ML13310B388
| ML13310B388 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/1984 |
| From: | Medford M SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-44478, NUDOCS 8405070006 | |
| Download: ML13310B388 (3) | |
Text
Southern California Edison Company P. O. BOX 800 2244WALNUTGROVEAVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 M.O.MEDFORD TELEPHONE MANAGER, NUCLEAR LICENSING May 1, 1984 1213) 572-1749 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: D. M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Docket No. 50-206 Post-Accident Sampling Capability San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 By letter dated March 14, 1983, you issued a Confirmatory Order which set forth the implementation schedules for certain post-TMI related items.
In particular, the Confirmatory Order requires the implementation of the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) during the current outage.
The purpose of this letter is to reschedule the completion of the PASS to the next refueling outage. As discussed in our letter of April 16, 1984, the San Onofre Unit 1 startup date is now anticipated in mid-September 1984. However, based on the extent of work remaining, the PASS cannot be completed until the next refueling outage, which is expected to occur approximately fifteen calendar months following return to service from the current outage. It is requested that the Confirmatory Order dated March 14, 1983 be revised to reflect completion of the PASS prior to return to service from the next refueling outage. Additional details related to this request are provided below.
The PASS at San Onofre Unit 1 is a Combustion Engineering skid mounted unit. It is installed in an underground pit with two chambers, for shielding purposes. The first chamber, accessible only when the shielded cover is opened, contains the PASS skid, piping from the containment, electrical and control penetrations, an HVAC system for environmental control, and a sump.
The second chamber is the operator's control area with the control boards and its own HVAC system and also is shielded from the first chamber. The second chamber is accessible by an entry stairwell. The PASS is approximately 400 feet from the control room and is within the radiologically controlled area.
80507-0006 8450 70DRA DOCK 05000
'PPD
Mr. D.
May 1, 1984 The actions completed to date and the actions necessary to complete the PASS are described in Enclosure 1 to this letter. Based upon these actions, we have completed a substantial portion of the work necessary to complete the PASS. The majority of the work necessary to achieve PASS operability is the startup testing, training, and operation procedures checkout. The actions necessary to complete the PASS, some of which will be performed in parallel, are expected to take fifteen to twenty-two months. As stated in Enclosure 1 to this letter, the schedule for startup testing of the San Onofre Unit 1 PASS is based upon the startup experience at San Onofre Units 2 and 3 for a similar PASS unit. The effective use of the training period requires that the PASS be operable and San Onofre Unit 1 be in at least Mode 3 operation. Based upon this schedule, the PASS can be completed prior to return to service from the next refueling outage as discussed above.
We are developing an alternate means of post-accident sampling capability similar to the plan described in Enclosure 5 to the April 14, 1983 letter submitted in Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 for San Onofre Units 2 and
- 3. This alternate sampling capability will be completed prior to Unit 1 entry into Mode 2, consistent with the requirements of the Station PASS Program as described in General Station Order S0123-G-19, "PASS Program." Accordingly, the core damage assessment procedure based upon the alternate PASS methods is currently being developed and will be completed prior to Unit 1 entry into Mode 2. For your information, the core damage assessment procedure referred to in our December 27, 1983 letter related to the permanent PASS will also be completed prior to return to service from the next refueling outage.
Based on the information discussed above, the delay in the implementation of the PASS is caused by the time required to procure material, complete startup testing and complete training. In addition, interim measures will be implemented pending completion of the PASS. Since the bases for the delay in the completion of the PASS are consistent with the bases utilized by the NRC to approve delays in the implementaton of certain post-TMI related items as documented in the Confirmatory Order dated March 14, 1983, it is respectfully requested that you approve the delay in the completion of the PASS until the next refueling outage.
If you have any questions regarding this request, please let me know.
Very truly yours, 6?'
POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1 Actions to Date Purchase Order Issued to CE.
June, 1980 Construction of PASS Pit Initiated.
January, 1981 Final Construction to Receive PASS August, 1981 Skid into PASS Pit.
CE PASS Skid Delivery to Site September, 1981 CE PASS Skid into Pit.
January, 1982 CE/SCE Punch List Initiated to Track July, 1982 Numerous Startup Problems.
Many Unit 1 parts Utilized by San Onofre September, 1982 Units 2 and 3 for Startup of Similar through CE PASS Units.
January, 1983 Minimum Effort and Improvements, Including May, 1983 Preservation Due to Uncertainty Regarding through San Onofre Unit 1 Return-to-Service Date.
Present Actions to Complete PASS Procure Replacements for Parts Utilized 3 month lead time for San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
Reinstall Components and Perform Remaining 4 months PASS Skid Upgrades.
Perform Start-Up Testing (after 9 months, based Installation of Parts and Completion upon experience at of Upgrades).
San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Training, Operational, Maintenance, and 6 months Calibration Procedures Checkout.
LAB:1554F