ML13241A264

Enclosure 2 - Columbia Generating Station, Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (Public Version)

ML13241A264
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	08/12/2013
From:	Erwin T, Swank D Energy Northwest
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GO2-13-117
Download: ML13241A264 (92)

Text

Enclosure 2 - Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

ENCLOSURE 2 COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

ENERGY NORTHWEST COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION RICHLAND, WASHINGTON Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Tom Erwin

ýz cPI6 (Date)

//Z" Energy Northwest Fukushima Technical Lead Dave Swank (Date)

Energy Northwest Assistant Vice President, Engineering

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

Table of Contents Executive Sum m ary ........................................................................................................... ii 1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Purpose ........................................................................................................ 1 1.2 Acronym G lossary ............................................................................................ 1 2.0 Seism ic Licensing Basis Sum m ary ...................................................................... 3 2.1 Identification of the Seism ic Licensing Basis .................................................... 3 2.2 Codes, Standards, and Methods ...................................................................... 3 3.0 Personnel Q ualifications Sum m ary ...................................................................... 4 3.1 Q ualification Sum m ary ..................................................................................... 4 3.1.1 Equipm ent Selection Personnel ................................................................. 4 3.1.2 Seism ic W alkdown Engineers (SW Es) ...................................................... 4 3.1.3 Licensing Basis Reviewer .......................................................................... 4 3.1.4 IPEEE Reviewer ....................................................................................... 4 3.1.5 Peer Review Team Mem bers ................................................................... 5 3.2 Personnel Q ualifications ................................................................................... 5 4.0 SSC Selection .................................................................................................... 8 4.1 Purpose ........................................................................................................ 8 4.2 SW EL Developm ent .......................................................................................... 8 4.2.1 SW EL 1 Developm ent .............................................................................. 8 4.2.2 SW EL 2 Developm ent .............................................................................. 11 4.2.3 Com bined SW EL ..................................................................................... 12 4.3 Inaccessible Equipm ent ................................................................................ 12 4.4 Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 13 5.0 Seism ic W alkdown and Area W alk-By Sum m ary ............................................... 14 5.1 Seism ic W alkdown and Area W alk-by Planning ............................................. 14 5.2 Seism ic W alkdowns ....................................................................................... 15 5.3 Area W alk-Bys ................................................................................................ 19 5.4 Inaccessible and Deferred Item s .................................................................... 20 6.0 Licensing Basis Evaluation Sum m ary ............................................................... 22 6.1 Plant Modifications ......................................................................................... 22 7.0 IPEEE Vulnerabilities .......................................................................................... 23 8.0 Peer Review Team Report ................................................................................ 24 9.0 References ............................................................................................................ 25 10.0 Attachm ents ............................................................................................................ 26

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

Executive Summary This reportpresents the results of Seismic Walkdowns for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 (Seismic), requested by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part50, Section 50.54(f).

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Seismic Walkdown Guidance was endorsed by the NRC, to provide detailed guidance and methodology to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(f) letter. Energy Northwest used the EPRI Guidance to develop the scope of Seismic Walkdowns, conduct the Seismic Walkdowns, disposition the findings, prepare the report, and perform a peer review of these efforts.

The scope of Seismic Walkdowns was developed by preparation of two Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWEL), SWEL 1 and SWEL 2. These two lists were developed by an individual with extensive plant operations experience and a qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE) with input from experienced system engineers and plant personnel.

SWEL 1 was a sampling of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from frontline safety and support systems related to the five safety functions below:

1. Reactor reactivity control

2. Reactor coolantpressure control

3. Reactor coolant inventory control

4. Decay heat removal

5. Containment function The equipment lists used as a starting point for development of SWEL 1 included a list of Seismic Category 1 SSCs generated from the plant equipment database and the Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE)program.

SWEL 1 was developed by applying the following five sample selection attributes,defined in the EPRI Guidance:

1. A variety of types of systems

2. Major new and replacementequipment

3. A variety of types of equipment

4. A variety of environments

5. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilitiesidentified during the IPEEEprogram.

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Enclosure 2 - Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

SWEL 2 is a list of equipment supporting spent fuel pool (SFP)operation. SWEL 2 was developed by reviewing spent fuel pool related systems for Seismic Category 1 equipment and completing a review of any SSCs that upon failure could result in rapid drain-down of the SFP. The Seismic Category 1 SSCs were selected for inspection consistent with SWEL 1 methods. No items were identified that could lead to rapid drain-down of the SFP other than failure of the SFP structure, which is excluded by the EPRI Guidance.

The 116 items on SWEL 1 and the 18 items on SWEL 2 were combined to form the 134 items on the combined SWEL, which defined the scope of Seismic Walkdowns.

The items on the combined SWEL were reviewed to determine the population of items with anchorage. More than 50% of items with anchorage were selected for verification, during the walkdowns, that their anchorageconfiguration was installedper design.

Walkdown packages were developed for each item on the SWEL and for each area based on checklists provided with the EPRI Guidance. Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed by one walkdown team consisting of two qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) and assisted, when possible, by operations or knowledgeable plant personnel.

A total of 134 Seismic Walkdowns and 61 Area Walk-Bys were conducted for Columbia Generating Station. Most Seismic Walkdowns were accomplished with the station on-line over the course of 10 weeks, in which 120 Seismic Walkdowns and 55 Area Walk-Bys were performed. Due primarily to accessibility during plant operation, 14 items and 6 associatedArea Walk-Bys were not completed with the initial group. The walkdowns for these 14 items, in addition to the opening of 21 electrical panels previously walked down, but not opened, were completed between the time the initial report was submitted in November 2012 and the end of refueling outage R21 in June 2013.

Issues found during the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-Bys were documented on the walkdown checklists. The 134 Seismic Walkdowns performed resulted in the identification of 40 potentially adverse seismic conditions and the 61 Area Walk-Bys performed resultedin 79 potentially adverse seismic conditions.

These conditions were submitted to licensing basis evaluation personnel for review and were either resolved by evaluation (i.e. existing calculation and drawing confirmations) or entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Reports (CRs). There were a total of 84 licensing basis evaluations performed and a total of 37 CRs were generated to address potentially adverse seismic conditions. Several of the 119 potentially adverse conditions had both licensing basis evaluations and CRs written.

None of the issues identified resulted in a condition that placed the plant outside its licensing basis, and no operabilityissues were identified.

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- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

During the walkdowns, non-seismic related issues (i.e., housekeeping issues) were identified and noted on the checklists. These did not undergo a licensing basis evaluation, but were entered into the CAP by generating CRs.

There are no planned design changes to the plant as a result of the walkdowns, but plant Work Requests were generated, when required, to bring the equipment item back into compliance with existing plant documentation (i.e. installing a missing bolt or clamp).

The conclusion of this effort for Columbia Generating Station is that a thorough sampling of safety and support system components was evaluated for integrity and compliance with plant design based on the EPRI Guidance. This evaluation resulted in discovery of a number of lower level deficiencies, but none that placed the plant in a condition that was outside its licensing basis or compromised the safety function of any SSC.

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- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 1.0 Introduction 1.1 Purpose This report presents the results of the Seismic Walkdowns for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation (NTTF) 2.3 (Seismic), requested by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.54(f) (Reference 9.9) for Columbia Generating Station. Columbia Generating Station is operated by Energy Northwest.

1.2 Acronym Glossary 10 CFR Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations ACI American Concrete Institute ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ANSI American National Standards Institute AWB Area Walk-by AWC Area Walk-By Checklist CAP Corrective Action Program CIA Containment Instrument Air CR Condition Report DOE Department of Energy DSA Diesel Starting Air EPN Equipment Part Number EPRI Electric Power Research Institute FAQ Frequently Asked Questions FPC Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GIP Generic Implementation Procedure for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment HPCS High Pressure Core Spray IPEEE Individual Plant Examination for External Events LBE Licensing Basis Evaluation LPCS Low Pressure Core Spray NEMA National Electrical Manufactures Association NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NTTF Near-Term Task Force NQA-1 Nuclear Quality Assurance-1 PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment R21 Columbia Refueling Outage "21" 1

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RHR Residual Heat Removal RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel SC-1 M Seismic Category 1M (Maintains Structural Integrity During/After SSE)

SFP Spent Fuel Pool SLC Standby Liquid Control SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List SWC Seismic Walkdown Checklist SWE Seismic Walkdown Engineer SWEL Seismic Walkdown Equipment List WD Walkdown WNP-2 Washington Nuclear Plant 2 WO Work Order ZPA Zero Period Acceleration 2

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 2.0 Seismic Licensing Basis Summary 2.1 Identification of the Seismic Licensing Basis The seismic licensing basis for Columbia Generating Station is documented in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (Reference 9.1), Section 3.2, Classification of Structures, Components, and Systems. The FSAR describes the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) loads and their application to the Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) of Columbia Generating Station. Technical Memorandum, TM-2143 (Reference 9.4),

"Geology, Seismology, and Geotechnical Engineering Report," referenced in Section 2.5 of the FSAR, contains the results of seismology studies.

Seismic design input motion for Columbia Generating Station is established from the investigation of the site seismicity. Based on this investigation, a value of peak horizontal ground acceleration or zero period acceleration (ZPA) of 0.25g for a SSE was established as the conservative design basis. The ground ZPA for vertical direction is taken as two thirds of the horizontal value, which is 0.167g for SSE. The vibratory ground motions, however, are defined by design response spectra for the SSE to account for amplification at various ranges of vibration frequencies. These design response spectra for the vibratory ground motions form the basis for the seismic design of all Seismic Category 1 building structures and structural components of Columbia Generating Station (Reference 9.7).

In-structure response spectra are generated to account for the amplification of the ground seismic motions due to the dynamic properties of a building structure. These in-structure response spectra are the seismic input motion for the qualification of the structural components supported from the building.

2.2 Codes, Standards, and Methods Section 3.8 of the Columbia Generating Station FSAR describes the design of all Seismic Category 1 structures. Table 3.8-4 of the FSAR summarizes the codes, standards, and methods that were used for the various types of SSCs involved.

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Enclosure 2 - Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 3.0 Personnel Qualifications Summary 3.1 Qualification Summary This section identifies the qualifications of the personnel who performed activities associated with the Seismic Walkdown efforts at Columbia Generating Station. A diverse group of engineers with varied backgrounds and experience were combined to complete the necessary tasks. Section 3.2 of this report indicates specific personnel qualifications, experience of the walkdown team members, and identifies the activity(s) they performed.

3.1.1 Equipment Selection Personnel The equipment selection personnel have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs. One was an operations Shift Manager with long time plant experience at all levels of the Operations Department, who served as the operations representative. The other was a degreed engineer with experience in the design of seismically qualified systems, who also served as a Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

3.1.2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)

Each of the Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course and had a Bachelor's of Science degree in either civil or mechanical engineering. SWEs also attended plant specific Human Performance Awareness training.

3.1.3 Licensing Basis Reviewer The Licensing Basis Reviewer was a degreed civil engineer with extensive experience in plant design and completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course. The Licensing Basis Reviewer had knowledge of the seismic licensing basis, seismic qualification methods and documentation, and the Corrective Action Program (CAP) for the plant.

3.1.4 IPEEE Reviewer The Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) reviewer had adequate engineering experience to review and understand the results of the IPEEE program. The reviewer was a degreed civil engineer with background in nuclear plant design requirements and had completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course.

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- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 3.1.5 Peer Review Team Members The qualifications of peer review team members were consistent with the activities for which the peer review is being conducted. The peer review team members were degreed engineers with extensive experience in nuclear plant design.

3.2 Personnel Qualifications Michael Corleto Activities Performed: Seismic Walkdown Engineer EPRI Industry Training Completed: NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course Education: Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering, San Francisco State University Summary of Background/Experience: Approximately eight years of experience in nuclear plant civil/structural/seismic engineering at Hanford Nuclear Waste Treatment Plant.

Originated calculations for the designs of Seismic Category 1 building structures, equipment components and anchorage, and multi-commodity supports for electrical raceways & piping systems under ANSI N690 and ACI 349 Codes.

Gregory (Greg) Jaschke Activities Performed: Equipment Selection, Seismic Walkdown Engineer EPRI Industry Training Completed: NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course Education: Bachelors of Science in Mechanical Engineering, North Dakota State University Summary of Background/Experience: Approximately nine years of experience in engineering, procurement and construction of Seismic Category 1, NQA-1 qualified process piping systems for Hanford Nuclear Waste Treatment Plant. One additional year of experience at a Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant performing system completion walkdowns for plant startup as well as Engineering, Procurement &

Construction activities.

Leanna Staudenmier Activities Performed: Seismic Walkdown Engineer EPRI Industry Training Completed: NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course Education: Bachelors of Science in Civil and Environmental Engineering, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 5

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

Summary of Background/Experience: Over a year of experience in nuclear plant civil/structural/seismic engineering. Originated design calculations and design documents for equipment anchorage. Preparation of Plant Design Change packages for Columbia Generating Station.

Eugene (Gene) Scott Jr.

Activities Performed: IPEEE Review, Seismic Walkdown Engineer EPRI Industry Training Completed: NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course Education: Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering, Michigan Technological University Summary of Background/Experience: Approximately 15 years in commercial nuclear power and waste treatment industries, combined. A registered Professional Civil Engineer in Texas, Oregon, and Michigan. Worked as a Plant Design-Pipe Stress Engineer and Civil/Structural Engineer with the Maanshan Nuclear Generating Station support team, worked on South Texas Project in the Special Task Group, and has worked as a Civil/Structural/Architectural Engineer at the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant.

Myron Baird Activities Performed: Equipment Selection, Seismic Walkdown Support Education: Bachelors of Science in Technology, Excelsior College Summary of Background/Experience: Approximately 38 years of nuclear experience with 29 years of experience as a Senior Reactor Operator. Reached the rank of Electricians Mate First Class, serving in the United States Navy, on a nuclear powered submarine.

Has held positions as an Equipment Operator, Reactor Operator, Shift Support Supervisor, Control Room Supervisor, Licensed Operator Requalification Training Supervisor, Operations Training Manager, Shift Manager, and Work Control/Outage Shift Manager at Columbia Generating Station.

Robert (Bob) Slovic Activities Performed: Peer Review Education: Bachelors of Science in Mechanical Engineering (completed Nuclear Engineering courses), Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Summary of Background/Experience: Approximately 32 years in design and construction of commercial nuclear power and nuclear waste projects. Registered Professional Engineer in the state of Virginia. Has held positions as a mechanical design engineer, lead site liaison, mechanical group supervisor, assistant project engineer, project engineer, senior project engineer, area project engineering manager, discipline 6

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) production engineering manager, and project engineering manager. Started as a design engineer for mechanical systems for initial design of commercial nuclear power plants and progressed to leading teams of engineers and designers for major projects. Has held positions at Millstone Unit 2, Wolf Creek, Callaway, Grand Gulf, Pilgrim, Turkey Point, and Almaraz Nuclear Power Plants, Yucca Mountain facility, Hanford Waste Treatment Plant, as well as design support for several other nuclear power plants.

Leo Nadeau Activities Performed: Peer Review Lead EPRI Industry Training Completed: NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course Education: Bachelors and Masters of Science in Mechanical Engineering, University of Connecticut Summary of Background/Experience: Over 25 years of experience in project management and engineering activities related to nuclear power projects including engineering and construction experience during refueling outages in operating facilities, performing new construction and the refurbishment of nuclear power plants. Has over 15 years of seismic design experience with nuclear power plants, including Bellefonte Nuclear Station, Bruce Power, Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Station, as well as design support at various other nuclear power plants.

Greg Lisle Activities Performed: Licensing Basis Reviewer EPRI Industry Training Completed: NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course Education: Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering, Washington State University Summary of Background/Experience: A registered Professional Civil Engineer in the state of Washington with 22 years' experience in project design engineering. Includes five years at Energy Northwest's Columbia Generating Station and 17 years for the Department of Energy (DOE), including five years as Principle Civil/Structural Engineer.

Skilled as a design engineer in developing engineering estimates and schedules for allocating budgets, preparation of design media (calculations, specifications, drawings),

structural design codes associated with nuclear and non-nuclear applications, and using finite element computer software for structural analysis.

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- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 4.0 SSC Selection 4.1 Purpose This section describes the process used to develop the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL), which defines the scope of the Seismic Walkdowns performed in response to the NRC's 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012. The SWEL was developed using the guidance provided in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Seismic Walkdown Guidance, For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic (Reference 9.3) hereafter referred to as the EPRI Guidance. In addition, clarifications and methods stated in the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on Seismic Walkdown Guidance, were followed as noted in Section 4.2 below. The FAQ is included as Attachment 9 to this report.

4.2 SWEL Development EPRI Guidance, Section 3: Selection of SSCs, describes the process to be used to identify structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to be included on a SWEL. A SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 list were required by the EPRI Guidance. SWEL 1 consists of safety-related, Seismic Category 1 items associated with bringing the reactor to a safe shutdown condition and maintaining containment integrity. SWEL 2 consists of equipment or systems associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 are combined to form the combined SWEL, which defines the overall scope of equipment used as input to the Seismic Walkdowns. Additional information regarding the methodology and process utilized by the operations and equipment selection personnel to develop the combined SWEL is provided below.

4.2.1 SWEL 1 Development A list of all Seismic Category 1 equipment was generated from the plant equipment database. Structures, containment penetrations, and piping were removed from the list (valves and instrumentation were included). This list became Base List 1, as defined in Section 8 of the EPRI Guidance, and is included as Attachment 4.

A Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) (Reference 9.5, Table 6-1) for a seismic vulnerability evaluation was previously developed in response to the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program requested by the NRC in Generic Letter 88-20 (Reference 9.10).

Base List 1 was compared to the SSEL. The SWEL 1, as shown in Attachment 2, was developed by the equipment selection personnel using both the SSEL and Base List 1.

Of the 116 items on SWEL 1, 68 were previously included on the IPEEE SSEL.

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- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

SWEL 1 was developed by applying the following five sample selection attributes, defined in the EPRI Guidance. The method of application is summarized for each attribute:

1. A variety of types of systems. SWEL 1 items were selected to represent a broad range of SSCs from frontline safety and support systems. A summary of systems is provided in Attachment 6. A distribution of SSCs from 26 different systems was selected.

2. Major new and replacement equipment. The approach provided in Section 3.2 of Attachment 9, was followed. The equipment was first selected for SWEL 1 based on the other sample selection attributes (i.e., a variety of systems, equipment types, environments, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) risk items, and IPEEE enhancements). Then, SWEL 1 was thoroughly reviewed to identify whether any items had been subject to major changes during approximately the past 15 years.

This review was conducted using the plant equipment database to list changes affecting items on SWEL 1 as well as review by operations, design engineering, and system engineering personnel. These Items are identified in the "Major Change" column on SWEL 1.

3. A variety of types of equipment. Sample selection for SWEL 1 included providing a variety of the equipment types described in EPRI Guidance, Appendix B, Classes of Equipment. A summary of equipment classes from SWEL 1 is provided in Attachment 7. All equipment types are represented with the exception of motor generators. The motor generator equipment type is not represented because none of the motor generators at Columbia Generating Station are Seismic Category 1.

4. A variety of environments. Sample items were selected from different locations inside and outside the station to include various environments (hot, cold, dry, wet).

Attachment 8 provides a summary of the areas where walkdowns and walk-bys were conducted. Six items in containment (drywell) were added to be walked down during the recent R21 refueling outage along with one item located in the main steam tunnel. Another six items were included that are outdoors and exposed to weather conditions, four of which are in close proximity to the spray ponds. Ten items were included that are located in buildings outside the main station in the service water pump houses, circulating water pump house, and water treatment building. The bulk of the items selected are located inside the station's diesel generator, radioactive waste, and reactor buildings.

5. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program.

The IPEEE program documentation was reviewed to determine equipment that had been modified or otherwise enhanced to reduce IPEEE vulnerabilities. Four Seismic Category 2 fire protection batteries, FP-B0-1 1OA, FP-B0-1 10B, FP-BO-1A, and FP-BO-1 B, were identified as enhancements; no Seismic Category 1 items were identified as enhancements. These items were added to SWEL 1 to ensure IPEEE enhancements are still in place.

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- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

As shown on Attachment 2, the applicable supported safety function(s) were determined for each item as confirmation that the five following safety functions are adequately represented:

1. Reactor reactivity control

2. Reactor coolant pressure control

3. Reactor coolant inventory control

4. Decay heat removal

5. Containment function A Level 1 Seismic PRA exists for Columbia Generating Station, which was used by a PRA subject matter expert to generate an importance list of basic events. Non-SSC related basic events such as plant-practices and operator performance events were not considered. The list of basic events was used by the equipment selection personnel to identify a sampling of SSCs associated with those basic events having a risk achievement worth value greater than 1.8 for inclusion on SWEL 1. These are identified in the "High Risk Item" column on SWEL 1 (Attachment 2).

There were seven items added to SWEL 1 that are not Seismic Category 1, four are the fire protection batteries which were previously discussed as IPEEE enhancements. The remaining three items added to SWEL 1, RFT-CP-COM1, E-TR-ISOL/USA, and DSA-C-1A1, are all Seismic Category 1M (SC 1M) (maintains structural integrity during/after SSE) and were added for the reasons below:

E-TR-ISOL/USA - Added as a transformer supporting important loads, including control room computer equipment, control rod drive system instrumentation, and various process radiation monitors.

RFT-CP-COM1 - Added control panel for importance to reactor pressure vessel level control as it is integral to reactor feedwater pump turbine control.

DSA-C-1A1 - This was added for the compressor equipment type since Columbia Generating Station does not have any compressors that are Seismic Category 1.

Additionally this item is SC-1 M because it must maintain integrity during and after the seismic event to maintain the diesel starting air (DSA) system integrity for the diesel generators.

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- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 4.2.2 SWEL 2 Development Base List 2, as defined in Section 8 of the EPRI Guidance and included as Attachment 5, was developed based on a review of systems and components associated with the SFP.

These SFP related items were pulled from the same equipment database generated list of Seismic Category 1 items as Base List 1.

In selecting components for SWEL 2 (Attachment 3) from Base List 2, the EPRI Guidance identifies four sample selection considerations. The method of application is summarized for each consideration below:

1. A variety of types of systems. The SFP related items include the Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-up (FPC) system and the associated instrumentation and controls. The summary of systems is provided in Attachment 6.

2. Maior new and replacement equipment. The approach provided in Section 3.2 of Attachment 9, was followed. The equipment was first selected for SWEL 2 based on the other sample selection attributes (i.e., variety of systems, equipment types, and environments). Then, SWEL 2 was reviewed to identify whether any items had been subject to major changes during approximately the past 15 years. This review was conducted using the plant equipment database as well as review by operations, design engineering, and FPC system engineering personnel. These Items are identified in the "Major Change" column on SWEL 2.

3. A variety of types of equipment. The equipment types from Base List 2 that are identified in Appendix B of the EPRI Guidance, with the exception of Class 0, "Other," were included on SWEL 2. Seismic Category 1 structures and in-line components that are part of Seismic Category 1 piping systems (i.e., piping, manual valves, and instrumentation) were excluded as they are not part of the selection criteria. A summary of equipment classes from SWEL 2 is provided in Attachment 7.

4. A variety of environments. All of the areas containing equipment types selected in the previous step were included. The in-scope FPC equipment is all contained inside the reactor building and main control room in the radioactive waste building.

Attachment 8 provides a summary of the areas in which these Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were conducted.

A total of 18 components were identified that met the criteria for inclusion in the Seismic Walkdowns and were added to SWEL 2. A justification was provided for SFP related components identified on Base List 2, as to why the item was added or not added to SWEL 2. This is shown in the "SWEL 2 Inclusion/Exclusion Justification" column on Base List 2 (Attachment 5).

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Enclosure 2 - Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

Rapid Draindown No components, whose failure could result in rapid drain-down of the SFP, were identified for addition to SWEL 2. There are only two penetrations in the SFP which are located approximately 1 foot below the normal operating level. FSAR Section 9.1.2.3.3, Spent Fuel and Cask Handling states the following:

"Failureof the gates between the reactor well and the spent fuel storage pool is improbable. However, in the event of this failure, the loss of water from the storage pool into the reactorwell would not uncover the stored spent fuel due to the elevation of the weir wall under the gates. This elevation ensures that sufficient water is retainedin the pool to cover the spent fuel.

To avoid unintentional draining of the spent fuel storage pool to levels below that required for adequate shielding of the spent fuel, no inlets, outlets, or drains that would normally permit the pool to be drained are provided.

Discharge lines extending below the pool water level are designed to prevent any siphon back flow. Two skimmer surge tanks are provided and are sized to accommodate water displacement due to large items being placed into or removed from the spent fuel storage pool."

Additionally, the fuel pool cooling return lines to the SFP have both check valves and vacuum breakers to prevent siphoning. These are supported as part of the Seismic Category 1 inlet piping system and not an equipment type that is part of the selection criteria for walkdowns.

4.2.3 Combined SWEL The combined SWEL was developed by combining the items on SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 for a total of 134 items. The items on the combined SWEL (Attachment 1) were reviewed to determine the population of items with anchorage and, as shown on the combined SWEL, more than 50 percent of those items underwent a configuration verification of the installed anchorage during the associated Seismic Walkdown. The combined SWEL serves as the input to the Seismic Walkdowns conducted in accordance with EPRI Guidance, Section 4 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.

4.3 Inaccessible Equipment During the equipment selection process, operations personnel played a key role not only in selecting equipment that met the sample considerations, but also in selecting equipment that had accessible anchorage as recommended in the EPRI Guidance.

However, in the course of performing walkdowns, there were four items with anchorage that was not visible and appeared to be difficult to access. E-CB-B/7, E-DP-S1/1 D, E-DP-S1/2, and E-DP-S1/2A were either substituted or removed from SWEL 1, as detailed in 12

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Section 5.2 of this report, but the Area Walk-Bys were still performed. Additionally, RHR-V-48B was removed for dose considerations and no walk-by was performed. These five items are shown in strikethrough at the bottom of SWEL 1 and the combined SWEL.

Similarly, SWEL 2 shows E-IR-71 at the bottom in strikethrough as it was also removed for dose considerations.

As discussed in Section 5.4 of this report, there were a number of items that were deferred and completed later due to location, safety, or schedule. These included items inside containment, electrical panels that required internal inspection, and items added to the SWEL after further review by plant operations personnel. These deferred items are identified in Attachment 11 and were completed by the end of the recent R21 refueling outage.

4.4 Conclusions The development of the SWEL was performed and implemented as described in Section 4.2 of this report in accordance with EPRI Guidance, Section 3 Selection of SSCs.

Clarifications and methods stated in the FAQ provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) were followed as noted in Section 4.2 of this report.

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Enclosure 2 - Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 5.0 Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By Summary The following subsections provide a summary of the approach used to implement the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys for Columbia Generating Station; to document the results of these Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; and to report any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during plant walkdowns and area walk-bys. Any issues found during the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-Bys were documented on the designated checklists. The potentially adverse seismic conditions were submitted for license basis evaluations and, if found to be an issue from the license basis evaluation, entered into the CAP as Condition Reports (CRs). The license basis evaluations are stated in Attachment 13, with references to specific checklists. Non-seismic related issues (i.e., housekeeping issues) were also identified and noted on the checklists.

These housekeeping type issues did not undergo a licensing basis evaluation but were entered into the CAP by generating CRs.

Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed in 2 groups, the initial group and the deferred group. The initial group represents the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys performed prior to the initial submittal of this report in November of 2012. The deferred group represents the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys performed after the initial submittal of this report for various ALARA and safety reasons. The deferred Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were all performed between the time when the initial report was submitted in November 2012 and the end of refueling outage R21 in June 2013. The Seismic Walkdown Checklists for the initial group are included in 0 and the Seismic Walkdown Checklists for the deferred group are included in Attachment 10A.

5.1 Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by Planning Walkdown packages were prepared for each component listed on the SWEL and for each Area Walk-By to be performed. Each walkdown package included the following items, as applicable: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC), Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC), General Arrangement drawings showing equipment location, flow diagrams or isometric drawings for valves (when applicable), anchorage details, or structural drawings for SWEL items requiring anchorage configuration verification. A hardcopy of each walkdown package was carried by the Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) during performance of the walkdowns.

Planning and scheduling the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys was completed in accordance with the station work management system. The Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were scheduled into divisional work weeks ensuring the walkdown team would not interfere with regular station operation and maintenance. A log was established to identify each SWC and AWC, and date of the scheduled walkdown. Work 14

Enclosure 2 - Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) packages were generated for each item on the combined SWEL (Attachment 1), in accordance with plant procedures.

In order to comply with Energy Northwest's Error Prevention program, each Seismic Walkdown Engineer completed Human Performance Awareness training. Prior to the start of the Seismic Walkdowns, the initial walkdown team participated in a mock-up walkdown scenario to demonstrate acceptable work practices. For the deferred walkdowns one of the initial team members was paired with the new Seismic Walkdown Engineers that did not participate in the mock-up.

The walkdown team always consisted of two SWEs and was assisted, when possible, by operations or plant personnel who were knowledgeable of the SWEL item location, general plant area, and also provided assistance in addressing non-seismic related issues that were found during the walkdowns.

5.2 Seismic Walkdowns Seismic Walkdowns for Columbia Generating Station were performed in accordance with Section 4 of the EPRI Guidance. The initial Seismic Walkdown Checklists are included in 0, and deferred items checklists are included in Attachment 1OA.

The combined SWEL contained 134 items to be walked down. Of the 134 items identified on the combined SWEL, 120 walkdowns were performed with the initial group and 14 walkdowns were performed with the deferred group. Both groups of walkdowns utilized a similar walkdown team and usage of plant work packages. The deferred group of SWEL items is listed in Attachment 11.

The Seismic Walkdowns performed resulted in the identification of 40 potentially adverse seismic conditions as listed in Attachment 13. Note that several of the issues (within the total of 40 issues) are similar in nature. The following list summarizes the potentially adverse seismic conditions that were found during the Seismic Walkdowns:

" Missing concrete anchors from surface mounted support plate (for example, a surface mounted plate with 4 bolt holes but with only 3 concrete anchors installed),

• Improperly installed concrete anchors (anchors installed not perpendicular to the plate, resulting in gaps between bolt head and plate surfaces),

" Missing nuts on bolts and missing washers for nuts/bolts in oversized or slotted holes in surface mounted plates,

• Anchor bolt and concrete anchor corrosion that appeared to be more than mild,

" Missing support clamps on instrument tubing that was routed from specific SWEL item, 15

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

" Improperly restrained maintenance tools hanging on specific SWEL item,

" Long cantilevered manual valve operators over specific SWEL item,

• Bent flanges on specific SWEL items at bolted interfaces,

" Overhead ceiling tiles in the control room were present and from visual inspection from floor level, the supporting structure and details of the ceiling tiles was not visible, and

" Lights above SWEL equipment that do not have fall restraints or safety chains There were six equipment items included in the original combined SWEL scope that were deleted after being walked down due to inaccessibility (not-authorized to open electrical item based on plant operations) and no visibility of anchorage (i.e. electrical panel was flush against the wall and anchors were inside the panel). These items, shown in strikethrough at the bottom of Attachments 1, 2, and 3, are listed below along with the reason for deletion and any substitutions made:

" E-CB-B/7 (Standby Feed from Backup Transformer, E-TR-B Cubicle 12):

Anchorage was neither visible nor entirely accessible because part of the circuit breaker was energized at the time of the Seismic Walkdown. This item was substituted with "SW-CB-PlA", which is a 4160V Circuit Breaker that meets the same safety functions as E-CB-B/7 as described in Section 4.2 of this report for SWEL development. The Seismic Walkdown for SW-CB-P1A was performed during the recent R21 refueling outage. The Area Walk-by was still performed.

" E-DP-S1/1D (125VDC Distribution Panel located in the Remote Shutdown Room):

This panel was flush against the wall and administratively could not be opened to see anchorage or internal components during the Seismic Walkdown. A direct substitution for this item was not made because there is another distribution panel, E-DP-S1/1F, included in the combined SWEL that met similar safety functions, as described in Section 4.2 of this report, for SWEL 1 development. The Area Walk-By was still performed.

• E-DP-S1/2 (DIV 2 125VDC Main Distribution Panel): Anchorage was not visible from the panel exterior and administratively could not be opened to see anchorage or internal components during the Seismic Walkdown. A direct substitution for this item was not made because there is another distribution panel, E-DP-S1/1F, included in the combined SWEL that met similar safety functions, as described in Section 4.2 of this report, for SWEL 1 development. The Area Walk-By was still performed.

16

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

" E-DP-S1/2A (125V DC Distribution Panel): Anchorage was not visible from the panel exterior and administratively could not be opened to see anchorage or internal components during the Seismic Walkdown. A direct substitution for this item was not made because there is another distribution panel, E-DP-S1/1F, included in the combined SWEL that met similar safety functions as described in Section 4.2 of this report, for SWEL 1 development. The Area Walk-By was still performed.

• RHR-V-48B (Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 1B Bypass Valve (RHR-HX-1B)): This valve was deleted mainly because the valve was located in a room with drastically increased radiation dose due to maintenance work performed the week prior to the Seismic Walkdown. Due to ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) concerns and several other system Residual Heat Removal (RHR) equipment items that supported the same safety functions and were already on the combined SWEL, RHR-V-48B was removed. The Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By were not performed for this equipment item.

" E-IR-71 (Reactor Building Instrument Rack): This item is located within a locked high radiation area and was removed from SWEL2 due to ALARA concerns. A direct substitution for this item was not made since E-IR-69, which shares the same equipment class and similar safety function, is included in SWEL2. The Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By were not performed for this equipment item.

A minimum 50% of combined SWEL items (with anchorage) were to be verified for proper anchorage configuration and documented in the Seismic Walkdown Checklists, per EPRI Guidance. A total of 52 SWEL items were verified. The total number of SWEL items (134 items), minus 39 valves (which are not counted towards anchorage verification), results in 95 SWEL items that can have anchorage verification. Valve SW-V-2A has its own separate anchorage and was counted for verification (not counted in the 39 valves).

Since 52 items were verified, 55% of the total SWEL items with anchorage were verified.

Refer to Attachment 1 for specific items verified.

The FAQ in Attachment 12 discusses visual inspection requirements of internal components of electrical cabinet/panel items on the combined SWEL. The requirements are only applicable for the combined SWEL items in the Seismic Walkdowns and not surrounding equipment within the Area Walk-Bys.

The following Electrical panels were opened for visual inspection of internal components (refer to Attachment 1 for specific details on items listed below):

1. E-CP-H13/P611 [Reactor Protection System Trip System B Control Panel]

2. E-CP-H13/P618 [RHR Control Panel]

3. E-CP-H13/P626 [Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) Control Panel 1]

17

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

4. E-CP-H13/P627 [Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) Control Panel 2]

5. RFT-CP-COM1 [Fiber/Network Enclosure]

6. CIA-CP-1 [CIA Nitrogen Bottles Control Panel 1]

7. CIA-CP-2 [CIA Nitrogen Bottles Control Panel 2]

8. E-C1-1A [125V DC Vital Battery Charger A]

9. E-C2-1 [250V Battery Charger 1]

10. E-CP-ARS [Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel]

11. E-CP-DG/CP3 [HPCS Engine & Generator 480V Power Panel]

12. E-CP-DG/EP3 [HPCS Diesel Generator Engine Control Panel]

13. E-CP-H13/P833 [Control Room Safety System Panel (Board G2)]

14. E-CP-H13/P841 [Control Room Panel (Board G1)]

15. E-DP-S1/1F [Division 1 Critical Switchgear Panel]

16. E-DP-S1/HPCS [125V DC HPCS System Distribution Panel]

17. E-IN-2A [Division 2 Critical 120V AC Power Supply Inverter A]

18. E-IN-2B [Division 2 Critical 120V AC Power Supply Inverter B]

19. E-IR-68 [Reactor Building Instrument Rack]

20. E-IR-69 [Reactor Building Instrument Rack]

21. E-IR-PO01 [LPCS Instrument Rack]

22. E-IR-PO1 1 [SLC Instrument Rack]

23. E-IR-PO1 7 [RCIC Instrument Rack]

24. E-MC-4A [HPCS Motor Control Center 4A]

25. E-MC-7A [Motor Control Center 7A]

26. E-MC-8A [Motor Control Center 8A]

27. E-MC-8F [Motor Control Center 8F]

28. E-PP-8AE [1 20/240V 200 A Reactor Bldg Instr & Cntl Power Panel]

29. FPC-42-7BB9B [NEMA Size 3 Motor Starter for FPC-P-1 A]

30. FPC-42-8BB2D [NEMA Size 3 Motor Starter for FPC-P-1 B]

31. RCIC-SC-C002 [RCIC Turbine Speed Controller]

32. SW-CB-P1 A [4160V Circuit Breaker for SW-M-P/1 A]

The items listed above were opened and inspected in accordance with Attachment 12.

There were no adverse seismic conditions found inside the opened electrical panels.

Components, wiring, and fasteners were in place. Although not deemed to be an adverse seismic condition, one CR was entered into the CAP for broken cable ties found inside E-CP-ARS.

18

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 5.3 Area Walk-Bys Area Walk-Bys for Columbia Generating Station were performed in accordance with Section 4 of the EPRI Guidance. The Area Walk-By Checklists for the initial group are included in Attachment 10 and the Area Walk-By Checklists for the deferred group are included in Attachment 1OA.

The Area Walk-By consisted of 61 unique areas that were walked down, resulting in the identification of 79 potentially adverse seismic conditions as listed in Attachment 13. Note that several of the issues (within the total of 79 issues) are similar in nature. The following list summarizes the general potentially adverse seismic conditions found during the Area Walk-Bys:

• Surface mounted plates (for pipe supports, tubing, etc.) or supports were missing concrete anchors (for example, for a surface mounted plate with four bolt holes, only three concrete anchors were installed),

" Missing bolts between support angles and electrical cable trays,

" Unusual anchorage conditions, such as gaps between support angles with concrete anchors and the base frame, gaps between bolt heads and plate surfaces, as well as bolts installed at minor angles (resulting in gaps under the bolt heads or nuts) and bolts that were not fully engaged,

" Light fixture interferences, such as lighting fixture support struts and light fixture exterior casing that were found resting on cable trays, conduit, and firewater piping, as well as spatial concerns with adjacent equipment in a seismic event,

" Light fixtures with bent hanger rods and disengaged nuts on rod connections,

" Storage permit questions with items in the plant approved storage boundaries. In this case we wanted verification the items (i.e. storage barrels, tool chests) within the boundaries were in fact approved based on the storage permit identification numbers. In some cases, items were stored outside of permit boundaries and could have spatial interactions with nearby equipment in a seismic event,

" Overhead ceiling tiles in the Control Room were present during visual inspection from floor level; the supporting structure and details of the supporting structure of the ceiling tiles were not visible,

" Partially engaged nuts (negative bolt shaft projection resulting in several exposed threads of nuts),

• Possible missing supports on instrument tubing routed from equipment, 19

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

" Maintenance/operations items such as a stanchion, scaffolding components, tool carts (outside of storage areas), and oil dipsticks that can potentially damage equipment during a seismic event,

" Questionable valve operator orientations. These valve operators appeared to be cantilevered significantly and needed verification that they were within design,

• Spalled or cracked concrete and cracked grout (for instance on a grout pad) adjacent to concrete anchors,

" Lights above equipment that do not have fall restraints or safety chains,

" Missing conduit covers, and

" Bent instrument tubing During the Area Walk-Bys, non-seismic related issues were identified, but were either safety hazards or related to housekeeping. For instance, oil leaks on a pump in the area were noted on the Area Walk-By Checklists (or Seismic Walkdown Checklists if the non-seismic issue related directly to the specific seismic class equipment). These issues were entered into the CAP by CRs.

Some of the non-seismic related issues found were as follows:

• Extraneous duct tape left on various items, such as overhead piping,

" Equipment tags found on the floor,

" Light support was broken and was held via cable wire,

• Loose or missing conduit covers,

" Oil leaks,

• What appeared to be oil or water ponding (on top of a tank corner that is in a confined space),

" Trash in undesignated location,

" Unrestrained ladders and ladders left on the floor, and

• Loose guardrail 5.4 Inaccessible and Deferred Items During SWEL development, in order to align with Columbia Generating Station's divisional work weeks for major equipment, it was determined that several equipment 20

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) items should be deferred. The reasons for the deferrals include radiation exposure concerns, location (i.e. inside Primary Containment), as well as waiting for equipment to be de-energized (i.e. circuit breaker SW-CB-P1A).

The following deferred items (listed below) were not originally included in the SWEL but were added later based upon discussions with industry peers and additional clarification in the FAQs.

• E-CP-H13/P833 [Control Room Safety System Panel (Board G2)],

" E-CP-H13/P841 [Control Room Panel (Board G1)],

" E-IR-69 [Reactor Building Instrument Rack],

• E-IR-71 [Reactor Building Instrument Rack],

• FPC-42-7BB9B [NEMA Size 3 Motor Starter for FPC Pump 1A], and

" FPC-42-8BB2D [NEMA Size 3 Motor Starter for FPC Pump 1B]

• LD-TE-29A [Main Steam Line Tunnel Inlet Vent Temperature Element]

" LD-TE-31 C [Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temperature Element]

Internal inspections of the electrical items originally on the combined SWEL (cabinets, panels, etc.) were also deferred. The requirement for internal inspection was clarified in a FAQ (Attachment 12). This clarification came after most of the initial walkdown field activities were completed. Due to the timing of receipt of the clarification and the potential need for some of the electrical panels to be de-energized to allow the walkdown, the decision was made to defer these inspections.

The walkdowns for these deferred items were performed between the time the initial report was submitted in November 2012 and the end of refueling outage R21 in June 2013 and are detailed in Attachment 11. The Seismic Walkdown Checklists for the deferred items are included in Attachment 10A.

21

Enclosure 2 - Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 6.0 Licensing Basis Evaluation Summary The potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-By activities are listed in Attachment 13. Attachment 13 has each issue tied to specific combined SWEL items and Walk-By Areas. Also listed in the same attachment are the licensing basis evaluations, and any references to CR's written and their status.

The total number of potentially adverse seismic conditions identified was 119 (40 Seismic Walkdown issues and 79 Area Walk-By issues). There were a total of 85 licensing basis evaluations performed (i.e. existing calculation and drawing confirmations) while a total of 36 CRs were generated to address issues. The total number of licensing basis evaluations and CRs do not equal the total number of adverse seismic conditions, due to the fact that some issues have both licensing basis evaluations and CRs, refer to 3 for specific details. Attachment 13 is organized by Walk-By Area, which corresponds to the header information on each Area Walk-By Checklist. Listed for each Walk-By Area is the equipment item (from the combined SWEL) within the area, any issues found (this would be documented on the Seismic Walkdown Checklist for the specific equipment), and "Walk-by Items" found during the Area Walk-By as documented on the associated Area Walk-By Checklist.

No potentially adverse seismic issues or housekeeping issues were identified resulting in the equipment or the plant being outside of the license basis. Although some of the CRs still need to be closed, initial evaluations were performed to ensure proper plant operability and safety. These evaluations are documented in the individual CRs identified in Attachment 13.

6.1 Plant Modifications There are no planned or newly installed changes to the plant as a result of implementing the EPRI Guidance. The changes that have occurred or will occur (via CRs) will bring alignment between plant configuration and plant documentation. (e.g. installing a missing tube clamp or providing justification within design calculations and drawings).

22

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 7.0 IPEEE Vulnerabilities The recommended improvements resulting from the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) were identified in Section 7.3 of the Washington Nuclear Plant 2 (WNP-2) IPEEE report (Reference 9.6). Washington Nuclear Plant 2 was the original name of Columbia Generating Station. The status of each proposed improvement was provided to the NRC under letter G02-01-010 (Reference 9.2). This letter provided the status of seven improvements, five of which are seismic related. Of these five, Improvement 3 installed straps on the fire protection diesel engine batteries. None of the other four improvements resulted in changes to the plant or procedures. Additionally, one action was completed at the time of the IPEEE submittal. This action installed missing anchorage nuts or washers in two air handling units in the Division 1 Diesel Generator Room to restore the units to the design anchorage configuration. The NRC staff evaluation report of Columbia Generating Station's IPEEE submittal concluded that Energy Northwest's IPEEE process was capable of identifying the most likely severe accidents and severe accident vulnerabilities from external events, and the Columbia Generating Station IPEEE met the intent of Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20 and the resolution of specific safety issues discussed in the staff evaluation report (Reference 9.8).

The fire protection diesel engine batteries (FP-BO-1 10A, FP-B0-1 10B, FP-B0-1A and FP-B0-1B) identified in Letter G02-01-010 (Reference 9.2) are included in SWEL 1. The subsequent Seismic Walkdown found the fire protection diesel engine batteries to be seismically acceptable. The modifications installed based upon guidance from the IPEEE are still in place.

23

Enclosure 2 - Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 8.0 Peer Review Team Report I The initial Peer Review Team Report is included as Attachment 14. An updated Peer Review Team Report, for the deferred SWEL items, is included as Attachment 14A.

24

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 9.0 References 9.1 Columbia Generating Station. (2011). Final Safety Analysis Report, Ammendment

61. Richland, WA: Energy Northwest.

9.2 DW Coleman, Energy Northwest (2001, January 24). Letter G02-01 -010: Initial Submittal of Individual Plant Examination for External Events.

9.3 Electric Power Research Institute. (2012). Seismic Walkdown Guidance, For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic.

Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute.

9.4 Energy Northwest. (1998, November). Technical Memorandum, TM-2143, "Geology, Seismology, and Geotechnical Engineering Report."

9.5 EQE International. (1994). Development of Seismic Fragilitiesfor WNP-2 IPEEE.

Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program. EQE International.

9.6 JV Parrish, Energy Northwest (1995, June 26). Letter G02-95-119: Initial Submittal of Individual Plant Examination for External Events.

9.7 Energy Northwest. (1993). CIVES-1: Seismic/Dynamic Analysis of Structural Components.

9.8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2001). Letter G12-01-022: Review of Columbia GeneratingStation Individual Plant Examination of External Events Submittal (TAC No. M83695). Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

9.9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2012). Request For Information PursuantTo Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, And 9.3, Of The Near-Term Task Force Review Of Insights From The Fukushima Dai-lchiAccident. Washington, D.C.: NRC.

9.10 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1988) Generic Letter 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10CFR 50.54(f)," November 23, 1988.

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- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version) 10.0 Attachments

1) Combined SWEL

2) SWEL 1

3) SWEL 2

4) Base List 1

5) Base List 2

6) Summary of Equipment Systems

7) Summary of Equipment Classes

8) Summary of Walk-by Areas

9) FAQ - Frequently Asked Questions on Seismic Walkdown Guidance

10) Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By Checklists 1OA) Deferred Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by Checklists

11) Deferred SWEL Items

12) FAQ - Electrical Panel Inspection

13) Licensing Basis Evaluations

14) Peer Review Team Report 14A) Peer Review Team Report Update 26

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 1-Combined SWEL This attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a final version has been included in this submittal.

Enclosre 2 - Public Version Attachment I - Combined SWEL Developed By My r aid Dale7/ Z-/

De"60me I seehion Developed By GregJJake eM Date-/29 3

/Poswoffliselectin

- . - - ~ T Y Equipmen Equipment NIgn I

Waikdowf Class Msjor Risk Part Number LEPNI C-CH-CR-1 A 1 iGIP Classi 11 Chanoe N

Item IEwupmew Descdpft I CHILLED WATER CHILLER PKG (0lVI Function Walk-13v Area Description 1J.23,4,5 T

I II An-chc-ragle Y

AncVorie Verifed Y

Completion Date A/14/"2012 CCH-CR-1B 1 1 ___ N L¸ CHILLED WATER SYSTEM (DIV 2) 1,2.3,4.5 Y Y 8/14/2012

~IA-CP-1 20 N N CIA I 0L PANEL 2 Y Y 7/31/2012

[;[A-CP-2 20 IJ A N I OL PANEL 2 RO'I-ILE TK-AB DISCH 2 Y Y 7/31/2012 CIA-SRPV-Sfl a N N .5" 2-WAY SOL VLV ON N, N N 7/31/2012 CIA-SPV-8A a I N N .5" 2-WAY SOL VLV ON N2 BOTTLE TK-8A DISCH 2 N N 7/31/2012 ON-V-106 7 N N V lNetLow Wer Tem Isolation 2 N N 8/21/2012 CN-V-07 7 N N Vpizer Inlet Low Temp Isolation 2 N N 5/21/2012 CRD-HCU-2635 0 N Y CRD HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT ASSY 1 N N 7/31/2012 ORD-HCU-3027 0 N Y CRD HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT ASSY 1 N N 7/31/2012 CSP-V-5 7 N N Sumession Pool Vacuum ReieflInbd AO) 5 N N 9/5=2012 DCW-HX-1B1 21 N N DG-ENG-1 B1 COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 1.2.3.4.5 Y Y 9/11/2012 DCW-HX-1B2 21 N N DG-ENG-1B2 COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 1,3.4.5 Y Y 9/11/2012 DEA.FN-21 9 N N DG2 ROOM STANDBY EXHAUST FAN 1.2,3.4,5 Y Y 9/11/2012 DEA-FN-31 9 N N HPCS ROOM STANDBY EXHAUST FAN 3 Y N 9/4/2012 DG-ENG-1A1 17 N Y UNIT1 DIESELGENENG I (NORTH) 1.2,3.4.5 Y N 9r25/2012 DG-ENG-1A2 17 N Y UNIT I DIESEL GEN ENG 2 (SOUTH) 1.2.3.4,5 Y Y 9/25/2012 DG-ENG-1B1 17 N Y UNIT 2 DIESEL GEN ENG 1 (NORTH) 1.2,3.4.5 Y Y 9/11/2012 DG.ENG-1B2 17 N Y UNIT 2 DIESEL GEN ENG 2 (SOUTH) 1,2.3.4.5 Y Y 9/11/2012 DG-ENG-1C 17 N Y DIESEL ENGINE FOR HPCS SYSTEM 3 Y Y 9/4/2012 DMA-AH-21 10 1 N N DG2 ROOM STANDBY AIR HANOLING UNIT 1.2,3,4.5 Y Y 9/11/2012 DMA-AH-22 10 N N 0G2 ROOM NORMAL OPERATING AIR HANDLING UNIT 1.2,3.4,5 Y Y 9/11/2012 DMA-AH-31 10 N N HPCS ROOM STANDBY AIR HANDUNG UNIT 3 Y Y 9/4/2012 DMA-AH-32 10 N N HPCS ROOM NORMAL OPERATING AIR HANDLING UNIT 3 Y Y 9/4/2012 DO-P-1A 6 N Y DO-TK-1A FUEL TRANSFER PUMP (25 GPM) 1,2,3,4,5 Y Y 8/28/2012 DO-P-1B a0 N Y DO-TK-1B FUEL TRANSFER PUMP (25 GPM) 12,23,4,5 Y Y 9)11/2012 DO-P-2 6 N Y HPCS DO-TK-2 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP (25 GPM) 3 Y Y 9/4/2012 DO-TK-3A 21 N Y DAY TANK FOR OG-ENG-1Al & 1A2 (3,000 GAL) 1,2,3,4,5 Y Y 8128/2012 DO-TK-3B 21 N Y DAY TANK FOR DG-ENG-I B1 & 1B2 (3,000 GAL) 1,2,3,4,5 Y Y 9/11/2012 DO-TK-3C 21 N Y DAY TANK FOR HPCS DG-ENG-IC (3,000 GAL) 3 Y Y Y 9/4/2012 DSA-C-1A1 12 N Y MOTOR-DRIVEN AIR COMPRESSOR FOR DG-ENG-1A1 & 1A2 1,2.3.4,5 "V-Y N 8r820 12 DSA-TK-3A 21 N Y DG-ENG-AI & 1A2 AIR RECEIVER 132 CF') 1,2,3,4,5 Y N 8/28/2012 DSA.TK-4A 21 N Y DG-ENG-1A1 & 1A2 AIR RECEIVER (32 CFT 1,2,3.4,5 Y N 8128/2012 DSA-TK-7A 21 N Y DG-ENG-1A1 & IA2 AIR RECEIVER (32 CFT) 1,2,3,5 Y N 8/28/2012 DSA-TK-8A 21 N Y DG-ENG-IA1 & 1A2 AIR RECEIVER (32 CFT) 12.3.4,5 N 8/28/2012 E-B1-1 Is N Y 125V BATTERY 01_-1 12.3.4,5 Y 8/1/2012 E-B1-2 1 N Y 2BTR1-2 1.2,345 Y Y 9/11/2012 E-B2-1 15 N N 2 V BATTERY 82-1 123.4,5 Y N 8/1/2012 E.C1-1A 16 Y Y 125VDC VITAL BATr CHARGER A - 123.4,5 Y Y 7/31/2012 E-C2-1 16 N N 250V BATTERY CHARGER 1 1 *, 3 _ N 7/3112012 12345 I of 4

Enclosre 2 - Public Version Attachment 1 - Combined SWEL Equipment Equipment High SI Walkd Part Number Class Majow Risk Safety HaslAnchorage Completion (EPN) (GIP Class) IChagei Item Equipment Description FunctionWalk-ByArea Descrdptin Anchorage Verified Date

.-Ur-pqna '*U F'. I' P.L I U-MNI', I I:cMIJ: I rI-U I ANL.

PUW Y N 9'11,iZ 12'

.-CP-DG/CP3 20 N N HPCS ENGINE & GEN 480V POWER PANEL 3 Y N 9/4/2012

-CP-DG/EP3 20 N N HPCS DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE CONTROL PNL 3 Y N 9W4/2012 E-CP-H13/P611 20 N N RPS TRIP SYS B CONTROL PANEL 1.4 Y N 8/1412012

• .-CP-H13/P618 20 N N DIV 2 RHR CONTROL PANEL 3.4.5 Y N 8/14/2012 E-CP-H13/P626 20 N N FPC4CP Y N 8/1412012

=-CP-Hl3/P627 20 N N FPC CP 2 4 Y N 8/14/2012 E-CP-Hi 3/P833 20 N N CTL ROOM SAFETY SYS PANEL (BOARD G2Y . 4 Y N 12/4/2012

'-CP-H13/P841 20 N N CONTROL ROOM PANEL (BOARD GI) 4 Y N 1214/2012 O-DP-SII1F 14 N Y IDIV I CRITICAL SWGR DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1,2.3A4,5 Y Y 9/2512012 E-DP-Sl/HPCS 14 Y N 125VDC HPCS SYS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 3 Y N 914/2012 E-IN-2A 16 Y N DIV 2 CRITmCAL 120 VAC POWER SUPPLY INVERTER A 2.3,4.5 Y Y 8/15/2012

-IN-28 16 Y N DIV 2 CRITICAL 120 VAC POWER SUPPLY INVERTER B 2,3,4,5 Y Y 8/15/2012

-IR-68 18 N N RX BLDG INSTR RACK 5 Y N 8/7/2012

.-IR-69 18 N N RX BLDG INSTR-RACK 4 Y N 12/4/2012 E-IR-P001 18 N N LPCS INSTRUMENT RACK 3 Y Y 8/28/2012

'TR-POI 18 N N SLC INSTRUMENT RACK 1 Y Y 8/21/2012 E-IR-POI7 18 N N RCIC'INSTRUMENT RACK 1,2.3 Y Y 9/18/2012 E-MC-4A 1 N N HPCS MOLTOR CONTROL CENTER 4A 3 Y N 9/4/2012

-MC-7A _ 1 N N MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 7A 1.3,4 Y N 9/25r2012 E-MC-8A 1 N N MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 8A 1.3,4 Y N 8/15/2012

.MC-8F I N N MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 8F 1.2,3,4.5 Y N 8/14/2012 E-PP-MAE 2 N N 120240V 200A RX BLDG INSTR &CNTL POWER PNNL Y N 8/15/2012 E-TR-7171 4 N Y 4160-480V STA SER TRANSFORMER 1,3,4.5 Y N 9W25/2012 ETR7/73 4 N N 4160-48DV STA SER TRANSFORMER 1,3.4.5 Y N 9/25/2012 TR-ISOL/USA 4 N N ISOLATION TRANSFORMER FOR E-PP-US/A N/A Y N 8/1/2012 FP-BO-1IOA 15 Y N FP-P-110 BATTERY A 3 Y Y 8/2112012 FP-BO-110B 15 Y N FP-P-110 BATTERY B 3 Y Y 8/21/2012 FP-B0-1IA 15 Y N FP-P-1 BATTERY A 3 Y Y 8/21/2012 FP-B0-1B 15 Y N FP-P-1 BATTERY B 3 Y Y 8/21/2012 PC..42-7BBgB I N N NEMA SIZE 3 MOTOR STARTER FOR FPC-P-IA 4 Y N 11/29/2012 FPC-42-8BB2D I N N FPC-P-1B 4 Y N 11/26/2012 FPC-FCV-1 0 N N Fuel Pool F/D By ' ' 4 N N 8/7/2012 FPC-HX-1A 21 N N FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 1A 4 Y Y 808/2012 FPC-HX-1 B 21 N N FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 1B 4 Y Y 8/0/2012 FPC-P-1A 5 Y N FUEL POOL COOLING CIRCULATION PUMP IA (575 GPM) 4 Y Y 818/2012 FPC-P-1B 5 Y N FUEL POOL COOLING CIRCULATION PUMP 1B (575 GPM) 4 Y Y 8/8/2012

PC-V-149 8 N N Supp Pool Cleanp Return Outboard Isol (MO) 5 N N 8/7/2012 FPC-V-153 8 N _N. Supp Pool Cleanup Suction Inbd Isol (MO) 5 N N 8/7/2012 FPC-V-154 8. N N SuPo Cleanup Suction Outbd Isol (MO) 5 N N 8/712012 FPC.V-156 8 N N Suppool Cleanup Return Inbd Isol (MO) 5 N N 81712012 FPC-V-172 8 N N FPC-HX-1A & 1B DISCH TO FILTER-DEMIN (MO) ISOL VALVE 4 N N 8/7/2012 FPC-V-173 8 N N FILTER-DEMIN INLET MO) ISOL VALVE 4 N N 8/7/2012 FPC-V-175 8 N N FILTER-DEMIN BYPASS (MO) VALVE 4 N N 8/7/2012 FPC-V-181A 8 Y N lCirculation Pump ASuction (MO) 4 N N 8/8/2012 FPC-V-1816 8 Y N Circulation Pump B Suction (MO) 4 N N 808/2012 FPC-V-184 8 N N FILTER-DEMIN OUTLET (MO) ISOL VALVE 4 N N 8/712012 iPCS-Bi -DG3 15 Y N 125V DIV 3 58 CELL STATION BATTERY 3 Y N 914/2012 iPCS-P-i 6 N N MAIN HPCS PUMP 3 Y Y 915/2012 2of4

Enclosre 2 - Public Version Attachment I - Combined SWEL Equipment Equipment M I Highi j Wamlcdown Put Number Class M Risk Safety Has Anchorage CompletioM

([EP.) (GIP Class) Change itemr Euipment Description Function Walk-By Area Description Anchorage Verified note iPCS.r-2 6 N N HPI'LS UIESEL SER-VICE WA IEH PUMP R Y 9//2012 HPCS-P-3 5 N N HPCS SYSTEM WATER LEG PUMP 3 V Y

Y 9/5/2012 HPCS*V-4 8 N N RPV INJECTION MOV 3 N N 914/2012

.D-TE-29A 19 N N MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL INLET VEN 5 Y N 12/1112012 D-TE-31C 19 N N MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL AMBIENT TEMP 5 Y N 5/23/2013

,PCS-P-2 5 N N LPCS WATER LEG PUMP 3,4.5 Y Y 8/2912012 LPCS-V-5 8 N N RPV Injection 3 N N 82w/2012 AS-V-22B 8 N Y MS LINE B INBOARD ISOL SOV 3.5 N N 6/512013 AS-V-22C 8 N Y MS LINE C INBOARD ISOL SOV 3.5 N N 615/2013 AS-V.37C 0 N N 101CHECK MS-RV-2D DISCHARGE 5 N N 6/5/2013 AS-V-37K 0 N N 1i- CHECK MS-RV-ID DISCH 5 N N 6/5/2013

&S-V-38C 0 N N 10" CHECK VAC BKR FOR MS-RV-2D 5 N N 6/512013 MS-V-38K 0 N N 10' CHECK VAC BKR FOR MS-RV-1D 5 N N 6/5/r2013 PRA.FN-1B 9 N N RECIRCULATION FAN FOR PRA-FC-IB 12g3.4,5 Y N 9/6/2013 RCIC-HX-l 21 N Y RCIC BAROMETRIC CONDENSE 1,2.3 Y N 911912012 RCIC-HX-2 21 N Y RCIC LUBE OIL COOLER HT EXCH 1,2,3 Y Y 9/1912012 RCIC-P-1 5 N Y RCIC PUMP 1.2.3 Y Y 911912012 RCIC-P-2 5 N Y RCIC VACUUM PUMP 12,3 Y N 9119/2012

.CIC-PS-9A 0 N Y RCIC-DT-1 EXH PRESS HIGH TRIP SWITCH 1 23 Y N 9/1912012 RCIC-PS-9B 0 N Y RCIC-DT-1 EXH PRESS HIGH TRIP SWITCH 123 Y N 9119/2012 RCIC-SC-C002 20 N Y RCIC TURBINE SPEED CONTROLLER 1,2,3 Y N 9/19/2012 IFT-CP-COM1 20 N N FIBER/NETWORK ENCLOSURE 3 Y N 9/1512012 9/5,201 1 RHR-P-2A 6 N Y RHR PUMP LOOP A HX SUPPLY 3.415 Y Y RHR-P-3 5 N N RHR WATER LEG PUMP 3.4,5 Y Y 9/12/201'd RHR-V-16B 8 N N Lower B a.

fw 5 N N RHR-V-17B 8 N NN Lower Drywell Spa 5 N N 91281201'd IHR-V-27A 8 N Y ession Pool Spray 5 N N 7/25/201'.

RHR-V-42B 8 N N LPCI Isolation 3 N N 9/12/201'g RRA-FC-4 10 N N HPCS PMP RM FAN COOLER ASSY 3 Y Y 9251201.

SGT-FN-1A1 9 N N EXHAUST FAN SGT-FU-IA 5 Y Y 7/25=2014 SGT-FU-1A 10 N N STANDBY GAS FILTER UNIT I 5 Y Y 7125/2012 SGT-V-1A 88 N N INLET FROM CONTAINMENT 5 N N 7/251201' SGT-V-3A2 8 N N 18'MO BFLY SGT-FN-1A1 INLET 5 N N 7/25=201, XLC-P-1A 5

_SLC_ N N PUMP 1.3 Y Y 7/25/201d SLC-TK-1 21 N N SLC'STORAGE TANK 1.3 Y Y 97/25/2012

ýLC-V-1A 8 N N SLC Storage Tank Outlet 1,3 N N 7/251201' SW-CB-P1A 3 Y N 4160V CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR SW-M-P./1A 1.214,5 Y N 12/11/201--

SW-P-1B 6 Y Y LOOP B MAIN SSW PUMP 1A3,4,5 Y N 9/502011, SW-V-165A 0 N N B Spray Header Bypass .. 23,4t5 N N SW-V-165B 0 N N A Header Bypass ... 2.34.5 N N 9/512012 SW-V-170A 0 N N B Spray Header Isolaton 1.2.3W45 N N 9/512012 5W-V-170B 0 N N A Spray Header Isolation 11.2,3,4,5 N N SW-V-29 8 N Y HPCS-P-2 DISCHARGE VALVE (MO) 3 N N 8/29/2014 Y Y SW-V-2A 8 N Y SW-P-1A DISCHARGE VALVE 12.3.4,5 9/6/2014 N

__Go hW-V-2B so i-448/

8 1____

N Y Sw-P.

• VAVILE

'Xr-MR.re :MR- 42 1_234.5 1 4vDA3 N

N N

N

$/442DI',

i9p-sw2 _4 1N k mGPN'M 4,,4 b5i M 4dttt fl-, fll'C.OI ln _,*.S DANIcl +/- N 8/44/8QMQ 44_____ .l26VL.* N " 4rl 4 3o114

Enclosre 2 - Public Version Attachment 1 - Combined SWEL Equipment I Equipment I H*Jh I I ~Walkdown PartNumber IClass I Major IRiskI Ssafety Has Anchorage Completion (EPN) I (GIP Class) Change ItRem _Equipment Description FucioWalk-By Area Desortotion Anchorage Verified Date 6IS 1N 1I I . INSTR RACK 4 N NIAI NI-V-49 I N I lN-lR N N WIA Total = 1341 Safety Functions

1. Reactor reactivity control

2. Reactor coolant pressure control

3. Reactor coolant inventory control

4. Decay heat removal 5, Containment function Equipment Classes 0 - Other 1 - Motor Control Centers and Wall Mounted Contactors 2 - Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels 3 - Medium Voltage Switchgear, Metal-Clad Switchgear 4 - Transformers 5 - Horizontal Pumps 6 - Vertical Pumps 7 - Pneumatic-Operated Valves (Hydraulic) 8 - Motor Operated Valves and Solenoid Operated Valves 9- Fans 10 - Air Handlers 11 -Chilers 12 - Air Compressors 13 - Motor Generators 14 - Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Swvtches 15 - Battery Racks 16 - Battery Chargers and Inverlers 17 - Engine Generators 18 - instruments Racks 19 - Temperature Sensors 20 - Instrumentation and Control Panels 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers 4o14

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 2-SWEL 1 This attachment was not modified from the initial revision of this report and therefore is not included in this submittal.

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 3-SWEL 2 This attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a final version has been included in this submittal.

Enclosre 2 - Public Version Attachment 3 - SWEL 2 Equipment Equipment Part Number Class Major (EPN) (GIP Class) Change Equipment Description Walk-By Area Description E-CP-H13/P626 20 N FPC CP 1 E-CP-H13/P627 20 N FPC CP 2 E-CP-H13/P833 20 N CTL ROOM SAFETY SYS PANEL (BOARD G2)

E-CP-H13/P841 20 N CONTROL ROOM PANEL (BOARD G1)

E-IR-69 18 N RX BLDG INSTR RACK FPC-42-7BB9B 1 N NEMA SIZE 3 MOTOR STARTER FOR FPC-P-1A FPC-42-8BB2D 1 N FPC-P-1 B FPC-FCV-1 0 N Fuel Pool F/D Bypass FPC-HX-1A 21 N FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 1A FPC-HX-1 B 21 N FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 1 B FPC-P-1A 5 Y FUEL POOL COOLING CIRCULATION PUMP 1A (575 GPM)

FPC-P-1 B 5 Y FUEL POOL COOLING CIRCULATION PUMP 1 B (575 GPM)

FPC-V-172 8 N FPC-HX-1 A & 1 B DISCH TO FILTER-DEMIN (MO) ISOL VALVE FPC-V-173 8 N FILTER-DEMIN INLET (MO) ISOL VALVE FPC-V-175 8 N FILTER-DEMIN BYPASS (MO) VALVE FPC-V-181A 8 Y Circulation Pump A Suction (MO)

FPC-V-1 81 B 8 Y Circulation Pump B Suction (MO)

FPC-V-184 8 N FILTER-DEMIN OUTLET (MO) ISOL VALVE E-R-74 Total = 18 8 N IRX BLDG INSTR RACK I

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- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

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REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 4-Base List 1 This attachment has been withheld

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 5-Base List 2 This attachment has withheld

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 6-Summary of Equipment Systems This attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a final version has been included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 6 - Summary of Equipment Systems System System Description SWEL 1 SWEL 2 Combined SWEL CCH CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER 2 0 2 CIA CONTAINMENT INSTRUMENT AIR 4 0 4 CN CONTAINMENT NITROGEN 2 0 2 CRD CONTROL ROD DRIVE 2 0 2 CSP CONTAINMENT SUPPLY PURGE 1 0 1 DCW DIESEL COOLING WATER 2 0 2 DEA DIESEL (BUILDING) EXHAUST AIR 2 0 2 DG DIESEL GENERATOR 5 0 5 DMA DIESEL (BUILDING) MIXED AIR 4 0 4 DO DIESEL OIL 6 0 6 DSA DIESEL (ENGINE) STARTING AIR 5 0 5 E ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 26 5 31 FP FIRE PROTECTION 4 0 4 FPC FUEL POOL COOLING 4 13 17 HPCS HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY 5 0 5 LD LEAK DETECTION 2 0 2 LPCS LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY 2 0 2 MS MAIN STEAM (NUCLEAR) 6 0 6 PRA PUMP HOUSE RETURN AIR 1 0 1 RCIC REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING 7 0 7 RFT REACTOR FEEDWATER TURBINE 1 0 1 RHR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL 6 0 6 RRA REACTOR (BUILDING) RETURN AIR 1 0 1 SGT STANDBY GAS TREATMENT 4 0 4 SLC STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL 3 0 3 SW STANDBY SERVICE WATER 9 0 9 1 Total 116 18 134 1 of 1

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

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REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 7-Summary of Equipment Classes This attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a final version has been included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 7 - Summary of Equipment Classes GIP Class Class Title SWEL 1 SWEL 2 Combined SWEL 0 Other 12 1 13 1 Motor Control Centers and Wall Mounted Contactors 4 2 6 2 Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels 1 0 1 3 Medium Voltage Switchgear, Metal-Clad Switchgear 1 0 1 4 Transformers 3 0 3 5 Horizontal Pumps 6 2 8 6 Vertical Pumps 7 0 7 7 Pneumatic-Operated Valves (Hydraulic) 3 0 3 8 Motor Operated Valves and Solenoid Operated Valves 20 6 26 9 Fans 4 0 4 10 Air Handlers 6 0 6 11 Chillers 2 0 2 12 Air Compressors 1 0 1 13 Motor Generators 0 0 0 14 Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches 2 0 2 15 Battery Racks 8 0 8 16 Battery Chargers and Inverters 4 0 4 17 Engine Generators 5 0 5 18 19 Instruments Racks Temperature Sensors 4

2 1

0 5

2 I

20 Instrumentation and Control Panels 9 4 13 21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 12 2 14 Total 116 18 134 I 1 of 1

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COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

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REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 8-Summary of Walk-By Areas This attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a final version has been included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 8 - Summary of Walk-By Areas Walk-By Area Description Building Elevation (Column Lines) SWEL 1 SWEL 2 Combined SWEL Service Water Pump House A 441 3 0 3 Service Water Pump House B 441 3 0 3 Containment (Drywell) 506 6 0 6 Diesel Generator Building 441 4 0 4 Diesel Generator Building 441 2 0 2 Diesel Generator Building 441 1 0 1 Diesel Generator Building 441 3 0 3 Diesel Generator Building 441 4 0 4 Diesel Generator Building 441 2 0 2 Diesel Generator Building 441 1 01 1 Diesel Generator Building 441 5 0 5 Diesel Generator Building 441 1 0 1 Diesel Generator Building 441 1 0 1 Diesel Generator Building 441 1 0 1 Diesel Generator Building 441 1 0 1 Diesel Generator Building 455 3 0 3 Water Treatment Building 438 2 0 2 Outdoor Inside Protected Area 441 2 0 2 Circulating Water Pumphouse 448 2 0 2 Reactor Building 422 1 0 1 Reactor Building 422 2 0 2 Reactor Building 422 4 0 4 Reactor Building 422 1 0 1 Reactor Building 422 1 0 1 Reactor Building 422 2 0 2 Reactor Building 441 3 0 3 Reactor Building 441 4 0 4 Reactor Building 444 1 0 1 Reactor Building 471 21 0 2 Reactor Building 471 2 3 5 Reactor Building 471 2 0 2 Reactor Building 501 2 0 2 Reactor Building 522 1 0 1 Reactor Building 522 1 0 1 Reactor Building 522 2 0 2 Reactor Building 522 1 0 1 Reactor Building 522 0 1 1 Reactor Building 522 1 0 1 Reactor Building 548 1 2 3 Reactor Building 548 0 6 6 Reactor Building 548 3 0 3 Reactor Building 548 1 0 1 Reactor Building 572 4 0 4 Reactor Building 572 }0 1 1 Reactor Building 572 }0 1 1 Steam Tunnel 501 1 0 1 Service Water Spray Pond A 435 2 0 2 Service Water Spray Pond B 435 2 0 2 Radwaste Building 467 5 0 5 Radwaste Building 467 1 0 1 Radwaste Building 467 1 0 1 Radwaste Building 467 2 0 2 Radwaste Building 467 2 0 2 Radwaste Building 467 1 0 1 Radwaste Building 467 3 0 3 Radwaste Building 467 0 0 0 Radwaste Building 501 2 4 6 Radwaste Building 501 1 0 1 Radwaste Building 501 1 0 1 Radwaste Building 525 2 0 2 Radwaste Building 525 1 0 1 Totals 61 116 18 134

• • This Area Walk-By was completed for an item that was later removed from the SWEL.

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COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

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REPORT (Public Version) -FAQ-Frequently Asked Questions on Seismic Walkdown Guidance This attachment was not modified from the initial revision of this report and therefore is not included in this submittal.

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 10-Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By Checklists This attachment has been withheld.

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 1OA-Deferred Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By Checklists This attachment has been withheld

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 11-Deferred SWEL Items This attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a final version has been included in this submittal. This attachment has been edited to withhold sensitive information

Enclose 2 - Public Version Attachment 11 - Deferred SWEL Items Internal EQUIP CLASS Safety Walk-By Area Requires Internal Walkdown Inspection EPN (GIP Class) EQUIPMENTDESCRIPTION Function Description Inspection Completed Completed CIA-CP-1 20 CIA N2 BOTTLES CONTROL PANEL 2 YES 7/31/2012 12/11/2012 CIA-CP-2 20 CIA N2 BOTTLES CONTROL PANEL 2 YES 7/31/2012 12/4/2012 E-C1-1A 16 125VDC VITAL BATT CHARGER A 1,2,3,4,5 YES 7/31/2012 5/22/2013 E-C2-1 16 250V BATTERY CHARGER 1 1,2,3,4,5 YES 7/31/2012 5/22/2013 E-CP-ARS 20 ALTERNATE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL 2,3,4,5 YES 9/18/2012 5/21/2013 E-CP-DG/CP3 20 HPCS ENGINE &GEN 480V POWER PANEL 3 YES 9/4/2012 5/31/2013 E-CP-DG/EP3 20 HPCS DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE CONTROL PNL 3 YES 9/4/2012 5/31/2013 E-CP-H13/P833 20 CTL ROOM SAFETY SYS PANEL (BOARD G2) 4 YES 12/4/2012 12/4/2012 E-CP-H13/P841 20 CONTROL ROOM PANEL (BOARD G1) 4 YES 12/4/2012 12/4/2012 E-DP-S1/1F 14 DIV 1 CRITICAL SWGR DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1,2,3,4,5 YES 9/25/2012 5/22/2013 E-DP-S1/HPCS 14 125VDC HPCS SYS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 3 YES 9/4/2012 5/31/2013 E-IN-2A 16 DIV 2 CRITICAL 120 VAC POWER SUPPLY INVERTER A 1,2,3,4,5 YES 8/15/2012 6/3/2013 E-IN-2B 16 DIV 2 CRITICAL 120 VAC POWER SUPPLY INVERTER E 1,2,3,4,5 YES 8/15/2012 6/3/2013 E-IR-68 18 RX BLDG INSTR RACK 4 YES 8/7/2012 12/4/2012 E-IR-69 18 RX BLDG INSTR RACK 4 YES 12/4/2012 12/4/2012 E-IR-PO01 18 LPCS INSTRUMENT RACK 3 YES 8/28/2012 12/11/2012 E-IR-PO11 18 SLC INSTRUMENT RACK 1 YES 8/21/2012 12/11/2012 E-IR-P017 18 RCIC INSTRUMENT RACK 1,2,3 YES 9/18/2012 12/11/2012 E-MC-4A 1 HPCS MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 4A 3 YES 9/4/2012 5/31/2013 E-MC-7A 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 7A 1,2,3,4,5 YES 9/25/2012 5/22/2013 E-MC-8A 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 8A 1,2,3,4,5 YES 8/15/2012 6/3/2013 E-MC-8F 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 8F 1,2,3,4,5 YES 8/14/2012 6/3/2013 E-PP-8AE 2 120/240V 200A RX BLDG INSTR & CNTL POWER PNL 5 YES 8/15/2012 6/3/2013 FPC-42-7BB9B 1 NEMA SIZE 3 MOTOR STARTER FOR FPC-P-1 A 4 YES 11/29/2012 11/29/2012 FPC-42-8BB2D 1 NEMA SIZE 3 MOTOR STARTER FOR FPC-P-1 B 4 YES 11/26/2012 11/26/2012 LD-TE-29A 19 MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL INLET VENT TEMP 5 NO 12/11/2012 N/A LD-TE-31C 19 MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL AMBIENT TEMP 5 NO 5/23/2013 N/A MS-V-22B 8 MS LINE "B" INBOARD ISOL SOV 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/A MS-V-22C 8 MS LINE "C" INBOARD ISOL SOV 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/A MS-V-37C 0 10" CHECK MS-RV-2D DISCHARGE 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/A MS-V-37K 0 10" CHECK MS-RV-1D DISCH 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/A MS-V-38C 0 10" CHECK VAC BKR FOR MS-RV-2D 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/A MS-V-38K 0 10" CHECK VAC BKR FOR MS-RV-1D 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/A RCIC-SC-C002 20 RCIC TURBINE SPEED CONTROLLER 1,2,3 YES 9/19/2012 12/11/2012 SW-CB-P1A 3 4160V CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR SW-M-P/1A 1,2,3,4,5 YES 5/20/2013 5/20/2013 Page 1 of 1

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

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REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 12-FAQ-Electrical Panel Inspection This attachment was not modified from the initial revision of this report and therefore is not included in this submittal.

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 13-Licensing Basis Evaluations This attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a final version has been included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status SLC-P-1A None N/A N/A N/A SLC-TK-1 None N/A N/A N/A iz SLC-V-1A None N/A N/A N/A SGT-V-3A2 None N/A N/A N/A SGT-V-IA None N/A N/A N/A SGT-FU-1A None N/A N/A N/A SGT-FN-1A1 None N/A N/A N/A The support in question provides support to the 3/8" tubing for the SGT-FIS-2A2. Review Walk-By Item #1 Pipe support missing base plate bolt of details on the plant drawing for this support 267511 Complete indicates that the missing bolt is allowed.

License Basis is Met This issue is entered directly into the Corrective Action Program to evaluate this Walk-By Item #2 Light fixture resting on firewater line condition. The initial functionality 267512 Complete determination found the piping to remain fully

_qualified.

2The Storage Permit process is governed by a Site Wide Procedure. Review of the storage permit indicates the permit for the area in Walk-By Item #3 Storage Permit #268 has question is applicable to (2) 55 gallon drums N/A N/A unrestrained barrels with equipment inside. This is consistent with what is discussed on the walk-by checklist and is therefore satisfactory.

License Basis is Met This issue has been addressed by a previous Condition Report (CR 255023) and concluded Walk-By Item #4 HNES #6 is not restrained that it did not impact continued operability of N/A N/A items near by License Basis Is Met Page 1 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written I CR Status None during external inspection E-DP-S1/1F Opened for internal Inspection on N/A N/A N/A 5/22/13 during R21 refuel outage, no adverse seismic issues identified Rod hanger located on North end of This issue is entered directly into the central room lighting string has a nut Corrective Action Program. A work request E-TR-7/71 central room lighatingstringllhasnaan was generated to correct the problem. No CR 271532 Complete on the rod that is not fully engaged operability determination was required for this below the hook ise issue.

The flange that is bent belongs to a cover that spans between E-TR-7/73 and E-SL-73.

A portion of the flange connecting E- Design documents evaluate the floor TR-7/73 and E-SL-73 is partially bent anchorage of E-TR-7/73 without considering E-E-TR-7/73 resulting in the bolt at that location to TR-7/73 and E-SL-73 being coupled together. N/A N/A resn intbot not fy fully egagd lThis be engaged irespectcover to thehas no anchorage floor structural relevance design of with either E-TR-7/73 or E-SL-73.

License Basis Is Met None for external inspection Opened for internal inspection on Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 285207 Open E-CP-ARS 5/20/13 during R21 refuel outage.

Two broken tie-wraps identified, not a seismic issue.

None- walkdown for this component SW-CB-PIA performed on 5/20/13 during R21 N/A N/A N/A outage The conduit support in question is shown on plant drawings. The plant drawing for the Conduit support is missing anchor on support indicates that the missing anchors are Walk-By Item #5 considered as abandoned and are not N/A N/A base plate required. Therefore, the missing anchors are accounted for.

License Basis Is Met The conduit support is considered a hard target in accordance with plant engineering procedures. The light fixture will not have an adverse effect on the support due to contact generated from a seismic event. The light Light fixture has spacial interaction Walk-By Item #6 fixture does not require safety chains as N/A N/A issue with adjacent conduit support identified by the plant design drawing. This indicates that the fixture has been evaluated to have no adverse affect on safety related equipment in the event the light should fall.

License Basis Is Met Continued on Next Page Page 2 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status The trays are supported by Cable Tray Support TS-2310 as shown on the plant drawing. The CR 268720 W Cable tray missing bolts to support EDISON impact report indicates loads are nerated to Walk-By Item #7 small and the tray attachment remains Complete arm qualified with a single bolt. The drawing install missing requires 2 bolts per tray attachment. bolts t License Basis is Met The Storage Permit process is governed by a Site Wide Procedure. Review of the storage Storage Permit #252 has permits indicates the permit for the area of Walk-By Item #8 S ra d t box concern is applicable to a red tool box and N/A N/A 8unrestrained tool box breaker storage straps, This is consistent with what is discussed on the walk-by checklist License Basis is Met None for external inspection E-CI-1A Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 5/22/13 during R21 refueling outage, no adverse seismic issues identified None for external inspection E-C2-1 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 5/22/13 during R21 refueling outage, no adverse seismic issues identified The support in question is the wall attachment portion of a cable tray support. It is shown on plant drawings as a 3 base plate support. The support has been installed as a 3 baseplate 2support, white the analysis documented in the design calculation evaluates for only the upper Support between two sides of DP-S2- and lower baseplates. The extra middle base Walk-By Item #9 1 is missing bolts. Threaded inserts plate that has been installed reduces the span N/A N/A can be seen. between base plates and provides additional anchors beyond what has been evaluated for in the calculation even when considering the undocumented missing anchors. Thus, this portion of tray support remains qualified for seismic and dead weight design loads.

License Basis is Met Page 3 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations I r I Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status CRD-HCU-3027 None N/A N/A N/A CRD-HCU-2635 None N/A N/A N/A The Control Rod Drive hydraulic control unit (HCU) modules are installed on elevated concrete pads. The pads are secured to the floor with cast in place #5 rebar stirrups at 12" on center. The pads are shown on a plant drawing. The angle with the anchor bolts is At base of CRD-HCU-3015 there is a part of the CRD HCU frame as shown on the Walk-By Item #10 At base of p ach e i plant drawing. The concrete pads and the N/A N/A 0gap in anchorage frames are independent of each other. The concrete pad does not provide lateral restraint for the angle of the frame. Therefore, the gap between the concrete pad and the frame has no affect on the seismic qualification of the CRD modules.

License Basis is Met The framing channel is in contact with 3/4"HPCS(55)-4 discharge vent/drain pipe for HPCS-P-1 as shown on plant isometric piping Light strut above power panel E-PP- drawings. The 3/4" pipe is considered a soft CR 269942 to Walk-By Item #11 3DAA is resting between a pipeline target in accordance with the applicable eliminate contact Complete and a conduit. Pipe has valve HPCS- engineering evaluation procedure. The light between light and V-87 nearby fixture is considered a light weight object and piping will not have an adverse effect on the pipe due to contact generated from a seismic event.

License Basis is Met None for external inspection CIA-CP-1 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 12/11/12, no adverse seismic issues identified None for external inspection CIA-CP-2 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 12/4/12, no adverse seismic issues identified CIA-SPV-6B None N/A N/A N/A CIA-SPV-8A None N/A N/A N/A The subject hanger is depicted on plant drawings. Additionally, another plant drawing 3-way pipe support on South wall depicts an anchor configuration similar to what near center of truck bay has an offset is identified in the field. An engineering Walk-By Item #12 bolt on surface mounted plate. Pipe N/A N/A calculation has evaluated the anchor support is 3rd from East wall. CN-V-configuration consistent with what is seen in 51 is reference for pipe system the field.

License Basis Is Met Continued on Next Page Page 4 of 29

Enclosure 2- Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status

3, The HVAC duct work is considered a hard target in accordance with the engineering evaluation procedure. Because light fixtures are considered light objects, they will not have an adverse effect on the ducting due to contact Lights are either in contact or resting geeaefrmasiicvntThlgt NANA Walk-Byneate onimi HVACtverica #a tilbacn.higt g doftem not require safety chains as efixtures NIA N/A E Walk-By Item #13 on HVAC vertical tie bracing. Lights Sare on the North wall of the truck bay identified by applicable plant drawings, which

,i**:: indicate that the fixtures have been evaluated to have no adverse affect on safety related equipment in the event the light should fall.

License Basis is Met None for external inspection RCIC-SC-C002 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 12/11/12, no adverse seismic issues identified The cable tray supports are considered a hard target in accordance with engineering Vevaluation procedures. The light fixture will not have an adverse effect on the supports due to mccontact generated from a seismic event.

>' Evaluation of safety chain requirements for lighting is described by the applicable plant drawings. Light fixtures that do not require Walk-By Item #14 Allwall overhead lightingwith is in contact along thetray cable East chains zone ofindicate influencethat of the fixtures safety areequipment related out of the N/A N/A supports in the event the light should fall. Some light fixtures have safety chains attached as indicated by the plant drawings which indicate they are in the zone of influence of safety related equipment and will keep the lights from falling. This is consistent with what is seen in the field.

License Basis Is Met Page 5 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-I by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written I CR Status E-TR-ISOL/USA None N/A N/A N/A The ceiling tile support grid has been designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements as evaluated calculation. The individual by engineering ceiliangdtile are poeresnto i theo ceiling tiles are secured to the room and are considered to be the vertical limit of the seismic walkdown support grid with hold down clips as described Walk-By Item #15 Visual inspection from the floor in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/A cannot verifyespiofrom sythe foor system. No tiles were observed to be cannot verify the support system for displaced or degraded in such a way that the ceiling tiles. would indicate the seismic mounting is compromised.

License Basis Is Met The unrestrained red tool chest along the south wall does not meet requirements of engineering procedural requirements to be an unrestrained object in the control room, as it is closer than the height of the chest + 9" from CR 269249 Complete safety related equipment. A revision to the applicable engineering calculation was Tool chest and a computer cart along performed that indicates that the chest is the South wall of the Control Room acceptable to be unrestrained.

Walk-By Item #16 may tip over during a seismic event Licensing Basis Is Met and damage nearby equipment Computer cart meets requirements of the engineering procedure that deals with storage of equipment with an aspect ratio less than 1.3. Therefore the cart will not tip over and N/A must be no closer than 4.5" from safety related equipment to be unrestrained. The cart meets these requirements.

License Basis Is met E-B1-1 None N/A N/A N/A E-B2-1 None N/A N/A N/A With a half inch nut, full thread engagement has 5.6 threads. The anchor installation is On E-BO-IA battery rack, the front 2 lacking 2 threads of engagement for a total Walk-By Item #17 anchor bolts have nuts with only engagement of 3.6 threads. Full tensile CR 269408 Complete about 50% thread engagement capacity of a bolt is achieved with only 3 threads of engagement.

License Basis is Met The subject hanger is similar to a QB style hanger as shown on plant drawings. The Missing bolt on conduit support RW applicable engineering calculation evaluates Walk-By Item #18 46 289 in the SE comer of the battery the hanger configuration with one end of the N/A N/A room hanger having only I anchor. This is consistent with what is seen in the field.

License Basis is Met Page 6 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status FPC-V-175 None N/A N/A N/A FPC-FCV-1 None N/A N/A N/A This issue is entered directly into the Socket wrench stored on front of rack Corrective Action Program. It was determined is free to swing and can hit internal the tools were not required and were removed.

E-IR-68 components of the rack. CR 269186 Complete Opened for intemal inspection on 12/4/12, no seismic issues identified oThe applicable plant drawing indicates that a 3-Tubing connecting to the FPC-FCV-1 way in iz: - support should be installed. The issue was entered into the Corrective Action Program. A 5 Walk-By Item #19 appears that a support connection calculation revision was performed that CR 268406 Complete may be missing upstream of valve.

maybemisin.usteamofvaveindicates the support clamps are not required.

License Basis Is Met Storage Permit #032 has a rack Revisit of this storage area shows that containing rolls of new hazardous everything is within the boundary of the area.

material storage bags which extends Review of the storage permits indicates the Walk-By Item #20 outerial storage ba bounds permit is applicable to various sized Rad bags, N/A N/A outside the storage area boundary sleeving and green bags. This is consistent tape indicating that it may not be with what is discussed on the walk-by checklist included on the storage permit License Basis is Met FPC-V-149 None N/A N/A N/A FPC-V-1 72 None N/A N/A N/A FPC-V-173 None N/A N/A N/A FPC-V-184 None N/A N/A N/A None for external inspection E-IR-P017 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 12/10/12, no adverse seismic issues identified The Storage Permit process is governed by a fSite Wide Procedure. Review of the storage permit indicates the permit is applicable to Ssteel posts with chains attached to place in Storage Permit #233 has two barrels floor pockets when floor plugs are removed.

Walk-By Item #21 labeled for rigging and scaffold type The storage area contained two barrels N/A N/A equipment. containing the posts and related equipment.

This is consistent with what is discussed on the walk-by checklist License Basis is Met Page 7 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Y

Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status FPC-V-153 None N/A N/A N/A FPC-V-154 None N/A N/A N/A FPC-V-156 None N/A N/A N/A The tubing isometric as shown on the plant drawing indicates that the subject hanger is a There is a missing bolt on the surface type 116-19, as shown on the applicable Thlk-ByItm22 mner i mss lat boltong thure t hanger drawing, The applicable hanger Walk-By Item #22 mounted plate supporting tubing to calculations have evaluated the base plate N/A N/A with a missing anchor similar in location to the anchor that is not installed.

License Basis is Met The tubing isometric as shown on the plant drawing indicates that the subject hanger is a type 116-3, as shown on the applicable hanger There is a missing bolt on the surface drawing. The applicable hanger calculation has Walk-By Item #23 mounted plate supporting tubing to evaluated the base plate with a missing anchor N/A N/A SW-V-762 similar in location to the anchor that is not installed.

License Basis is Met FPC-P-1A None N/A N/A N/A FPC-P-1B None N/A N/A N/A Additional lead blankets were placed on the East end of FPC-HX-1A, without any anchorage or restraints.

Since this exchanger already has Temporary shielding is controlled by a plant lead shield wrappings, tied around procedure and log system. The Temporary FPC-HX-1A the exchanger, it Is unclear if the lead Shielding Control Log entry for this shielding N/A N/A blankets were meant to serve as has addressed the weight of the additional temporary radiation shielding only shielding.

and if the additional weight is License Basis is Met accounted for in the structural analysis of the exchanger and its anchorage.

Additional lead blankets were placed on the East end of FPC-HX-1B, without any anchorage or restraints.

Since this exchanger already has Temporary shielding is controlled by a plant lead shield wrappings, tied around procedure and log system. The Temporary FPC-HX-1 B the exchanger, it is unclear if the lead Shielding Control Log entry for this shielding N/A N/A blankets were meant to serve as has addressed the weight of the additional temporary radiation shielding only shielding.

and if the additional weight is License Basis Is Met accounted for in the structural analysis of the exchanger and its anchorage.

FPC-V-181A None N/A N/A N/A FPC-V-181B None N/A N/A N/A Continued on Next Page Page 8 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status Near the north end of FPC-P-1B a stanchion is standing with no This issue is entered directly into the Walk-By Item #24 apparent reason. This is a potential Corrective Action Program. The subject CR 268643 Complete seismic hazard as it could fall onto stanchion was removed.

nearby equipment.

Scaffold ladder along north wall is This issue is entered directly into the touching or nearly touching RCC Corrective Action Program. It was evaluated 1ý Walk-By Item #25 piping. Ladder is next to and above torreception foram. t eva6uated be 6to be acceptable for scaffolding to be in aPccessBgoig to platm f contact with the large bore RCC piping.

access to RCC valves.

The isometric drawing for the subject piping Missing support on 10"FPC(1 5)-2. shows an item welded to the pipe flange that Walk-By Item #26 Support end brackets are seen with once belonged to a hanger. The hanger has N/A N/A no support between them been removed but the brackets have been left.

License Basis is Met None on extemal inspection Review of PPM 10.25.105, Motor Control Opened for internal inspection on Center and Switchgear Maintenance E-MC-8F 6/3/13 during R21 refuel outage. addresses this conditions and requires only N/A N/A Several control power transformers having 3 attachment bolts.

are only attached with 3 of 4 possible License Basis is Met bolts.

SW-TCV-1 I B valve operator installed The pipe stress calculation associated with the support layout is questionable. Valve subject valve was reviewed. The field Walk-By Item #27 operator stands vertically but no configuration of an unbraced valve operator is N/A N/A lateral supports are present for the consistent with the design configuration operator not the valve below it License Basis is Met E-DP-S1/2 was deleted from the N SWEL due to Z inaccessibility of the None N/A N/A N/A anchors. An area walkby was still performed, no

,D issues identified Page 9 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations

-- I I Y Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status CCH-CR-1A None N/A N/A N/A Anchor bolts have what appears to This issue is entered directly into the CCH-CR-1B be more than mild corrosion Corrective Action Program to evaluate this CR 271321 Complete condition. No impact to operability was found.

The piping isometric for the associated piping shows the valve operator oriented 30 degrees from vertical with a hanger attached at the The support layout for valve operator valve height. The pipe stress calculation Walk-By Item #28 SW-EHO-TCV/1 5A appears to be associated with the subject valve was also N/A N/A Wy #sti5Aappea reviewed. The field configuration of an questionable. unbraced valve operator oriented off vertical with a brace at the valve is consistent with the design configuration License Basis Is Met The pipe stress calculation associated with the The support layout for valve operator subject valve was reviewed. The field Walk-By Item #29 SW-EHO-TCV/15B appears to be configuration of an unbraced valve operator is N/A N/A questionable, consistent with the design configuration License Basis is Met The fire water pipe is considered a hard target in accordance with the engineering evaluation procedure. The piping is not associated with sprinkler piping and therefore clearance requirements of NFPA 13 do not apply.

Because the light fixtures are relatively light A light casing is touching a vertical weight, according to the procedural guidance Walk-By Item #30 firewater pipe for hose station RWB- they will not have an adverse effect on the N/A N/A HS-33 piping due to contact generated from a seismic event. The light fixture does not require safety chains as identified by the applicable plant drawing, which indicates that the fixture will have no adverse affect on safety related equipment in the event the light should fall.

License Basis Is Met Page 10 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status The ceiling tile support grid has been designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements as evaluated by the engineering calculation. The Ceiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to the room and are considered to be the support grid with hold down clips as described vertical limit of the seismic walkdown.

E-CP-H13/P611 in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/A Visual inspection from the floor system. No tiles were observed to be cannot verify the support system for displaced or degraded in such a way that the ceiling tiles.

would indicate the seismic mounting is compromised.

License Basis is Met The ceiling tile support grid has been designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements as evaluated by engineering calculation. The Ceiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to the room and are considered to be the vert lmit od teonsidereisi walbdthesupport grid with hold down clips as described E-CP-H13/P618 vertical limit of the seismic walkdown, in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/A Visual inspection from the floor system. No tiles were observed to be cannot verify the support system for displaced or degraded in such a way that the ceiling tiles, would indicate the seismic mounting is compromised.

License Basis Is Met The ceiling tile support grid has been designed to Seismic Category I requirements as evaluated by engineering calculation. The Ceiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to the 0 Cj room and are considered to be the described CD vertical limit of the seismic walkdown support grid with hold down clips as E-CP-H13/P626 Vical Visual imit f from inspection the the floor floor in thesystem.

purchase No specification for the ceiling tiles were observed to be tile N/A N/A cannot verify the support system for sse.N ie eeosre ob c the t verifyotiyst displaced or degraded in such a way that the ceiling tiles, would indicate the seismic mounting is compromised.

License Basis is Met The ceiling tile support grid has been designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements as evaluated by engineering calculation. The Ceiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to the room and are considered to be the vertical limit of the seismic walkdown support grid with hold down clips as described E-CP-H13/P627 Visual inspection from the floor in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/A cannot verify the support system for system. No tiles were observed to be the ceiling tilesy displaced or degraded in such a way that would indicate the seismic mounting is compromised.

License Basis is Met The ceiling tile support grid has been designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements as Walkdown peformed 12/4/12.

evaluated by engineering calculation. The individual ceiling tiles are secured to the Ceiling tiles are present in the control support grid with hold down clips as described room and are considered to be the E-CP-H13/P833 in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/A vertical limit of the seismic walkdown.

system. No tiles were observed to be Visual inspection from the floor displaced or degraded in such a way that cannot verify the support system for would indicate the seismic mounting is the ceiling tiles.

compromised.

License Basis Is Met Continued on Next Page Page 11 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations F Y Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status The ceiling tile support grid has been designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements as evaluated by engineering calculation. The Ceiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to the room and are considered to bthe tr support grid with hold down clips as described E-CP-H13/P841 vertical limit of the seismic walkdown, in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/A Visual inspection from the floor . system. No tiles were observed to be cannot verify the support system for displaced or degraded in such a way that c the verife sotiyst would indicate the seismic mounting is the ceiling tiles, compromised.

License Basis is Met The subject anchor bolt is a 3/4" Hilti Drop-In (HDI) and was installed under a plant work There is spalled concrete behind the order. The Anchor Inspection Checklist noted Walk-By Item #31 lower back anchor bolt of E-CP- the spalled concrete and found the installation N/A N/A TCOM/1 acceptable based on the HDI depth and subset relative to spall depth.

License Basis is Met The cable tray support is shown on plant drawings. The load on the tray support, according to Edison, is 22.5 lbs. The plant design drawing indicates a horizontal seismic factor of 1.5 for a lateral shear load of 34 lbs.

There is a missing bolt between The missing bolt is specified on the applicable Cable Tray 6783C-DIV2 and the drawing as a 3/8" diameter ASTM A307 bolt CR 270308 support angle. This occurs in the which has a shear capacity of 1100 lbs in To replace the Complete South East comer of Room C213 accordance with the AISC Manual Of Steel missing bolt right above E-IN-2A and E-IN-2B Construction. The shear capacity of the single installed bolt is much greater than the design lateral load. The subject cable tray and support remain qualified to all loading even with the E-IN-2A missing cable tray bolt.

License Basis is Met The light fixture does not require a safety chain as identified by the applicable plant drawing.

Light above E-IN-2A is hung by rod, This indicates that the fixture will have no should have chain attached adverse affect on safety related equipment in N/A N/A the event the light should fall.

License Basis is Met Opened for internal inspection on 6/3/13 during R21 refueling outage, N/A N/A N/A no adverse seismic issue identified Continued on Next Page Page 12 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status The cable tray support is shown on plant drawings. The load on the tray support, according to Edison, is 22.5 lbs. The plant design drawing indicates a horizontal seismic factor of 1.5 for a lateral shear load of 34 lbs.

There is a missing bolt between The missing bolt is specified on the applicable Cable Tray 6783C-DIV2 and the drawing as a 3/8" diameter ASTM A307 bolt CR 270308 support angle. This occurs in the which has a shear capacity of 1100 lbs in To replace the Complete South East corner of Room C213 accordance with the AISC Manual Of Steel missing bolt right above E-IN-2A and E-IN-2B Construction. The shear capacity of the single installed bolt is much greater than the design lateral load. The subject cable tray and support remain qualified to all loading even with the missing cable tray bolt.

License Basis is Met J4 Z

E-IN-2B 00 The light fixture does not require a safety chain as identified by the applicable plant drawing.

Light above E-IN-2B is hung by rod, This indicates that the fixture will have no N/A N/A CU should have chain attached adverse affect on safety related equipment in the event the light should fall.

(D License Basis is Met The bent flange is minor and does not effect the anchors for the inverter. It will not have an Bent flange on frame adverse affect on E-IN-2B during a seismic N/A N/A event License Basis is Met Opened for internal inspection on 6/3/13 during R21 refueling outage, N/A N/A N/A no adverse seismic issue identified Continued on Next Page Page 13 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations

'I. r Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status I 4 4.

Ultra sonic testing was performed to find the embedment depth of the 112" diameter Hilti Kwik Bolts (HKB) surrounding the base of E-MC-8A. The results of the testing concluded Several bolt heads were cut flush to that the 1/2" diameter HKB's did not have make room for seismic base restraint minimum embedment and have been N/A N/A plates abandoned in place and replaced with base restraints designed in accordance with engineering calculation and shown on plant drawings.

License Basis Is Met Ultra sonic testing was performed to find the embedment depth of the 1/2" diameter Hilti Kwik Bolts (HKB) surrounding the base of E-MC-8A. The results of the testing concluded E-MC-8A The south eastern bolt head on the that the 1/2" diameter HKB's did not have transition frame wasn't entirely flat or minimum embedment and have been N/A N/A engaged abandoned in place and replaced with base restraints designed in accordance with engineering calculation and shown on plant drawings.

License Basis is Met Opened for internal inspection on Review of PPM 10.25.105, Motor Control 6/3/13 during R21 refueling outage. Center and Switchgear Maintenance Several control power transformers addresses this conditions and requires only N/A N/A are only attached with 3 of 4 possible having 3 attachment bolts.

bolts. License Basis is Met 1- 1 The subject anchor bolt has approximately 3 threads not engaged. The anchor bolt is a 1 1/4" Hilti Super Kwik bolt in accordance with RPS-MG-2 flywheel shroud anchor the installation drawing. Threads for the bolt on base plate, located on SW anchors are 1 1/4 - 7 UNC. A 1 1/4" nut has a Walk-By Item #32 N/A N/A comer has a nut that is not fully height of 1 1/16". Therefore there are engaged approximately 4 threads engaged. CR 269408 provides the discussion that 3 thread engagement develops full strength of the bolt.

License Basis is Met Continued on Next Page Page 14 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status The cable tray support is shown on plant drawings which provide the details and attachment alternatives for attaching the cable trays to the supports. If there is a clip that has Cable tray in NE comer of room is been welded between the tray and the support CR 270351 Walk-By Item #33 missing bolt. Approx. 6' off of north in lieu of using a bolt, this is acceptable as it To replace the Complete wall and 4' off of east wall still meets the attachment requirements. missing bolt During performance of the Work Request that was generated for this issue, this condition was verified to be the case.

License Basis is Met Conduit is considered a hard target in accordance with the applicable engineering Cevaluation procedure. Because it is relatively light weight, the light fixture will not have an Horizontal strut for light above E-IN- adverse effect on the support due to contact Hgenerated from a seismic event. The light Walk-By Item #34 2A and E-IN-2B can hit DIVA-AVUS- N/A N/A 30-1 conduit during a seismic event, fixture does not require safety chains as identified by the applicable installation drawing, Uwhich indicates that the fixture is out of the zone of influence of safety related equipment in the event the light should fall.

License Basis Is Met Wt pThe wrap is a Flame-Safe Fire Resistant Wht lsi rpaon al ry Blanket installed in accordance with plant Walk-By Item #35 is visible and can be a flammable proedures, N/A N/A procedures, N/A source. Located in NE corner of room License Basis is Met Walk-By Item #36 Grey duct tape found on end of pipe This is a house keeping issue CR 268788 Complete support License Basis is Met There was a temporary tool cart and The temporary tool cart is part of "Work in oscillator monitor on the south end of Progress". Wheels are chocked in accordance Walk-By Item #37 the room, and also a -panel case on with the applicable plant procedure that N/A N/A the floor in the south east corner of governs storage of temporary equipment.

the room Licensing Basis is Met Page 15 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations

-- - I I Y Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status FP-BO-110A None N/A N/A N/A FP-B0-110B None N/A N/A N/A Unsecured item on north side of PWC-FU-1, ladder/steps The area is a non-safety related seismic Walk-By Item #38 unrestrained near DO-TK-7, the category 2 area. These issues are a house CR 269268 Complete stand for PWC-P-8 is rusted and keeping issue needs repair, several empty drums License Basis is Met and cart should be removed CN-V-106 None N/A N/A N/A CN-V-107 None N/A N/A N/A This is a outside area with no safety related There are seismic category 2 non- equipment. The equipment associated with Walk-By Item #39 safety related equipment in the area the cracked grouting is far enough from safety CR 269240 Complete with cracks in grouting around anchor related equipment that it will not be a spatial bolts. interaction concern.

License Basis is Met Noted venting or leaking and frost formed near CN-V-1 3. Build up of Maintenance Issue Walk-By Item #40 frost appeared to be damaging License Basis Is Met CR 269204 Complete insulation. Venting appears to be coming from CN-PCV-2 FP-B0-1A None N/A N/A N/A FP-B0-1 B None N/A N/A N/A CW-V-1A, 1B, and 1C all have one Walk-By Item #41 missing anchor/bolt holding down the Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 291016 Open motor operator Storage drums containing handrails The level transmitter is not safety related. This Walk-By item #42 that could impact CW-LT-4 was is a house keeping issue CR 269273 Complete noted License Basis is Met AED DWG 02H22-05,47 shows 6 The plant installation drawing reflects 4 holes available for anchor anchors installed. The drawing referred to in installation. Only 4 are installed, the issue description is a panel construction drawing, not showing anchorage.

License Basis is Met E-IR-P011 N/A N/A Opened for internal inspection on 12/11/12, no adverse seismic issues identified.

Page 16 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status DSA-TK-3A None N/A N/A N/A DSA-TK-4A None N/A N/A N/A The attachment bolts are evaluated in the applicable seismic qualification documents.

DSA-TK-7A has a weight of 800 lbs. with an attachment bolt size of 3/4". The seismic Anchor bolt on west side of tank qualification document has conservatively DSA-TK-7A appears to be bent or installed at a evaluated the attachment bolt arrangement for Complete skewed angle the tank. Review of this evaluation shows there is sufficient margin in the evaluation to consider the skewed attachment bolt to be

~ineffective.

License Basis Is Met DSA-TK-8A None N/A N/A N/A DSA-C-1A1 None N/A N/A N/A The dimensions on the desk are 29" high and 30" width for an aspect ratio of 1.03. This aspect ratio is less than the limiting ratio of 1.5 Desk near south wall is near SM- in the applicable plant procedure. Therefore Walk-By Item #43 Desk 4160 southw ear the desk will not overturn. The desk is 10" from N/A N/A DG1-7 4160 switchgear S-DG1-7-4160 which is greater than the 3" minimum required by the plant procedure to be an acceptable condition.

License Basis Is Met DO-P-IA None N/A N/A N/A N

DO-TK-3A None N/A N/A N/A Page 17 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations

q. I V I Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status None for external inspection E-IR-P001 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 12/11/12, no adverse seismic issues identified RHR-V-27A None N/A N/A N/A The light is not actually in contact with the pipe but is very close. The pipe is considered a soft target in accordance with the applicable engineering evaluation procedure. Because of its relatively light weight, the light fixture will not have an adverse affect on the pipe due to Walk-By Item #44 Light In contact with PI-VX-260 and contact generated from a seismic event. The piping light fixture does not require safety chains as N/A N/A identified by the plant installation drawing, which indicates that the fixture has been evaluated to have no adverse affect on safety related equipment in the event the light should fall.

License Basis is Met Process instrument line X-86A is shown on plant drawings and has analysis in an engineering calculation that can be retrieved by the normal plant records system. However, an additional approved calculation has been located that supersedes the output of the Support of PI-V-X86A is questionable calculation of record. This calculation has not Walk-By item #45 as it appears to be cantilevered out been officially input into Asset Suite (the N/A N/A engineering It that the record retrieval system).

from support appears new calculation has evaluated the process instrument line X-86A that added the short section of tubing that tee's off the main run of tubing and included PI-V-X86A1 and PI-V-X86A2. This evaluation appears consistent with the tubing installation drawing.

License Basis Is Met The configuration of the motor operator is 5

Motor Operator is a questionsal size consistent with the pipe stress calculation and LPCS-V-5 inorelatiorator In relation to thei size oftheoperator.the ofethe sizeoperator, seismic qualification documentation that was reviewed. N/A N/A License Basis is Met RHR-P-2A None N/A N/A N/A The subject support is depicted on the tubing Missing anchor bolt on support isometric drawing details. There is a note on Walk-By item #46 Mist a ltPSR-V-012 the detail indicating that the missing anchor N/A N/A bolt has been deleted.

License Basis Is Met Valve FDR-V-601 operator Is The cantilever orientation of the operator has cantilever out from the valve body a been accounted for in the design calculation Walk-By item #47 considerable distance. As this is the that was reviewed. N/A N/A 422' elevation, this could be a License Basis Is Met flooding concern ifit were to fail.

Page 18 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status LPCS-P-2 None N/A N/A N/A SW-V-2A None N/A N/A N/A cc HPCS-P-2 None N/A N/A N/A SW-V-29 None N/A N/A N/A HPCS-V-4 None N/A N/A N/A jjN Page 19 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status None for external inspection E-CP-DG/CP3 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 5/31/13 during R21 refueling outage, no adverse seismic issues identified The batteries have plexiglass covers that shield the electrical connections from above.

CNosafety chain on light above The applicable installation drawing does not Nof cspecifytey to the lights N/A N/A over the abattery, HPCS-B1-DG3 safety which chain isattached battery' consistent with what is seen in the field License Basis Is Met None for external inspection E-MC-4A Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 5/31/13 during R21 refueling outage, no adverse seismic issues identified None for external inspection E-DP-S1/HPCS Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 5/31/13 during R21 refueling outage, no adverse seismic issues identified Floor drain piping hanger FD-265 has a missing stud at the Richmond insert. FD-265 is depicted on an approved plant drawing and associated piping isometric drawing. An Support above door to D103 diesel engineering evaluation has been prepared and Generated to Walk-By item #48 oil storage tank access room has a approved that has modeled the piping system i Complete missing bolt without benefit of hanger FD-265. Results of install missing that evaluation show that the piping system and adjacent hangers remain qualified to ANSI B31.1 Code requirements.

License Basis Is Met The support in question is depicted on plant drawings. According to the applicable engineering calculations, the loads on this hanger are very small with design loading conservatively chosen to be 50 lbs in each Base plate supporting line for DSA- direction. Thetensile allowable anchor andbolts arecapacity shear 1/2" HDIper with Walk-By item #49 AR-2C near valve DSA-V-81b Bi anchor of 1,688 lbs and 1,568 Ibs, respectively N/A N/A missing a bolt in accordance with engineering procedures.

The hanger in question remains qualified and will provide support for the 1/2"DSA(4)-2 drain pipe during a seismic event with only 3 of the anchor bolts installed.

License Basis is Met The applicable installation drawing shows a Lighting behind E-MC-4A has one safety chain on one light and one light without Walk-By item #50 light with a safety chain and one light a safety chain behind E-MC-4A which is N/A N/A without a safety chain consistent with what is seen in the field.

License Basis Is Met Page 20 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status DO-P-2 None N/A N/A N/A jDO-TK-3C None N/A N/A N/A DG-ENG-1C None N/A N/A N/A

-4 ý3 None for external inspection E-CP-DG/EP3 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A 5/31/13 during R21 refueling outage, no adverse seismic issues identified DEAFN31 There are washers a few bolts installed that needof on anchorage The bolts are still in place and capable of DEA-FN-31 weDEA-FN-31 r from o d duct flange flange too carrying design License Basis isloads Met CR 271064 Complete support frame on north side of flange DMA-AH-32 None N/A N/A N/A cc4 DMA-AH-31 None N/A N/A N/A The ceiling tile support grid has been designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements as Cevaluated by engineering calculation, The Ceiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to the vertical limit of the seismic walkdown. support grid with hold down clips as described coRFT-CP-COM1 in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/A 8j Visual inspection from the floor cannt veifythe upprt tfor system. No tiles were observed to be sysem displaced or degraded in such a way that the ceiling tiles, would indicate the seismic mounting is

<compromised.

License Basis is Met Page 21 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status by RRA-FC-4 None N/A N/A N/A HPCS-P-3 None N/A N/A N/A HPCS-P-1 None N/A N/A N/A The tubing associated with PSR-V-014 is shown on plant drawings. The subject hanger Missing bolt on base plate for support with the missing anchor bolt is identified in Walk-By item #51 on south wall just east of PSR-V-014. drawing details. The drawing detail has N/A N/A Support is for same line identified a deleted anchor bolt consistent with the anchor bolt that is missing in the field.

License Basis Is Met The cantilever orientation of the operator has Walk-By item #52 FDR-V-603 is cantilevered out a been accounted for in the engineering N/A N/A considerable distance calculation for the valve.

License Basis Is Met The piping in question is floor drain piping. The Lead shielding for what looks to be section identified is shown on a plant piping floor drain piping may not be isometric drawing near hanger EDR-82. The accounted for in pipe seismic piping analysis for this pipe is evaluated by an Walk-By item #53 analysis. Lead shielding for piping engineering calculation and the lead shielding N/A N/A located about 7' off of east wall on is evaluated in a modification to that south half of HPCS pump room calculation that was performed prior to Shielding log 95-2-0010 installing the shielding.

License Basis Is Met CSP-V-5 None N/A N/A N/A The calculation for anchorage of the E-PP-8AE is contained in seismic qualification Supporting angles against the wall documentation. Anchorage qualification is behind panels have drilled holes but based on a 6 bolt anchor arrangement using N/A N/A no anchors installed 1/2" diameter Hilti Drop-ins (HDI) with one of the top anchors missing for a total of 5 anchors. Installed anchors are (18) 5/8"

• 1-diameter HDI's in a more conservative grouping pattern by having 2 anchors installed E-PP-8AE The top left bolt head when facing the for each single anchor used for the evaluation.

The skewed angle can be considered as panel is not engaged entirely and bolt N/A N/A ineffective and the pattern would still be appears to be installed at an angle bounded by the evaluation.

License Basis is Met Opened for intemal inspection on 6/3/13 during R21 refueling outage, N/A N/A N/A no adverse seismic issue identified Continued on Next Page Page 22 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status The hanger in question does not support line CAC-800-9. The hanger in question is an HVAC support with the pipe on the support being a sump vent pipe. The HVAC layout is shown on a current plant drawing. Hanger Near column lines 8.7/N a support for identification is shown on a historical drawing Walk-By item #54 line CAC-800-9 is contacting conduit as Hanger 4071. Duct Hanger 4071 is depicted N/A N/A ASH-9304-1 on a separate plant drawing. The calculation that evaluates duct hanger 4071 contained in the installation contract files shows that hanger deflections are low so there is no adverse affect to hanger 4071 by being in Vcontact with the conduit.

License Basis is Met The conduit and tee are considered a soft target in accordance with the applicable engineering evaluation procedure. Because of its relatively light weight, the light fixture will not East/West running light located North have an adverse affect on the conduit or tee Walk-By Item #55 West comer of hatch (Approximate due to contact generated from a seismic event. N/A N/A column line 7.7/N) is in contact with The light fixture does not require safety chains horizontal conduit and tee connection as identified by the plant installation drawing, which indicates that the fixture will have no adverse affect on safety related equipment in the event the light should fall.

License Basis is Met SW-V-165A None N/A N/A N/A SW-V-170A None NIA N/A N/A SW-V-165B None N/A N/A N/A SW-V-170B None N/A N/A N/A Cracks in the concrete of the spray pond walls Noted several surface cracks in the Walk-By item #56 spray pond wall. Most severe crack were previously identified. Propagation is Previous located about 15 south of SW-V- being tracked and trended as described in a Closed 933A .,eeprevious CR.

933A License Basis Is Met Missing or abandoned anchor on NW B The missing bolt is accounted for in the Bomr Missig a ond fanc on Equipment Qualification Record for the fan. N/A N/A ceff License Basis Is Met SW-P-2B None N/A N/A N/A SW-V-2B None N/A N/A N/A Page 23 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Y

Area bWalk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status E-131-2 None N/A N/A N/A DMA-AH-21 None N/A N/A N/A DMA-AH-22 is set on a concrete pad that is secured to the floor with #5 rebar dowels. The design of the pad is shown on plant drawings.

Horizontal rebar is also provided with lap joints.

Approximately 2"x2"x3" of concrete is The horizontal rebar encircles the pad and are DMA-AH-22 chipped off near the 3rd anchor along positioned such that they cross the shear cone N/A N/A NW comer of DMA-AH-22 planes for the anchors providing a much greater shear strength than plain unreinforced concrete. The condition does not affect mounting qualification.

License Basis is Met This issue is entered directly into the Bolt is missing a nut at the top flange Corrective Action Program to initiate repairs. CR 271067 Complete on the South side of DEA-FN-21 Initial operability assessment was that all equipment remained operable.

DEA-FN-21 Northern most bolt from flange to This issue is entered directly into the lateral support of DEA-FN-21 should Corrective Action Program to initiate repairs. CR 271067 Complete have a washer because the hole is Initial operability assessment was that all slotted equipment remained operable.

DO-TK-3B None N/A N/A N/A A washer was noticed on the floor This issue is entered directly into the that may have come from a Corrective Action Program to initiate repairs. CR 270372 Complete Walk-by Item #57 permanent platform above as there Initial operability assessment was that all was a bolt on the beam connection equipment remained operable.

missing a washer DCW-HX-1 B1 None N/A N/A N/A DCW-HX-1 B2 None N/A N/A N/A DG-ENG-1 B1 None N/A N/A N/A DG-ENG-1 B2 None N/A N/A N/A Page 24 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status DO-P-1B None N/A N/A N/A Dipstick is standing in a bucket and is This issue is entered directly into the unrestrained laterally. It can fall Corrective Action Program to remove item.

Walk-by Item #58 The initial operability assessment was that CR 271146 Complete

<tubing and valves on top of tank there was no impact to operability of adjacent tequipment.

iThe cantilever orientation of the operator has

- RHR-P-3 FDR-V-604 is cantilevered out been accounted for in the engineering N/A N/A significantly above RHR-P-3 calculation for the valve.

lQLicense Basis Is Met RHR-V-16B None N/A N/A N/A RHR-V-17B None N/A N/A N/A This issue is entered directly into the Mirror standing in comer of room Corrective Action Program to correct the Walk-by Item #59 could fall and damage tubing nearby condition. The initial operability assessment CR 271133 Complete should be restrained was that there was no impact to operability of adjacent equipment.

The structural floor plan for Reactor Building IEl.NE corner of room there is an In 501 isdetail drawing shown onshows that plant drawings.

the openingThe in Walk-by Item #60 opening in the concrete wall with quesin is show tis 4 o f th N/A N/A

~drawing. exposed rebar question is shown in Section 7740-7740 of the License Basis is Met Ligh fiturein oomhas eveely This issue is entered directly into the Corrective Action Program to initiate repair.

Walk-by Item #61 one of them is not engaged and a This condition does not impact operability of CR 270988 Complete

>1 wire has been used as a temporary quick-fix adjacent equipment.

This issue is entered directly into the L Corrective Action Program to initiate repair.

< Walk-by Item #62 Loose and rs The initial operability assessment was that CR 270992 Complete athere was no impact to operability of adjacent equipment.

This issue is entered directly into the Bent tubing around 18" off floor in Corrective Action Program to evaluate if repair Walk-by Item #63 central part of room is needed. The initial operability assessment CR 271135 Open was that there was not an impact to operability of the equipment.

VThis issue is entered directly into the Valve tag on floor for RHR-V-16B MO Corrective Action Program to correct the Walk-by Item # and hose, and duct tape in various condition. The initial operability assessment CR 271133 Complete

.places was that there was no impact to operability of padjacent equipment.

Page 25 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status RHR-V-42B None N/A N/A N/A Loose wrenches are hanging on wall CR 270931 nearby. They are unrestrained at the This issue is entered directly into the Generated to get RCIC-PS-9A bottom of the tools and can swing Corrective Action Program to correct the wrenches Complete during a seismic event and hit RCIC- condition. properly PS-9A restrained This issue is entered directly into the Tubing at penetration seal R01 5- Corrective Action Program to correct the RCIC-PS-9B Tub ing a clamp condition. The initial operability assessment CR 270927 Complete 4009 is missing a clamp was that there was no impact to operability of the equipment.

The tubing associated with RHR-PI-2A is shown on a plant drawing. The hanger in question is identified as a Type 220-1. The Walk-by Item # 65 There is a missing bolt on a tubing drawing for this type of hanger references the N/A N/A support from RHR-PI-2A hanger calculation. This calculation has evaluated hanger installation with a missing anchor similar to the one seen in the field License Basis Is Met RCIC-HX-1 None N/A N/A N/A RCIC-HX-2 None N/A N/A N/A This issue is entered directly into the Corrective Action Program to correct the pump casing that is not fully engaged condition. The initial operability assessment was that there was no impact to operability of the equipment.

RCIC-P-1 CR 271312 Open This issue is entered directly into the 2 of the 4 bolts on the pump casing Corrective Action Program to correct the do not have washers on what condition. The initial operability assessment appears to be oversized holes was that there was not impact to operability of the equipment.

RCIC-P-2 None N/A N/A N/A The tubing associated with RCIC-V-19 is shown on a plant drawing. The hanger in There is a missing bolt on a base question is identified as a Type 320-1. The Walk-by Item #66 plate for tubing that routes from RCaC plant drawing for this type of hanger references N/A N/A V-19 the hanger calculation. This calculation has evaluated the hanger with two missing anchors which bounds the condition found in the field License Basis Is Met Page 26 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written ICR Status Hanger RCIC-2 is depicted on a plant drawing.

Hanger RCIC-2, for piping with RCIC- The detail of the hanger shows that only one V-708, may be missing a snubber on side of the clamp is used. This hanger is not a Walk-by Item #67 N/A N/A the west side. Only one snubber snubber but a rigid strut and is consistent with installed on east side what is seen in the field.

License Basis is Met The CR describes that the installed strut for pipe support RCIC-2 does not look exactly like the sketch drawing of the strut in the installation drawing. However, the drawing bill Uponfinvesgation of RCIC-2, nthes of material for item #14 says: "Strut, Grinnell Walk-by Item #68 concfiguratonfiguration seen on CVo Fig 210 Size 2 (OR EQUAL)." The installed CR 271216 Complete DWG 215-08,3533 strut is an equal strut fabricated by a different pipe hanger fabrication company (NPSI rather than Grinnell). The drawing allows the installation as installed.

License Basis Is Met Light in northwest comer of RCIC This issue is entered directly into the Walk-by Item #69 Pump Room has one support rod Corrective Action Program to correct the C

that is bent with nuts on rod not fully condition. There is no operability impact from CR 271325 Complete threaded into it's counterparts this condition.

This issue is entered directly into the Corrective Action Program to evaluate this condition. It was found that this issue has been identified previously and evaluated by an Walk-by Item #70 Excessive vibration of level switch 10 earlier Action Request. This Action Request CR 271328 Complete noticed caused an engineering calculation to be done to determine if vibration was acceptable. This calculation determined that vibration levels were acceptable and no piping or hanger modification was necessary.

This issue is entered directly into the Walk-by Item #71 RClC-P-3 had a hole in junction box Corrective Action Program to correct the CR 271349 Complete condition. Initial determination was that there was no impact to operability of the equipment.

This issue is entered directly into the Corrective Action Program to evaluate this RCIC-V-59 had gold colored/coated Walk-by Item #72 condition. Review by engineering determined CR 271348 Complete bolts in the flange plates that the bolting met the requirements of the design and was satisfactory.

DG-ENG-1A1 None N/A N/A N/A DG-ENG-1A2 None N/A N/A N/A The cast in place anchor bolts belonged to hangers DCW-4622-11 and DCW-4622-12.

On Northeast corer of DG-ENG-1A1 These hangers are shown on a historical plant near DCW-TK-2A1, there are cast in drawing. This historical drawing was voided Walk-by Item #73 place bolts on the concrete floor for a due to design activities associated with a plant N/A N/A Tsupport that is either missing or s abandoned design change that removed hangers DCW-a o4622-11 and DCW-4622-12.

License Basis is Met Page 27 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status Anchor on Northwest comer of E-MC- Ultra sonic testing was performed to find the 7A does not have a washer and there embedment depth of the 1/2" diameter Hilti is a gap between the channels Kwik Bolts (HKB) surrounding the base of E-bottom flange and the floor, exposing MC-7A. The results of the testing concluded the shaft of the anchor that the 1/2" diameter HKB's did not have minimum embedment and have been E-MC-7A abandoned in place and replaced with base N/A N/A restraints designed in accordance with an engineering calculation and shown on plant Opened for internal inspection on installation drawings for the switchgear.

5/22/13 during R21 refueling outage, License Basis is Met no adverse seismic issues identified Wall mounted supports for E-CP- This issue is entered directly into the C72/SO01A are not flush against the Corrective Action Program to evaluate the Walk-by Item #74 wall (appears that the surface condition and correct it ifnecessary. Initial CR 271334 Complete mounted plates and anchors have assessment determined that there was no pulled out resulting in a gap between impact to the operability of the equipment.

plates and wall surfaces The subject anchor bolt has approximately 1 thread not engaged. The anchor bolt are 1 1/4" Hilti Super Kwik bolts in accordance with the Nut on bolt located on Northeast installation drawing. Threads for the anchors Nut-byIte on bl floted o ortha of arel 1/4 - 7 UNC. A 1 1/4" nut has a height oft N/A N/A Walk-by Item #75 comer of the flywheel support of RPS 1/16". Therefore there are approximately 6 MG-i is not fully engaged threads engaged. CR 269408 provides the evaluation that 3 thread engagement develops full strength of the bolt.

License Basis is Met The wall mounted support is cable tray support On East wall behind E-MC-S1/1D, TS-2303. TS-2303 is an (8) anchor bolt wall mounted support for cable tray hanger. The anchor identified as not fully has anchor bolt issues. The wall engaged is one of the top anchors. TS-2303 is Walk-by Item #76 mounted support is located about 3'- detailed on a plant drawing. The calculation N/A N/A 6" South of large diagonal supports that evaluates TS-2303 evaluates the hanger behind E-MC-S1/1D. The top right as if the top 2 anchors have failed. This bolt is not fully engaged while the 3rd calculation bounds the condition found in the right bolt is missing a washer field for this hanger License Basis is Met E-IR-69 Bolt on front base of rack slightly Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 275620 closed bent or skewed.

Walk-by Item #77 Missing bolt on cable tray support. Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 275619 closed Location 8.5/M.7 Page 28 of 29

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 13 - Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status LD-TE-29A None N/A N/A N/A M FPC-42-8BB2D None N/A N/A N/A PC-42-7BB9B None N/A N/A N/A MS-V-22C None N/A N/A N/A MS-V-22C None N/A N/A N/A MS-V-37C None N/A N/A N/A MS-V-38C None N/A N/A N/A MS-V-37K None N/A N/A N/A MS-V-38K None N/A N/A N/A LD-TE-31C None N/A N/A N/A Walk-by Item #78 Jacket Split on conduit to LD-TE- Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 285562 Complete 0 . Walk-by Item #78 31C, not a seismic issue Walk-by Item #79 Damaged. iNot a sesmicn ssuear P Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 285565 Complete Page 29 of 29

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 14-Peer Review Team Report This attachment was not modified from the initial revision of this report and therefore is not included in this submittal.

- Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

REPORT (Public Version)

Attachment 14A-Peer Review Team Report Update This attachment is a new attachment not previously included in the report.

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 14A - Update to Peer Review Team Report Columbia Generating Station Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Peer Team Review Summary - July 2013 Update The Peer Review function and required activities are delineated in EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance, Section 6, Peer Review. The Peer Review Team is tasked to perform a review of the Seismic Walkdown effort including the following activities:

1. Review the selection of the SSCs included on the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL).

2. Review a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.

3. Review of the licensing basis evaluations.

4. Review of the decisions for entering or not entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions into the Corrective Action Process (CAP).

5. Review of the submittal report.

6. Summarize the results of the peer review process in the submittal.

Peer Review activities were previously performed throughout the duration of the seismic walkdowns beginning in June 2012 and completed in October 2012. Subsequent to the issuance of the initial report additional Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed to address equipment that was considered inaccessible. The results of this Peer Review effort are summarized in this document. The Peer Review Team members for this update were Leo Nadeau (Lead) and Robert Slovic.

1. SWEL - No revisions to SWEL-1 were required. SWEL-2 was revised to remove one item; E-IR-71 was removed due to its location in a locked high radiation area. This revision to SWEL-2 was compared to the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance, Section 3, Selection of SSC and Appendix F, PeerReview Checklist by the Peer Review Team. The SWEL was found to be in accordance with applicable requirements.

2. Licensing Basis Evaluations (LBE) - LBE's were performed as required to document as-found conditions. The LBE Summary (Attachment 13) was updated to provide a revised status.

3. Sample of Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) and Area Walkdown Checklist (AWC)

The Peer Review Team concluded that the level of detail contained in the SWC/AWC performed and summarized below was appropriate and in accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance.

a. SWC/AWC were prepared in compliance with ERPI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance, Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns andArea Walk-Bys and Appendix B, Checklists with no modifications or additions.

b. The Walkdown Team included two (2) Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE); Gregory Jaschke, Eugene Scott or Leanna Staudenmier. A review of the Columbia Generating Station's Personnel Qualification Database demonstrated that the SWEs Page 1 of 6

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 14A - Update to Peer Review Team Report were included in that database and have been qualified as a SWE in accordance with the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.

c. Walkdowns were planned by work week and managed using the Columbia Generating Station's Work Order/Work Management process. This work management and planning approach was found to comply with the EPRI Report 1025286 guidance and Columbia Generating Station work control methods.

d. Completed SWC/AWC documentation packages listed in the tables below were reviewed and comply with the EPRI Report 1025286 guidance.

e. Equipment Class listed on SWCs were correct.

f. There were thirty-three (33) SWCs and six (6) AWCs performed for a total of 39 documentation packages (SWC/AWC, Work Order, Condition Report) and are listed in the tables below. All 39 documentation packages were reviewed by the Peer Review Team representing 100% of the total. This exceeds the EPRI Report 1025286, Section 6, Peer Review requirement for the Peer Team to review 10% to 25% of the documentation packages. The SWCs/AWCs documentation packages reviewed by the Peer Review Team were determined to be appropriately detailed and complete. During its review, the Peer Review Team identified minor comments on the documentation packages. These comments were transmitted to the SWEs and were incorporated into the documentation packages.

SWC Description Eqmt. Peer Review Comment Class

1. CIA-CP-1 CIA N2 Bottles Control 20 Peer Review (PR) Acceptable Reactor Building Panel

2. CIA-CP-2 CIA N2 Bottles Control 20 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Panel

3. E-C1-1A 125VDC Vital Battery 16 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Charger A

4. E-C2-1 250V Battery Charger 1 16 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg.

5. E-CP-ARS Alternate Remote 20 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Shutdown Panel

6. E-CP-DG/CP3 HPCS Engine & GEN 20 PR Acceptable DG Building 480V Power Panel

7. E-CP-DG/EP3 HPCS Generator 20 PR Acceptable DG Building Engine Control Panel

8. E-CP-H13/P833 Control Room Safety 20 PR Acceptable: Minor Radwaste Bldg. System Panel-Board G2 administrative issue - SWC did not indicate Equipment Description. SWEs corrected omission on SWC.

9. E-CP-H1 3/P841 Control Room Panel 20 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Board G1

10. E-DP-S1/1 F DIV 1 Critical Swtchgr. 14 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Distribution Panel

11. E-DP-S1/HPCS 125VDC HPCS 14 PR Acceptable DG Building Distribution Panel I I Page 2 of 6

I Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 14A - Update to Peer Review Team Report

12. E-IN-2A DIV 2 Critical 120 VAC 16 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Power Supply Inverter A

13. E-IN-2B DIV 2 Critical 120 VAC 16 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Power Supply Inverter

14. E-IR-68 Reactor Building 18 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Instrument Rack

15. E-IR-69 Reactor Building 18 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Instrument Rack

16. E-IR-POO1 LPCS Instrument Rack 18 PR Acceptable Reactor Building

17. E-IR-PO1 1 SLC Instrument Rack 18 PR Acceptable: Item #5 Reactor Building disposition documented in Attachment 13, LBE

18. E-IR-PO1 7 RCIC Instrument Rack 18 PR Acceptable Reactor Building

19. E-MC-4A HPCS Motor Control 1 PR Acceptable DG Bldg. Center 4A

20. E-MC-7A Motor Control Center 7A 1 PR Acceptable: Anchorage, Radwaste Bldg. item #2 disposition documented in Attachment 13, LBE

21. E-MC-8A Motor Control Center 8A 1 PR Acceptable: Anchorage, Radwaste Bldg. item #2 disposition documented in Attachment 13, LBE

22. E-MC-8F Motor Control Center 8F 1 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg.

23. E-PP-8AE 120/240V 200A Rx 2 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Bldg. Instrument &

Control Power Panel

24. FPC-42-7BB9B NEMA Size 3 Motor 1 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Starter for FPC-P-1A

25. FPC-42-8BB2D NEMA Size 3 Motor 1 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Starter for FPC-P-1 B

26. LD-TE-29A Main Steam Line Tunnel 19 PR Acceptable Reactor Building. Inlet Vent

27. LD-TE-31C MS Line Tunnel 19 PR Acceptable Steam Tunnel Ambient Temperature

28. MS-V-22B MS Line "B" Inboard 8 PR Acceptable Containment Isolation SOV

29. MS-V-22C MS Line "C" Inboard 8 PR Acceptable Containment Isolation SOV

30. MS-V-37C/38C 10" Check MS-RV-2D 0 PR Acceptable Containment Discharge

31. MS-37K/38K 10" Check MS-RV-1 D 0 PR Acceptable Containment Discharge

32. RCIC-SC-C002 RCIC Turbine Speed 20 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Controller

33. SW-CB-P1A 4160V Circuit Breaker 3 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. for SW-M-P/1 A Page 3 of 6

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 14A - Update to Peer Review Team Report AWC Peer Review Comment

1. Drywell Elevation 506' PR Acceptable AZ 270 - AZ 60

2. Reactor Building Elevation 522' PR Acceptable H.3-K.6/5.3-9.4

3. Reactor Building Elevation 522 PR Acceptable L.6-N.8/6.5-9.4

4. Reactor Building Elevation 572 PR Acceptable M-M.6/5.4-6.2

5. Reactor Building Elevation 572' PR Acceptable M-N/7.9-8.3

6. Reactor Building Elevation 501 PR Acceptable ST501, G.5-H/5.2-6.8 1__

4. Review Licensing Basis Evaluations/Review CAP Decisions - Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions were identified by the SWE on the SWC/AWC, forwarded to, and tracked by the Licensing Basis Evaluator (Greg Lisle, Site Engineering) on Attachment 13.

The Peer Review Team reviewed the three (3) Condition Reports (CRs) submitted to the Colombia Generating Station Corrective Action Program (CAP) as a result of seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. It was determined that the threshold level at which a Condition Report (CR) was generated was low enough to ensure that a potentially adverse seismic condition or licensing basis issue would have been appropriately documented. No Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions that could not be reconciled against licensing basis documentation were found.

5. Review Submittal Report - A review of the submittal report was performed by members of the Peer Review Team and it was determined that the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter and EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance were met.

Peer Team Member Date July 2, 2013 Leo Nadeau (Lead)

Peer Team Member Date 17 July 2013 Robert Slovic Page 4 of 6

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 14A - Update to Peer Review Team Report Peer Review Checklist for SWEL Instructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist should be used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may have changed to address those findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL 1 selection? YI0 NI]

Change to SWEL-2 was not significantand SWEL adequatelyrepresentsa diverse sample of the equipment requiredto perform the five (5)safety functions.

2. Does SWEL 1 include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

a. Various types of systems? YO N[I No significant changes were made to the SWEL andf it includes an appropriate representationof types of systems.

b. Major new and replacement equipment? YJO NEI The SWEL 1 includes all known major new and replacementequipment that qualifies.

c. Various types of equipment? Y NIOI The SWEL 1 includes an appropriaterepresentationof types of equipment.

d. Various environments? YI NO The SWEL I includes various types of environments Page 5 of 6

Enclosure 2 - Public Version Attachment 14A - Update to Peer Review Team Report Peer Review Checklist for SWEL

e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program? YO NO A total of 4 pieces of equipment were included in SWEL 1 based on the IPEEE program.

f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL 1? YO NOI Yes, the narrativein the ProbabilityRisk Assessment (PRA) was reviewed and used in the selection of the SWEL equipment.

3. For SWEL 2:

a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in YO NE SWEL 2?

A total of 18 items were included in the SWEL 2.

b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not included in SWEL 2?

A justification was provided for SFP relatedcomponents identified on Base List 2, as to why the item was added or not added to SWEL 2.The justificationprovided was appropriate.

4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.

None

5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL? YO NE]

Door *1 I on AhDAnrio Al~n~. Date: July 2, 2013

• Ib,,*lt JL'*,,VItI*'IY*J[ *rr*.

Peer Reviewer #2: Robert Slovkc Date: July 17. 2013 Page 6 of 6