GO2-16-024, Technical Specifications Section 5.6.4 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report

Technical Specifications Section 5.6.4 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report

ML16028A229
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	01/25/2016
From:	Gregoire D Energy Northwest
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GO2-16-024
Download: ML16028A229 (3)

Text

D. W. Gregoire Columbia Generating Station P.O. Box 968, PE20 Richland, WA 99352-0968 Ph. 509.377.8616 l F. 509.377.4150 dwgregoire@energy-northwest.com January 25, 2016 GO2-16-024 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 5.6.4 POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REPORT

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is the Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report for Columbia Generating Station. This report is submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications (TS)

Section 5.6.4.

On December 20, 2015 during a planned surveillance activity, Operations personnel identified the dual position indication for the Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MS-V-28B) did not indicate when expected. The most likely cause is a limit switch failure.

This required entry into TS Section 3.3.3.1, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)

Instrumentation Condition A, due to an inoperable indication channel for Function 7 of Table 3.3.3.1-1 Penetration Flow Path PCIV Position. Condition A requires restoration of the required indication channel to an operable status within 30 days, or initiate reporting requirements in accordance with TS Section 5.6.4.

Resolution of this issue within the 30-day requirement was not feasible due to the significant power reduction and potential steam tunnel entry required to complete the necessary repairs (see attachment). For this reason, Energy Northwest is submitting this report in accordance with TS Section 5.6.4 Accordingly, the attached report outlines the preplanned alternate method of monitoring and the apparent cause of the inoperability along with the plans and schedule for restoring the instrument channel to an operable status.

There are no commitments being made to the NRC by this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Ms. D.M. Wolfgramm, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, at (509) 377-4792.

G02-16-024 Page 2 of 2 Executed on le t1 tAtuy 2.::S) 212 /fu.

Respectfully, tvJ-a_ z,J;Jll c-~

,p{ D. W. Gregoire

-1 Manager, Regulatory Affairs & Performance Improvement

Attachment:

Technical Specifications Section 5.6.4 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report cc: NRC Region IV Administrator NRC NRR Project Manager NRC Senior Resident lnspector/988C CD Sonoda - BP A/1399 WA Horin - Winston & Strawn

GO2-16-024 Attachment Page 1 of 1 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report Inoperable Channel for Penetration Flow Path PCIV Position Preplanned Alternate Method of Monitoring An alternate method of monitoring the isolation function for the outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) has been implemented. The alternate method requires Operations personnel, following an isolation signal, to verify that flow indication for the

'B' Main Steam Line in the Main Control Room is indicating zero flow in addition to verifying the inboard MSIV indicates closed.

It should be noted that the position indication for the inboard MSIV on the 'B' Main Steam Line is fully functional.

This guidance has been communicated to Operations personnel initially with a Night Order, sustainability maintained with a Caution Tag, and is included with the "Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Outage Report." This alternate method provides an acceptable means of indication to ensure the Main Steam Line isolation function has been accomplished. In addition, the MSIV indication anomaly has been entered into the Corrective Action Program for final resolution.

Apparent Cause of the Inoperability The most likely cause is a faulty limit switch which provides the open indication for the outboard MSIV. The cause will be determined when the limit switch is replaced.

Plans and Schedule for Returning Function to Operable Status The limit switch will be replaced during the next appropriate forced outage, or the next refueling outage scheduled for May 2017.

D. W. Gregoire Columbia Generating Station P.O. Box 968, PE20 Richland, WA 99352-0968 Ph. 509.377.8616 l F. 509.377.4150 dwgregoire@energy-northwest.com January 25, 2016 GO2-16-024 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 5.6.4 POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REPORT

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is the Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report for Columbia Generating Station. This report is submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications (TS)

Section 5.6.4.

On December 20, 2015 during a planned surveillance activity, Operations personnel identified the dual position indication for the Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MS-V-28B) did not indicate when expected. The most likely cause is a limit switch failure.

This required entry into TS Section 3.3.3.1, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)

Instrumentation Condition A, due to an inoperable indication channel for Function 7 of Table 3.3.3.1-1 Penetration Flow Path PCIV Position. Condition A requires restoration of the required indication channel to an operable status within 30 days, or initiate reporting requirements in accordance with TS Section 5.6.4.

Resolution of this issue within the 30-day requirement was not feasible due to the significant power reduction and potential steam tunnel entry required to complete the necessary repairs (see attachment). For this reason, Energy Northwest is submitting this report in accordance with TS Section 5.6.4 Accordingly, the attached report outlines the preplanned alternate method of monitoring and the apparent cause of the inoperability along with the plans and schedule for restoring the instrument channel to an operable status.

There are no commitments being made to the NRC by this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Ms. D.M. Wolfgramm, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, at (509) 377-4792.

G02-16-024 Page 2 of 2 Executed on le t1 tAtuy 2.::S) 212 /fu.

Respectfully, tvJ-a_ z,J;Jll c-~

,p{ D. W. Gregoire

-1 Manager, Regulatory Affairs & Performance Improvement

Attachment:

Technical Specifications Section 5.6.4 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report cc: NRC Region IV Administrator NRC NRR Project Manager NRC Senior Resident lnspector/988C CD Sonoda - BP A/1399 WA Horin - Winston & Strawn

GO2-16-024 Attachment Page 1 of 1 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report Inoperable Channel for Penetration Flow Path PCIV Position Preplanned Alternate Method of Monitoring An alternate method of monitoring the isolation function for the outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) has been implemented. The alternate method requires Operations personnel, following an isolation signal, to verify that flow indication for the

'B' Main Steam Line in the Main Control Room is indicating zero flow in addition to verifying the inboard MSIV indicates closed.

It should be noted that the position indication for the inboard MSIV on the 'B' Main Steam Line is fully functional.

This guidance has been communicated to Operations personnel initially with a Night Order, sustainability maintained with a Caution Tag, and is included with the "Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Outage Report." This alternate method provides an acceptable means of indication to ensure the Main Steam Line isolation function has been accomplished. In addition, the MSIV indication anomaly has been entered into the Corrective Action Program for final resolution.

Apparent Cause of the Inoperability The most likely cause is a faulty limit switch which provides the open indication for the outboard MSIV. The cause will be determined when the limit switch is replaced.

Plans and Schedule for Returning Function to Operable Status The limit switch will be replaced during the next appropriate forced outage, or the next refueling outage scheduled for May 2017.