ML17228B096

LER 94-010-01:on 941124,inadvertent B Train ESFAS Due to Deficient Instrument & Control Test Procedure.B Train Safeguards Equipment Was reset.W/950406 Ltr

ML17228B096
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	04/07/1995
From:	Lyons E, Sager D FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-95-109, LER-94-010, LER-94-10, NUDOCS 9504140145
Download: ML17228B096 (7)

Text

VH.j.MH.L'.'X ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9504140145 DOC.DATE: 95/04/07 NOTARIZED- NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-335 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000335 AUTH NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LYONS,E.E. Florida Power & Light Co.

SAGER,D.A. Florida Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 94-010-01:on 941124,inadvertent B train ESFAS due to deficient instrument DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Tncident Rpt, etc.

NOTES i

& control test procedure.B train safeguards equipment was reset.W/950406 ltr.

ENCL g SIZE: t RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-2 PD 1 1 NORRIS,J 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 OD 2 2 AEOD/S PD/RRAB 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DISP/PIPB 1 1 NRR/DOPS/OECB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRSS/PRPB 2 2' NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"Rl DS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE! CONTACTTfIE DOCUXfENT CONTROL DESK, ROOb,f Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2083 ) TO ELIXfINATEYOUR NAifE FROif DISTR I 8 U'I'ION LISTS I OR DOC I.'4 I Ei'I'S YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 28 ENCL 28

Florida Power & Light Company, P.O. Box 128, Fort Pierce. FL 34954-0128 April 6, 1995 L-95-109 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 Reportable Event: 94-010 Revision 1 Date of Event: November 24, 1994 adver ent B rain En ctuation S'a i eered Safe uards Features ESFAS due to a Deficient Instrument an Control Test P ocedure The attached Licensee Event Report is being revised pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide an update on the subject event.

Very truly yours, D. A ager Vice resident St. Lucie Plant DAS/EJB Attachment cc: Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant II Ir ~l ~

'it504140145 950407 PDR ADOCK 05000335 8 PDR an FPL Group company

NRC FORH 366 U.S ~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOH APPROVED BY OMB HO- 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY NITH r.XCmSEE EVZNT REPORT (LER) THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50 ' HRS.

FORIIARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS MANAGEHEHT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) HASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERllORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET HASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

St. Lucie Unit 1 05000335 1 OF 3 TITLE (4) Inadvertent B train Engineered Safeguards Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS)

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUHBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

SEQUEHTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKEl'UMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER HUHBER MOHTH DAY YEAR Unit 2 05000389 24 94 --010-- 1 4 7 FACILITY NAME N/A DOCKET HUMBER OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or mor e) (11)

MODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) ~ 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POMER 20.405(a)(l)(i) 50 '6(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in 20.405 (a) (1) ( i v) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Abstract below and in Text, 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Edward E. Lyons, Shift Technical Advisor (407) 465-3550 x3151.

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMI SS I OH (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).

X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten Lines) (16)

On November 24, 1994 St. Lucie Unit 1 was in Mode 5 during a scheduled refueling outage with Pressurizer level at 36%. At 1412 an inadvertent Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) occurred on the B train of the Safety Ingection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and on the B train of the Containment Isolation Signal (CIS) . The A train of SIAS and CIS had been placed in block per the Instrument and Control test procedure. Therefore, the A train of SIAS and CIS did not inadvertently actuate.

The cause of the event was a deficient Instrument and Control (I&C) test procedure. The Pressurizer pressure measurement bistables are removed to bypass the trip input received during response time testing. The Pressurizer pressure measurement bistables were not removed far enough away from the circuit board to prevent inadvertent contact. When inadvertent contact occurred the bypass was removed and the B train SIAS and CIS components actuated.

Corrective actions were: Operations reset the B train Safeguards Equipment.

I&C has revised "Reactor Protective and Engineering Safeguards System Response Time Testing" to ensure appropriate channels are bypassed by using additional ESFAS bypass keys. I&C has reviewed other applicable procedures to ensure bistables are withdrawn sufficiently.

NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB HO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY llITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REOUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORNARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO I,XCmsZZ EVER REPQRT (Zm) THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, TEXT CONTINUATION llASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERHORK REDUCTIOH PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET NASHIHGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR St. Lucie Unit 1 05000335 HUNGER

--010--

NUMBER 2 OF 3 94 TEXT (lf more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

On November 24, 1994 St. Lucie Unit 1 was in Mode 5 during a scheduled refueling outage with Pressurizer level at 36%. Utility Instrument and "Reactor Control (I&C) personnel were performing I&C Procedure 1-1400053 Protective and Engineering Safeguards System Response Time Testing". At 1412 an inadvertent Engineered Safety Features Actuate.on Signal (ESFAS)(EIIS:JE) occurred during the test on the B train of the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS)(EIIS:JE) and on the B train of the Containment Isolation Signal (CIS)(EIISIB4). The A train of SIAS and CIS had been placed in block per the I&C test procedure. Therefore, the A train of SIAS and CIS did not inadvertently actuate. Prior to blockinq the B train SIAS and CIS per the I&C test procedure an inadvertent actuate.on occurred.

The B train SIAS and CIS components actuated as expected for this Mode of operation. Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Room Ventilation (EIIS:VI) systems went on recirculation as required. At 1414 Operations reset the B train SIAS and CIS. At 1451 Operations secured the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (EIIS:EK) .

The cause of the event was a deficient test procedure. The purpose of the response time test is to determine the time interval from when a monitored input to the ESFAS exceeds its trip input until the protective actuation has been actuated. During response time testing a single channel is tripped while the other three channels are bypassed by removing their measurement bistables. Three of the Pressurizer pressure measurement bistables were partially removed from the cabinet'drawer,to bypass the trip input received during response time testing. One of the Pressurizer pressure measurement bistables was not withdrawn sufficiently from its seated position to prevent inadvertent contact. When inadvertent contact occurred the bypass was removed. This resulted in two ESFAS channels being in the tr3pped state which made up the required two of four logic for a SIAS and CIS Actuation.

This event is reportable as an actuation of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) under 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) .

This event did not adversely affect Plant Operations because: 1) The plant was in Mode 5 during a refueling outage with 36% level in the Pressure.zer.

2) The B train SIAS and CIS components actuated to their proper position in this mode of operation. 3) Reactor Coolant makeup was not required as a result of this event. 4) The B train SIAS and CIS actuation did not interrupt shutdown cooling (EIIS:BP).

Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

HRC- FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY 'WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

IZCmSZZ EVE'EPORT (LXR) FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO TPE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH TEXT CONATION (I NBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION St. Lucie Unit 1 YEAR NUHBER NUHBER 05000335 94 --010-- 3OF3 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

1) Operations reset the B train SIAS and CIS components.

2) A 50.59 Safety Evaluation performed as a result of this event and other similar events concluded that simultaneously bypassing all four channels of ESFAS during Modes 5 and 6 is acceptable for Reactor safety. This should prevent reoccurrence of similar events.

3) Operating procedures were changed on 3/22/95 to bypass certain measurement inputs of all four channels of ESFAS during Modes 5 and 6.

4) IEZ has revised IEd procedure 1-1400053 "Reactor Protective and Engineering Safeguards System Response Time Testing" to ensure appropriate channels are bypassed by using additional ESFAS bypass keys.

5) IGd has reviewed other applicable procedures to ensure bistables are withdrawn sufficiently.

None LER 389-90-004 "Inadvertent Actuation of Engineered Safeguards Equipment during Time Response Testing due to personnel error" LER 389-84-007 "Inadvertent Containment Isolation Signal Actuation" NRC- FORH 366A (5-92)