ML13330B348

Forwards Update of Progress Made Re Environ Qualification Program at Facility.List of 10CFR50.49 b(1) Equipment & Corrective Actions Encl

ML13330B348
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	07/09/1988
From:	Medford M SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
GL-88-07, GL-88-7, TAC-67758, NUDOCS 8807150224
Download: ML13330B348 (19)

Text

0 Southern California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD. CALIFORNIA 91770 M.O.MEDFORD TELEPHONE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING (818) 302-1749 AND LICENSING July 9, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Docket No. 50-206 Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 During this extended mid-cycle outage, SCE has been resolving concerns with the environmental qualification program at San Onofre Unit 1. As part of this effort, SCE has provided the NRC staff with updates of the progress made. The purpose of this letter is to provide a further update of these efforts.

The last information transmitted to the NRC staff was by letter dated May 27, 1988.

The enclosed tables from the May 27, 1988 letter have been updated.

Changes are identified by change bars. Table 1 lists the b(l) equipment identified during the review which required some corrective action. Tables 2 and 3 list the b(2) equipment identified as a result of the review and fuse coordination study, respectively.

The May 27, 1988 letter also indicated that SCE would be evaluating the environmental qualification status of cable which would be exposed to a harsh environment. As a part of this evaluation, approximately 1100 cables were walked down in the plant. These walkdowns have resulted in replacing 53 cables which were of indeterminate qualification.

In addition, it has been determined that two cable types require a justification for continued operation (JCO) to be established prior to returning the unit to service. These JCOs are provided as Enclosures 1 and 2 for your information. Enclosure 1 addresses cable associated with the Nuclear Instrumentation System. Enclosure 2 addresses cable associated with one of the two refueling water pumps which is used for containment spray. The current schedule for replacement of this cable is during the upcoming refueling outage.

8807150224 880709 PDR ADOCK 05000206 P

PDC

Document Control Desk

-2 Therefore, with the exception of the cable associated with the enclosed JCOs and the modifications identified in our November 20, 1987 letter regarding the single failure issues, San Onofre Unit 1 will comply with 10CFR50.49 at the time the unit returns to service.

If you have any questions regarding this information, please call me.

Very truly yours, M. 0. Medfor Manager of Nuclear Engineering and Licensing ACL:0028n Enclosures cc: 3. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V F. R. Huey, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3

Table 1 10 CFR 50.49 b(1) Equipment Device Description Corrective Action MOV 1202 AFW Pump Discharge Valve Added to EQML MOV 1204 AFW Pump Discharge Valve Added to EQML HY 1304 Charging Pump to Loop A Replaced and Isolation Valve CV 304, Actuator Added to EQML ZSO/C 1304 Limit Switches for CV 304 Replaced and Added to EQML HY 1305 Charging pump to Press Aux. Spray Replaced and Isolation CV 305 Valve, Actuator Added to EQML ZSO/C 1305 Limit Switches for CV 305 Replaced and Added to EQML PT 459 Mainsteam line Pressure Input to Added to EQML Steam-Feed Mismatch Trip FY 1112 Charging Pump Flow Control Valve Added to EQML FCV 1112, I/P Transducer SV 1112 Solenoid Actuator for FCV 1112 Replaced and Added to EQML TS 34, 35 Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Added to EQML Temperature Elements for Cooler Fans E-17A, B Feedwater Pump Lube Oil.Cooling Added to EQML Fans SV 17, 17A Feedwater Pump Miniflow to Replaced and Condensor, Isolation Valve Added to EQML Actuators SV 18, 18A Feedwater Pump Miniflow to Added to EQML, Condensor, Isolation Valve Replaced and Actuators Added to EQML SV 524, 5, Pneumatic Supply Solenoids For Replaced and 6, 7, 8, 9, Feedwater Pump SI Alignment Valves Added to EQML 30, 31 SV 875A, B Feedwater Pump SI Miniflow to Replaced and Refueling Water Storage Tank, Added to EQML Isolation Valve Actuators

-2 ZSO/C 1875A, Limit Switches for SV 875A, B Replaced and B

Added to EQML SV 955, Primary System Sample Containment Replaced and 6, 7 Isolation Valve Actuators Added to EQML SV Ill5DA, Containment Recirculation Flow Replaced and DB, EA, EB, Control Valve Pheumatic Supply Added to EQML FA, FB Solenoids SV 2900, Bonnet Vent Solenoid for Added to EQML 3900 Feedwater Pump SI Alignment Valves SV 520, 1, Pneumatic Supply to Feedwater Replaced with check 2, 3 Pump SI Alignment Valves valves SV 135 Service Water to AFN Pump Replaced with check Bearing Solenoid Valve valve CV 2145 Charging Pump Discharge Sample Replaced and Valve Added to EQML FT 21148, C, Containment Recirculation Flow Added to EQML 3114A Transmitters FY 1115D, E, Containment Recirculation Flow Added to EQML F

Control Valve Transducers T 14A, B Residual Heat Removal Pump Relocated Thermal Overload Devices T 45A Containment Recirculation Pump Relocated Thermal Overload Device X07, 8 Station Service Transformers Added to EQML

Table 2 10 CFR 50.49 b(2) Equipment (b)(2)

(b)(2) Device (b)(1) Equip Device Description b(l) Equipment Description Corrective Action VPS-1 Transformer for SV 702B, D Position Containment Fuse Isolation/

Indication Isolation, Removal for SV7028, D valve position indication VPS-2 Transformer for SV 702A, C Position Containment Fuse Isolation/

Indication Isolation Removal for SV702A, C valve position indication SV 600 Spray Hydrazine SV533A ZSO/C Service Water Fuse Isolation ZSO/C2600 Isolation Valve and Limit 2533 SV537A and Makeup Water Switches ZSO/C 2537 Containment Isolation Valves and Limit Switches FV-2077, Service Water to Recirculation G45A, B Containment Fuse Isolation 3078 Pump Bearings Control Recirculation Circuits Pumps SV 601 Spray Hydrazine Isolation Valve SV126 ZSO/C Service Water, Fuse Isolation ZSO/C 2601 and Limit Switches 3115 SV532 Nitrogen and ZSO/C 1532 Makeup Water SV 534A ZSO/C Containment 3534 Isolation Valves and Limit Switches SV 951 Primary System Sample Containment ZSO/C 2951 Position Fuse Isolation Isolation Valve Actuator Indication SV 953 Primary System Sample Containment ZSO/C 2953 Position Fuse Isolation Isolation Valve Actuator Indication SV %2 Primary System Sample Containment ZSO/C 2962 Position Fuse Isolation Isolation Valve Actuator Indication PCV430C, H, Pressurizer Aux. Spray and HY 1304 Charging Pump Fuse Isolation HCV III7 Excess Letdown Isolation Valves Discharge Isolation Valve Actuator Humidity Containment High Humidity Alarm SV28, 9, 30 Containment Fuse Isolation Bridge and Ventilation Amplifier Isolation Valve Actuators FY 5112 Charging Pump Discharge FCV 1112 Charging Pump Open Breaker Isolation Valve Actuator Discharge Isolation Valve PY 5530, PORV and Block Valve CV 530, 546 PORV and Block Open Breaker 5546 Actuators Valve FY IIISA, Containment Recirculation Flow FY 11150, E, F Containment Replaced, Added B, C Control Valve Transducers Recirculation to EQML Flow Control Valve Train A Transducers SV20, PS-80 Turbine Plant Cooling Water G6N (Note 1)

Turbine Plant Install Fuse, Hx Flow Control Valve Solenoid Cooling Water Isolate and Pump Discharge Pressure Pump Switch SV21, PS-81 Turbine Plant Cooling Water G6S (Note 1)

Turbine Plant Install Fuse, Hx Flow Control Valve Solenoid Cooling Water.

Isolate and Pump Discharge Pressure Pump Switch

e S

-2 (b)(2)

(b)(2) Device (b)(I) Equip Device Description b(l) Equipment Description Corrective Action SV26 Circulating Water Pump G4A (Note 1)

Circulating Install Fuse, Discharge Control Valve Solenoid Water Pump Isolate SV27 Circulating Water Pump G4B (Note 1)

Circulating Install Fuse, Discharge Control Valve Solenoid Water Pump Isolate SV-62,PS-53, Service Air System Solenoid KIA (Note 1)

Air Compressor Install Fuse, PS-56,TS-15 Valve, Pressure Switch and Isolate Temperature Switch SV-63,PS-54, Service Air System Solenoid KIB (Note 1)

Air Compressor Install Fuse, PS-57,TS-16 Valve, Pressure Switch and Isolate Temperature Switch SV-64,PS-55, Service Air System Solenoid KIC (Note 1)

Air Compressor Install Fuse, PS-58,TS-17 Valve, Pressure Switch and Isolate Temperature Switch PS-l,dps-9 Condenser Vacuum Pump Pressure X7A (Note 1)

Condenser Install Fuse, SV-7,PS-26 Switches and Solenoid Valves Vacuum Pump Isolate SV-41,SV-69 PS-2, dps-10 Condenser Vacuum Pump Pressure X7B (Note 1)

Condenser Install Fuse, SV-8, PS-27 Switches and Solenoid Valves Vacuum Pump Isolate SV-42,SV-70 LS-8, LS-10 Feedwater Heater Level G56A, G36B Heater Drain Install Fuse, Sensors (Note 1)

Pump Isolate PS-136, Turbine Lube Oil Pressure G29 (Note 1)

Turbine Aux.

Install Fuse, PS-44 Switches Lube Oil Pump Isolate 86-M3-1, SIS-LOP Lockout Relays B03 (Note 1)

MCC #3 Install Fuses; 86-M-3-2 Isolate and 86-M3-3, remove automatic 86-M3-4, cross connect SD-1-6 with Switchgear 2 on SIS -LOP LT-451 Wide and Narrow Range SG FT 458, 462 Feedwater and Add fuse LT-455 Level Transmitter Steam Flow Transmitters LT-452 Wide and Narrow Range SG FT 456, 460 Feedwater and Add fuse LT-453 Level Transmitter Steam Flow Transmitters LT-450 Wide and Narrow Range SG FT 457, 461 Feedwater and Add fuse LT-454 Level Transmitters Steam Flow Transmitters TIC-IIIO Boric Acid System Temperature FY 1112, Transducers for Add fuse TIC-1108N Controller, Heater Switch and FY 1115 D, E, F FCV 1112 and FT-1102B Flow Controller FCV 1115 D, E and F Notes

1. Equipment identified is not b(l), but is de-energized on a SIS-LOP. The b(2) device failure could impact this tripping function and therefore emergency diesel generator loading under a SIS-LOP condition.

Table 3 10 CFR 50.49 b(2) Equipment from Fuse Coordination Study (b)(2)

Associated (b)(1)

Fuse Coordination Equipment Equipment Resolution LCV 1112 FY 1203, ZSO/C 1203, HY 1304, ZSO/C 1304, Coordinated FY 1202, ZSO/C 1202, FY 1204, ZSO/C 1204 SV 225 FY 1203, ZSO/C 1203, HY 1304, ZSO/C 1304, Replaced FY 1202, ZSO/C 1202, FY 1204, ZSO/C 1204 SV 276 HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287, Coordinated HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305 SV 288 HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287, Coordinated HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305 TCV 1105 HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287, Replaced HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305 LCV 1100A HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287, Replaced HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305 SV 544 HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305, Coordinated HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287 SV 412 SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Coordinated SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 SV 413 SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Replaced SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 SV 414 SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Replaced SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 RCV 605 SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Coordinated SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 HCV 602 SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Coordinated SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 TCV 601A SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Coordinated SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 TCV 601B SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Replaced SV 410, ZSO/C 1410

-2 (b)(2)

Associated (b)(1)

Fuse Coordination Equipment Equipment Resolution PO 1, 2, ZSO/C 2009, ZSO/C 2010, Coordinated 3, 4, 5, SV 28, SV 29, SV 30 6, 7, 8 PO 13, 14, ZSO/C 2009, ZSO/C 2010, Coordinated 15, 16, 21 SV 28, SV 29, SV 30 PCV 1115A HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305, Replaced HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287 PCV 1115B HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305, Replaced HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287 PCV 1115C HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305, Replaced HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287 SV 99 ZSO/C 2009, ZSO/C 2010, Coordinated SV 28, SV 29, SV 30 SV 2001, AEH22001, 3001, PE 2001, 3001, Coordinated 2, 3, 3001, TE2001, 3001, SV 2004, 3004, 2, 3 LE 2001, 3001, 2002A, 8, C, LE 3002A, B, C, PT 2001, 3001 SV 150, 151 HV 851A, 852A, 853A, 854A Relocated SV 457, 458 SV 524, 525, 526, 527 (Note 1)

Timer 62-1 LCV 1112 FY 1202, 1203, 1204 Coordinated SV 225 HY 1304 (Note 1)

SV 406A, B SV 149 HV 851B, 852B, 8538, 854B Coordinated SV 427A, B, C SV 528, 529, 530, 531 (Note 1)

SV 456 Notes

1. Failure of b(2) device could impact b(1) loads fed from the same breaker position.

0028n

• Memorandum for File July 7, 1988

Subject:

Operability of Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Components Following a Mainsteam Line Break (MSLB) Outside Containment San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1

References:

A. WCAP-11294, "SCE SONGS UNIT 1 STEAMLINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT MASS/ENERGY RELEASE ANALYSIS" B. Memorandum for File by W. G. Flournoy, dated 6/13/88;

Subject:

Equipment Qualification of the Nuclear Instrument System (NIS), San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 C. Memorandum G. J. Stawniczy to R. L. Phelps, dated 5/31/88;

Subject:

Project Work Notification No. 14WD-NIS Cables D. Chaung, A.; "A Simplified Heat Transfer Method to Evaluate the Temperature Profile of Rockbestos Cable Subjected to a LOCA Environment; "Sorrento Electronics; 1987 E. Impell Calculation 0310-201-001 "l20VAC & 125VDC (b)(2) Fuse Coordination Study" dated 5/26/86, SCE Number M85010

Purpose:

To evaluate the operability of NIS cable in a steam environment following a MSLB outside containment; to provide a reactor trip signal as assumed in the Safety Analysis for these events.

==

Conclusion:==

The subject cable is considered operable to provide a reactor trip as required, based on the limited required operating time and objective evidence that the cable will not experience a significant increase in temperature during that time.

Discussion:

The NIS is required to provide reactor trip for selected mainsteam line breaks outside containment.

Refer nce A identifies breaks between 2.66 ft2 and

.4 ft at 103% power which credit high neutron flux trip at between 9.2 and 36 seconds post-accident.

Reference B further defines the maximum time required to generate a high neutron flux trip for any break outside containment, as less than 1 minute post-accident.

-2 The NIS detectors which input to the Reactor Protection System High Neutron Flux Trip (NE 1205A, B; NE 1206A, B; NE 1207A, B; NE 1208A, B) are located inside containment, as shown on drawing 458591-0. For an MSLB outside containment, only the cable is subjected to a harsh environment. The cable for the power and intermediate range channels was walked-down in Reference C. The NIS cable is shown on drawing 568436 to be in conduit in those areas outside containment which are subjected to steam post-accident.

Based on the short operating time requirement (less than one minute), and the fact that the cable is in conduit when running through a steam environment, the cable is considered to be operable without environmental qualification testing. The cable is not expected to experience a significant increase in temperature above normal operating conditions during the short period required to generate a reactor trip.

This conclusion is further substantiated by the thermal response analysis of radiation monitoring cable in conduit performed in Reference D. This analysis indicated that the mid-plane of the cable jacket for the cable analyzed would experience virtually no increase in temperature in less than one minute when subjected to a reference LOCA profile.

Although the analyzed cable and temperature-pressure profile are different than those considered here, it is apparent from this case that no significant temperature increase is expected for the SONGS-1 condition, in the required operating time.

The Reference D analysis is conservative in that the outside surface temperature of the conduit is assumed to be the same as the ambient temperature (as high as 340 0 F) at that pressure.

For the limiting outside containment mainsteam line break at SONGS 1, the pressure profile reaches a maximum of 2 psi and returns to 0 psi in approximately 0.2 seconds post-accident.

During the first several minutes of the event, condensation heat transfer will be the dominant heat transfer mechanism.

Therefore, the maximum outside surface temperature under these conditions will be the saturation temperature (213 0 F).

A plot of the Reference D LOCA profile, the limiting SONGS-1 profile for area 2.2 and the analyzed cable jacket temperature is attached.

This plot shows the minimal effect of the temperature excursion without the above noted conservatism of condensation heat transfer.

-3 The cable heatup rate in the SONGS-1 case will be slower than the Reference D analysis, considering the saturation temperature as the driving force; further substantiating the conclusion that the cable will not experience a significant temperature increase during the required operating time.

In addition, the potential for adverse electrical interactions due to subsequent failure of the NIS components was evaluated in Reference E, and found not to exist.

The NIS is not required for long term post-accident monitoring; primary system sampling is used to verify subcriticality.

NIS failure will not mislead the operator, since the NIS is not relied upon for any long term post-accident recovery scenario.

- R. L. PHELPS cc:

G. Stawniczy D. F. Pilmer J. L. Rainsberry E. J. Donovan W. Flournoy S. D. Root C. R. Hover S. S. Bailey CDM Files 1958L-11

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1,1,

,CPA JO F IGURE 4 A.C4C'5 t4id-plan l Ne~rature Profile obtained by Manual CalctilationS 3

/..9 Memorandum for File June 28, 1988 CAROL CABLE SUBJECT Justification for Continued Operation for Carol Cable (ID #1GBS219P2).

PURPOSE The purpose of this memorandum is to document the evaluation which provides the Justification for Continued Operation for Carol Cable located in Area 14 until the refueling outage of 1989.

BACKGROUND During the recent SONGS-1 b(2)/b(1) equipment analysis, EQ cables routed through harsh environments were identified. Walkdowns were then performed to identify all cable jacket markings. From this effort, one of the cables identified was Carol Cable (1GBS219P2) [3). Cable 1GBS219P2 is routed from the 480 Volt Switchgear Room directly to the Refueling Water Storage Tank Area (Area 14) and powers refueling water pump motor G27S.

The motor only operates a total of 1,040 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> in 40 years including the entire 120 days post accident [16, attachment 15] which means that in its qualified life of 40 years, the Carol cable is only energized for a total of 1,040 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />. The 480 Volt Switchgear Room is a mild environment. Area 14 is a harsh environment due to only radiation and relative humidity [13].

During recent walkdowns (PWN 10, item 82), Carol Cable ID number 1GBS219P2 was identified. The cable is described as 3/c, 550kcmil copper conductor, type W, non-shielded, supervutron, 90 oC from

[3]. The insulating material was identified to be Ethylene Propylene Rubber (EPR)

[3], an elastomer produced from ethylene and propylene monomers.

Their maximum continuous service temperature is around 350 OF [1,2]. The jacket was identified as Chlorinated Polyethylene (CPE) [3].

DISCUSSION The following considerations as stated.in 10CFR50.49, paragraph i, will be analyzed to ensure that the plant can be safely operated pending completion of equipment qualification:

(1)

Accomplishing the safety function by some designated alternative if the principal equipment has not been demonstrated to be fully qualified.

The safety function of Carol cable (1GBS219P2) is to supply power to safety related pump G-27S. If G-27S were to fail caused by a failure in Carol cable (1GBS219P2), an alternative would be pump G-27N.

G-27N is fully qualified along with its associated cabling.

Page 1

Carol Cable (continued)

(2)

The validity of partial test data in support of the original qualification.

There is no specific testing done for Carol Cable which uses EPR insulation; however, several other cable manufacturers use Ethylene Propylene Rubber (EPR) insulation and have environmental test reports which qualify their cable for Nuclear Power Plant applications.

Anaconda manufactures a 600 Volt power cable which uses EPR Insulating material. This cable had been tested under postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) and qualified for 385 OF, 66 psig, 2.0E8 rads (gamma), chemical spray, and 100 percent relative humidity.

This cable had been thermally pre-aged for 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> @ 150 oC (302 OF) [4].

GE cable also uses an Ethylene Propylene Rubber (EPR) Insulating material and a Neoprene jacket for their 600 Volt power/control cables. This cable had been tested under postulated Design Basis Accident and qualified for 340 OF (LOCA maximum), 113 psig (LOCA maximum), 100 percent relative humidity, chemical spray, 2.2E8 rads (gamma), and submergence.

This cable had been thermally pre-aged for 130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br /> @ 150 oC (302 OF) [5].

Okonite manufactures a 600 and 2k Volt power and control cable using an EPR insulating material and Chlorosulfonated Polyethylene (CPSE) jacket. This cable had been tested under postulated Design Basis Accident and qualified for 340 OF, 114 psig, 100 percent relative humidity, chemical spray and 2.0E8 rads (gamma) and submergence This cable had been thermally pre-aged for 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> @ 150 oC (302 OF) [6].

The worst DBA environmental parameters which the Refueling Water Storage Tank Area 14 are subjected to are 100 percent relative humidity, 4.0E6 rads (post accident condition) and 104 OF for 36 minutes and returning to 80 OF for the remaining 120 days post accident. The normal conditions are 80 OF, 0 psig, 60 percent relative humidity, and 40 year TID of 1.0E3 rads

[13].

From references [4], [5], and [6], an activation energy of 1.22, 1.33, and 1.14 eV respectively were identified for Ethylene Propylene Rubber insulation.

Test data from Okonite Cable (which is the most conservative of the three test reports) with an activation energy of 1.14 eV for Ethylene Propylene Rubber insulation [6] will be used for the following evaluations.

Page 2

Carol Cable (continued)

THERMAL AGING AND OPERATING TIME DISCUSSION A) Normal 40-year Aging Utilizing the Arrhenius equation defined below, the equivalent life of Ethylene Propylene Rubber insulation tested for 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br />, @150 oC (302 OF) is as follows:

t2 = tI x [exp(K x (

))

where:

exp exponent to base e Ea/Kb -

slope of Arrhenius curve -Activation Energy/Boltzman's constant t

aging time in hours t2 equivalent life in hours T1 aging temperature (degrees K)

T2 normal service temperature (degrees K)

Self heating is a result of resistive losses. The energy dissipated/loss along a cable is dissipated as heat (known as 12R loss). Cables are designed such that their rated ampacity will result in the conductor reaching the cable/insulation rated temperature (typically 90 oC) at a given ambient temperature.

Thus AT heat rise T conductor - Tambient is proportional to 12.

let AT1 T conductor - T ambient where:

T conductor

=

conductor temperature = 90 oC [15]

Tambient

=

ambient temperature = 30 oC [15]

AT

=

actual heat rise, oC 1

=

cable ampacity = 210 amps [15]

=

maximum rated motor current 172 amps [ 16, attachment 5, pg 43]

Then, T,

T I2 2

I1 2

Therefore, T = actual heat rise x T, 2 I Page 3

Carol Cable (continued)

Thus the maximum heat rise of Carol cable (1GBS219P2) due to the powering of refueling water pump motor G27S is 60 0 x

(172amps/210amps) 2 - 40.25 oC = 73 OF.

However, G27S is only run for half an hour every week (1040 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.9572e-4 months <br /> out of 40 years) [16, attatchment 15.

This means that the cable is de-energized for the remaining 349,360 hours0.00417 days <br />0.1 hours <br />5.952381e-4 weeks <br />1.3698e-4 months <br />.

The thermal aging qualified life -

Pre-aging (normalized to an arbitray number) - Aging due to energization of cable(normalized to an arbitrary number) - Aging when cable is de-energized(normalized to an arbitrary number).

For this calculation, 80 OF will be the arbitrary temperature used.

Using an activation energy of 1.14eV for the Ethylene Propylene Rubber insulation, the EPR insulation pre-aged at 150 oC (302 OF) for 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> normalized to 80 OF is as follows:

= 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> x [exp(

1.14eV x(

8.61 x 10-2 1

where:

T, (302 OF + 459.67)/1.8 = 423.15 OK T2 80 OF normalized temperature = 299.82 OK 2

=

5,327 years @ 80 OF normalized temperature.

349,360 hours0.00417 days <br />0.1 hours <br />5.952381e-4 weeks <br />1.3698e-4 months <br /> de-energized @ 80 OF ambient normalized to 80 OF

= 40 years.

1,040 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> energized @ 80 OF ambient + 73 OF heat rise normalized to 80 OF = 23 years.

Thus the qualified thermal life = 5,327 years - 40 years -

23 years

= 5,264 years.

5,264 years >> 40 years.

Therefore, the EPR insulation material demonstrates thermal aging capability for the entire life of the plant.

Accepted industry practice is that the cable's insulation provides the necessary dielectric barrier between the conductor and the outside environment.

The purpose of the jacket is to protect the insulation from damage during cable pulling and initial installation [12].

Therefore, although some of the test cables had a jacket during the testing, it has no impact on the cable qualification at SONGS-i and does not change the thermal aging test result.

Page 4

Carol Cable (continued)

B) Operating Time The required Design Basis Accident profile for area 14 is conservatively estimated from [13] as follows:

36 minutes @ 104 oF(assume 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> @ 104 OF) t heat rise 120 days - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> @ 80 oF(assume 120 days @ 80 OF) + heat rise The tested LOCA profile is estimated from [6] as follows:

2 days @ 300 OF 14 days @ 230 OF 14 days @ 222 OF Since the first 2 days of the DBA is enveloped by the test profile, the only necessary verification is the remaining 28 days @ 222 OF is equivalent to or greater than the remaining 118 days post accident @ 80 OF plus heat rise of 73 OF = 153 OF t2

=

28 days x [exp(

1.14eV x( 1

_1) 8.61 x 10-5 T2 where:

Ti

=

(222 OF+459.67)/1.8 378.71 OK T2 (153 OF +459.67)/1.8 = 340.37 OK t2=

1,437 days @ 153 OF Since the test enveloped all required condition, the test satisfied the 120 day Post DBA conditions.

Therefore operating time has been satisfied.

RADIATION The most conservative of the test reports irradiates the EPR insulated cable up to 2.0E8 rads. This is far greater than the required 4.0E6 rads (post accident) + 1.0E3 rads (40 year normal TID).

In addition, reference [13]

shows an available limit dose for EPR up to 4.0E8 rads.

Therefore EPR is considered qualified for radiation for the life of the plant including 120 days post accident.

RELATIVE HUMIDITY The Anaconda, GE and Okonite cable which uses EPR insulation all have been tested and qualified for 100 percent relative humidity [4,5,6].

The EPR insulation provides excellent resistance to moisture [9,10].

Page 5

Carol Cable (continued)

Therefore, the insulation material of the Carol cable is considered capable of withstanding 100 percent relative humidity.

(3)

Limited use of administrative controls over equipment that has not been demonstrated to be fully qualified.

No administrative controls are necessary.

The operators will be briefed regarding the qualification status of this equipment and the need to confirm satisfactory operation until It is fully qualified.

(4) Completion of the safety function prior to exposure to the accident environment resulting from a design basis event and ensuring that the subsequent failure of the equipment does not degrade any safety function or mislead the operator.

This cable only supplies power to G-27S and Isolation breaker(breaker #

52-1219) will protect other safety-related equipment. This pump is an on/off device whose operation can be independently verified by operators using qualified instruments.

(5)

No significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event.

This cable only supplies power to G-27S and does not support the operation of any instrumentation and is isolated so no other safety-related equipment will be affected. This pump is an on/off device whose operation can be independently verified by operators using qualified instruments.

CONCLUSION By the preceeding discussion, the following conclusions are drawn:

1. Alternate equipment and its associated cabling is fully qualified.

2. The cable insulation has suitable material characteristics to withstand and function in the environmental stresses and is considered to be in a justifiable configuration until the refueling outage of 1989.

3. The cable will be replaced in the 1989 refueling outage with fully qualified cable and included in the SONGS-1 EQ program.

Supervising Engineer Page 6

Carol Cable (continued)

REFERENCES

1.

Materials Handbook by and Clauser, 11th edition, pg. 272.

2.

Parker O-Ring Handbook, Impell DI# 0310-035-115, pg. A3-4.

3.

Interoffice memorandum from Alan Nakashima (Bechtel) to G. G. Allen (Bechtel), dated June 9, 1988.

4.

CDM "M" No M38767, Rev 0, EQDP "Anaconda Cable", dated 3/12/86.

5.

CDM "M" No M38280, Rev 2, EQDP "GE Cable", dated 2/3/86.

6.

CDM "M" No M39078, Rev 0, EQDP "Okonite Cable", dated 5/26/86.

7.

Impell report #01-0310-1321 "High Energy Line Break Environmental Analysis San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1, Rev 3, dated 6/87.

8.

Memorandum to W.D. Fargo (Impell) from Jay Mearns (Impell) and Greg Holbron (Impell) Re: "Carol Cable 1GBS219P2 Routed From 480V switchgear Room Directly into the Refueling Water Storage Area", dated 6/20/88.

9.

Anaconda Wire and Cable Data Catalog, section 4 11, "Low Voltage Power Cable".

10.

Rockbestos Wires and Cables Catalog, section PCl-5-78, "Power Cables Firewall EP 600 volts".

11.

Kuriyama, I., et. al., "Radiation Resistance of Cable Insulating materials for nuclear power gnerating stations, "IEEE Transactions, Vol. EI-13, No. 3, 164 (1978).

12.

Investigation of the November, 1985 In-service Cable Failure and Report on the Material Condition of Cables, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1. The 4kV Cable Evaluation Task May, 1986, page 7-28.

13.

SONGS Retrofit General Design Criteria Manual, Revision 6, dated 10/15/87. 14 1 4.

Telecopy from James Fang (Impell) to W Nakamoto (Impell), Re: Circuit Raceway Tracking System, drawing #M30415, Rev 30, 10/30/87, pg. 237.

1 5.

Roc between Mrinal Mitra (Carol Cable) and W Nakamoto (Impell), Re: Ampacity of 600 V/2000V, 3/C, 350 kcmil, type W, non-shielded, super-vutron, 90 degrees C Carol cable, dated 6/27/88.

16.

CDM "M" No M38306, Rev 1, EQDP "Westinghouse Motors", dated 5/29/86.

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