ML17223B213

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LER 91-004-00:on 910516,late Fire Watch Patrol of Shield Bldg Discovered.Caused by Personnel Error.Shield Bldg Exhaust Fan Secured to Allow Access to Annulus & Fire Watch Entered Annulus & Performed patrol.W/910614 Ltr
ML17223B213
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/14/1991
From: Kilroy T, Sager D
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-91-177, LER-91-004-01, LER-91-4-1, NUDOCS 9106210300
Download: ML17223B213 (6)


Text

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM e

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9106210300 DOC.DATE: 91/06/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET. g FACIL:50-335 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000335 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION KILROY,T. Florida Power & Light Co.

SAGER,D.A. Florida Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R

SUBJECT:

LER 91-004-00:on 910516,late fire watch patrol of shield bldg discovered. Caused by personnel error. Shield bldg D exhaust fan secured to allow access to annulus & fire watch entered annulus & performed patrol.W/910614 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT . COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES D ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL -ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-2 LA 1 1 PD2-2 PD 1 1 D NORRIS,J 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1

1 1

1 REG

/~ T/S B8D1 02 1

1 1

1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 CA2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 . 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D

D D

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 33 ENCL 33

P.O. Box z8, Ft. Prerce, FL 34954-0120 FPL June 14, 1991 L-91-177 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Re: St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 Reportable Event: 91-04 Date of Event: May 16, 1991 Late Technical Specification Recpxired Fire Watch Patrol Due to Personnel Error The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours, D. A ager Vice resident.

St. c ie Plant DAS/JJB/kw Attachment cc: Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant DAS/PSL N455 9 106 ". 10300 90 1 0614 00033.':-

PDR &DOCK PDR an FPL Group company IV 4 'v' oy

FPL FCOatmle Ol NRC Form 366 (849) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

L.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMSSION XttlXNIONI IXXT1 WC IXI XXXXXXXIOCC I XCI%NTOXIXXOOItOI IXNXXNXNI OTXSXTWINTNS INIXWXTXN ~

IXXXXXT'IIXXIIIXWXNNITCCONCNTC XXNIXXNCSJXXN CCTXNTXTO TIN IXOXXNNOIXTXXOC NCXIXNTWINXXIltCXXIXCNXXTNT XXXIXNXIX XXXNNNXXWNXNXXNXI,OCXXNXttO NITIN ttTTNXXNI XTXOMNtASKCT T,

$ 1 XXCXNT.OIIICXCX INNNNICNTNO TXXXÃT,WNXNIXlOKOC NCCL FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE 3 St. Lucie Unit 1 050003351 0 3

'~ (4) Late Technical Specification Required Fire Watch Patrol due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED(8)

IAL FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)

DAY YEAR YEAR S MONTH DAY YEAR N/A 0 5 169 1 9 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 6 1 4 N/A 050 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO lHE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR:

OPERATING Check one or more of the followfn (11)

MODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POWER 50.73(a)(2)(v) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) . 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 1 0 0 20.405(a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER (Specify in Abstract 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) below and in Text 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) NRC Fcrm 366A) 50.73(a)(2)(il) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAME TELEP ONE NUMBER AREA CODE Tom Kilroy, Shift Technical Advisor 4 0 7 465 -3550 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13 REPORTABLE 'AUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION YES (Ifyes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) > NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400spaces.i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 16 May, 1991, while operating at 100% power, St. Lucie Unit 1 experienced a late fire watch patrol of the "BN shield building annulus area. Due to modifications being performed to the Unit 1 Fire Detection system, the side Fire Detection system was out of service, for which Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 requires an 8 hour fire watch inspection of the shield building annulus. A concurrent 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> surveillance run of a shield building exhaust fan created a differential pressure across the annulus door that made it impossible to open and gain access to perform the inspection. Upon notification of this condition, the control room senior reactor operator assumed that the fire watch was required shiftly rather than every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, and continued the exhaust fan surveillance. When the site Fire Protection department later notified the control room that the fire watch was late, operators secured the 6B Shield Building Exhaust fan to allow the fire watch to be performed.

The cause of this event was personnel error. The surveillance run of the shield building exhaust fan interfered with the scheduled fire watch, resulting in the fire watch time interval being exceeded.

Corrective actions for this event were to secure the shield building exhaust fan to allow access to the annulus, perform the required fire patrol, and defer the exhaust fan surveillance until the B side Fire Detection system was placed back in service. The Training Department will review this event for possible incorporation into the Licensed Operator Requalification Training program, and Control Room supervision will receive counselling on correct interpretation of Technical Specification fire watch requirements.

FPL Facsimile of NRC Form 366 (6-89)

FPL Facslmlro Ua. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlsslON ~ ae rro sr~qg NRC Form 666 (646)

FACILITYNAME (1)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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DOCKET NUMBER (2)

EQUENTIAL REVISIO NUMBER NUMBER St. Lucie Unit 1 0 500 0335 9 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 3 TEXT (lfmore spaceis required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On May 13 1991, St. Lucie Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. Modifications were started on the Fire Detection System circuitry (EIIS:IG). These modifications required that the affected side of the Fire Detection circuitry (either "A" or "B") be taken out of service. Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 requires that a fire watch be established and a fire patrol be performed every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> in the containment shield building annulus area while the associated fire detectors are out of service.

On May 15 at 2230, an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> fire watch patrol was performed on the shield building annulus. At 0100 on May 16, Operations began the monthly 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> surveillance run of the 6B Shield Building Exhaust fan (EIIS:VG), per Tech Spec 3.6.6.1. At 0630, contractor maintenance personnel on the fire watch team made an attempt to access the annulus to perform the fire watch, but the annulus door could not be opened due to the differential pressure created by the fan. The control room was notified, but the utility licensed senior reactor operator assumed that the fire patrol was required shiftly (Technical Specifications define "shiftly" requirements as those to be performed every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />), rather than every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, and did not verify his assumption against the Technical Specifications. At 0840, the contractor notified the utility Fire Protection department that the fire watch was not performed. At that time, the control room was contacted and the 6B Shield Building Exhaust fan was secured. The annulus fire watch was performed at 0913, after a period of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, 43 minutes.

The root cause of this event was personnel error by a utility licensed Senior Reactor Operator. The requ'lred 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> fire watch of the annulus area was delayed by the concurrent performance of the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> monthly surveillance run of the 6B Shield Building Exhaust fan. The differential pressure across the annulus door was such that it was physically impossible to open the door. Additionally, when the Unit 1 Senior Reactor Operator was notified of the problem, he incorrectly assumed that the fire watch was a shiftly (12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) requirement, rather than an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> requirement. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location that contributed to the error, nor were any actions taken contrary to any approved plant procedures.

FPL Facsimile of NRC Form 366 (6-69)

FPL Facslrtiro Oi U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0ITIOITOOH5 IIO 01100104 NRC Form S66 ~SKL IIT000 (6-69) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Cr01ITTO TCTOOITOI Icsawc TOCO00TTCCIO00 00ICTC01 Coutcnof ITXCCCO TIC ITICIOIWIIOCCICCIIICICOWOWO ICTTIOITCTI0Atc TO TIO TEXT CONTINUATION CCMCSSCK ~,OC ICOTTTICITO ICTOOC IlINACKl47rtITWCH +400 OC IOOTffr %OAATOPN T054L rfct To llC 0%0OIIIICT01 COVCIT01IITlÃOTI 01I0010TTOFTCCC0 WIKXMJITNOMXCT.Tlk%IICIIOCOCTICIIL FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR EQUENTIAL REVISIO NUMBER NUMBER St. Lucie Unit 1 0 500 0335 9 1 0 0 4 0 0 03 03 TEXT (Ifmore spaceis required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 lists a minimum number of fire detectors that must be operable for plant operation. With the number of detectors in a given zone less than the number required to be operable, a periodic fire watch must be initiated and a fire patrol be continually performed. This specification requires a minimum of 1 operable detector in zone B of the annulus region. With the "B" side Fire Detection system taken out of service, no fire detectors were available in zone B of the annulus, and thus, an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> fire watch was established. Both zone A detectors were operable throughout the entire event. The zone A and zone B detectors occupy the same general area and are not seperated by any physical barriers; thus fire detection in the annulus was,available throughout this time period. The total elapsed time between fire patrols was 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and 43 minutes, which only slightly exceeded the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> interval required by Tech Specs. The health and safety of the public was not endangered at any time during this time period.

1) Operations secured the 6B Shield Building Exhaust fan to allow access to the annulus for the fire watch.
2) The fire watch entered the annulus and performed the required fire watch patrol.
3) The 6B Shield Building Exhaust fan surveillance was deferred until the B side fire detection system was placed back in service.
4) Training will review this event for possible incorporation into the Licensed Operator Requalification Training program.
5) Control Room supervision will receive counselling on correct interpretation of Technical Specification fire watch requirements.

For the most recent similar event, see LER 335-83-25, "Surveillance of Fire Stations" None FPL Facsimile of NRC Form 366 (6-89)