ML13309A079
| ML13309A079 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1981 |
| From: | Baskin K Southern California Edison Co |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111090668 | |
| Download: ML13309A079 (52) | |
Text
Southern California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE
- ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 K. P. BASKIN TELEPHONE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING, (213) 572-1401 SAFETY, AND LICENSING NOveiber 4, 1981 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or Attention:
D. M. Crutchfield, Chief RE Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing LA KI 81M U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Docket No. 502-206 Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 By letter dated June 2, 1981, you transmitted the Requlatory staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) regarding the environmental qualification of electrical equipment at San Onofre Unit 1. Enclosures 1, 2 and 3 of this letter transmits our response to the SER, additional information regarding equipment not addressed in the SER, and revised pages to our October 31, 1980 letter.
This represents efforts to date in obtaining information regarding equipment qualification.
As indicated in Enclosures 1 and 2, we have obtained information which demonstrates qualification to the DOR Guidelines, information which requires additional analyses to demonstrate qualification, information which demonstrates equipment will operate prior to seeing a harsh environment, and information insufficient to demonstrate qualification to the DOR Guidelines.
For that equipment requiring additional analyses to demonstrate qualification, our evaluation is continuing and the results will be provided to the NRC upon completion. For that equipment identified for replacement, we will provide a completion schedule, including engineering and design time, material availability, and construction time, by December 1, 1981. In some cases, we have already replaced equipment which was demonstrated to not meet the post-accident harsh environment.
If you have any questions regarding the enclosed information, please let me know.
Very truly yours, 81110906 11104 PDR ADOCK 05000206 PDR Endlosures
ENCLOSURE 1 Southern California Edison Company's Responseto -the NRC'-s Safety-Evaluation Report By The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation REULCH OKET RLE COPY
3.1 COMPLETENESS OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT The SER indicates that the systems identified by SCE are acceptable.
3.2 SERVICE CONDITIONS The staff assumes and requires that the Licensee verify that the containment spray system is automatic and not subject to a disabling single component failure and, therefore, satisfies DOR Guideline requirements of Section 4.2.1. Our October 31, 1980 letter indicated that the containment spray system is automatic; however, no discussion was provided concerning the single failure criteria. The containment spray system was evaluated as part of the Single Failure Analysis of the ECCS which was provided to the NRC by letter dated December 21, 1976.
The evaluation identified various administrative controls which have been implemented to ensure the containment spray system cannot be disabled by a single component failure. Therefore, the large break LOCA peak environment conditions have been used in the qualification of the safety-related electrical equipment located inside containment.
A Main Steam Line Break analysis inside the San Onofre Unit 1 containment has been performed. This analysis was done as part of the TMI Action Plans for automating the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The results of that analysis were provided to the NRC in letters dated June 10, 1980 and March 6, 1981.
The results indicated that the environmental conditions resulting from the MSLB enveloped the LOCA conditions.
The March 6, 1981 letter concluded that the double-ended guillotine rupture of the main steam line is not a credible event and the consequences of a probable steam line rupture would be no more severe than the post-LOCA temperature and pressure. This conclusion is based on the mechanistic fracture evaluation of the main steam line provided to the NRC by letter dated January 14, 1981. As part of our environmental qualification work we are proceeding to perform analysis of a more probable steam line break as indicated in the fracture evaluation. The results of this effort will be provided to the staff when it becomes available.
3.3 TEMPERATURE,
- PRESSURE, AND HUMIDITY CONDITIONS INSIDE CONTAINMENT As indicated in Section 3.2, the analysis for the MSLB has been performed.
The peak containment conditions are as follows:
T = 406oF P = 53.0 psig H = 100%
As discussed in Section 3.2, it is concluded that the MSLB event which yields these peak conditions is not a credible event. The more probable type of break resulting in the main steam line would result in conditions no worse than the post-LOCA peak conditions. Therefore, use of the LOCA peak pressure and temperature for environmental qualification is considered appropriate.
-2 Contrary to the NRC staff's recommendations, we have concluded that an increase in the minimum temperature profile to account for higher than average temperature in the upper regions of the containment that can exist due to stratification is not warranted. The basis for this conclusion is that the inherent conservatisms in our containment pressure and temperature analysis and the conservatisms included by the DOR Guideline requirements of Sections 4.0 and 6.0 assure adequate margins to the maximum containment conditions.
3.4 TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE AND HUMIDITY CONDITIONS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT The SER indicates that the conditions utilized for areas outside containment are acceptable. SCE and their consultants are assessing the appropriateness of these parameters outside containment as compared to time dependent temperature and pressure analyses.
The results of this assessment will be provided to the NRC.
3.5 SUBMERGENCE The October 31, 1980 submittal identified the following items as submerged.
The SER indicated only two of the items below as being submerged.
G45 A and B LC 951 LS 73 CV 287 GE Vulkene Cable GE Cable G14 A and B MOV 822 A and B HCV 602 FT 602 MOV 813 and 814 MOV 833 and 834 3.6 CHEMICAL SPRAY The SER referenced chemical concentrations for the containment spray system which are not appropriate. Our October 31, 1980 letter indicated that the chemical concentrations are contained in Amendment 52 submitted by letter dated December 3, 1975. Those concentrations are as follows:
Boric Acid RWST: 4300 ppm maximum 3750 ppm minimum RCS:
3750 ppm maximum 1 ppm minimum
-3 Hydrazine 55 ppm concentration at the refueling water pump discharge.
Trisodium Phosphate Sufficient TSP is stored in the containment sump to maintain the sump fluid pH between 7.5 and 7.0 within four hours after initiation of the containment sprays.
For the staff's information, SCE is presently preparing a proposed change to the Technical Specifications which affects the post-accident sump pH.
The minimum pH within four hours will be 6.8 instead of 7.0.
3.7 AGING Based on the requirements of the DOR Guidelines the licensee is required to consider the aging characteristics of equipment materials in maintenance or replacement schedules, to review maintenance and surveillance records to identify age related degradation and to identify the material susceptability to thermal and radiation aging.
In order to assess the material aging of safety-related equipment, we have conducted aging evaluations for existing equipment, and based on available information, we have established the qualified life for some equipment. Where we have been unable to determine the qualified life of some equipment as a result of not having sufficient information and for equipment with less than full life qualification, our October 31, 1980 letter committed to institute a maintenance and surveillance program for periodic replacement and monitoring of age related degradation.
In addition, a program will be implemented to assess the material aging of all new equipment. Appendix A of this report provides a description of methodology used in assessing the material aging of equipment.
3.8 RADIATION (INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT)
As indicated in Table 3 of the October 31, 1980 submittal, the DOR guideline value for gamma radiation was utilized in the evaluation. It also states that due to the low penetrating power of beta radition, it is generally less significant than gamma radiation for equipment qualification.
Electrical equipment is usually surrounded by casing material which prevents the intrusion of beta radiation.
The only concern with respect to beta radiation is electric cable exposed to the containment atmosphere. Section 4.1 of the DOR guidelines indicates that of the general classes of electrical equipment in the plant, electrical cable is considered the most vulnerable to beta radiation.
Therefore, the guideline value for gamma and beta radiation were utilized only in the assessment of electrical cable. The assessment of beta radiation is included in Appendix A of the October 31, 1980 submittal.
Appendix A included a Wyle Laboratories Engineering Report entitled, Electrical Cable Qualification Analysis for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1.
-4 4.0 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT The status of the qualification of the electrical equipment to date is provided in the response to Appendices B and C.
5.0 DEFERRED REQUIREMENTS The environmental qualification information for the equipment installed for general commitments such as this tend to be unfulfilled. Please provide a specific date by which qualification documentation will be provided. TMI requirements is currently being generated. As this information is developed and assessed, it will be provided to the NRC prior to the June 30, 1982 deadline.
APPENDIX A PURPOSE This report is a discussion of the aging methodology used to assess safety-related electrical equipment installed in a harsh environment at Southern California Edison Company's (SCE) San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit I (SONGS I).
SUMMARY
The methodology presented herein is consistent with the NRC's DOR Guidelines.
The purpose of aging analysis per the DOR Guidelines is to determine if material constituents of safety-related electrical equipment are significantly affected by radiation and thermal aging.
Where it was determined that the life of material constituents of Class IE equipment is less than the qualified life of the plant a shorter, life is assigned to the material and a preventive maintenance and surveillance interval is called out for that equipment.
DISCUSSION The DOR Guidelines require that materials within safety-related electrical equipment which are subject to significant aging effects be evaluated. Significant aging effects (or degradation) of non-metallic or polymeric constituents of Class IE equipment is defined as that amount of degradation that would place a substantial doubt on the ability of that equipment to perform its safety function in design basis event environment.
The two primary effects of aging that require evaluation are radiation and thermal. The following discussion describes how the non-metallic material of electrical equipment is evaluated for radiation and thermal aging:
1
Radiation Susceptability Analysis The Class IE equipment has been divided into two categories, inside and outside containment for the purpose of evaluating the effect of radiation. For equipment located outside containment, the effect of gamma is the only radiation of concern.
For equipment inside containment, in addition to gamma, the effect of beta is also considered.
For equipment outside containment which has radiation test data available, verification of the data is required.
For that equipment which does not have radiation test data available, an evaluation of the specific non-metallic materials is required.
The following criteria was utilized for the radiation evaluation of equipment located inside containment. Due to the low penetrating power of beta particles, beta radiation is only of concern to equipment that has non-metallic material exposed directly to the containment environment such as cable insulation cable in open trays.
The beta dose could be reduced by a factor of 10 if the cable insulation is 30 mils thick.
An additional 40 mils of thickness reduces the dose by another factor of 10 and for 70 mils, a factor of 100. If the beta dose including shielding is less than or equal to 10 percent of the specified dose to which equipment is tested, the Class 1E equipment is qualified to the specified dose for gamma and beta radiation. If this criteria was not met, the equipment is evaluated for the effect of both gamma and beta radiation. The total radiation dose used as a base for the evaluation is the sum of beta and gamma dose.
The radiation evaluation is performed by comparing the radiation threshold damage of each non-metallic material constituent to the radiation dose specified for the equipment environment.
If the lowest radiation damage threshold is significantly greater than the specified dose, the equipment is considered to not have materials susceptable to the radiation dose specified.
Where the lowest radiation threshold damage equals or is slightly less than the specified dose, the equipment is considered to have material(s) susceptable to the radiation dose specified.
All radiation susceptable materials of the equipment are identified.
2
Time/Temperature Susceptability Analyses For non-metallic materials, it is known that the degradation process can be defined by a single temperature-dependent reaction that follows the Arrhenius equation k = A exp
-(Ea/kB)
(l/T)
(1) where k
=
reaction rate A
=
frequency factor exp
=
exponent to base e Ea
=
activation energy kB
=
Boltzmann's Constant T
=
absolute temperature It is further noted that, for many reactions, the activation energy can be considered to be constant over the applicable temperature range.
Life is assumed to be inversely proportional to the chemical reaction rate.
In terms of life, and after converting to Napierian base logarithms, equation (1) becomes In (life)
=
(Ea)
(1)
+
Contant (2)
(kB)
(T)
Intercept (always a negative number)
Equation (2) is used to determine if any non-metallic material of safety-related equipment has the potential for significant degradation due to the time/temperature aging mechanism.
The anticipated life of each non-metallic constituent of safety-related equipment at the limiting service condition is calculated through equation (2).
If the calculated life of a material is greater than desired life by a factor of 3, that material is considered to be insensitive to time/temperature aging for the specified service temperature. If the calculated life for a material does not fulfill the above criteria, then material is considered to be susceptable to time/temperature aging for the service condition specified. A qualified life at that service temperature less than the plant life is specified for the material. This process is performed for all non-metallic material of safety-related equipment.
3
Example of Radiation Susceptability Analysis The example chosen for this analysis is a cable exposed to the environment inside containment, the following data is known:
- 1)
Specified beta dose 2 x 108 rads
- 2)
Specified gamma dose 2 x 107 rads
- 3)
Cable has been exposed to gamma radiation of 2 x 107 rads
- 4)
Insulation of cable is 80 mils Analysis
- 1)
The cable is located inside containment and exposed to containment environment without any shielding. The cable is evaluated for beta radiation in addition to gamma.
- 2)
The insulation is greater than 70 mils, therefore, the beta radiation dose including shielding is 0
2 x 108 rads =
2 x 106
- 3)
The DOR acceptance criterion is (Shielding considered) beta dose is equal to or less than 10 percent of the total gamma dose.
2 x 106 10 percent of 2 x 107 rads The cable is said to be qualified per DOR Guidelines. If above criteria was not met, then sum of beta radiation (considering shielding) and gamma dose 2 x 106 + 2 x 107 = 2.2 x 107 rads gamma is used for radiation susceptability analysis.
4
Example of Time/Temperature Aging Susceptability Analysis The subject of this example is Epoxy Resin. The following data is known:
Desired life = 40 years Service temperature = 420C and 200C operating temperature use Ea = 1.38 eV K = 8.617 x 105 Intercept = -30.8 In (life)
=
Ea x
I
+ (intercept)
K T
In (life)
=
1.48 eV x I
30.8 8.617-335 life
=
7.75 x 108 hours0.00125 days <br />0.03 hours <br />1.785714e-4 weeks <br />4.1094e-5 months <br /> or 8.85 x 104 year The calculated life is greater than desired life of 40 years by a significant factor.
Therefore, this material is considered not to have potential for significant time/temperature aging.
5
APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information And/Or Corrective Action Provided below is an update of the equipment qualification effort for that equipment identified in Appendix B of the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report.
TER No:
1 (FT 460, 461 and 462)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
E 11 DM Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging, Qualification Time Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines.
The test reports utilized for the qualification do not adequately demonstrate the relationship between the tested model and the installed model.
However, it does indicate that a similar model transmitter did operate while subjected to an accident environment.
As indicated in our October 31, 1980 letter, these transmitters are required for reactor protection.
The operation time for the transmitters is immediate and consequently the transmitters will perform their safety function prior to seeing a harsh environment.
Based on this information, the transmitters will perform their safety function and will not be replaced.
TER No:
3A and 3B (PT 430, 431 and 432)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
E11GM and NE11GM Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging, Qualification Time Statuts:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines.
The test reports utilized for the qualification do not adequately demonstrate the relationship between the tested model and the installed model.
However it does indicate that a similar model transmitter did operate while subjected to an accident environment.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates that these transmitters will operate immediately for a large break LOCA or early in the accident for a small break LOCA or secondary line break.
The transmitters will perform their safety function prior to seeing a harsh environment or during an environment which is not as extreme as the large break LOCA. Based on this information, the transmitters will perform their safety function and will not be replaced.
-2 TER No:
4 (LT 430, 431 and 432)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
E13DH-HFD-SAH1 Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging, Qualification Time Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guideline.
The test reports utilized for the qualification do not adequately demonstrate the relationship between the tested model and the installed model.
However, it does indicate that a similar model transmitter did operate while subjected to an accident environment.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicated that these transmitters provide a reactor trip on high pressurizer level.
In the event of a small break LOCA or a secondary line break these transmitters are used to monitor the RCS. During the accident in which the transmitters are monitoring the RCS, they will not see the extreme environmental conditions of the large break LOCA.
Based on this information, the transmitters will perform their safety function and will not be replaced.
TER No:
5 (G3A and B)
OEquipment
Description:
Motor Manufacturer:
Byron Jackson/Westinghouse motor Model/Type:
DVMX/CS Type Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
These motors are required to he operational for the Feedwater and Condensate System during normal operation.
The pumps deliver feedwater to the steam generators.
Upon initiation of Safety Injection, these pumps are automa tically isolated from the Feedwater System by the opening and closing of valves. Once isolated, the pumps are part of the Safety Injection System and will deliver borated water to the Reactor Coolant System.
Since these motors are located outside containment they will be exposed to radiation only during a LOCA. Depending on the extent of the break these pumps are required during the early part of the accident until long term recirculation is initiated. In the event of a secondary line break outside containment in the vicinity of one of the motors, the motor would be exposed to saturated steam conditions. Continuous operation of these motors offers credibility for their operation during an accident.
We have obtained information regarding these motors which requi re additional analysis to demonstrate qualification.
-3 TER No:
6 (HV 853, 851, 854, 852)
Equipment
Description:
HV with positioner Manufacturer:
Teledyne Model/Type:
02112-002-5210- and 02112-003-5210 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We have performed a materials analysis on these positioners.
The analysis addressed the temperature, pressure, relative humidity and radiation environment. The radiation thresholds and thermal aging effects were also addressed.
Based on the results of this evaluation the positioners are qualified for outside containment use for 40 years.
TER No:
9 (FT 912, 913 and 914)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
630-2AS Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these transmitters are used to monitor safety injection flow until it is terminated and recirculation is initiated.
These transmitters would be exposed to radiation in the event of a LOCA or saturated steam in the event of a secondary line break in the vicinity of the transmitters.
In the event of failure of these transmitters the operator can monitor the RWST level to determine if safety injection flow exists.
As noted in our October 31, 1981 letter these transmitters are not required for the proper operation of the safety injection system and will not be replaced.
TER No:
10 (MOV 850 A, B and C)
Equipment
Description:
MOV Manufacturer:
Limitorque Model/Type:
SMA-1-40 Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these valves which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines. Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates that these valves are the safety injection discharge valves at the RCS cold legs.
Based on accident analyses these valves are required to operate within 30 seconds of the accident.
These valves will perform their required safety function early in the accident and will not be replaced.
-4 TER No:
11 (G45A and B)
Equipment
Description:
Motor Manufacturer:
Chempump Model/Type:
GPS-60L 46H-3T Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We have verified that the pumps are capable of performing their safety function in the event of an accident including the aging of non-metallic materials in the motors for a limited life. Prior to attaining this life, these pump motors will either be replaced with qualified units or refurbished to maintain the existing motors qualification.
TER No:
12 (MOV 866 A and B)
Equipment
Description:
MOV Manufacturer:
Limitorque Model/Type:
SMB-000-5 Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these valves which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these valves are required to operate for the recirculation phase of safety injection.
The valves operate once, early in the accident and are not required to be operated again during the course of the accident. These valves will perform their safety function and will not be replaced.
TER No:
13 (FT 500 and 501)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
E13DM Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging, Qualification Time Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines. The test reports utilized for the qualification do not adequately demonstrate the relationship between the test model and the installed model.
However, it does indicate that a similar model transmitter did operate while subjected to an accident environment.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these transmitters are used to monitor recirculation flow.
In the event the transmitters fail, pneumatic flow indicators are available.
Based on the information provided in the test report, the transmitters will perform their safety function and will not be replaced.
ofteacdn.Teevavswl0efr hi
-5 TER No:
19A (FCV 1115 D, E and F)
Equipment
Description:
Flow Controller Manufacturer:
Honeywell Model/Type:
IS HE-i Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these flow controllers which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines. These valves are required to be modulated for recirculation flow at various times during the accident up to 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br />. Since these flow controllers are expected to operate in a harsh environment and other equipment in a non-harsh environment is not available to perform a similar function, the flow controllers will be replaced.
TER No:
19B Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
B8300-B56R1 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
The solenoid and the actuator internals and the regulator were replaced during the last refuel ing/ma intenance/steam generator sl eevi ng outage. In addition, a regular maintenance program was instituted for these valves.
Detailed information regarding the valves refurbishment is documented in our letter dated May 4, 1981.
TER No:
21 (MOV 356, 357 and 358)
Equipment
Description:
MOV Manufacturer:
Limitorque Model/Type:
SMB-00-25 Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these valves which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines. Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these valves are required to open for the recirculation phase of safety injection.
The valves operate once early in the accident and are not required to operate again during the course of the accident. These valves will perform their safety function and will not be replaced.
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-6 TER No:
26 (FT 504)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
E13DM Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines. The test reports utilized for the qualification do not adequately demonstrate the relationship between the tested model and the installed model.
However, it does indicate that a similar model transmitter did operate while subjected to an accident environment.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these transmitters monitor containment spray flow and are located outside containment. The transmitters will be exposed to a radiation harsh environment only.
These transmitters will perform their safety function and will not be replaced.
TER No:
27 Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPLR 8300B59 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We have identified parts of the solenoid that will degrade. However, as demonstrated in the analysis 0
referenced in our October 31, 1980 letter the valve will perform its safety function to allow borated water to the spray nozzles.
These solenoids will perform their required safety function and will not be replaced.
TER No:
28 (PT 501, 502 and 503)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
[11GM Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines.
The test reports utilized for the qualification do not adequately demonstrate the relationship between the tested model and the installed model.
However, it does indicate that a similar model transmitter did operate while subjected to an accident environment.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these transmitters initiate the containment spray actuation signal.
These transmitters are located outside containment and will be exposed to a radiation harsh environment only.
These transmitters will perform the required safety bfunction and will not e replaced.
-7 TER No:
29 (CV 102, 104 and 106)
Equipment
Description:
SOy Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
8300 B61R Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We have identified material in the solenoid that will degrade. However, as demonstrated in the analysis referenced in our October 31, 1980 letter, the valve will perform its safety function. These solenoids will not be replaced.
TER No:
30 (CV 103, 105 and 107)
Equipnent
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
8300B61 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
31 (CV 146 and 147)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPLB 8300 B59 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
32 (SV 1212-8 and 1212-9)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPLB 8300 B59 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
33 (CV 117, 118 and 119)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPLB 831735 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See discussion in TER No. 29.
-8 TER No:
34 (CV 120, 121 and 122)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WP 831735 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
35 (CV 123)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WP 8300-B61R Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
36 (CV 537)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPHT X 832093 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
37 (CV 115)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPLB 8300 B61RU Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
38 (SV 702B and D)
Equipment
Description:
Solenoid Manufacturer:
Marotta Model/Type:
MV-583H-4A Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these solenoid valves which would demonstrate qualification to the DOR Guidelines. Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these valves are normally closed and are required to remain closed during the accident.
Failure of these solenoid valves would not prevent them from performing their safety function. We have performed a materials analysis on these solenoids which verifies their failure will not affect the valve remaining closed. Based on this information, the valves will not be replaced.
0e h icsini E o 9
-9 TER No:
39 (SV 702A and C)
Equipment
Description:
Solenoid Manufacturer:
Marotta Model/Type:
MV-583H-4A Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 38.
TER No:
40 (POV9 and 10)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
8345 C11 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
41 (CV 40 and 116)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPLB 8300 B59RF Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
42 (CV 10)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPLB-8300-B59 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
43 (CV 533 and 536)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPHT X 832093 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
44 (CV 534 and 535)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPHT X 832093 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed St atus:
See the discussion in TER No.
29.
-10 TER No:
45 (CV 525 and 527)
Equipment
Description:
MDv Manufacturer:
Gulf and Western Model/Type:
EBV-D2-3006 and EBV-D3-15014 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We have obtained information concerning component qualification which requires additional analysis to demionstrate qualification.
TER No:
46 (CV 526 and 528)
Equipment
Description:
Manufacturer:
Gulf and Western Model/Type:
EBV-D2-3006 and EBV-D3-15014 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 45.
TER No:
47 (CV 287)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We have identified material in the solenoid that will degrade. However, as demonstrated in the analysis referenced in our October 31, 1980 letter the valve will perform its safety function.
This solenoid will not be replaced.
TER No:
48 (CV 202, 203 and 204)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPLB 8300 B59 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
49 (CV 532)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPHTX 8320 93 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See the discussion in TER No. 29.
TER No:
50 (CV 515 and 516)
Equipment
Description:
Manufacturer:
Gulf and Western Model/Type:
EBV-D-6-15018 Deficiency:
Qualification Infomation Being Developed Status:
See TER No. 45.
TER No:
51 (PT 1120A, B and C and PT 1121A, B and C)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
E11M Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines. The test reports utilized for the qualification do not adequately demonstrate the relationship between the tested model and the installed model.
However, it does indicate that a similar model transmitter did operate while subjected to an accident environment.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these transmitters input into the containment isolation and safety injection signals.
They are required to operate early in the accident to initiate containment isolation or safety injection.
The transmitters are located outside containment, and will be exposed to a radiation harsh environment only.
These transmitters will perform their required safety function and will not be replaced.
TER No:
58 (CV 76, 77, 78 and 79)
Equipment
Description:
Solenoid Manufacturer:
Valvair Model/Type:
5682-2 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these solenoid valves to demonstrate qualification to the DOR Guidelines. Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these solenoid valves are used for the atmospheric steam dump valves.
The valves are shielded such that they would only be exposed to radiation in the area.
Since the valves are not required for a large break LOCA and are located outside containment the harsh environment they would be exposed to would be limited.
These valves will perform their required safety function and will not be replaced.
adqaeydmntaeterltosiSewe h
-12 TER No:
62 (TE 606)
Equipment
Description:
Temperature Sensor Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
DB-13V-26W Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding this sensor to demonstrate qualification to the DOR Guidelines.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these teSterature sensors monitor the component cooling water and are located outside containment.
These sensors would only be exposed to a radiation environment due to recirculation equipment in the area.
These sensors will perform their required safety function and will not be replaced.
TER No:
64 (GlOS)
Equipment
Description:
Motor Manufacturer:
Westinghouse Model/Type:
Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
See TER No. 45.
TER No:
66 (LT 450X, 451X and 452X)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Ma nufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
NE-13DM Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging, Qualification Time Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate qualification to the DOR Guidelines. The test reports utilized for the qualification do not adequatley demonstrate the relationship between the tested model and the installed model.
However, it does indicate that a similar model transmitter did operate while subjected to an accident environment.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these transmitters monitor steam generator level and provide actuation of the the auxiliary feedwater system.
These transmitters will perform their required safety function and will not be replaced.
-13 TER No:
67 Equipment
Description:
Cable Manufacturer:
GE Model/Type:
Vulkene Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed, Aging, Radiation Status:
We have performed an evaluation of the cable installed at Unit 1. This evaluation included temperature, radiation threshold and thermal aging.
Results were provided in Appendix A of our October 31, 1980 letter. It indicated that Vulkene cross-linked polyethylene is qualified for plant life.
TER No:
68 Equipment
Description:
Cable Manufacturer:
GE Model/Type:
FR-EPR Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Submergence Status:
The evaluation identified in TER No. 67 indicates this cable is qualified for plant life.
TER No:
71 Equipment
Description:
Electrical Penetrations Manufacturer:
Viking Model/Type:
Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
We have performed a material analysis on these penetrations which indicated these penetrations are capable of performing their safety function.
However, additional information and analyses are required to demonstrate qualification.
TER No:
73 Equipment
Description:
Electrical Penetration Manufacturer:
Amphenol Model/Type:
Deficiency:
Aging, Chemical Spray Status:
We evaluated the available test data and performed a material analysis. The results of the evaluation indicate that the penetrations are qualified for a limited life of 12 years. Additional analysis is required to demostrate qualification for plant life. Prior to exceeding the limited life these penetrations will be fully qualified or replaced.
-14 TER No:
79 Equipment
Description:
Resistance Temperature Detector Manufacturer:
Weed Instruments Model/Type:
2004 Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed Status:
These detectors are being replaced.
The qualification of the new detectors will be addressed with the equipment installed as part of TMI modifications as indicated in Section 5.
TER No:
81 Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
E11GM Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging, Qualification Time, Radiation Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines. The test reports utilized for the qualification do not adequately demonstrate the relationship between the tested model and the installed model.
However, it does indicate that a similar model transmitter did operate while subjected to an accident environment.
This transmitter is used for the RCS subcooling recorder. This transmitter will be exposed to the containment harsh environment. Based on the information provided in the test reports, this transmitter will perform its safety function and will not be replaced.
TER No:
92 Equipment
Description:
Terminal Block Manufacturer:
Model/Type:
Deficiency:
Qualification Information to be Developed, Aging, Qualification Method, Chemical Spray, Radiation Status:
During the last refueling/maintenance/steam generator sleeving outage, terminal blocks in safety-related circuits were replaced with Raychem cable splices. The qualification of these splices is addressed in TER No. 74. Details regarding the terminal block replacement was provided by our letter dated May 18, 1981.
-15 TER No:
96 (FT 602)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
E13DM Deficiency:
Qualification Method, Aging, Qualification Time, Submergence, Radiation Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would demonstrate their qualification to the DOR Guidelines. The test reports utilized for the qualification do not adequately demonstrate the relationship between the tested model and the installed model.
However, it does indicate that a similar model transmitter did operate while subjected to an accident environment.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates this transmitter monitors RHR flow and would only be required to operate during a secondary line break.
In the event the break is inside containment, this transmitter will be submerged.
There are other means available for shutdown if this transmitter or the RHR System fails.
This transmitter will not be replaced.
TER No:
100 Equipment
Description:
Cable Manufacturer:
Model/Type:
Deficiency:
Qualification Information Being Developed, Aging Qualification Method, Submergence, Chemical Spray Status:
We have performed an evaluation of the cable installed at Unit 1. The results of that evaluation indicated that specific cables are not qualified.
During the last refueling/maintenance/steam generator sleeving outage, this cable was replaced.
Details regarding the cable replacement was provided to the NRC by our letter dated May 18, 1981.
ACL:1815
APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable TER No:
2 (FT 456, 457 and 458)
Equipment
Description:
Transmitter Manufacturer:
Foxboro Model/Type:
613DM Deficiency:
Aging Status:
We are unable to obtain information regarding these transmitters which would allow us to determine a qualified life for the transmitters. Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these transmitters will initiate a reactor trip immediately in the event of a secondary line break. If these transmitters are affected by a break in their vicinity, other instrumentation is available to provide reactor trip.
These transmitters will not be replaced.
TER No:
69 Equipment
Description:
Cable Manufacturer:
Raychem Flamtrol Model/Type:
Deficiency:
Aging Status:
We have performed material analyses of the cable installed at Unit 1.
The analyses included radiation aging, thermal aging and service temperature. Based on the analyses, the cable is qualified for plant life as is.
TER No:
70 Equipment
Description:
Cable Manufacturer:
Rockbestos Model/Type:
Firewall III & S15 Deficiency:
Aging Status:
We have reviewed the test report and performed an analysis of the non-metallic materials in these penetrations. The analysis included radiation and thermal aging. Based on that analysis this cable is qualified for plant life as is.
TER No:
72 Equipment
Description:
Electrical Penetrations Manufacturer:
Conax Model/Type:
Deficiency:
Aging Status:
We have reviewed the test report and performed a material analysis of this cable The analysis included radiation and thermal aging. Based on that analysis these penetrations are qualified for plant life as is.
-2 TER No:
74 Equipment
Description:
Cable Splice Manufacturer:
Raychem Model/Type:
Thermofit Deficiency:
Aging Status:
We have reviewed the test report and performed a material analysis. The analysis included radiation and thermal aging. Based on that analysis, these splices are qualified for plant life as is.
TER No:
78 Equipment
Description:
Limit Switch Manufacturer:
NAMCO Model/Type:
EA 180 Deficiency:
Aging Status:
Additional information is being evaluated to demonstrate qualification of these limit switches.
TER No:
7 (CV 875 A and B)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPHT 8314 Deficiency:
None Status:
TER No:
8 (CV 36 and 37)
Equipment
Description:
SOV Operator Manufacturer:
ASCO Model/Type:
WPLB 8300B59 Deficiency:
None Status:
TER No:
23 (MOV 883)
Equipment
Description:
MOV Manufacturer:
Liitorque Model/Type:
SMB-00 Deficiency:
None Status:
EA18
-3 TER No:
15 (MOV/LCV 1100 B, C, and D)
Equipment
Description:
MOV Manufacturer:
Limitorque Model/Type:
SMB-10 Deficiency:
Aging Status:
We have been unable to obtain information regarding these valves which would assist in determining a qualified life for the valves. Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these valves operate upon initiation of safety injection and are not required to operate again.
The environment they are required to operate in is their normal operating environment. The valves will perform their required safety function and since operation is required during their normal environment the valves will be considered in the mild environment review.
TER No:
18 (MOV 18 and 19)
Equipment
Description:
MOV Manufacturer:
Limitorque Model/Type:
SMB-00 Deficiency:
Aging Status:
We have been unable to obtain information regarding these valves which would assist in determining a qualified li'fe for the valves. Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these valves are similar in operation as the valves in TER No. 15.
Therefore they will be considered in the mild environment review.
TER No:
24 (MOV 880)
Equipment
Description:
MOV Manufacturer:
Limitorque Model/Type:
SMB-00 Deficiency:
Aging Status:
We have been unable to obtain information regarding these valves which would assist in determing in a qualified life.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates this valve is not required to operate during the accident.
The safety related function of this valve is to remain closed. This valve will perform its required safety function and will not be repl aced.
TER No:
60 (MOV 720 A and B)
Equipment
Description:
MDV Manufacturer:
Limitorque Model/Type:
SMB-00 Deficiency:
Aging Status:
We have been unable to obtain information regarding these valves which would assist in determining a qualified life.
Our October 31, 1980 letter indicates these valves are similar in operation as the valves in TER. No. 15.
Therefore, they will be considered in the mild environment review.
ENCLOSURE 2 Information On Equipment Not Addressed By The NRC's Safety Evaluation Report
The following equipment is included in Table 5 of our October 31, 1980, submittal.
This equipment was not addressed in the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report and the following represents additional information regarding this equipment since the October 31, 1980 submittal.
(The numbering of the items corresponds to that in Table 5 of the October 31, 1980 submittal.)
- 14.
LC 951 As indicated in the Franklin TER, this item is deferred as part of TMI Action Plan.
- 16.
G8A and B We have performed a materials analysis on these motors and reviewed the manufacturers generic test report.
The analysis of the non-metallic materials included thermal aging and radiation damage threshold. Based on results of the the analysis these motors are qualified for plant life.
- 17.
LS 73 As indicated in the Franklin TER, this item is deferred as part of TMI Action Plan.
- 21.
G27A and B We have performed a materials analysis on these motors and reviewed the manufacturers generic test report. The anlysis of the non-metallic materials included thermal aging and radiation damage threshold. Based on the results of the analysis, these motors are qualified for plant life.
- 25.
CV 517 and 518 This item was previously included in Appendix C of the NRC's EER.
It indicated that the valves were considered acceptable. The Franklin TER indicates the valves are being deferred into the mild environment evaluation.
- 51.
FCV 1112 The Franklin TER indicates this equipment is deferred into the evaluation for cold shutdown equipment.
- 52.
FIT 1112 See 51
- 53.
CV 304 See 51
- 54.
CV 305 See 51
- 55.
PCV 430 C and H See 51
- 56.
CV 410 and 411 See 51
-2
- 58.
G15 A, B and C We have performed a materials analysis on these motors and reviewed the manufacturers generic test report. The analysis of the non-metallic materials included thermal aging and radiation damage threshold. Based on the results of the analysis these motors are qualified for plant life.
- 60. CV 737 A and B The Franklin TER indicates these valves are being deferred into the mild environment review.
- 63. FT 2002 A, B and C As indicated in the Franklin TER, this item is deferred as part of the TMI Action Plan.
- 74. MCC 2A The Franklin TER indicates this motor control center is being deferred into the mild environment evaluation.
- 76.
CV 530 and 531 The Franklin TER indicates these valves are deferred as part of the TMI Action Plan.
- 77.
CV 545 and 546 See 76.
- 81.
PS 56, 57 and 58 The Franklin TER indicates that these pressure switches are being deferred into the mild environment evaluation.
- 82.
SV 147 The Franklin TER indicates this solenoid valve is being deferred into the mild environment evaluation.
- 83.
PS 119 The Franklin TER indicates this pressure switch is being deferred into the mild environment evaluation.
- 84. K-1A, B and C The Franklin TER indicates these motors are being deferred into the mild environment evaluation.
- 85. Emergency Compressor See 84.
- 86.
SV 105, 106 and 107 See 82
- 87.
R-1232 As indicated in the Franklin TER, this is deferred as part of the TMI Action Plan.
- 88. G14 A and B The Franklin TER indicates these motors are deferred into the evaluation of equipment required for cold shutdown.
- 89. MOV 822 A and B The Franklin TER indicates these valves are deferred into the evaluation of equipment required for cold shutdown.
-3
- 90.
HCV 602 The Franklin TER indicates this positioner is deferred into the evaluation of equipment required for cold shutdown.
- 92. MOV 813 and 814 The Franklin TER indicates these valves are deferred into the evaluation of equipment required to cold shutdown.
- 93.
MOV 833 and 834 The Franklin TER indicates these valves are deferred into the evaluation of equipment required for cold shutdown.
- 94. TE 601 A and B The Franklin TER indicates these sensors are deferred into the evaluation of equipment required for cold shutdown.
ACL:1816
ENCLOSURE 3
. Enclosure 3 provides change pages to the October 31, 1980 submittal.
The changes consist of corrections, clarifications and equipment additions. The changes are noted by change bars.
As part of SCE's efforts on environmental qualification, it was determined that additional equipment should be included within the scope of enivornmental qualifications of safety related electrical equipment.
This equipment is required since it was determined that this equipment assisted equipment previously identified in performing their safety function.
This equipment includes:
Component Cooling Water System YM 601 A and B This current to pressure converter operates in conjunction with TE 601 A and B in the Residual Heat Removal System to modulate the flow of component cooling water to the RHR Heat Exchangers.
Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves PC 418A YM 418 SV 175 The pressure controller, current to pressure converter and solenoid valve are required to manually operate the Dump Valves CV 76, 77, 78 and
- 79.
Reactor Protection System Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker This circuit breaker is required to complete the Reactor Protection System loop.
Those components in a harsh environment and required to be evaluated at this time are YM 601 A and B, YM 418 and SV 175.
PC 418A and the Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker are located in a mild environment. The enclosed change pages provide the additional details regarding this equipment and other corrections and clarifications.
PT-501, PT-502 and PT-503 PIS-511, 512 and 153 CV-82 and CV-114 MOV-880 MOV-883 G-200A and G-200B, Chemical addition pumps SV-600 and SV-601 FT-506 and FT-507 (hydrazine flow)
FIS-500 and FIS-501 LT-500A and LT-500B (hydrazine tank level)
LIS-500A and LIS-500B
- 7.
Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ADV)
PC 418A YM 418 SV 175 CV-76, CV-77, CV-78 and CV-79
- 8.
Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)
CCW pumps G-15A, G-15B and G-15C MOV-720A, B TE/TC/TR-606 CV-737A and CV-737B (Recirculation heat exchanger)
YM 601A and B
- 9.
Salt Water Cooling System (SWCS)
Salt Water Cooling pumps G-13A and G-13B POV-5 and POV-6, SV-24 and SV-25 MOV-9 SV-81, SV-82
- 10.
Monitoring Instrumentation TA-401B-X, TA-411B-X and TA-421B-X (RCS low T ave.)
CBX-1-1, CBX-1-2, CBX-2-1, CBX-2-2, SDX-1-1 and SDX-2-1 K1521, K1522, K1523 and K1524 Core exit thermocouples PT-4/R8-1 RCS subcooling recorder Pressure Transmitter for RCS subcooling recorder Reactor Coolant Temperature Detectors YR-456, TR-457, TR-458 (steam generator low level)
Humidistat
- 11.
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS)
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump G-10 FT/FC/FI-2002A, B, C (auxiliary feedwater flow)
LT/LI-450X, 451X, 452X Condensate Storage Tank Level
Table 3:
Post-Accident Environmental Conditions Area 1, Containment The environment specified in containment is based on the guidelines in to Mr. Ziemann's February 15, 1980 letter. Specifically, the environment is based on a LOCA. Temperature and pressure are based on the Containment Post Accident Pressure Reanalysis submitted to the NRC by letter dated January 19, 1977. Chemical sprays are used as identified in Amendment 52 to the Final Safety Analysis Report forwarded by letter dated December 3, 1975. Radiation is based on the value specified in Enclosure 1 to Mr. Ziemann's February 15 letter. The post-accident flooding level is based on an elevation of 3' 11" as indicated in Appendix B of NUS-1854, Separation and LOCA Environment Assessment of San Onofre Unit 1 Emergency Core Cooling Systems, dated December, 1977.
Based on the above references the following environment is specified for the containment:
Temperature:
291oF Pressure:
64.1 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
Yes Radiation:
2 X 107 rads Submergence:
Yes to elevation 3' 11"
. It is noted that the radiation level of 2 X 107 rads identified above is based on the NRC guidelines for gamma radiation. Due to the low penetrating power of beta radiation, it is generally less significant than gamma radiation for equipment qualification. In general, electrical equipment contains sufficient beta shielding, such as metallic cases, to make the radiation sensitive equipment internals immune from the damaging effects of beta radiation. The only concern with respect to the potential for susceptibility to the effects of beta radiation is electric cable exposed to the containment atmosphere. Therefore, the evaluation of cable in Appendix A to this submittal includes an assessment of beta radiation.
The NRC guidelines also specify that for PWR's with automatic containment spray, the LOCA temperature and pressure environment can be used for qualification of equipment to an MSLB environment. San Onofre Unit 1 has automatic containment spray, and therefore use of the LOCA temperature and pressure environment is appropriate. The radiation value for the MSLB is based on the NRC guidelines. The following environment is specified for the MSLB inside containment:
Temperature:
291oF Pressure:
64.1 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
Yes Radiation:
2E6 Submergence:
Yes
Area 1, Piping Penetration Building The Piping Penetration Building is located west of the containment. The temperature in this building is expected to increase slightly under the post accident conditions and, as such, a value of 110OF was specified in NUS-1854 dated December, 1977.
Pressure will remain at atmospheric. Radiation in this area will be due to operating the recirculation system since some components of this system are located in this area. The radiation level is based on the guidelines in Enclosure 1 to Mr. Ziemann's February 15 letter.
Based on the above, the following environment is specified for the Piping Penetration Building:
Temperature:
110OF Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
4 X 106 rads Submergence:
No Area 1, Sphere-Enclosure Building Annulus In the area between the sphere and the enclosure building, the environmental conditions will remain ambient with the exception of radiation. The radiation level in this area is based on the NRC guideline value for inside containment. The following environment is specified:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
2E7 Submergence:
No Area 1, Outside In the areas outside, the environmental conditions will remain at ambient with the exception of radiation which results from operating the recirculation system.
The radiation level is based on the NRC guidelines. The following environment is specified:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
4 X 106 rads Submergence:
No
Area 2, Mezzanine Under Turbine Deck Area 2 is located directly south of the containment and contains the feedwater and steam piping. The limiting temperature in this area is based on a high energy line break which results in a saturated steam environment at atmospheric pressure. This is based on the Report on Effects of a Piping System Break Outside the Containment dated December, 1973. The radiation level in this area is conservatively assumed to be the same as that specified for inside containment (see the discussion for Area 1, Containment). The specified environment is:
Temperature:
2120F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
2 X 107 rads Submergence:
No Area 3, Fuel Storage Building This building will remain at ambient conditions following an accident. With respect to radiation, calculations performed for TMI followup, have estimated a value of 5 X 102 rads integrated over one year at the outside wall of the Sphere Enclosure Building. Therefore, the dose in Area 3 will be significantly less than this and is considered insignificant. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No Areas 4, 5 and 6, Under Turbine Deck The limiting temperature in this area is based on a high energy line break (see the discussion for Area 2).
The radiation level which may result from a LOCA, is considered insignificant (see the discussion for Area 3).
The specified environment is:
Temperature:
212oF Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No
Area 7, Turbine Deck Extension This area is at the south end of the turbine building and will remain at ambient conditions following any postulated accident. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No Area 8, Auxiliary Building The auxiliary building and auxiliary building roof, located west of containment, contain various items of recirculation equipment. The post-accident environment is ambient with the exception of radiation which results from operating the recirculation system.
The radiation level is based on the NRC guidelines. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
4 X 106 rads Submergence:
No Area 8, Auxiliary Building Charging Pump Room The charging pump room contains recirculation equipment. The radiation value inside this room is based on the recirculation dose provided in the NRC guidelines. The post-accident temperature will be higher than that utilized for the auxiliary building. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
110OF Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
4E6 rads Submergence:
No Area 9, Intake Structure This area is outside and removed from radiation areas. Environmental conditions will remain at ambient. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No
Area 10, Control Administration Building This area contains the control room and various electrical distribution equipment. The control room environment will remain at ambient conditions following an accident provided the control room fan is operable. Other areas do not require air conditioning to be operable. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No Area 12, Condensate Storage Tank This area is outside and will remain at ambient conditions. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No Area 14, Refueling Water Storage Tank This area is outside and will remain at ambient conditions with the exception of radiation which results from operating the recirculation system. The radiation level is based on the NRC guidelines.
The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
4 X 106 rads Submergence:
No Areas 16 and 17, Diesel Generator Building The diesel generator building is located at the northeast corner of the plant and is equipped with redundant air conditioning systems.
This building will remain at ambient conditions. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No
Reactor Protection System FM-456B-X, 4578-X, 458B-X 10 YE-430A, 431A, 432A 10 LC-430A, 431A, 432A 10 LI-430, 431A, 432A 10 YE-340B, 431B, 432B 10 PC-430A/F, 431A/D, 432A/B 10 PI-430, 431, 432 10 Safety Injection Sequencer 10 Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker 10 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation RLR-1200, RLR-1201 10 R-1215 3
R-1216 10 Atmospheric Steam Dump PC-418A 10
age 1 of 2 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE
- 5. G-3A and B Byron Jackson Pump Area 5 T - 2120F 2120F Analysis 1
Feedwater Pumps Westinghouse motor Area 6 P - 14.7 NVS*
Analysis 1
CS type H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
No R -
No S -
No
- 6. HV853A and B Teledyne Positioner Area 5 T -
212oF 140 0 F Spec 5
HV851A and B 02112-002-5210 Area 6 P - 14.7 NVS Spec 5
HV854A and B 02112-003-5210 H - 100%
100%
Spec 5
HV852A and B C -
No R -
No S -
No
- 7. CV875A and B Area 5 T -
212 0F 650 0F (1)
Sim; Anal (2) 2, 3, 1 Feedwater Pump Solenoid ASCO WPHT 8314 Area 6 P -
14.7 65 Sim; Anal 2, 3, 1 Recirculation H - 100%
100%
Sim; Anal 2, 3, 1 C -
No R -
No S -
No B. CV36 and 37 Area 5 T - 212oF 650oF (1)
Analysis 2, 3, 1 (SV17 and 18)
Solenoid ASCO WPLB 8300 B59 Area 6 P -
14.7 65 Analysis 2, 3, 1 Feedwater to on CV36 and XB302C25 on H - 100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3, 1 Condenser CV37 C -
No R -
No S -
No
14.7 H -
100%
C -
No R -
2E7 9.9E4 Analysis 3
S -
No
- NVS = No Value Specified
Page 1 of 2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE
- 21.
C-27A and B Worthington Pump Area 14 T - 970F 2480F Analysis 2, 3, 1 Refueling Water Pumps Westinghouse motor AALG P -
14.7 Analysis 2, 3, 1 H - 100%
Analysis 2, 3, 1 C -
No R -
4E6 1E7 (4)
Analysis 2,
3, 1
S -
No
- 22. MOV 883 Limitorque SMB-00 Area 14 T -
970F 3290F Similar (2) 2, 3, 34 RWST Isolation Peerless motor P -
14.7 105 Similar 2, 3, 34 H -
100%
Steam Similar 2, 3, 34 C -
No R -
4E6 2E8 Similar 2, 3, 34 S -
No
- 23.
MOV 880 Limitorque SMB-00 Area 1 T -
11C0 F 329 0 F Similar (2) 2, 3, 34 Spray/Recirculation Peerless motor P - 14.7 105 Similar 2, 3, 34 Crosstie H -
100%
Steam Similar 2, 3, 34 C -
No R -
4E6 2E8 Similar 2, 3, 34 S -
No
- 24.
CV517 and 518 EBV Systems D-6-300-7 Area 1 T - 970F 1100F c of c 15 Spray Flow Control Solenoid Atkomatic 3101 P - 14.7 ATM c of c 15 Switch Trombetta SOL:NA-702E1 H -
100%
100%
c of c 15 Motor Boston Gear cat ADR C -
No R -
4E6 2E7 c of c 15 S -
No
- 25.
FT 504 Foxboro E13DM Area 1 T -
970F 3000F Test 10 Spray Flow P -
14.7 75 Test 10 H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C-No R -
4E6 2.2E8 Test 11, 26 S-No
Paqe 2 of 2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE
- 26.
CV82 and 114 Area 1 T - 2910F 6500F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 SV128 and 118 Solenoid ASCO WPLB 8300 B61RV Dontainment P - 64.1 64 Analysis 2, 3 Spray Isolation on CV82 and U8302C26R H - 100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 on CV114 C -
Yes Yes Analysis 2, 3 R - 2E7 (5)
Analysis 2, 3 S -
No
- 27. PT501, 502 and 503 Foxboro E11GM Area 1 T -
970F 300oF Test 10 Containment P - 14.7 75 Test 10 Pressure H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C -
No R -
2E7 2.2EB Test 11, 26 S -
No
Paie 1 of 00NTAINMENT ISOLATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE
- 28.
CV102, 104 and 106 Area 1 T - 2910F 6500F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 SV108, 110 and 112 ASCO WPLB 8300 861R Containment P -
64.1 65 Analysis 2, 3 Sphere Sump Discharge H - 100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 RCS Dr Tk Discharge C - Yes Yes Analysis 2, 3 RCS Dr Tk Vent R - 2E7 (5)
Analysis 2, 3 S - No
- 29. CV103, 105 and 107 ASCO 8300 B61 Area 1 T - 11OF 6500F (1)
Similar (2) 2, 3 SV109, 111 and 113 P -
14.7 65 Similar 2, 3 Sphere Sump Discharge H -
100%
100%
Similar 2, 3 RCS Dr Tk Discharge C -
No RCS Dr Tk Vent R -
4E6 (5)
Similar 2, 3 S -
No
- 30.
CV146 and 147 Area 1 T -
291 0F 6500 F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 SV1212-6 and 1212-7 ASCO WPLB 8300 B59 Containment P - 64.1 65 Analysis 2, 3 Sphere Air Sample H -
100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 C - Yes Yes Analysis 2, 3 R -
2E7 (5)
Analysis 2, 3 S -
No
- 31.
SV1212-8 and 1212-9 ASCO HT X 8210 27 Area 1 T -
1100 Sphere Air Sample P -
14.7 H -
100%
C-No R -
4E6 S-No
- 32.
- CV117, 118 and 119 ASCO WP 831735 Area 2 T -
212 0F 650 0F (1)
Similar (2) 2, 3 SV119, 120 and 121 P -
14.7 65 Similar 2, 3 Steam Gen. Steam Sample H -
100%
100%
Similar 2, 3 C -
No R -
2E7 (5)
Similar 2, 3 S -No
Paqe 2 of 5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE
- 33. CV120, 121 and 122 ASCO WP 831735 Area 2 T - 212oF 6500F (1)
Similar (2) 2, 3 SV122, 123 and 124 P - 14.7 65 Similar 2, 3 Steam Gen. Blowdown Sample H -
100%
100%
Similar 2, 3 C -
No R -
2E7 (5)
Similar 2,
3 S -
No
- 34. CV123 ASCO WP 8300 B61R Area 1 T -
970F 6500F (1)
Similar (2) 2, 3 SV125 P -
14.7 65 Similar 2, 3 Service Air H -
100%
100%
Similar 2, 3 C -
No R -
2E7 (5)
Similar 2,
3 S -
No
- 35.
CV537 Contromatic C-9922-DC Area 1 T -
2910F 2720F Spec 28 Service Water Solenoid ASCO WP HTX 832093 Containment P - 64.1 61.1 Spec 28 H -
100%
100%
Spec 28 C -
Yes Yes Spec 28 R -
2E7 1EB Spec 28 S -
No
- 36.
CV115 ASCO WPLB 8300 B64RU Area 1 T - 970F 6500F (1)
Similar (2) 2, 3 SV126 P -
14.7 65 Similar 2, 3 Service Water H -
100%
100%
Similar 2, 3 C -
No R -
2E7 (5)
Similar 2, 3 S -
No
- 37.
SV7028 and D Morotta Valve Co.
Area 1 T -
2910F Cold Leg Vent Model MV 583H-4A Containment P - 64.1 H -
100%
C -
Yes R -
2E7 S -No
Page 3 of 5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE
- 38. SV702A and C Morotta Valve Co.
Area 1 T -
970F Cold Leg Vent Model MV 583H-4A P -
14.7 H -
100%
C -
No R -
2E7 S -No
- 39.
POV 9 and 10 Area 1 T -97 0 F AMB Exp SV29 and 30 ASCO 8345 C11 P -
14.7 ATM Exp Sphere Purge H -
100%
AMB Exp C -No R -
2E7 (5)
Similar (2) 2, 3 S -No
- 40.
CV40 and 116 Area 1 T -
2910F 650oF (1)
Analysis 2, 3 SV19 and 127 ASCO WPLB 8300 B59 RF Containment P -
64.1 65 Analysis 2, 3 Sphere Vent H -
100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 C -
Yes Yea Analysis 2, 3 R -
2E7 (5)
Analysis 2, 3 S -
No
- 41.
CV10 Area 1 T - 970F 6500F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 SV28 ASCO WPLB 8300 859 P -
14.7 65 Analysis 2, 3 Sphere Vent H - 100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 C -
No R -
2E7 (5)
Analysis 2,
3 S -
No
- 42.
CV533 and 536 Contromatic C-9922-DC Area 1 T - 291 F 272oF Spec 28 Press Relief Tank Solenoid ASCO WPHTX 8320 93 Containment P -
64.1 61.1 Spec 28 RCS Drain Tank H -
100%
100%
Spec 28 C -
Yes Yes Spec 28 R -
2E7 1E8 Spec 28 S -
No
Page 4 of5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE
- 43. CV534 and 535 Contromatic C-9922-DC Area 1 T -
110 0F 120 0F Spec 28 Press Relief Tank Solenoid ASCO WPHT 8320 93 P -
14.7 NVS Spec 28 RCS Drain Tank H -
100%
100%
Spec 28 C -
No R -
4E6 2.5E7 Spec 28 S -
No
- 44.
CV525 and 527 EBV D-2-300-6 Area 1 T -
291 0F 272 0F c of c 15 RCS Letdown EBV D-3-150-14 Containment P - 64.1 61.1 c of c 15 RCP Sealwater Solenoid Atkomatic 3101 H - 100%
100%
c of c 15 Switch Trombetta SOL: NA702E1 C - Yes Yes c of c 15 Motor Boston Gear Cat: ADR R - 2E7 3E7 c of c 15 S -
No
- 45.
CV526 and 528 EBV D-2-300-6 Area 1 T -
110 0 F 110 0F c of c 15 RCS Letdown EBV D-3-150-14 P - 14.7 ATM c of c 15 RCP Sealwater Solenoid Atkomatic 3101 H -
100%
100%
c of c 15 Switch Trombetta SOL: NA702E1 C -
No Motor Boston Gear Cat: ADR R - 4E6 2E7 c of c 15 S -
No
- 46.
CV287 Solenoid ASCO Area 1 T - 291 0F RCS Letdown Containment P - 64.1 H -
100%
C -
Yes R -
2E7 S -
Yes
- 47. CV202, 203 and 204 ASCO WPLB 8300 B59 Area 1 T - 291oF 6500F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 RCS Letdown Containment P - 64.1 65 Analysis 2, 3 H -
100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 C - Yes Yes Analysis 2, 3 R - 2E7 (5)
Analysis 2, 3 S-No I
I (IageI Iof 1
HOT LEG RECIRCULATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE
- 51.
FCV 1112 Honeywell Positioner Area 1 T -
110 0F 120 0 F Analysis 1
HLR Flow Control ASCO WPHT 8314 6 P -
14.7 NVS Analysis 1
H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
No R -
4E6 S -
No
- 52.
FIT 1112 Brooks 5523A Area 1 T -
110 0F HLR Flow P -
14.7 H -
100%
C -
No R -
4E6 S -
No
- 53.
CV304 Area 1 T -
2910 F NVS Analysis 1
Loop A ASCO WPHT 8314 6 Containment P -
64.1 NVS Analysis 1
Charging Line H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
Yes NVS Analysis 1
R -
2E7 S -
No
- 54.
CV305 Area 1 T - 291 0F NVS Analysis 1
Pressurizer Spray Line ASCO WPHT 8314 6 Containment P - 64.1 NVS Analysis 1
H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
Yes NVS Analysis 1
R -
2E7 (4)
S -
No
- 55.
PCV 430C and H Foxboro 69 TA-1H Area 1 T - 291 0F NVS Analysis 1
Loop A and B Containment P - 64.1 NVS Analysis 1
H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
Yes NVS Analysis 1
R -
2E7 S -
No
Paae 1 of 1 STEAM DUMP EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE
- 57.
CV76, 77, 78 and 79 Solenoid Area 1 T - 970F SV85, 86, 87 and 88 Valvair 5682-2 P -
14.7 ATM Steam Dump H -
100%
C -
No R -
2E7 S - No 57a. YM 418A Foxboro Area 2 T -
2120F 69-TA-1 P -
14.7 H - 100%
C - No R -
2E7 S - No 57b. SV 175 ASCO Solenoid Area 2 T - 2120F P -
14.7 H -
100%
C - No R -
2E7 S - No
Page 1 of 1 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE
- 58. G15A, B and C Pacific Pump Area 8 T -
970F 2120F Analysis 1
Component Cooling Pumps Westinghouse motor AALG P -
14.7 NVS Analysis 1
H - 100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
No R -
4E6 S -
No
- 59.
MOV 720A and B Limitorque SMB Area 8 T -
970F 3290F Similar (2) 2, 3, 34 Component Cooling P - 14.7 105 Similar 2, 3, 34 Ht Ex Outlet H -
100%
Steam Similar 2, 3, 34 C -
No R -
4E6 2E8 Similar 2, 3, 34 S -
No
- 60.
CV737 A and B EBV Systems D-4-150-18 Area 8 T -
970F 1100F c of c 15 Recirculation Ht Ex Solenoid Atkomatic 3101 P - 14.7 ATM c of c 15 Switch Trombetta SOL: NA-302E1 H -
100%
100%
c of c 15 Motor Boston Gear Cat: ADR C -
No R -
4E6 2E7 c of c 15 S -
No
- 61.
TE-606 Foxboro DB-13V-26W Area 8 T - 970F Cooling Water P -
14.7 H -
100%
C-No R -
4E6 S - No 61a.
YM 601 A and B Foxboro 69-TA-1 Area 1 T -
970F P -
14.7 H - 100%
C - No R -
4E6 S - No
removal of heat through the steam generators and is described in the Loss of Coolant Operating Instruction. Another method involves use of the recirculation pumps to provide cooling and is described in Item 5 of the enclosure to SCE's letter to the NRC dated November 27, 1974. In the event of a steam or feedwater line break outside containment, the RHR system would not be affected by a hostile environment and would be available to permit operations to attain cold shutdown.
The RHR pumps provide for long-term cooling of the reactor coolant following a MSLB. These pumps will be required to operate submerged in the post-MSLB environment. In the submerged environment the RHR pumps will be subjected to a temperature and pressure lower than the containment vapor temperature and pressure resulting from a LOCA.
Reference 33 documents a test performed on the motors of the RHR pumps which demonstrates the motors will perform their safety function following an MSLB inside containment.
- 89.
MOV 822 A and B (RHR Heat Exchanger Valves)
These valves are located inside containment below the containment flooding level.
References 2, 3 and 34 indicate that the valves are capable of withstanding the post-accident environment inside containment with the exception of flooding. During normal plant operation one of the valves is normally open to provide a path for reactor coolant letdown. All that is required for RHR cooldown is one heat exchanger.
In addition, the discussion in item 88 ensures a means to provide shutdown if these valves fail.
- 90.
This valve provides the flow control for the RHR system. It will be subjected to the post-accident environment including submersion. The analysis performed in the reference indicates that the valve is capable of withstanding the environment. It also points out that failure of the electrical components to the valve will have no effect on the valve performing its safety function. In addition, the discussion in item 88 ensures a means to provide shutdown if this valve fails.
- 91.
FT 602 (RHR Flow Monitor)
This transmitter provides the operator with the flow indication in the RHR system. This instrument will be subjected to the post-acccident MSLB environment including submersion. References 10 and 11 indicate that the transmitters are capable of operating for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at conditions greater than the MSLB. Based on References 2 and 3, the RHR system would be put into operation in approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> following an MSLB. In addition, the discussion in item 88 ensures a means to provide shutdown if this transmitter fails.