ 16]

Relief Valve Yes 1NC2 CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Relief Valve Yes 1NC3 CN-1553-01.0 I [ 16]

Relief Valve Yes INC27 CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Packless Air Valve Failed Closed Yes 1NC28 CN-1553-01.01 [16)

Manual Valve Normally Throttled with a 3/8" Reducing No Orifice Down Stream INC29 CN-1553-01.01 [ 16)

Packless Air Valve Failed Closed Yes INC30 CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Manual Valve Normally Throttled with a 3/8" Reducing No Orifice Down Stream INC31B CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Valve Normally Open; Would only be a potential if 32B fails Potential to stay closed INC32B CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Piston Valve Failed Closed Yes INC33A CN-1553-01.01 [16)

Valve Normally Open; Would only be a potential if34A fails Potential to stay closed

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 86 of94 Table B-3: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Valve ID P&ID Comment Evaluation Needed 1NC34A CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Piston Valve Failed Closed Yes INC35B CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Valve Normally Open; Would only be a potential if368 fails Potential to stay closed INC368 CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Piston Valve Failed Closed Yes INC108 CN-1553-01.0 I [16)

Manual Valve Normally Closed No 1NC223 CN-1553-01.0 l [16]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INC226 CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INC250A CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Failed Closed Valve Yes 1NC2518 CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Potentially only if 1NC250A Fails to close Potential 1NC252B CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Normally Closed Valve depowered No INC253A CN-1553-01.01 [16]

Normally Closed Valve depowered No 1NC300 CN-1553-01.0 l [16]

Normally Closed Manual Valve No 1NV1A CN-1554-01.00 [228]

Piston Valve Failed Closed Yes 1NV2A CN-1554-01.00 l228]

Piston Valve Failed Closed; Potential only if INV I A foils to Potential close 1NV34 CN-1554-01.00 [228]

Packless Check Valve Operator No INV38 CN-1554-01.00 [228]

Packless Check Valve Operator No 1NV41 CN-1 554-01.00 [228)

Packless Check Valve Operator No 1NVl228 CN-1554-0 I.DO [228)

Piston Valve Failed Closed Yes INVl23B CN-1554-0 I.OD [228]

Piston Valve Failed Closed; Potential only if INV 1228 fails to Potential close 1NV49 CN-1554-01.05 [229]

Simple Check Valve No Fail Open Air Operated Valve. Operators will manually INV52A CN-1554-01.05 [229]

isolate if there is a loss of offsite power.' Otherwise the seal Yes package is functioning and is not an RCS leak path.

INV60 CN-1554-0 1.05 [229)

Simple Check Valve No Fail Open Air Operated Valve. Operators will manually 1NV638 CN-1554-0 I.05 [229]

isolate if there is a loss ofoffsite power.' Otherwise the seal Yes package is functioning and is not an RCS leak path.

1NV71 CN-1554-01.05 [229]

Simple Check Valve No Fail Open Air Operated Valve. Operators will manually 1NV74A CN-1554-01.05 [229]

isolate if there is a loss ofoftSite power.'* Otherwise the seal Yes package is functioning and is not an RCS leak path.

INV82 CN-1554-01.05 [229]

Simple Check Valve No Fail Open Air Operated Valve. Operators will manually INV85B CN-1554-01.05 [229]

isolate if there is a loss ofoffsite power.'* Otherwise the seal Yes package is functioning and is not an RCS leak path.

INDIB CN-1561-01.00 [230]

MOY Valve Normally Closed Yes 1ND2A CN-1561-01.00 [230]

MOY Valve Normally Closed; Potential only if INDOO 1 B Potential fai Is to close 1ND4 CN-1561-01.00 [230]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No

'This operator action is performed in accordance with procedure AP-l-A-5500-008 [267].

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station l 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 87 of94 Table B-3: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Valve ID P&ID Comment Evaluation Needed IND! 10 CN-1561-01.00 [230]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 1NDl16 CN-1561-01.00 [230]

Simple Check Valve No IND36B CN-1561-01.0 l [23 l]

MOY Valve Normally Closed Yes IND37A CN-1561-01.0 I [231]

MOY Valve Normally Closed; Potential only if 1ND36B fails Potential to close 1ND39 CN-1561-01.01 [231]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No lNDlll CN-1561-01.01 [231]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 1NDll7 CN-1561-01.01 [231]

Simple Check Valve No IN115 CN-1562-01.00 [232]

Packless Check Valve Operator No IN!l7 CN-1562-01.00 [232]

Packless Check Valve Operator No 1Nil9 CN-1562-01.00 (232]

Packless Check Valve Operator No INI21 CN-1562-01.00 [232]

Packless Check Valve Operator No 1Nl60 CN-1562-01.0 I (233]

Simple Check Valve No INl71 CN-1562-01.0 I (233]

Simple Check Valve No INl82 CN-1562-0LOl [233]

Simple Check Valve No INl94 CN-1562-01.0 I (233]

Simple Check Valve No lNl391 CN-1562-01.0l [233]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No lN1392 CN-l 562-01.0 l (233]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No lNl393 CN-1562-01.01 [233]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No lN1394 CN-1562-0 l.O I [233]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No 1Nll26 CN-1562-01.02 [234]

Simple Check Valve No IN1134 CN-I 562-01.02 [234]

Simple Check Valve No 1Nll57 CN-1562-01.02 [234]

Simple Check Valve No 1Nll60 CN-1562-01.02 (234]

Simple Check Valve No INJ395 CN-1562-01.02 [234]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No 1Nl396 CN-1562-01.02 (234]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No lNl397 CN-1562-01.02 [234]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No 1N1398 CN-1562-01.02 (234]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No lNM2 CN-1572-01.00 [235]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No lNM3A CN-1572-01.00 (235]

Valve Normally Open Yes INM5 CN-1572-01.00 (235]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INM6A CN-1572-01.00 [23 5]

Valve Normally Closed Yes lNM21 CN-1572-01.00 [235)

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No lNM022A CN-1572-01.00 (235]

Valve Normally Open Yes 1NM24 CN-1572-01.00 [235]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No INM025A CN-1572-01.00 [235]

Valve Normally Closed Yes 1NM424 CN-1572-01.00 [235]

Simple Check Valve No 1NM425 CN-1572-01.00 [235]

Simple Check Valve No INM490 CN-1572-01.00 [235]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No Unit 2 2NC4 CN-2553-01.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No

~A 50.54(f) NTTF 2. I Seismic High Frequency

~

Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 88 of94 Table B-3: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Valve ID P&ID Comment Evaluation Needed 2NC5 CN-2553-01.00 (236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC6 CN-2553-D I.DO [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NCl3 CN-2553-D I.DO [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NCl4 CN-2553-D 1.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Open; No Relays No 2NCl9 CN-2553-Dl.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC20 CN-2553-D l.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC23A CN-2553-01.0D (236]

Air Operated Valve Normally Open; Both sides of the Head No Gasket would have to Fail 2NC24A CN-2553-D 1.00 [236]

Air Operated Valve Normally Open; Both sides of the Head No Gasket would have to Fail 2NC25A CN-2553-DI.00 [236]

Air Operated Valve Normally Open; Both sides of the Head No Gasket would have to Fail 2NC26 CN-2553-Dl.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC37 CN-2553-0 I.DO [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Open; No Relays No 2NC94 CN-2553-D I.DO [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC95 CN-2553-01.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC106 CN-2553-D 1.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NClll CN-2553-DI.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NCI 12 CN-2553-01.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Open; No Relays No 2NCI 13 CN-2553-01.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NCI 15 CN-2553-0 l.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed; No Relays No 2NC234 CN-2553-01.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC235 CN-2553-0 l.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC261 CN-2553-D 1.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC298 CN-2553-DI.00 (236]

Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC311 CN-2553-01.00 [236]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NCI CN-2553-01.0l [17)

Relief Valve Yes 2NC2 CN-2553-Dl.OI [17]

Relief Valve Yes 2NC3 CN-2553-Dl.OI [17)

Relief Valve Yes 2NC27 CN-2553-Dl.OI (17]

Packless Air Valve Failed Closed Yes 2NC28 CN-2553-01.0J (17)

Manual Valve Normally Throttled with a 3/8" Reducing No Orifice Down Stream 2NC29 CN-2553-01.01 [17]

Packless Air Valve Failed Closed Yes 2NC30 CN-2553-01.01 [17]

Manual Valve Normally Throttled with a 3/8" Reducing No Orifice Down Stream 2NC31B CN-2553-01.01 (17]

Valve Normally Open; Would only be a potential if32B fails. Potential to stay closed 2NC32B CN-2553-01.0 I [ 17]

Piston Valve Failed Closed Yes 2NC33A CN-2553-Dl.OJ (17]

Valve Normally Open; Would only be a potential if34A fails Potential to stay closed 2NC34A CN-2553-D l.O I [ 17]

Piston Valve Failed Closed Yes

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 89 of94 Table B-3: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Valve ID P&ID Comment Evaluation Needed 2NC35B CN-2553-01.01 [17]

Valve Normally Open; Would only be a potential if 36B fails Potential to stay closed 2NC36B CN-2553-01.01 [17]

Piston Valve Failed Closed Yes 2NC108 CN-2553-01.01 [17]

Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC223 CN-2553-01.01 (17]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC226 CN-2553-0l.O1 ( 17]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC250A CN-2553-01.01 (17]

Failed Closed Valve Yes 2NC251B CN-2553-01.01 [ 17]

Potentially only if I NC250A Fails to close Potential 2NC252B CN-2553-01.01 [ 17]

Normally Closed Valve depowered No 2NC253A CN-2553-01.0 I [ 17]

Normally Closed Valve depowered No 2NC300 CN-2553-0l.O1 [ 17]

Normally Closed Manual Valve No 2NVlA CN-2554-01.00 (23 7]

Piston Valve Failed Closed Yes 2NV2A CN-2554-01.00 [23 7]

Piston Valve Failed Closed; Potential only if INV l A fails to Potential close 2NV34 CN-2554-0 l.00 [237]

Packless Check Valve Operator No 2NV38 CN-2554-01.00 (237]

Packless Check Valve Operator No 2NV4l CN-2554-01.00 (237]

Packless Check Valve Operator No 2NV122B CN-2554-01.00 [23 7]

Piston Valve Failed Closed Yes 2NV123B CN-2554-0 l.00 (237]

Piston Valve Failed Closed; Potential only if2NV122B fails to Potential close 2NV49 CN-2554-01.05 (238]

Simple Check Valve No Fail Open Air Operated Valve. Operators will manually 2NV52A CN-2554-0 l.05 [238]

isolate if there is a loss ofoffsite power.'"' Otherwise the seal Yes package is functioning and is not an RCS leak path.

2NV60 CN-2554-01.05 [238]

Simple Check Valve No Fail Open Air Operated Valve. Operators will manually 2NV63B CN-25 54-0 l.05 (23 8]

isolate if there is a loss ofoffsite power."; Otherwise the seal Yes package is functioning and is not an RCS leak path.

2NV7l CN-2554-01.05 [23 8]

Simple Check Valve No Fail Open Air Operated Valve. Operators will manually 2NV74A CN-2554-01.05 [23 8]

isolate if there is a loss ofoffsite power.'*i Otherwise the seal Yes package is functioning and is not an RCS leak path.

2NV82 CN-2554-01.05 [238]

Simple Check Valve No Fail Open Air Operated Valve. Operators will manually 2NVS5B CN-2554-01.05 [238]

isolate if there is a loss of offsite power."; Otherwise the seal Yes package is functioning and is not an RCS leak path.

2NDIB CN-2561-01.00 [239]

MOY Valve Normally Closed Yes 2ND2A CN-2561-01.00 [23 9]

MOY Valve Normally Closed; Potential only if 2NDOO 1 B Potential fails to close 2ND4 CN-2561-01.00 [239]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NDl 10 CN-2561-01.00 (239]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No

This operator action is performed in accordance with procedure AP-2-A-5500-008 [266].

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station I 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 90 of94 Table B-3: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Valve ID P&ID Comment Evaluation Needed 2NDI 16 CN-2561-0 l.00 [239]

Simple Check Valve No 2ND36B CN-2561-01.0 I [240]

MOY Valve Normally Closed Yes 2ND37A CN-2561-01.01 [240]

MOY Valve Normally Closed; Potential only if2ND368 fails Potential to close 2ND39 CN-2561-0 l.O I [240]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NDlll CN-2561-01.0 I [240]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2ND117 CN-2561-01.01 [240]

Simple Check Valve No 2NI!S CN-2562-01.00 [241]

Packless Check Valve Operator No 2Nll7 CN-2562-0 l.00 [241]

Packless Check Valve Operator No 2Nll9 CN-2562-01.00 [241]

Packless Check Valve Operator No 2Nl21 CN-2562-01.00 [241]

Packless Check Valve Operator No 2Nl60 CN-2562-0l.O1 [242]

Simple Check Valve No 2Nl71 CN-2562-01.0 I [242]

Simple Check Valve No 2Nl82 CN-2562-01.0 I [242]

Simple Check Valve No 2Nl94 CN-2562-01.01 [242]

Simple Check Valve No 2Nl391 CN-2562-0 l.O I [242]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orilice upstream No 2Nl392 CN-2562-01.01 [242]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No 2Nl393 CN-2562-01.01 [242]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No 2Nl394 CN-2562-01.0 I [242]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No 2N1126 CN-2562-01.02 [243]

Simple Check Valve No 2Nll34 CN-2562-0 I.02 [243]

Simple Check Valve No 2Nll57 CN-2562-01.02 [243]

Simple Check Valve No 2Nl160 CN-2562-01.02 [243)

Simple Check Valve No 2Nl395 CN-2562-01.02 [243]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No 2NI396 CN-2562-01.02 [243]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No 2NI397 CN-2562-01.02 [243]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No 2NI398 CN-2562-0 I.02 [243]

Not considered a leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream No 2NM2 CN-2572-0 l.00 [244]

Pack!ess Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NM3A CN-2572-01.00 [244]

Valve Normally Closed Yes 2NM5 CN-2572-0 I.00 [244]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NM6A CN-2572-01.00 [244]

Valve Normally Closed Yes 2NM21 CN-2572-01.00 [244]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NM022A CN-2572-01.00 [244]

Valve Normally Open Yes 2NM24 CN-2572-01.00 [244]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NM025A CN-2572-0 l.00 [244]

Valve Normally Closed Yes 2NM424 CN-2572-0 l.00 [244]

Simple Check Valve No 2NM425 CN-2572-01.00 [244]

Simple Check Valve No 2NM465 CN-2572-01.00 [244]

Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No

~-

50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

¥J4. Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station Page 91 of94 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Table B-4: Core Cooling Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation I Component I Description I

Reference i

Unit 1 ICA2 Hotwell Suction Isolation CN-1592-01.00 [245]

ICA4 Upper Surge Tank Isolation CN-1592-01.00 [245]

ICA7A TDAFW Pump Suction Isolation CN-1592-01.00 [245]

ICA36 CA Pump to SIG D Flow Control CN-1592-01.01 [73]

ICA38A CA Pump to SIG D Isolation CN-1592-01.01 r73l ICA48 CA Pump to SIG C Flow Control CN-1592-01.01 P31 ICA50A CA Pump to SIG C Isolation CN-1592-01.01 r73l ICA52 CA Pump to SIG B Flow Control CN-1592-01.0 I [731 ICA54B CA Pump to SIG B Isolation CN-1592-01.01 r731 ICA64 CA Pump to SIG A Flow Control CN-1592-01.0 I r73l ICA66B CA Pump to SIG A Isolation CN-1592-01.01 f73l ISA2 Stearn Supply to CA Pump CN-1593-01.01 r246l ISA5 Steam Supply to CA Pump CN-1593-01.0 I f246l ISAl45 Trip and Throttle Valve CN-1593-01.0 I [2461 Unit 2 2CA2 AFW Holwell Suction Isolation CN-2592-01.00 [247]

2CA4 Upper Surge Tank Isolation CN-2592-01.00 [24 7]

2CA7A TDAFW Pump Suction Isolation CN-2592-01.00 r247]

2CA36 CA Pump to SIG D Flow Control CN-2592-01.0 I [248]

2CA38A CA Pump to S/G D Isolation CN-2592-01.0 I [248]

2CA48 CA Pump to S/G C Flow Control CN-2592-0 I.0 I \\2481 2CA50A CA Pump to SIG C Isolation CN-2592-01.0 I [248]

2CA52 CA Pump to S/G B Flow Control CN-2592-01.0 I [2481 2CA54B CA Pump to SIG B Isolation CN-2592-01.0 I [248]

2CA64 CA Pump to S/G A Flow Control CN-2592-01.0 I [2481 2CA66B CA Pump to S/G A Isolation CN-2592-01.0 I [248]

2SA2 Stearn Supplv to CA Pumo CN-2593-01.0 I [2491 2SA5 Steam Suoolv to CA Pumo CN-2593-01.0 I [2491 2SAl45 Trio and Throttle Valve CN-2593-01.0 I [2491

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station 16C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 92 of94 Table B-5: Electrical Power Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Description Drawing Function Unit 1 EDGIA IA Diesel Generator CN-1702-02.0 I [2501 Provides Emergency Power Source EDGIB I B Diesel Generator CN-1702-02.02 r25 l l Provides Emergency Power Source IETAl4 NSW Pump IRNIPA Breaker CN-1702-02.0 I [2501 EOG Cooling Water IETAl8 EOG I A Output Breaker CN-1702-02.0 I [2501 Connect EOG to 4KV ESF Bus

!ETAS Feed to I ETXA CN-1702-02.0 I f250l ESF Bus to 4KV/600V Transformer IETA16 Feed to I ETXC CN-1702-02.0 I [2501 ESF Bus to 4KY/600V Transformer IETBl4 NSW Pump IRNIPB Breaker CN-1702-02.02 [25 ll EOG Cooling Water IETBl8 EOG I B Output Breaker CN-1702-02.02 [251 l Connect EDG to 4KV ESF Bus IETBS Feed to I ETXB CN-1102-02.02 r15 I l ESF Bus to 4KV/600V Transformer IETB16 Feed to IETXD CN-1102-02.02 r1511 ESF Bus to 4KV/600V Transformer IELXA-048 Normal Incoming Feed Breaker CN-1703-01.0 I [252] I ETXA Transformer to 1 ELXA Bus 1ELXA-04C I EMXA Feed Breaker CN-1703-01.01 [252] 1 ELXA to MCC I EMXA IELXA-06C l EMXE Feed Breaker CN-1703-01.0 I [252] I ELXA to MCC I EMXE IELXC-048 Normal Incoming Peed Breaker CN-1703-0 1.0 I [252] I ETXC Transformer to I ELXC Bus IELXC-04C I EMXI Feed Breaker CN-1703-01.01 [252] IELXC to MCC !EMXI IELXB-04B Normal lncomin_g Feed Breaker CN-1703-0 1.02 r253l I ETXB Transformer to l ELXB Bus

!ELXB-04C l EMXB Feed Breaker CN-1703-01.02 [253) I ELXB to MCC l EMXB 1ELXB-06C I EMXF Feed Breaker CN-1703-01.02 [253] l ELXB to MCC 1 EMXF IELXD-048 Normal Incoming Feed Breaker CN-1703-01.02 [253] I ETXD Transformer to l ELXD Bus IELXD-04C I EMXJ Feed Breaker CN-1703-01.02 [253) I ELXD to MCC I EMXJ

!EIA ISKVA Yitai Inverter CN-1705-01.02 [2541 !25VDC to 125VAC IEJB ISKVA Yitai Inverter CN-1705-01.02 [254] !25VDC to 125VAC

!EiC

!5KVA Yitai Inverter CN-1705-01.02 [254] !25VDC to 125VAC

!EID 15KVA Vital Inverter CN-1705-0 l.02 [254) l 25VDC to I 25V AC

!ECA Vital Batterv Charger CN-1705-01.01 [1271 Batterv l EBA Charger IECC Vital Battery Charger CN-1705-0l.Ol r1271 Battery I EBC Charger

!DGCA DG Battery Charger CN-1705-04.0l [2551 Battery IDGBA Charger

!ECB Vital Battery Charger CN-1705-01.01 r127l Battery !EBB Charger IECD Vital Battery Charger CN-1705-01.01 [!271 Battery I EBO Charger IDGCB DG Batterv Charger CN-1705-04.0 l f25 51 Batterv l DOBB Charger IRNIA RN Pumphouse Pit A Isolation CN-1574-0 I.DO f 1481 NSW Suction

!RN2B RN Pumphouse Pit A Isolation cN-1574-01.00 rr4sl NSW Suction 1RN5A RN Pumphouse Pit B Isolation CN-1574-01.00 [!481 NSW Suction

!RN6B RN Pumphouse Pit B Isolation CN-1574-01.00 [1481 NSW Suction

!RNllA RN Pump Motor Cooler Isolation CN-1574-01.00 f 148] NSW Discharge

!RN20B RN Pump Motor Cooler Isolation CN-1574-01.02 r1491 NSW Discharge IRN28A RN Pump Discharge Isolation CN-1574-01.00 rl481 NSW Discharge IRN38B RN Pump Discharge Isolation CN-1574-01.02 [1491 NSW Discharge IRN232A Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water CN-1574-02.01 [256] DG Cooling Cooler RN Supply Isolation IRN292B Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water CN-1574-02.05 [257] DG Cooling Cooler RN Supply Isolation

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station l 6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 93 of94 Table B-5: Electrical Power Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Description Drawin2 Function IRN847A DSL GEN l A Heat Exchanger Return CN-1574-02.01 [256] NSW Return to Lake IRN849B DSL GEN IB Heat Exchanger Return CN-1574-02.05 [257] NSW Return to Lake Unit 2 EDG2A 2A Diesel Generator cN-2102-02.01 rz5 s1 Provides Emergency Power Source EDG2B 2B Diesel Generator CN-2702-02.02 r2591 Provides Emergency Power Source 2ETAl4 NSW Pump 2RNI PA Breaker CN-2102-02.01 rz5s1 EOG Cooling Water 2ETA18 EOG 2A Output Breaker CN-2702-02.0 I [2581 Connect EOG to 4KV ESF Bus 2ETA5 Feed to 2ETXA CN-2702-02.0 I [2581 ESF Bus to 4KV/600V Transformer 2ETAl6 Feed to 2ETXC CN-2702-02.0 l [25 81 ESF Bus to 4KV/600V Transformer 2ETB14 NSW Pumo 2RNIPB Breaker CN-2702-02.02 [2591 EDG Cooling Water 2ETBl8 EOG 2B Outout Breaker CN-2102-02.02 r159l Connect EOG to 4KV ESF Bus 2ETB5 Feed to 2ETXB CN-2702-02.02 r259l ESF Bus to 4KV/600v Transformer 2ETBl6 Feed to 2ETXD CN-2702-02.02 [2591 ESF Bus to 4kv/600v Transformer 2ELXA-U4B Normal Incoming Feed Breaker CN-2703-01.0 I [260] 2FTXA Transformer to 2ELXA Bus 2ELXA-04C 2EMXA Feed Breaker CN-2703-01.0 I [260] 2ELXA to MCC 2EMXA 2ELXA-06C 2EMXE Feed Breaker CN-2703-01.0 I [260] 2ELXA to MCC 2EMXE 2ELXC-04B Normal Incoming Feed Breaker CN-2703-01.0 I [260] 2ETXC Transformer to 2ELXC Bus 2ELXC-04C 2EMXI Feed Breaker CN-2703-01.0 I [260] 2ELXC to MCC 2EMXI 2ELXB-04B Normal Incoming Feed Breaker CN-2703-01.02 [261] 2ETXB Transformer to 2ELXB Bus 2ELXB-04C 2EMXB Feed Breaker CN-2703-01.02 [261] 2ELXB to MCC 2EMXB 2ELXB-06C 2EMXF Feed Breaker CN-2703-01.02 [261] 2ELXB to MCC 2EMXF 2ELXD-04B Normal Incoming Feed Breaker CN-2703-01.02 [261] 2ETXD Transformer to 2ELXD Bus 2ELXD-04C 2EMXJ Feed Breaker CN-2703-01.02 [261] 2ELXD to MCC 2EMXJ 2EIA 15KVA Vital Inverter CN-2705-01.02 r262l I25VDC to 125VAC 2EIB ISKVA Vital Inverter CN-2705-01.02 [262] 125VDC to 125VAC 2EIC 15KVA Vital Inverter CN-2705-0 I.02 [262] !25VDCto 125VAC 2EID 15KVA Vital Inverter CN-2705-0 I.02 [262] 125VDC to 125VAC 2ECA Vital Battery Charger CN-2705-01.0 I r 128] Battery 2EBA Charger 2ECC Vital Battery Charger CN-2705-01.0 l f 1281 Battery 2EBC Charger 2DGCA DG Batterv Charger CN-2705-04.0 I [2631 Battery 2DGBA Charger 2ECB Vital Battery Charger CN-2705-01.0 I f 1281 Battery 2EBB Charger 2ECD Vital Battery Charger CN-2705-01.0 I f 1281 Battery 2EBD Charger 2DGCB DG Battery Charger CN-2705-04.0 I f263l Battery 2DGBB Charger 2RNIIA RN Pump Motor Cooler Isolation CN-1574-0 l.00 rl481 NSW Discharge 2RN20B RN Pump Motor Cooler Isolation CN-1574-01.02 [1491 NSW Discharge 2RN28A RN Pump Discharge Isolation CN-1574-01.00 rJ48] NSW Discharge 2RN38B RN Pump Discharge Isolation CN-1574-01.02 [1491 INSW Discharge 2RN232A Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water CN-2574-02.01 [264] DG Cooling Cooler RN Supply Isolation 2RN292B Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water CN-2574-02.05 (265] DG Cooling Cooler RN Supply Isolation

~A 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

~

Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station I6C4437-RPT-002 Rev. 0 Page 94 of94 Table B-5: Electrical Power Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Description Drawin~

Function 2RN847A DSL GEN 2A Heat Exchanger Return CN-2574-02.01 [264] NSW Return to Lake 2RN8498 DSL GEN 2B Heat Exchanger Return CN-2574-02.05 [265] NSW Return to Lake

CNS-17-043, Report 16C4437-RPT-002, Revision 0, 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for Catawba Nuclear Station

Text

SUMMARY

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