ML13316B897
| ML13316B897 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1988 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13316B895 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-67758, NUDOCS 8805170328 | |
| Download: ML13316B897 (4) | |
Text
pR REGUI, 0jR UNITED STATES LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO REGION V 1450 MARIA LANE, SUITE 210 WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 FEB 26 1988 MEMORANDUM TO:
File (Inspection Report No. 50-206/88-10)
FROM:
P. H. Johnson, Chief Reactor Projects Section 3
SUBJECT:
MID LEVEL MANAGEMENT MEETING WITH SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON ON FEBRUARY 25, 1988 At 12:00 p.m. on February 25, 1988, Southern California Edison (SCE) personnel held a meeting, at their request, with Region V staff. The meeting attendees were as follows:
SCE W. Moody, Deputy Site Manager J. Reilly, Station Technical Manager D. Pilmer, Nuclear Engineering Manager NRC D. Kirsch, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects A. Chaffee, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects R. Zimmerman, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch P. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3 R. Huey, Senior Resident Inspector C. Caldwell, Project Inspector During the meeting, the following topics were discussed:
I. Status Of Licensee Root Cause Evaluation Of Environmental Qualification Problems Identified In Unit 1 The Region asked SCE to provide information on their evaluation of the root cause and proposed corrective actions for the environmental qualification (EQ) problems that had been identified in Unit 1.
The licensee responded by specifying that the following root causes had been identified:
Electrical interactions were not included in the Systematic Evaluation Process (SEP) for Unit 1 -
thus, these items were not considered Design changes in the 1981, 1982 timeframe were not evaluated for EQ since that was not an issue at Unit 1 until the EQ rule was promulgated.
Full root cause may not be complete until after the proposed startup date 3805170328 8S0427 PDR ADOCK 05000206 0
BCD
The review identified 500 electrical components which are located in a potentially adverse environment. As of the meeting date, the licensee had determined that 40 of these components need to be added to the list and will be upgraded.
The licensee identified that the corrective actions for the EQ problems are:
5 people have been dedicated full time to review and verify the master EQ list The problems that have been identified will be fixed prior to startup or justification for continued operation will be provided - items not to be upgraded prior to restart include MO 20, 21, and 22, which will be upgraded prior to the end of the next refueling (based on core life, failure of these MOs would not lead to a reactor restart if a main steam line break without safety injection should occur).
Will fix additional items as they are found The licensee's QA organization will perform a generic review of modifications completed in the 1981, 1982 timeframe to determine if other problems (e.g., fire protection) may have occurred as a result lack of consideration in the SEP process.
II. Control Of Boron Concentration Identified In Unit 1 LER 88-03 Region V asked for the licensee's evaluation of the apparent improper implementation of design requirements with regards to maintaining proper boron concentrations in the safety injection (SI) discharge piping. The licensee responded by identifying that SCE had previously desired to relax the boron concentration requirements in the SI piping to minimize recirculation of-the system. They had asked Westinghouse what concentration was assumed in the SI piping in the performance of safety analyses. Westinghouse incorrectly identified that the assumed value, and therefore the lower limit that could be used was 0 ppm.
The licensee stated to Region V that, after discovering the discrepancy, they reviewed their records and found that the lowest value achieved for boron concentration in the SI piping (after the analysis was performed) was 1500 ppm. Westinghouse is in the process of performing a new analysis and the results will be provided to SCE in several weeks. As a compensatory measure, the licensee has restored the boron concentration to a minimum of 3750 ppm. The re-analysis should indicate if the system was operable, in the past, with a 1500 ppm boron concentration.
0II
III. Focus Of NRC Program Towards Inspection Of Utilities In The Future The licensee asked where the focus of NRC inspection effort would be in the future for the country as a whole. Region V responded by stating that the NRC would be showing additional interest or conducting inspections in the following areas:
A. Performance of Technical Work
- 1. Control and Understanding of Design Bases
- 2. Performance of Engineering B. Safety System Outage Modification Inspection (SSOMI)
C. Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI)
D. Maintenance - per the new NRC Maintenance Policy Statement E. Emergency Operating Procedures F. Plant Aging and Its Effect On Continued Operation G. Fitness for Duty H. Operator Requalification and Operator Licensing On a National Basis IV. 5 Year Role Of SCE and Interface With NRC The licensee asked if the NRC and/or Region V had been placing any attention on the following items:
A. NRC Evaluation Of Licensee Interface Programs B. NUMARC and the Effect on Regional Policy and Programs C. Effect of Shutdown of Some or All Nuclear Plants in California on the Role of the NRC Limited feedback was provided to the licensee during a brief discussion of these issues.
V. Reactor Coolant System Cleanup For Units 2 and 3 In order to reduce the number of fuel pin failures in Combustion Engineering fuel, SCE indicated that they will perform a vacuuming operation on the reactor coolant system and all interfacing systems. This is because C.E. has identified debris in the RCS to be a major contributor to the failures experienced to date. The licensee is hopeful that the vacuuming operation will reduce the number of fuel particles and reduce the amount of foreign material that could potentially cause additional fuel failures. This will be conducted over a period of time as Units 2 and 3 are shutdown for refueling operations.
VI.
Possible SSFI to be Conducted by Licensee In a follow-up discussion with W. Moody, D. Kirsch inquired about the benefit and additional safety assurance which would be provided by an SSFI conducted by the licensee for selected systems (e.g., safety injection and AFW). Mr. Moody stated that SCE would assess the proposal and respond at a later time.
P. H. J hnson, Chief Reacto Projects Section 3 cc: J. Martin D. Kirsch A. Chaffee R. Zimmerman R. Huey C. Trammell, NRR C. Caldwell 0
0ll