ML13330B315
| ML13330B315 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1988 |
| From: | Medford M SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| TAC-67758, NUDOCS 8806010171 | |
| Download: ML13330B315 (9) | |
Text
Southern California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 M.O.MEDFORD TELEPHONE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING (818) 302-1749 AND LICENSING May 27, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Docket No. 50-206 Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Southern California Edison is currently resolving environmental qualification discrepancies identified during a review of the Environmental Qualification Master List (EQML).
Information regarding this work was provided to the NRC in an LER dated March 30, 1988 and correspondence dated March 11, March 30, April 1 and April 26, 1988.
The results of thereview associated with 10 CFR 50.49b(l) equipment are addressed in Enclosure 1. The equipment identified has been added to the EQML, qualified or replaced, as required.
The results of the review associated with the identification of potential 10 CFR 50.49 b(2) equipment are addressed in Enclosure 2. This equipment has been verified to be acceptable as is or modified such that the potential for interaction with b(l) equipment has been removed.
In addition SCE is currently verifying the qualification of (1) all cable associated with the equipment on the EQML; and (2) b(2) equipment and equipment in a mild environment with cable that traverses a harsh environment. This program will involve walkdowns of cables located in potential harsh environments and may result in a few additional potential b(2) items requiring fusing, but will not result in any new b(l) items.
This evaluation effort is scheduled for completion by mid-June, 1988. The NRC will be advised if any discrepancies are found for which corrective action might delay returning the unit to service by mid-June.
8806010171 880527 PDR ADOCK 05000206 P
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Document Control Desk
-2 Based on the work performed during this mid-cycle outage the Environmental Qualification Program at San Onofre Unit 1 will comply with 10 CFR 50.49 at the time the unit returns to service.
If you have any questions regarding this information please let me know.
Very truly yours, Enclosures cc: 3. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V F. R. Huey, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3 Environmental Qualification Effort for 10 CFR 50.49 b(l)
A comprehensive review of all the safety related equipment at San Onofre Unit 1 which could potentially be located in a harsh environment was performed to determine if that equipment needed to be environmentally qualified.
Qualification would be necessary if the safety related equipment was required to function during a design basis accident. In this case the equipment would be qualified and added to the Environmental Qualification Master List (EQML) to be maintained in a qualified state. The results of the review indicate that additional components require qualification and inclusion on the EQML.
These components are listed on Table 1. A general description of the items and the reasons they were not originally included on the EQML is also provided.
As a part of the review it was determined that the components were not included on the EQML due to one of the following reasons:
a) the component was installed after the original master list but before the implementation of the design control process which identifies equipment requiring environmental qualification and inclusion on the EQML, or b) the component was reclassified as safety related, or c) the component is required to support other components performing a safety function.
The corrective actions included qualification of the component to be added or replacement with a qualified component and the addition of the component to the EQML. In order to verify the accuracy of SCE's review, an independent verification was performed by an outside consultant.
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Table 1 10 CFR 50.49 b(l) Equipment Device Description Corrective Action MOV 1202 AFW Pump Discharge Valve Added to EQML MOV 1204 AFW Pump Discharge Valve Added to EQML HY 1304 Charging Pump to Loop A Replaced and Isolation Valve CV 304, Actuator Added to EQML ZSO/C 1304 Limit Switches for CV 304 Replaced and Added to EQML HY 1305 Charging pump to Press Aux. Spray Replaced and Isolation CV 305 Valve, Actuator Added to EQML ZSO/C 1305 Limit Switches for CV 305 Replaced and Added to EQML PT 459 Mainsteam line Pressure Input to Added to EQML Steam-Feed Mismatch Trip FY 1112 Charging Pump Flow Control Valve Added to EQML FCV 1112, I/P Transducer SV 1112 Solenoid Actuator for FCV 1112 Replaced and Added to EQML TS 34, 35 Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Added to EQML Temperature Elements for Cooler Fans E-17A, B Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Cooling Added to EQML Fans SV 17, 17A Feedwater Pump Miniflow to Replaced and Condensor, Isolation Valve Added to EQML Actuators SV 18, 18A Feedwater Pump Miniflow to Added to EQML, Condensor, Isolation Valve Replaced and Actuators Added to EQML SV 524, 5, Pneumatic Supply Solenoids For Replaced and 6, 7, 8, 9, Feedwater Pump SI Alignment Valves Added to EQML 30, 31 SV 875A, B Feedwater Pump SI Miniflow to Replaced and Refueling Water Storage Tank, Added to EQML Isolation Valve Actuators
-2 ZSO/C 1875A, Limit Switches for SV 875A, B Replaced and B
Added to EQML SV 955, Primary System Sample Containment Replaced and 6, 7 Isolation Valve Actuators Added to EQML SV 1115DA, Containment Recirculation Flow Replaced and DB, EA, EB, Control Valve Pheumatic Supply Added to EQML FA, FB Solenoids SV 2900, Bonnet Vent Solenoid for Added to EQML 3900 Feedwater Pump SI Alignment Valves SV 520, 1, Pneumatic Supply to Feedwater Replaced with check 2, 3 Pump SI Alignment Valves valves SV 135 Service Water to AFW Pump Replaced with check Bearing Solenoid Valve valve CV 2145 Charging Pump Discharge Sample Replaced and Valve Added to EQML FT 2114B, C, Containment Recirculation Flow Added to EQML 3114A Transmitters FY 1115D, E, Containment Recirculation Flow Added to EQML F
Control Valve Transducers T 14A, B Residual Heat Removal Pump Relocated Thermal Overload Devices T 45A Containment Recirculation Pump Relocated Thermal Overload Device X07, 8 Station Service Transformers Added to EQML Environmental Qualification Effort for 10 CFR 50.49 b(2) Equipment 10 CFR 50.49 b(2) requires that equipment could potentially interact with b(l) equipment during the performance of its safety function be identified and evaluated.
SCE initiated a program to identify potential b(2) equipment. This program followed the guidelines outlined in the NRC's May 9, 1984 letter for identifying b(2) equipment. Utilizing the Environmental Qualification Master List (EQML) which had been finalized as part of the b(l) review the elementary electrical drawings for the equipment on the EQML were reviewed. All the devices that are electrically connected to the control and power circuits and power supplies of the equipment were identified. It was then determined whether failure of these devices in a postulated harsh environment could adversely affect the operation of the safety related equipment. All electrically interconnected equipment were reviewed for electrical components which could fail in a postulated harsh environment and affect the b(l) equipment. Where required new fuses were installed. The results of this effort are shown in Table 2.
Once identified, the circuits associated with the potential (b)(2) items were modified through electrical fuse isolation, to prevent impact on the safety function performed by the (b)(1) equipment. In order to verify the adequacy of both the existing and the added isolation devices, a fuse-breaker coordination analysis was performed. The methodology employed postulated that maximum credible fault currents occur in unqualified devices based on fundamental electrical engineering principles.
The purpose of the study is to ensure that failure of the potential b(2) item including the isolated circuit will not impact power supplies to the b(l) equipment. The analysis verified the capability of the existing and added fuses to respond to a failure of potential b(2) devices. The integrity of the resulting electrical protection scheme was ultimately verified in each instance. Modifications involved replacing existing fuses in the potential b(2) device circuits, as shown in Table 3.
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Table'2 Potential 10 CFR 50.49 b(2) Equipment Potential Potential (b)(2)
(b)(2) Device (b)(1) Equip Device Descripption Correctie Action VPS--1 Transformer for SV 7028, D Position Containment Fuse Isolation/
Indication Isolation Removal for SV702B, D valve position indication VPS-2 Transformer for SV 702A, C Position Containment Fuse Isolation/
Indication Isolation Removal for SV702A, C valve position indication SV 600 Spray Hydrazine SV533A ZSO/C.
Service Water Fuse Isolation ZSO/C2600 Isolation Valve and Limit 2533 SV537A and Makeup Water Switches ZSO/C 2537 Containment Isolation Valves and Limit Switches FV-2077, Service Water to Recirculation G45A, 13 Containment Fuse Isolation 3078 Pump Bearings Control Recirculation Circuits Pumps SV 601 Spray Hydrazine Isolation Valve SV126 ZSO/C Service Water, Fuse Isolation ZSO/C 2601 and Limit Switches 3115 SV532 Nitrogen and ZSO/C 1532 Makeup Water SV 534A ZSO/C Containment 3534 Isolation Valves and Limit Switches SV 951 Primary System Sample Containment ZSO/C 2951 Position Fuse Isolation Isolation Valve Actuator Indication SV 953 Primary System Sample Containment ZSO/C 2953 Position Fuse Isolation Isolation Valve Actuator Indication SV 962 Primary System Sample Containment ZSO/C 2962 Position Fuse Isolation Isolation Valve Actuator Indication PCV430C, H, Pressurizer Aux. Spray and HY 1304 Charging Pump Fuse Isolation HCV 1117 Excess Letdown Isolation Valves Discharge Isolation Valve Actuator Humidity Containment High Humidity Alarm SV28, 9, 30 Containment Fuse Isolation Bridge and Ventilation Amplifier Isolation Valve Actuators FY 5112 DSD Charging Pump Discharge FCV 1112 Charging Pump Open Breaker Isolation Valve Actuator Discharge Isolation Valve FY 1115A, Containment Recirculation Flow FY 11150, E, F Containment Replaced, Added B, C Control Valve Transducers Recirculation to EQML Flow Control Valve Train A Transducers
Table 3 Potential 10 CFR 50.49 b(2) Equipment from Fuse Coordination Study Potential (b)(2)
Associated (b)(1)
Fuse Coordination Equipment Equipment Resolution LCV 1112 FY 1203, ZSO/C 1203, HY 1304, ZSO/C 1304, Coordinated FY 1202, ZSO/C 1202, FY 1204, ZSO/C 1204 SV 225 FY 1203, ZSO/C 1203, HY 1304, ZSO/C 1304, Replaced FY 1202, ZSO/C 1202, FY 1204, ZSO/C 1204 SV 276 HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287, Coordinated HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305 SV 288 HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287, Coordinated HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305 TCV 1105 HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287, Replaced HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305 LCV 1100A HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287, Replaced HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305 SV 544 HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305, Coordinated HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287 SV 412 SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Coordinated SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 SV 413 SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Replaced SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 SV 414 SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Replaced SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 RCV 605 SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Coordinated SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 HCV 602 SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Coordinated SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 TCV 601A SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Coordinated SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 TCV 601B SV 411, ZSO/C 1411 Replaced SV 410, ZSO/C 1410 PO 1, 2, ZSO/C 2009, ZSO/C 2010, Coordinated 3, 4, 5, SV 28, SV 29, SV 30 6, 7, 8
PO 13, 14, ZSO/C 2009, ZSO/C 2010, Coordinated 15, 16, 21 SV 28, SV 29, SV 30 PCV 1115A HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305, Replaced HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287 PCV 1115B HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305, Replaced HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287 PCV 1115C HY 1305, ZSO/C 1305, Replaced HY 1287, ZSO/C 1287 SV 99 ZSO/C 2009, ZSO/C 2010, Coordinated SV 28, SV 29, SV 30 SV 2001, AEH22001, 3001, PE 2001, 3001, Coordinated 2, 3, 3001, TE2001, 3001, SV 2004, SV 3004, 2, 3 LE 2001, 3001, 2002A, B, C, LE 3002A, B, C, PT 2001, 3001